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#121
November 8th, 2011, 09:27 PM
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 That's the OTL Orbital (Orbiting?) Manned Lab, projected to use a Saturn V main tank as a proto-Skylab.Quote:
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Sometimes a butterfly is just a butterfly.  Economic Left/Right: -7.50 Libertarian/Authoritarian: -8.00 Join GPRO Last edited by phx1138; November 9th, 2011 at 07:55 AM.. Reason: getting mooned 
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#122
November 11th, 2011, 01:02 AM
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Update #8 is coming early this week!
Soviet Raketoplans, Kosmoplans and booster plans <The front-runner>  The R-7 continued to be the workhorse of OKB-1 (as, indeed, its descendants remain to the modern day). The original Sputnik model was retired after 1959, but the 3-stage Lunastrela/Nievo model provided yeoman service for years with modification completed in late 1962 to allow the booster to launch the heavier Novii Nievo. Work finally began shortly thereafter on a 4-stage version to launch heavy vehicles into geosynchronous orbit as well as past the moon and other celestial objects. Upon completion of flight trials in late '62, the R-9 was accepted into military service. It was a vast improvement upon the R-7, with a range of 16,000km, a payload of 1.65 megatons, and a fuel and launch prep time of as few as 21 minutes to. It was still unacceptably slow compared to Chelomei's storable-propellant UR-200, and, as the Soviet rocket forces valued response time over the potential danger of using incredibly toxic chemicals, they did not order very many. Of course, the lynchpin of OKB-1's efforts was the lunar N-1 rocket. Using the same engines as the R-9, development of the 24-engine monstrosity was begun in late 1962 with operational flights to begin by the end of 1967. The N-1 was supposed to launch an entire LOR stack (Moryak spacecraft, LK lunar module and transstage). Korolev's "Karlik" series of small science probes launched on Yangel's rockets continued through the summer of '64, eight satellites returning excellent data on various atmospheric and magnetospheric phenomena. The program was put on hold to devote resources to the nascent space station project. OKB-1's unmanned division grabbed the world's attention with the first successful soft-landing lunar spacecraft mission in October '64. The probe returned panoramas from the the Sea of Storms for several weeks, a feat the Americans would not match until the Jottenheim series of spacecraft was launched years later. <Chelomei, darling of the Strategic Rocket Corps>  1963 marked the year OKB-52 became indispensable to the Soviet nuclear strategy. UR-200 silos were established throughout the nation, supplementing Yangel's R-16 ICBMs and replacing Korolev's obsolete R-7 bases. Large-scale production of the missile meant that Chelomei had a large stock of boosters for space launches and for adapting into more-powerful rockets. A quick evolution of the UR-200 was the UR-300, an improved vehicle analogous to Korolev's 4-stage R-7, which was designed to give Chelomei the opportunity to launch completely in-house lunar and interplanetary missions. More ambitious was the UR-500. The two-stage version began development in the winter of 1962-3. It was designed to be a heavy-payload launcher with similar capacity to OKB-1's heaviest R-7 variant. In addition to being the Raketoplan's primary booster, it was offered to the military as the ultimate in ICBMs, capable of delivering a monster 100 megaton warhead to any likely target from Los Angeles to Peking. Understandably, the Rocket Corps never took Chelomei up on this offer (the largest nuclear device ever developed was the experimental 52 megaton bomb, the "Czar Bomba.") The UR-500 was designed with expansion in mind -- 3 and 4-stage versions, once developed, could launch heavier Raketoplans, space stations and even circumlunar missions. The penultimate evolution of the Universal Rocket series would be the UR-700 lunar rocket, comparable to the American Saturn V. There were plans for an even-larger UR-900. Of course, Chelomei's boosters were only a means to an end. The first Raketoplan was completed in early 1964. On July 5, the unpiloted R-1 was launched on suborbital paths on the shoulders of the UR-200; the feat was repeated on August 18, 1964. Both fifteen minute flights were completely nominal. More excitingly (though no less secretly), on October 23, 1964, OKB-52 launched its first cosmonaut into space in the 6300kg R-2. Evgeny Sergeivich landed just fourteen minutes later in the tundra of Siberia on a rude airstrip. The era of regular manned soaring space flight was about to begin.  