The Need for Speed: Technology Thread

Delta Force

Banned
Fast as a Comet

firstcomet.jpg

The inaugural flight of the de Havilland Comet. The aircraft was lost a year later over the Indian Ocean.

On May 2, 1952, BOAC's first de Havilland Comet took off from London Heathrow on the way to Johannesburg, South Africa, marking the dawn of the Jet Age. A sleek, fast, and smooth flying aircraft, the Comet was twice as fast as the propliners then in service. It was also the most tested airliner yet, having undergone the equivalent of over 40,000 flight hours during testing. The United Kingdom, the inventor of the first jet engine, had scored a major advantage over its American competitors. However, a year to the day after its first pioneering flight, the Comet suffered disaster. On May 2, 1953, a Comet disintegrated in the skies over India, with witnesses watching in horror as the wingless jet plunged into the ocean spouting flames.

Although the Comet was equipped with weather radar and artificial feel controls after the disaster, it did not stop tragedy from befalling the type again, as two more Comets were lost over the Mediterranean in 1954 in similar circumstances, suffering complete airframe failure. A court of inquiry established under Lord Cohen eventually traced the cause of the crashes to hull stress, especially around the square windows, which created an area of stress concentration and much higher metal fatigue around the windows. Further problems were found with riveting and construction methods used in the Comet.

After a complete redesign of the Comet involving wing and fuselage strengthening, use of heavier gauge metal, and replacing square windows with round ones, the Comet was ready to fly again. However, the United Kingdom had lost its lead to the Soviets and Americans, whose own designers took into account the lessons learned so harshly by the British. By the time the Comet took to the skies again in September 1958 it had to contend with a host of new jet aircraft already in service: the Tupolev Tu-104, the Avro Canada Jetliner, and the Boeing 707.

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Any thoughts, suggestions, etc. on this? This is my first timeline. The early jet age is going to go essentially as our timeline, so the Tu-104, Boeing 707, and DC-8 will not differ much from OTL. There will be differences with Convair though. Also, there is something I did change slightly in the Comet's timeline, see if you can find it.

Edited to include the Avro Jetliner.
 
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Delta Force

Banned
Late Wednesday a slow time for new timelines, or do people prefer to read about space and war? Figured this would have at least gotten more hits, nonetheless more comments.
 
Well, I am noticing that you are slowing the 707 a bit. It had flown in testing by 1958, it's first commercial flight was in September 1958.

As an aviation nut, I am interested as well. :cool:
 
Comet timeline

It's nice to see a few aviation related ATLs appearing in the past few days. I'll keep an eye out for more on this one. :)
 

Riain

Banned
In my mind a strong Comet goes hand in hand with a strong military aviation industry, I want to see more.
 

Delta Force

Banned
Well, I am noticing that you are slowing the 707 a bit. It had flown in testing by 1958, it's first commercial flight was in September 1958.

As an aviation nut, I am interested as well. :cool:

Actually, the 707 would fly a month later, in October 1958. It was the DC-8 that entered service in September, although in September 1959. The butterfly in this piece is that the Comet pictured was the second one to crash, not the first, and over the Mediterranean, not the Indian Ocean.
 

Delta Force

Banned
The Soviet Workhorse

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The Tu-104 tripled the speed of Soviet air-travel, bringing the Jet Age to the USSR.

The great speed and passenger comfort of the Comet did not go unnoticed in the Soviet Union, which was projecting a doubling of passenger loads by 1960. Such an increase would be daunting for any nation, but the state of Soviet commercial aviation was terribly underdeveloped given the physical size and economic strength of the country. The most advanced Soviet airliner in service, the Ilyushin Il-14, was little more than an updated DC-3, seating no more than twenty-eight passengers and taking eighteen long and uncomfortable hours lurching through the air to complete the Moscow-Omsk-Irkutsk route. Soviet commercial aviation infrastructure was similarly out of date, with many towns and cities being serviced by airports consisting of little more than cleared fields. In order to modernize Soviet air transport, in the summer of 1954 approval was given for the development of three new airliners for Aeroflot: the Antonov An-10, Ilyushin Il-18, and Tupolev Tu-104.

