|
|
|
#21
February 11th, 2012, 05:26 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Makes the Weimar Republic look robust by comparison.
|
|
#22
February 11th, 2012, 06:12 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
As messed up at the OTL South Vietnamese government was, it wouldn't take much to improve it.
Dealing with the North Vietnamese is one thing, but it isn't going to matter at all if most of the population sees the South Vietnamese government and political and military elite as so corrupt that Ho Chi Mihn's government is seen as acceptable. For South Vietnam to survive even a bit longer than OTL without the US sending in the B-52s again and again, the current government, in this timeline, has to get their house in order as much as possible over the next couple of years. Beyond that there will still need to be a lot of work to do, but it helps to have the initiative from the beginning.
|
|
#23
February 11th, 2012, 06:22 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Reinforces my original point, the south Vietnamese state was so corrupt it wasn't worth defending, the American public learned this fact, and the rest as they say, is history. However, this scenario seems to be an exerceise in correcting that flaw. Looking forward to more.
Last edited by Some Bloke; February 11th, 2012 at 06:30 PM..
|
|
#24
February 11th, 2012, 06:27 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Whether this timeline can get things fixed a bit sooner, or rather it's simply going to drive the same bus off a different cliff, we'll just have to wate and see. If the guy in charge right now in this timeline doesn't have to worry about a drug and sex trafficer and his private little army running around, having beat them months ahead of OTL, that might give the South Vietnamese a bit of room to focus on other issues sooner. Whether or not it will make a substantial change, or whether it's just putting new curtains in a condemned house, who knows.
|
|
#25
February 12th, 2012, 02:50 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Angels in Red Hats
Bravo Company of the 5th Colonial Parachute Battalion, was recruited in Than Liem and was scheduled to be evacuated at Hanoi. With the lengthy delays being encountered during the evacuation, their company commander Captain Pham Van Phu allowed his soldiers a 72 hour furlough to visit their homes one last time prior to proceeding south. This decision would lead to the moniker of the ‘Angels in Red Hats.’
Captain Pham Van Phu visited his family in Thanh Ha, a village that had been briefly occupied by the Viet Minh. After seeing the devastation wrought on his village from Viet Minh rule, he glimpsed the fate that would befall the country if communism was to prevail. In an inspired piece of oratory he persuaded the majority of the village to travel to Hanoi with him and to move to the South. The Viet Minh aware of the damage the flight of their citizens was doing to their international reputation, had stopped the influx of refugees from the countryside with their military. Here Captain Pham and his soldiers earned their moniker as they fought through several blockades to reach the safety of the Hanoi airport and the freedom of the south. This event was popularised by an accompanying reporter Mr Burton Crane, who published an article that received world - wide acclaim. The story was later adapted in Hollywood, but was set in the Congo with Belgian paratroopers protecting European colonialists, led by an overweight John Wayne, battling Simba rebels.  Above: Captain Pham Van Phu prepares to march for the annual Independence Day celebrations in Saigon.
|
|
#27
February 12th, 2012, 08:19 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Consider me hooked as well! Great work
|
|
#28
February 14th, 2012, 05:50 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
I am not saying it's ASB, it take more political skill to be done and deserve more explanations in your TL.
__________________
History is the sum total of things that could have been avoided. - Konrad Adenauer My first tentative attempt of a TL at AH.com. Last edited by Jonathan Kan; February 18th, 2012 at 11:03 AM.. Reason: Point added. Gammar fixed.
|
|
#29
February 14th, 2012, 11:39 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Remember it not going to be a single wave of immigrants, there will be several waves of immigrants. Yes there will be conflict between the multiple ethnic groups. In the future there will also be rural urban drift as light industrialisation begins. Hope that has answered your question.
|
|
#30
February 18th, 2012, 11:04 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
__________________
History is the sum total of things that could have been avoided. - Konrad Adenauer My first tentative attempt of a TL at AH.com.
|
|
#31
February 19th, 2012, 08:04 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Weakness into strength
The relationship between the Kinh and the ethnic minorities such as the Cham, Degar, and Khmer had been historically fraught with misunderstanding on both sides. Following the independence of the Kingdom of Vietnam, the minorities particularly the Degar were anxious about maintaining the degree of autonomy they had enjoyed under the French.