Of course, the R-2 was limited to suborbital test flights until the UR-500 came on line, which wasn't expected until 1966. By that time, Chelomei expected to have a stable of completed Raketoplan variants for true operational duty. <The little guy>  With the ICBM market snatched away by Chelomei, the scrappy Yangel wasted no time in making himself indispensable in other arenas. The OKB-586 chief quickly became the go-to guy for all manner of communications satellites. The bureau developed two systems. One of them was largely civilian, but it also relayed military Command and Control transmissions. The project was completed by the end of 1964 (though it was not operational until 1968), and it involved large satellites in high, eccentric orbits. These "Molniya" comsats provided the first international satellite service (to the consternation of the West!). However, the military communications constellation, known as "Strela," preceded Molniya. First launched in 1963 by the R-12, the store-dump satellites were later hoisted to orbit by the booster version of the R-14 IRBM, the R-14b. This larger rocket delivered eight of the small satellites at a time. Complementing these little comsats, used for open communications, were several 800kg satellites used for sensitive transmissions. The Strela constellations and their descendants have been maintained through the present day. Developing these satellites required a good deal of specialized engineers and materiele. To that end, OKB-586 essentially absorbed Reshnetev's OKB-10. Yangel was *the* Soviet clearing-house for the most cutting-edge technology throughout the 1960s. His other contributions to the burgeoning Communist space industry included the spy-satellite derivative of the Nievo capsule, called the "Otrkivat." Its capsule was recovered in the same fashion as its manned counterpart. There were four launches in 1964, two of which were successful. Preceding the visual surveillance satellites were Yangel's ELINT satellites. The upgraded E-2 began development in early '62, and six were launched in 1963-4. Work on an "E-3" was begun and aborted in 1964, the project proving too ambitious for the current state of the art. In addition to Korolev's "Karliks," Yangel launched two satellites in '64 to experiment with different methods of shifting mass and stabilization to optimize orbital performance. Two more Yangel-sats provided accurate time throughout the Soviet Union using an onboard cesium clock and a radiotransmitter. All four satellites functioned well. Yangel also launched several more satellites designed to be tracked by ABM radars. A pair of anti-satellite satellites were launched in late '64 (the latter failing to orbit when its leased UR-200 booster failed). Finally, work was begun in 1964 and completed in 1965 on the Tsiklon navigation satellite designed to provide Soviet ballistic missile submarines with accurate position fixes so that acceptable submarine-launched ballistic missile accuracy could be achieved. Yangel's prowess with miniaturized satellites led to the following maxim amongst the defense industry: "Korolev makes heroes, Chelomei makes firecrackers, Yangel makes payloads." <Abortive coup>  One of the more exciting revelations of the post-Cold War period was the unreported coup of 1963. By that year, Khruschev's policies had attracted increasing criticism: rapprochement with the United States, the increasing rift with China, the unsatisfactory resolution to the Cuban Missile crisis, the strident De-Stalinization of the Soviet Union, and decentralisation of some of the party apparatus were all controversial. Others simply did not appreciate his effervescent manner. In an April '63 phone conversation with Khruschev, the opportunistic Frol Kozlov, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and widely regarded to be Khruschev's successor, touched on these issues and more in a harangue of his superior that lasted at least ten minutes, according to his personal secretary. The Premier, astonishingly, responded in a soft, conciliatory manner, attempting to placate his deputy. Kozlov took this as a sign of weakness and enlisted the aid of several enterprising apparatchiks in an attempt to politically oust Khruschev. He walked into a trap: Khruschev had enlisted the aid of his trusted associates, Anastas Mikoyan, Nicholas Podgorny and Vladimir Semichastny to rally support behind him (as had been done in the face of a vote of no confidence in 1960). Kozlov had approached Leonid Brezhnev and Alexander Shelepin as potential allies, but the latter (the former KGB head, kicked upstairs where he could be less of a threat to the Khruschev) disliked Kozlov more than Premier. As for Brezhnev, he knew on which side his bread was buttered, preferring a shot at a peaceful ascension to the Premiership (accomplished upon Khruschev's retirement in 1965) to a second-fiddle role under Kozlov. The coup failed, and Khruschev enjoyed few obstacles to his rule until his step-down from power. His sudden death in 1967 prevented him from finishing his memoirs , the notes of which were released by his son in 1996; the coup went unreported until then. Last edited by neopeius; November 13th, 2011 at 03:06 PM..
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#123
November 11th, 2011, 01:42 AM
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Interesting, Khruschev doesn't get sacked like he did OTL, but Brezhnev still gets the Premiership anyways. One would think that without the coup, Khruschev would end up living a little longer than OTL.
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CLINCH THE FIST!
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#124
November 11th, 2011, 01:45 AM
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Yes, the smooth transition was huge, actually, and very very unexpected. Fact: Sometimes you just can't make up the weirdness of history.