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an-10a.jpg

While not as impressive as the Tu-104, the An-10 and Il-18 turboprop airliners also represented a significant performance increase for Soviet aviation.

The first two, the Antonov An-10 and the Ilyushin Il-18, marked a significant improvement over the old Il-14 and were to carry over one hundred passengers each, and were designed to cruise faster than the top speed of the Il-14 by utilizing new turboprop engines. Unlike the Tu-104, the aircraft were not based on military bombers and were civilian in origin, which resulted in them entering service a year after the Tu-104, in 1959. However, variants were produced for use by the Soviet Air Force.

As always in the Soviet Union, politics played a major role in the development of the aircraft, in this case in the choice of engine. Although the Kuznetsov NK-4 offered greater performance than the Ivchenko AI-20 and the firm had more experience in turboprop engines, the Communist Party leaders in Ukraine made sure that the AI-20 engine was selected for production. While consolidation of production was a major reason given (Ivchenko and Antonov both being Ukrainian firms), the AI-20's cause was also aided by the crash of an aircraft using prototype NK-4 engines, and the leadership in Moscow awarded production of Ivchenko. Being Ivchenko's first turboprop engine design early examples of the AI-20 required constant overhaul every few hundred hours, but in the 1960s reliability improved greatly.

In contrast to the Antonov and Ilyushin programs, development of Tupolev's Tu-104 was quite straight forward and simple, despite its revolutionary nature. By basing the aircraft on the firm's existing Tu-16 bomber and using the same flight deck, wings, engines, and landing gear, the Tu-104 was developed faster than any other Soviet airliner, taking less than two years to go from being approved to being in Aeroflot service. While its design was not the most modern, differing from the Tu-16 only in its fuselage, the Tu-104 was a marked improvement over Aeroflot's propliners. Apart from carrying nearly four times as many passengers as the Il-14, the new Tu-104 jetliner could complete the Moscow-Omsk-Irkutsk route in seven hours, compared to eighteen hours for the Il-14.

Stamp_of_USSR_2193.jpg

The Tu-110 was the first of many Tu-104 variants to enter commercial service.

Upon its successful entry into service in 1956, Aeroflot and Soviet economic planners were so impressed with the aircraft's performance that production was rapidly increased so that by 1959 all long-range routes were serviced by the aircraft, with over two hundred aircraft produced before production ended in 1960 in favor of the Tu-110, an improved four engine model of the Tu-104 with greater safety in the event of an engine failure and 800 kilometers greater range. Apart from the Tu-110, the basic Tu-104 design would give birth to the Tu-124 and Tu-134 aircraft families, which remain in service.

Atomic Aircraft

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The M-50 had a significant performance advantage over contemporary Soviet bombers.

While the Tu-104 and new propliners were revolutionizing Soviet commercial aviation, the Soviet Air Force was acquiring new aircraft of its own. The Korean War had shown the power of jet aircraft and the dangers of strategic bombers, which had demolished much of the electrical and industrial infrastructure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Along with the famous Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-21 fighter aircraft, and the Tupolev Tu-95, all of which remain in service, new supersonic interceptors and strategic bombers also entered Soviet service in the 1950s, the infamous Myasishchev M-50 "Atomic Bomber" being perhaps the best known.

The Myasishchev M-50 was, as is now known, essentially a Soviet version of the Convair B-58, although on a much larger scale, capable of carrying thirty metric tons of bombs up to 7,400 kilometers at speeds approaching Mach 2. However, when information on the design first reached the West in 1958 it was misidentified as a nuclear powered strategic bomber, creating fears of an "atomic bomber gap" in the United States. Significant criticism was levied at the United States Air Force for its cancellation of the NB-36 airborne nuclear reactor program, and over four billion dollars were spent by 1964 on developing airborne nuclear reactors until the initial intelligence errors were corrected and such aircraft deemed infeasible, by which point the XB-72 prototype nuclear bomber had been completed, resulting in a major intelligence victory for the Soviets. At least forty M-50s were constructed for the Soviet Air Force.