In August 5 1954 a delegation of minorities visited Saigon and the office of the Prime Minister, led by a Degar, Y Bham Enuol. Much to their surprise they were received by Dr Phan, who attentively listened to their grievances over Vietnamese whiskey and coffee. Their grievances revolved around the lack of representation in the National Assembly, lessons conducted in Vietnamese and the discrimination preventing minorities from attaining government positions. The Prime Minister agreed to the majority of the demands and, in doing so, preserved their autonomy. Each minority was allowed to maintain a militia which would be administered by the National Police. The militia leaders would receive formal training commensurate with their rank and responsibilities. In future the Vietnamese officers and Governors that were assigned to their area, would undergo cultural training prior to assuming their positions. It was here that the Vietnamese officers practised what became known as Tam Cung or the 'three withs.' Those officers and governors ate with their subordinates, slept in their longhouses and lived in conjunction with the Degar. Although it was often remarked that the medical care was higher under French rule, the degree of penetration of medical care improved under Vietnamese rule. Education would be conducted in their native language, however daily lessons in Vietnamese were mandatory. Separate flags could be flown, at a lower level than the National Flag. Flags that had remained hidden as a source of separatism, now fluttered in concert with the emblem of the Kingdom of Vietnam. The ethnic leaders were shocked by the conciliatory tone of the Prime Minister. Several of the generals, led by the Francophone General Nguyen Van Hinh, were disenchanted with a softer approach. Their belief was that by agreeing to the presumptuous demands of the moi, the strength of the government was eroded internally and externally. They were not persuaded by the Prime Minister’s assertion that the weakness of the state would not allow them to successfully pacify the minorities and to concurrently fight the Communists. They remain unconvinced that the loyalty of the Degar in particular could be secured by anything other than brute force. The concept that by co opting the minorities to the new power structure, removed a source of infiltration from the Communists, and assisted with securing the borders was anathema to their thinking. That this measure also expanded his power base in the National Assembly, did not go unnoticed. It was this divergence in opinion between several senior officers and the new Prime Minister, that led to the second coup. Below: Y Bham Enuol Last edited by La Rouge Beret; March 1st, 2012 at 10:18 AM..
|
|
#32
February 23rd, 2012, 11:37 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
An ill wind
The abortive coup launched in January 1955 was a direct result of the anxiety caused by the introduction of Minority Bill into the National Assembly. Many serving officers saw this as a dangerous precedent to pander to the minorities.
There were also rumours that a land redistribution program would be implemented, potentially eroding their power base further. The opportunity to strike with overwhelming force would soon pass, as the remaining French expeditionary forces were scheduled to complete their withdrawal by the end of January. A meeting of the plotters was held at the house of the French socialite Jaques Raphael-Leygues and set for 14 January 1955. The attendance at this meeting by the American Ambassador Donald Heath, acted as a catalyst for the plotters to believe that their actions were condoned by the United States Government. The plotters organised with the remaining French officers to block the roads preventing loyalist reinforcements reaching the Prime Minister’s residence and other key buildings. At 4:00 am the organisers struck with elements of the National Army of Vietnam led by General Vy seized the radio station in Saigon and broadcast that the military had intervened to prevent the slide into anarchy by the present government. They mentioned they were acting under the direct orders of Bao Dai, and were protecting the democratic institutions of the government. The guards outside the Prime Minister’s residence had been surprisingly doubled prior to the coup and were brought to a full state of readiness following the radio broadcast. The attack had been scheduled for 03:55 however two of the trucks had broken down and it took an additional ten minutes before they were replaced. A full engagement occurred between the two forces with heavy machine guns and mortars deployed on both sides. The airborne battalion was uncertain which faction to support. However a phone call from the army Chief of Staff General Khanh persuaded the wavering elements to support the government. They departed their barracks and relieved the nearly exhausted Prime Ministerial Guard and by 11 am had retaken the radio station. General Nguyen Van Hinh realised that the coup had failed fled to the airport, where he was detained by the famed Captain Phan. Despite protests from the French consulate regarding clemency for his service during WWII, he was hanged on June 1955. Those senior officers that had supported the coup faced a full court martial, with the majority stripped of their state pension, their assets seized and were deported with their families to France. Although the government remained in power, the question became how to remove Bao Dai as Chief of State? After all a Head of State that had actively conspired to remove his government, could not remain. The government of Ho Chi Minh greeted the news of a second coup with much mirth and commented that there would be no need to push for reunification by arms as the proletariat would surely rise up shortly. Instead they would focus on industrialising, after all Premier Khruschev himself had said that the people of South Vietnam would soon clamour for reunification once they realised the superiority of the communist system. However this did not stop the North Vietnamese Army from conducting a massive expansion to reunify the country by force if required. Below: The cover of Life Magazine after the failed Coup. Last edited by La Rouge Beret; February 23rd, 2012 at 11:54 AM.. Reason: Found a more appropriate photo.
|
|
#33
February 24th, 2012, 12:25 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Looking good! Better than OTL so far anyway. This is the sort of governance that might give South Vietnam a chance to stand on its own.