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#126
November 13th, 2011, 05:21 PM
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#127
November 14th, 2011, 03:17 AM
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Your help here would be much appreciated.
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#128
November 14th, 2011, 07:16 PM
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Would it really have been feasible to fully fund both a full-on capsule program and a full-on spaceplane program?
This goes for both the Americans and Soviets, since it seems like both are doing that in this scenario. I don't understand what a spaceplane brings to the table that a capsule doesn't, other than being reusable and perhaps more fun for the pilots. Controlled re-entry, but why does that really matter? You could turn it into a bomber, but doesn't an ICBM do the same job better? I guess I'm asking why the RL reasons spaceplane projects were cancelled aren't happening here. Is part of it just that you wanted to have more players in your game? What goals do the U.S. and the Soviets have for their spaceplane programs?
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#129
November 14th, 2011, 07:44 PM
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Nothing will tax America's ability to make multiple space programs. The Soviets do have something of a limited pie, which I have taken into account. Re: Chelomei, yes, Khruschev's soft landing is very helpful, though Chelomei is still going to run into some issues soon. Re: Tsien, that's a little beyond the scope of the game, sadly, but one would imagine. Re: Kuzentsov, that is an astute observation (and one I believe was made somewhere upthread)
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#130
November 14th, 2011, 08:08 PM
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#131
November 14th, 2011, 08:59 PM
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__________________
Eyes Turned Skywards
An alternate post-Apollo space age Atomic Rockets Seal of Approval, Turtledove Nominee 2011 Visit the wiki page for details
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#132
November 15th, 2011, 02:02 AM
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That's the sort of thing suggested for spaceplanes, going back I believe to Saenger's original "Silbervogel." I'll let e of pi or Truth Is Life address just how realistic or unrealistic such maneuvers might be. I was interested in the idea when on Eyes Turned Skyward we were talking about the unrealism of going to lunar polar orbits from Terran polar orbits--rather, I think we agree that would work great; the tricky bit is that first step, having a decent-sized moon ship in a Terran polar orbit in the first place. Clearly if our orbital load could vector itself from a standard 30 degree inclination orbit to a 90-degree polar one using atmospheric revectoring, that might be a major game-changer; there might be less or no need for direct high-inclination launches, rather we might simply concentrate on standard launches from standard rockets to standard orbits, and then steer the various payloads into their various niche orbits later. But given earlier discussion I've seen somewhere about the miserable lift-to-drag ratios one can expect from just about any aircraft at hypersonic (ie orbital) speeds, I doubt very much that significant orbital redirection can happen without major drag requiring a lot of reboosting just to keep the orbit from immediately decaying into at best case, a re-entry--worst case of course a burnup! To be more specific--usually when I see hypersonic L/D ratios quoted, even for say the Shuttle, the numbers given are generally less than one! Oddly, one of the highest I've ever noticed claimed is neither for a spaceplane nor a fairly conventional ballistic capsule nor one of the family of "lifting bodies" often touted, but a particular lenticular design proposal for Apollo submitted by Convair (now General Dynamics). Convair claimed hypersonic L/D of 4.4. (Still more strangely, in its own lenticular entry for Apollo General Electric submitted a design for which they estimated L/D of just 0.7! It was however lighter and still had a cross-range estimated at 1500 km) So let's say a ratio of 4 is readily attainable--assuming that "hypersonic" here covers full orbital speed that is! And say we want to change a 185 km "standard" orbit by 30 degrees inclination, by means of a retro-fire that will put the ship into an elliptical orbit that brings it down at perigee to a level where atmospheric dynamic pressure is such at orbital speeds that our craft--lenticular, winged plane, lifting body, whatever--can generate 4 Gs (call it 40 meters/sec^2) lift to turn the path through 30 degrees horizontally while suffering a drag acceleration of 10 meters/sec^2, which to return to 185 km apogee and recircularize the orbit means some kind of rocket has to fire to maintain orbital speed. The perigee speed will be something like 7900 m/sec or higher; the radius of