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Any suggestions for topics to cover for the next part of this timeline? The next installment will deal with 1950s American aviation, so feel free to suggest aircraft or ideas to be mentioned. The DC-8 and 707 will of course make an appearance, but other civilian aircraft can be focused on too. Military (and space) aviation can also be decreased or increased in importance, but civilian aviation will be a major focus (the timeline is about the Jet Age after all).
 
There was quite a story to the SNCASE Caravelle and it's relevence in engine placement, and in the genesis of the Douglas DC-9. Keep up the good work. I don't suppose the Avro Canada Jetliner is really relevent, but historically, it should get a mention.
 

Delta Force

Banned
There was quite a story to the SNCASE Caravelle and it's relevence in engine placement, and in the genesis of the Douglas DC-9. Keep up the good work. I don't suppose the Avro Canada Jetliner is really relevent, but historically, it should get a mention.

The DC-9 will feature predominately in the timeline.

We going to see an earlier development of high bypass ratio turbo fans?

The big push for that came from the military, not commercial aviation, since they tend to use nice long runways anyways. Douglas, Boeing, and the other aviation corporations would not be too interested in developing new engine options for their DC-8s and 707s right when their new SSTs and widebodies are starting to come out.
 
The big push for that came from the military, not commercial aviation, since they tend to use nice long runways anyways. Douglas, Boeing, and the other aviation corporations would not be too interested in developing new engine options for their DC-8s and 707s right when their new SSTs and widebodies are starting to come out.

Actually, high-bypass turbofans would be highly beneficial for the widebodies, greater power, less noise and lower emissions.
 

Delta Force

Banned
Actually, high-bypass turbofans would be highly beneficial for the widebodies, greater power, less noise and lower emissions.

We will see them on the widebodies as historically. I was thinking that it would come along early enough to have potential as an engine choice on the last DC-8s and 707s, which would be unlikely.

It is kind of like Windows and DirectX, they could have made it available for older systems, but by making it only for the new operating system they forced gamers to give up a perfectly fine operating system for one with the latest graphics drivers.

That said, once the planes are older (and mostly remaining in cargo and military roles) we will definitely see some reengining.
 
We will see them on the widebodies as historically. I was thinking that it would come along early enough to have potential as an engine choice on the last DC-8s and 707s, which would be unlikely.

It is kind of like Windows and DirectX, they could have made it available for older systems, but by making it only for the new operating system they forced gamers to give up a perfectly fine operating system for one with the latest graphics drivers.

That said, once the planes are older (and mostly remaining in cargo and military roles) we will definitely see some reengining.


Thanks for answering my question.

Yeah seeing them on the last 707s would be unlikely, unless they do some sort of super 707 instead of a 757, although the economics of twins vs quad-jets makes that unlikely I guess. Really I'm hoping for earlier super twins, because I love me some big twins.
 
A working prototype nuclear bomber, AWESOME!

I'm confused, do you mean the M-50? It isn't nuclear-powered, it's a bomber meant to be able to deliver a nuclear strike, which American intelligence got confused about.

Or, do you mean the US XB-72, which I gather is nuclear powered?

I certainly think the latter is a white elephant militarily speaking. A nuke bomber--any kind of nuclear powered airplane really-is necessarily a big one, since the shielding requirement (if one has any intention of the flight crew living long!) is severe, but does not scale up linearly with the power, so making a bigger plane with a much bigger power plant but the shielding mass rising only in a small proportion is the way to make it work. Such a big plane, even if it delivers fantastic performance (which means more power, a greater power plant in proportion, hence the "break-even" mass with adequate shielding is even higher) is going to be just about impossible to make stealthy; used in an all-out war against a strong opponent, the latter will presumably have a good system of early warning, target tracking and SAMs that will eat it for lunch. Meanwhile it is a massive investment; having enough of them to overwhelm Soviet air defenses and get some of them through to the targets would cost a staggering lot. OTL, bombers since WWII have mainly been useful against Third-World nations that can't credibly retaliate against the USA nor mount a top-rate air defense; for such missions this monster would be clear overkill, though I suppose if the USAF had managed to make the investment and shepherd it through the testing process, and somehow finagle DoD, the President and Congress into approving it for service, once the things are actually in inventory it would indeed be used in Vietnam or some such places. The question is, would it be developed at all?