Too bad the US Ambassador was sending mixed messages by attending that meeting and then not running to the legitimate government with word of it before the coup. Well, I don't know the customs of diplomacy; it may be that there is ample precedent for ambassadors of powerful nations listening, um, diplomatically, to some faction plotting actual treason against the government they are accredited to, and yet favoring that government over the plotters, and yet not tipping off the faction they support, which happens to be the legitimate actual government in this case, because to reveal what was said in confidence would be wrong. Uh huh. For all I know that's the sacred code of diplomacy, never to carry tales like that. Be mighty convenient for great powers if that's the case anyway; they can foment some plot to their heart's content and then if something goes wrong, shrug and say "we never favored them, but we could hardly say anything about it now could we?" I am not suggesting that happened here! The USA would have no rational interest in destabilizing Phan. Certainly OTL the Americans had a hard time herding the cats that were the South Vietnamese ruling elite; some coups had US connivance but quite a few were just plain headaches for the Americans. I've read, I think first in Fire In the Lake but then repeated in many accounts of the Vietnam war, how Americans negotiating with the North Vietnamese protested the NV claim that the government of the South was just a succession of US puppets; "how can these people be our puppets when we didn't want them in and they disregard so much of what we urge them to do?" the US envoy cried. The Vietnamese negotiator replied, "They are puppets, but they are bad puppets." I think that was a chapter title in FItL... It seems that so far Dr. Phan is avoiding being either bad or a puppet. That's good. I hope he can go the distance! Also, since I don't hate the NV Communists (and maybe I should; Vietnam was the only war my father ever fought in in his near-25 year USAF career) I have some optimism about where their current course might lead them--referring here to their current line about focusing on building up NV rather than actively trying to push for immediate revolution in the south. Now coming at it from the perspective I picked up as a young adult, reading available stuff on what the heck happened in Vietnam as that war was a big deal to my young life and of course a big deal still to 1980s America, the most sensible answer I ever saw to what exactly the US government was trying to accomplish in former Indochina was the one offered by Dr. Noam Chomsky at the time--the US wanted not so much to stop governments from terrorizing people or ruling unwisely, as to stop socialism as such. The only thing worse from the point of view of the US powers that be than a repressive, violent, grim, dysfunctional Communist regime would be a popular, civil, happy, functional one. Chomsky called it "the threat of a good example" and characterized American policy in general, especially in places like Vietnam or Cuba where the Communists actually took power, as first of all denying them the chance of power at all costs, and then if they failed, doing everything they could to spoil things for them so that other potential revolutionaries around the world would not be inspired and persuade others that taking a similar course might be their best move. If Chomsky is correct in this timeline, NV will not be allowed to develop in peace, no matter how scrupulously they restrain members of their movement from actively disrupting South Vietnam. So here's hoping Dr. Chomsky is wrong here, and there are no clandestine attempts to disrupt North Vietnam, and perhaps then the North will continue their policy of peaceful if derisive and rude co-existence. Which is what Khrushchev will be hoping they are doing anyway! The Kremlin had its own "bad puppets" problem, except that successful Leninist movements outside the range of the post-WWII Soviet occupying armies were never to my knowledge ever the result of some conspiracy of Moscow's, and typically the successful leaders--Tito, Mao, Ho, and Castro--operated pretty independently of Soviet control and often at direct cross-purposes to Moscow's line. Tito was pretty obedient, insofar as Soviet commands had any relevance to a guerilla war they had no means of aiding, during and for some time after WWII, only to dramatically split with Stalin; Mao was never Stalin's favorite even after he took over China; Fidel Castro was not even formally a Communist (his brother Raul was). Whereas on the other side, quite a few Third World leaders of the time owed their position quite clearly and directly to the aid and backing of the USA or some other major Western power (the British or French). I don't think it's really fair then to call Ho Chi Minh a "bad puppet" of Khrushchev's, he was never a puppet at all. But at any rate he gave Khrushchev headaches, heartburn, and grief. But the line they are following at this point in the North in this timeline is much closer to what Khrushchev wanted. Kind of a paradox; Americans and other hostile Westerners who want to make the case Hanoi is a Soviet puppet state can point to this concurrence and say "Aha! Living in peace with Saigon-- clearly they jump through whatever hoops the Soviets hold up..." Sheesh! I certainly suspect you are not going to let this watchful peace last a lot longer, and in your timeline the Viet Minh will clearly be to blame. Maybe not the central government in Hanoi though. While refugees from the North were displaced southward, so were other Vietnamese from southern Vietnam forced to flee north because of their politics (or just because they'd crossed the wrong local bigwig). These exiles are doubtless keen and impatient to return home as soon as they can. OTL the National Liberation Front in the South was always held to be an independent movement, not a wing of the Viet Minh, by both them and the VM, and indeed in the early '60s there was rather little in the way of supplies or direction coming from Hanoi. The American-backed programs did decimate the Southern movement however and gradually the southern cadres were replaced by Northerners and as the scale of American-supplied firepower mounted, weapons carried south from the North became more important, and the local character of the NLF became more and more hollow. But here in the mid-50s, the Southern-origin Viet Minh are still standing, and it isn't clear to me when the NLF was actually established as a nominally and largely Southern-run insurgency. I believe quite early, before the ink was dry the Treaty of Paris, so it is quite possible that regardless of what the Politburo in Hanoi decides, some factions will be actively and violently trying to overthrow any Southern government.