curvature of its changing path under 4 Gs side lift is therefore in the ballpark of the speed squared divided by the acceleration 40, so that's 1560 km or so. If we maintain constant forward speed the path has to go something like half this radial distance, so it needs to maintain the side thrust for 100 seconds. Since we are delivering thrust of 1 G during these 100 seconds, the equivalent delta-V is about 1 kilometer/sec. But mission delta-V for a typical surface to orbit launch is only in the ballpark of about 9 to 10 times that. I suspect that if we could add 10 percent more delta-V to a minimum-energy launcher, we could launch the same payload to any orbit we like directly! (Someone correct me if I am wrong about that!) It seems to me then that this sort of maneuvering is rather costly as well as risky and the smarter thing to do is just launch into the orbit you really want in the first place! I certainly note we don't see anyone trying this kind of thing OTL, not even on a small scale for unmanned satellites. Mind you I really do want to believe in your spaceplanes! But it isn't clear how they are superior for any kind of routine, planned orbital enterprise. Much of the interest the military has in them does have to do with their superior atmospheric maneuverability. One reason the Shuttle was required to get a lot more crossrange than the NASA designer Faget felt it was needed was to accomplish 1-orbit missions from and returning to Vandenberg AFB. But why exactly did the Air Force want to be able to launch a Shuttle and then land it within the same orbit? Turns out they were thinking of a mission where they'd intercept and take aboard a Soviet satellite, presumably overtaking the thing at a time and place when Soviet observation was at a minimum, and then bringing it down to base as quick as possible!  That strikes me as a very foolhardy, farfetched, and dangerous (both operationally and strategically) mission. I suppose someone could come up with examples less outrageous that might show why other one-orbit missions, or missions involving a "skip" turn off the upper atmosphere. But it seems likely they'd be limited to some rather esoteric situations. Then again, NASA (if not Max Faget) eventually came around to the idea that crossrange on a reusable reentry vehicle was a very good idea actually, one work paying some prices for. Anyway it seems that modern Russians believe they can get a good deal of crossrange out of a capsule design. Far less than the typical claims for a winged craft or the like, but it seems like they think 180 km is plenty! So the question is indeed, just what advantages does making a winged or otherwise highly aerodynamic vehicle offer over the capsules? Aside from wacky military shenanigans (and note that if the Air Force had been able to come up with any military missions for the X-20 derived vehicle they wanted, MacNamara would not have cancelled the program--but he said nothing about the vehicle being actually unfeasible, only that the Air Force had no business messing around on NASA's bureaucratic turf without a specifically military purpose) the straightforward advantage of a spaceplane, or some other type of craft of similar atmospheric maneuverability, is that it enables controlled runway landings, and it offers crossrange insofar as that is valuable or necessary. If neither of these things are necessary then a capsule type system can clearly be lighter for a given mission. I like the idea of the spaceplane as the space taxi--the default method of getting people up to and back from orbit. For them to then accomplish something, in Earth orbit or beyond, I suggest sending up some other payload on another launch and they rendezvous with it. But if we can limit the reuseable spaceplane to a people mover, it can be far smaller than the Shuttle and still move as many people, while a smaller and lighter craft will be easier to design for repeated reentries than the 100 ton Shuttle was. But it still should be shown why a 10-20 ton space taxi in an aerodynamic version is better than something like Big Gemini.
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#133
November 15th, 2011, 03:05 AM
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#134
November 15th, 2011, 03:32 AM
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Shevek, yes, spaceplanes can use the atmosphere to change their orbital plane (something capsules can't do), though going from an equatorial to a polar orbit is beyond their capabilities without buttloads of fuel (a technical term). E of Pi, you are correct that, without using the atmosphere, spaceplanes are not any more effective at changing their orbits than capsules (and in fact are worse as they carry a lot of extra weight in their wings). Gemini would be more manueverable than the X-20. But an X-20 could change its orbital plane using the atmosphere in a way that the Gemini could not. And one can definitely argue the merits of a Big Gemini vs. an X-20 expando. And they will be argued in this timeline. Entertainingly, I trust.