ITTL the embarrassing intelligence failure does have this effect but I don't think Delta Force is wrong to characterize it as overall a victory for the Soviets; the huge amounts of money doubtless involved had to have starved OTL successful and useful programs, or alternately bloated the DoD budget thus creating overall budget pressure on the US Government in general and setting up the Pentagon for future cutbacks, probably in programs they'd miss.

The question is, does this "kewl" nuke plane pave the way for something really useful down the line?

I suppose that, having started down the road of gigantism, someone in the Pentagon would argue for a transport derivative, one that would probably dwarf the OTL C-5, but have the virtue of not requiring jet fuel to operate.

Actually, many OTL nuke plane proposals I've seen fall back, for various reasons, on a dual-power arrangement that does require some conventional jet fuel--for safety reasons in particular, many suggest the plane should take off and land with the reactor shut down, because crashes are most likely in those crucial phases and a dormant reactor is apparently somewhat safer to contain if it goes down. Also, takeoff/landing are phases of flight requiring higher thrust than cruising; using the nuke only for the latter means requiring less peak power, and a pretty much fixed power, so the nuclear reactor can be smaller and operate at just one optimized setting. To be sure this savings is offset both by the fuel reserves and the alternative power plant! (One proposal I've seen, in a 1970s RAND Corporation study, asserted that the main engines could be designed to either burn fuel or be run off of reactor heat, which means just one set of engines, though each engine is obviously more elaborate and hence heavier). A non-nuclear alternative propulsion system also allows the plane some emergency range and landing reserve should it be necessary to shut down the reactor in flight. Having conventional jet fuel aboard and some of held in emergency reserve, it can be used as shielding allowing some savings on the fixed shielding mass; the reserve, without which the shielding would then be inadequate, would only be used up in an emergency that involved shutting down the main reactor, thus reducing the radiation output.

So really, unless the designers can plausibly answer these doubts, they won't eliminate fuel consumption completely. The argument would hinge on whether they'd save a substantial amount of fuel; size alone would have a tendency in that direction per ton of payload; long-range flights would justify it more than short-range, and a really big plane with highly specialized maintenance requirements argues against using it to reach near-front-line forward bases and for connecting a few widely separated and deeply defended, highly developed logistic bases, from which cargo would be re-deployed to short range forward-base planes. So that's another level of cost to offset the case for it.

(ITTL of course the XB-72, whatever it is, is flying, much of the R&D is done for good or ill, and it's a question of whether doubling down is a case of recouping on the investment or good money after bad.)

Another mission the RAND study considered, besides its primary focus on alternative fuels for a nominal really big transport plane (in the 1000 ton range) is very long loiter airborne stationing. Say for an AWACs type plane, or to station some kind of attack plane in place analogous to an aircraft carrier. Cruise missiles or even ballistic missiles might be based on it.

If the XB-72 is supersonic, I guess they'd go for something with performance comparable to the OTL XB-70 "Valkyrie" bomber, designed to cruise at Mach 3 or about a kilometer per second.

Which, combined with gigantism, suggests yet another mission that tempts the Strangelovian side of my schizophrenic mind--well actually this is much more innocuous and peace-loving than the above stuff--high speed, high altitude rocket launches of high mass.