|
|
#34
February 24th, 2012, 03:52 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
So if I'm reading this right, currently minority groups in South Vietnam are getting better treatment compared to OTL, and several of the old Vietnamese elite have been either killed or stripped of their powers.
Overall, how much of a difference compared to OTL does this make, in terms of keeping the country from falling apart and not having poor leadership in charge.
|
|
#35
February 24th, 2012, 05:43 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Centrally things so far do not change the rural structure of Catholic landlordism, and central state taxation of the peasantry in onerous ways.
They provide the central state apparatus more room for manoeuvre politically, as they're not beholden to a number of historical concentrations of comprador power. * * * In the North it looks like this massive industrialisation programme may mean that the countryside programmes will not go ahead. This will almost certainly reduce internal resentment in the North, though, at the same time, it will mean that ultra-ists haven't been purged. yours, Sam R.
|
|
#36
February 24th, 2012, 07:50 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Hello Gents, thanks for reading.
During the OTL the heavy handed tactics towards the minorities resulted in long running feuds and rebellions towards the state. In this case the government recognises the limitations of their power and coopts the minorities. The same principle will occur during the land redistribution inspired by the Japanese model. The landlords are coopted by being granted industrial licenses, but controlled through the application of credit. The peaceful watch will be broken and result in a proxy war in a third country involving Thailand, South Vietnam vs North Vietnam and Chinese volunteers led by Marshall Peng Dehuai. This also results in Avon Sabres flashing over rice paddies and if I can Centurions for Mac! Although that will be far in the future. Counter plots in another country with secret agents fighting it out. Well that's where I want to go anyway.
|
|
#37
February 25th, 2012, 07:47 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
[QUOTE=Sam R.;5689572] In the North it looks like this massive industrialisation programme may mean that the countryside programmes will not go ahead. This will almost certainly reduce internal resentment in the North, though, at the same time, it will mean that ultra-ists haven't been purged.QUOTE]
I missed this question the first time, the North Vietnamese will still conduct their own land redistribution program to disasterous effect. This means both sides will be busy with their internal programs until mid 1958 / 1959. I have also updated the first two posts with photos... and the mystery American was Jim Thompson - butterflies away.
|
|
#38
March 1st, 2012, 10:28 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
An ambiguous state of affairs
"Everything old is new again." —Peter Allen
The former Emperor Bao Dai had been proclaimed the Head of the Vietnamese State upon the French granting limited independence in 1950. He was an unpopular figure, due to his links with organized crime, a profligate lifestyle and primarily residing in France. The solution to this issue was novel in its simplicity. The actual status of the Vietnamese state was ambiguous did they have a constitutional monarchy, or a republic with a former Emperor at the head? An elegant solution would be to proclaim a constitutional monarchy, as the Bao Dai had abdicated the throne in 1945. Consequently, he had been acting as regent until the rightful heir to the throne could be crowned. The man chosen was respected throughout Vietnam as a nationalist who had advocated Vietnamese independence. Although considered elderly by 1955 Prince Nguyễn Phúc Bửu Lân was invited to assume the throne. Previously he was known once known as Emperor Thanh Thai. In a momentous occasion Emperor Thanh Thai was restored to the Dragon throne that he had been forced to abdicate all those decades before. His ascension to the throne was enhanced by his relationship with a younger woman from the South. Most believed that the Emperor was too old to sire a son, however 7 months after ascending the throne he became a father again. For many this symbolised the rebirth of the Kingdom from the fires of war. Although other scholars would argue that this was a positive point of view on an amourous older man. Those scholars have been universally charged under lese majeste. Below: Emperor Thanh Thai during his first reign as Emperor
|
|
#39
March 1st, 2012, 01:03 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
If he's getting on a bit who'd act as regent to his son if he pops his clogs?
|
|
#40
March 2nd, 2012, 06:30 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
There is no clear candidate to act as a regent if the Emperor passes. For two reasons, the first is that it will cause greater political turmoil and the second is trying to find a Vietnamese aristocrat or or senior government official that could act as Regent is difficult and I can't read Vietnamese. If anyone has any ideas, then feel free to message me.
|
 |
| Thread Tools | |
| Display Modes | |
|
|
Linear Mode