Mach 3, which I take as the practical upper limit of any airbreathing propulsion system demonstrated to reliably work as of yet OTL (and so even if ITTL things work out better and earlier, it seems unlikely we could do better in the 1970s anyway) is as I say a kilometer per second, or about 1/8 orbital velocity. Combined with the very altitudes such a fast plane can achieve (indeed in a sense must achieve--OTL supersonic planes cannot operate at their top speeds in the lower atmosphere, between the very high aerodynamic forces involved and the very high thermal heating--stratospheric air is much thinner and much cooler) a rocket to put a given payload into a given orbit can be substantially smaller and somewhat simpler than one launched from the ground. The catch is the airplane has to be big enough to lift the whole rocket, payload fuel and all, as well as itself. Given the aerodynamic situation, said rocket has to be carried horizontal; with cryogenic liquid propellants one might have the option of carrying them in separate fuel tanks aboard the launch plane and loading them into the rocket itself just at the last minute, but that requires doubling the total tank volume and while we might save on both insulation and related equipment mass on the rocket itself, the tanks on the plane still have to be efficient shapes for fuel storage and well-insulated to prevent propellant boil-off. Nor am I sure how fast really large masses of liquid oxygen and perhaps liquid hydrogen can be pumped from plane to rocket.

One help there is that I gather that a fairly recent attempt by NASA or the Air Force to develop and demonstrate a Scramjet came to grief when the high-speed flyer failed to safely deploy from the top of its launch plane; this suggests to me it might be safer and more effective to mount the rocket stage on the bottom of the launch plane, and deploy it by dropping it, rather than fire it from the top, as I'd normally imagined it working. The plane, flying just a bit below its speed and altitude ceiling, goes for a final surge of acceleration and pitches up into a climb to convert some forward speed to upward, following ideally the arc of a circle; if as it approaches its limit of thrust while climbing it simply releases the rocket, the lift on the wing though dropping is now acting on a greatly reduced mass so the launch plane pulls away sharply; with the rocket free-falling on a ballistic path upward into ever-thinning and already sparse air, it can wait some time for the launcher to get good and far away before firing.

So if the rocket is below the main airplane body, and fuel is stored in the latter, loading it in is a matter of opening stopcocks and letting it drop into place. It will still take some time as presumably there are a limited number of connecting pipes of limited cross-section; hydrogen in particular is very low density and hence bulky and hence needs more time, and its extreme cold is such that the rocket tank and the connecting hoses still need major insulation even for a storage time of just minutes (especially considering this is happening at high-speed, hence high-temperature, supersonic cruise). Liquid oxygen is both much denser and higher temperature, so it seems much more doable. A supersonic air launch system thus might be restricted to oxy-hydrocarbon as the maximum energy fuel, giving ISP in the 300+ range versus 400+ for hydrogen, which goes far to pretty much neutralize the advantage of launching from high speed and altitude. But then again hydrogen fuel, while very tempting and increasingly standard, has always been challenging and requires much more fuel tank volume as well as more sophisticated engines, which have hitherto offset their advantages. Perhaps then we should look at supersonic air launch as a way of making simpler, cheaper, more compact oxy-jet fuel rockets competitive with oxy-hydrogen? But the future challenge of getting all the benefits for maximum payload to orbit will still beckon!

Now, how big does a suitable airplane have to be? My best guess is, at least equal to the mass of the rocket launched! The rockets still have to mass something like ten times or more the mass orbited. Good, high-capacity airplanes typically mass empty somewhere between half to perhaps down to a third their total take-off weight; in turn the net useful lift available has to be divided between fuel and payload. So more realistically, considering that a pure nuke plane does not require fuel but does have a very heavy power plant that is in the ballpark of the fuel mass of a conventional equivalent engine set's requirements, we need somewhere between 3-4 times the rocket mass for all-up takeoff weight, meaning the plane itself is 2-3 times the rocket mass. Considering how advanced this plane has to be to get to Mach 3, and that its aerodynamics during the crucial takeoff phase are compromised to its requirement to operate at such high speeds, we should probably err on the cautious side. So supposing a 50-ton rocket can, from such a launch, orbit 5 tons, the plane itself has to weigh in at 150 tonnes, of which I guess a third or more is nuclear power plant. Total take off weight 200 tonnes, which is about 2/3 of a Boeing 747, but double the mass of a Concorde or B-70 IIRC.

Actually that might be too small for a nuclear plant with adequate shielding. Especially considering that supersonic flight is very power-intensive so we'd need a lot more power than a similar-sized subsonic plane would.

Meanwhile and come to think of it, for a relatively short-duration mission like this--take off, climb and accelerate to Mach 3, climb sharply and drop the rocket, then fly back to base--we'd probably do better not to use a nuke; using conventional fuel means the all-up mass is dropping as we fly and the plane is significantly lighter when the rocket is dropped off, so the airframe itself can in turn be lighter, thus saving on more mass while drop-off acceleration is higher. A nuke system means the mass is practically constant and we are hauling around power not immediately available nor needed, which compounds the all-up takeoff weight, hence thrust, hence requires still bigger engines and so on.

Nuclear power for aircraft thus strikes me as being most useful for subsonic cruise then, for long range or long loiter time. The former may or may not be useful depending on the relative costs of nuclear power versus conventional fuel, and the cost of the nukes has to factor in safety measures, and is a big investment that has to last years, while both state of the art of conventional engines and their fuel costs fluctuate, the former presumably only up, the latter unforeseeably up and down, so the uncertainty means conservative figuring has to be against the best case for conventional, which is the worst case for nukes.

The latter is the only application for which nukes stand out as clearly, unambiguously, advantageous. Giant AWACs, conceivably loitering airborne aircraft carriers or missile launchers. Maybe naval patrol craft. And we have to need giant ones!
 
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The Myasishchev M-50 was, as is now known, essentially a Soviet version of the Convair B-58, although on a much larger scale, capable of carrying thirty metric tons of bombs up to 7,400 kilometers at speeds approaching Mach 2. However, when information on the design first reached the West in 1958 it was misidentified as a nuclear powered strategic bomber, creating fears of an "atomic bomber gap" in the United States. Significant criticism was levied at the United States Air Force for its cancellation of the NB-36 airborne nuclear reactor program, and over four billion dollars were spent by 1964 on developing airborne nuclear reactors until the initial intelligence errors were corrected and such aircraft deemed infeasible, by which point the XB-72 prototype nuclear bomber had been completed, resulting in a major intelligence victory for the Soviets. At least forty M-50s were constructed for the Soviet Air Force....

Well now, let's compare to OTL. OTL, certainly US intelligence did make the same mistake; there was some real concern about late 1950s Soviet SST and/or nuclear bombers, being made capable, operational, and in very large numbers--the so-called "Bomber Gap" (until eclipsed in Beltway/newspaper buzz by the "Missile Gap.") The Russians, whose leaders felt very vulnerable to what their intelligence (correctly--after all, it's much easier to spy out an open society than a closed one!) told them was the clearly superior (and potentially, vastly superior) Western, especially US, capabilities, took every opportunity they could to give the impression of being as far in advance of their actual accomplishments as possible. Not saying these accomplishments were negligible; they were quite impressive given the disparity of resources available to the two camps! (Certainly I think any Western attack on the Soviet bloc would have been horribly costly even if the Westerners did prevail, and it would take a long time to do so, and it would be over the devastated corpse of Russia, with a badly battered Western Europe behind it. It's a very good thing IMHO this never happened after WWII.) But when the design bureaux and industrial ministries gave Khrushchev lemons, he made propaganda lemonade out of them.

OTL this, and possibly some useful design experience, is pretty much all the M-50 did accomplish. The plane when finally delivered, very late, with the wrong, inadequate engines (par for the course in 1950s cutting edge jet design, on both sides of the Iron Curtain:eek:) fell short of the specifications and was not in fact obtained in any numbers. But at the annual Moscow air show, the same planes were sent flying around the course many times, to give any Western observers, clandestine or open, the impression the things were accepted for regular service (hence presumably met specs) and were being churned out in quantity. It isn't clear to me whether Khrushchev ever mused that by scaring the pants off the Westerners he was driving them into a productive frenzy; I think he was smart enough to realize that, but figured since the USSR would be doomed even by a lazy and complacent West (in his lifetime, he had I believe real faith that the Soviet system would in good time pull ahead and prevail) he might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb if the West did attack, whereas keeping them guessing about just how badly they'd get mauled attacking the Socialist Motherland would deter them more effectively than meekly disclosing their relatively modest actual capabilities would.

So--M-50, big disappointment. I remember the media frenzy stirred up by some politicians in the 1970s about the then-new "Backfire" swing-wing bomber too. It's only with the "Blackjack," (a Tupolev design IIRC) a swing-wing plane similar to (but possibly superior to, being newer) the US B-1 that I think the Soviets got a real big-bomber long range supersonic strike capability. At which point the USSR was on its very last legs.

OTL the B-58 was never quite what it was cracked up to be either. It certainly deserved its name "Hustler" (unofficial and much deplored in certain corridors of the Pentagon!) for being very fast--not as fast as the B-70 would be at Mach 3, but quite as fast as operational supersonic fighters of the day (or today--we haven't been trying to increase top speed but rather low-speed maneuverability and range and stuff like that) and with considerably more range than them. Still not enough range IIRC to make it a really good and truly intercontinental weapon. More seriously, it turned out to have some nasty safety issues, with its engines subject to sudden failure--much worse, the airflow was such that one engine "unstart" could trigger a cascade of others and the plane would fall out of the sky. The safety record, I believe was rather poor. Perhaps it would have been mothballed anyway had it fully met or even surpassed all expectations, as elements of the US Government came to believe that manned bombers, at least for a mission like an all-out war against the Soviets, were becoming obsolete due to improving Soviet detection and interception capabilities. Or perhaps it would have been given a longer service on a contingency basis had it not proven so expensive and risky to operate.
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So, in the ATL, we now have, around the time that B-58 was operational in the USAF OTL, a Soviet supersonic bomber as good as the B-58 was supposed to be, only bigger, hence better. So how is that? Is this just a run of good luck for Myasishchev, with the engine design bureau doing a better job and his design team happening to anticipate and avoid, or solve, the other problems that made the design unacceptable OTL? Is the Soviet Union somewhat more together, with a less pilfered, more productive economy across the board provided by somewhat better motivated workers, or what?

Meanwhile it isn't clear whether the B-58 performs just as OTL or if it too benefits from a somewhat improved jet state of the art (its biggest problems I know of stemming after all from the engines).

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What exactly is the POD for this timeline? I wonder if it stems mainly from somewhat better or faster early (well, medium-early, say late 1940s/early '50s) jet engine development. As I alluded to above, reading up on the development history of various jets (and for that matter, earlier piston planes too) a design was often hobbled in its early development and testing because the engine anticipated by the designers turned out not to be ready yet, or in some cases never did get finished at all, and they'd substitute in something else that wasn't as good but had the virtue of actually being available; then the plane would fail to meet its targets but often it seemed no one would say "well, let's see how it does with the right engines before we scrap it!" Sometimes I guess because it showed other flaws that a new engine would not fix. Maybe other times because by then it was well known the desired engine would never be ready and something else equivalent might be too hard to redesign the plane around?

So, if for some reason the general state of the art of engine development is several years ahead of the progress OTL, more often the right engine is available from the get-go; more often experimental planes get into flight envelopes that shed some light on problems and solutions that OTL designers had to grope after for longer, meaning more knowledge about how to get new designs right the first time, hence more success. Also, more confidence from financiers and political advocates that this or that project is a good bet to back, hence earlier starts and more time to work the bugs out before the changing military, political or economic situation moves the goalposts and makes designs obsolete or irrelevant.

Is that it, or what?

FWIW based on the two posts so far, it seems the Soviets are clearly ahead of the game OTL, at least in the field of engines and perhaps across the board. Is the POD then strictly in Russia, and do alternative developments in the West stem mainly from feeling more pressure to keep ahead (often perceived as a need to catch up?) If Western military project budgets are increased and standards for accepting designs somewhat laxer due to feeling the pressure, then on one hand I suppose the costs are higher and so is the accident rate in the air forces, but on the other this hothouse might make somewhat better tech available sooner for civil purposes, bought with more gold and blood to be sure.

So that's two guesses--better engines all round; better progress in the USSR driving more of it in the other bloc. Which comes closest, may I ask, or is it some third thing?
 
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