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#135
November 15th, 2011, 03:49 AM
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__________________
Eyes Turned Skywards
An alternate post-Apollo space age Atomic Rockets Seal of Approval, Turtledove Nominee 2011 Visit the wiki page for details
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#136
November 15th, 2011, 12:34 PM
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It's the sort of thing that gets written in articles about the virtues of spaceplanes in general. The idea of Silbervogel and that tradition is more to be on a suborbital trajectory and then "skip" vertically off the atmosphere, to use the lift of the atmosphere to reverse the descending leg of the elliptical path to the upward one; since the angles involved in such a turn might be well under 30 degrees I guess that's more feasible. (It also seems obvious that during the same mainly upward-lifting maneuver, one could also bank and get some inclination-changing in at little added cost in drag). But against it, trying to estimate the velocities involved in suborbital paths I find that go any really significant distance that way the atmospheric velocities involved are practically as fast as a successful orbit's would be; it seems to me one might as well go all the way to orbit and then deorbit, rather than go 90 or 95 percent of the way there and have no choice but to reenter at the prescibed point. It does make a little sense to save a bit of fuel and do a straight suborbital path if the goal is simply to get from point A to point B on Earth as fast and simply as possible. I don't see the sense of planning repeated skips just to stay aloft though; given finite lift to drag ratios it seems one would be using more fuel to do that than to simply go to orbit. It would be different I guess if the velocity difference between a minimum-energy suborbital path that took one say 60 degrees around the Earth well above the atmosphere and a proper orbit with the same apogee were large rather than small, or if the lift/drag efficiency of the spaceplane were quite high, say in the range of 20 or so rather than 4 or 5! But of course the reason we have always favored blunt reentries rather than sleek craft is that high drag actually helps minimize the total heating; I used to think only because it shortened the deceleration time but actually it also creates a "virtual heat shield" by creating a thick wad of heated plasma between the front of the shock wave and the actual hull of the ship. Having stumbled on NASA publications available free on line, I re-read Heppenheimer's book on the "Shuttle Decision," to illustrate the point of these tradeoffs, Faget's original minimal cross-range, straight-winged Shuttle design would have had a total heat input something like a quarter of the extended, delta-winged higher-crossranged version foisted on him by DoD. I guess had NASA been thinking about reusable capsules instead the heat input of something comparable in payload to Faget's smaller-winged shuttle would in turn have been lower still. So all this bears you out of course. Nevertheless, the wacky notion of a spaceplane doing daredevil vector shifts in all directions skipping off the atmosphere is not just something I made up, it turns up in the boosterish literature. I'm surprised you haven't seen it! However, Quote:
Frankly maybe if the Air Force had stressed this kind of thing, maybe MacNamara might not have put the kibosh on DynaSoar aka X-20. Then again he might, if they'd had the chutzpah to actually write up the technical requirements (hot structures that have to endure much higher total heat inputs, repeatedly, due to discarding the "blunt entry" advantage; hypersonic lifting forms that manage higher L/D than 4 or 5; engines that carry enough fuel of high enough specific impulse and put out high enough thrust restartably to maintain speed during the maneuver; enough fuel to manage it often enough to make it a mission option and not a stunt) he'd probably discard it on those grounds! I have to admit the spaceplane options are looking now like there are good reasons no one actually did them except for the much-berated Shuttle! Still I suspect horizontal landing ability and crossrange have got to be worth something. The question is, how much? And how cheaply can these advantages be secured? Do you think the touted Rogallo wing landing option of Big Gemini was actually going to work out to be feasible? I'd think it could be made to work, but the option was abandoned after some testing for Gemini.
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#137
November 15th, 2011, 12:49 PM
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It did make sense as a test program, especially if Gemini was to see the planned use by the USAF or was being redesigned into Big Gemini as opposed to being phased out entirely after just a few years in service. It's a good way to get the benefits of more controlled landing without the costs of full spaceplane wings. As fas as would it work...I think it could be made to. Certainly hang-glider pilots seem to enjoy using it without too much trouble.
__________________
Eyes Turned Skywards
An alternate post-Apollo space age Atomic Rockets Seal of Approval, Turtledove Nominee 2011 Visit the wiki page for details
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#138
November 15th, 2011, 01:40 PM
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You'll have to be the judge as the story unfolds. Quote:
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#139
November 15th, 2011, 06:21 PM
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Fun! I think you just butterflied away deregulation already! Now you have the military, intelligence, nasa, and private corps all in the space game. While the different american approach will be slower it will be more robust than the soviet or OTL. I think ATT and co will get tax breaks and funding to do things. Lobbying will be big and since regulation is still in effect they might get it.
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#140
November 19th, 2011, 12:10 AM
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Update #9!
Part 9 DoD, NRO and NASA unmanned, 1963-64
<The X-20 Dyna-soar> Development of the X-20 went extraordinarily quickly with the help of plentiful funding and the wealth of data resulting from the flight of the X-15b. The experimental spaceplane was ready for flight testing by the end of 1964. It was hugely popular already, thanks to an Air Force advertising blitz (to keep their vehicle in the spotlight while headlines were made by Magellan and Nievo missions). A schedule of flight testing, including B-52 drops followed by Titan 2-boosted suborbital missions, was drawn up. Unfortunately, the X-20's orbital booster, the powerful Titan 3, suffered delays in development, and it would not be ready until 1966, at the earliest. Yet, there was immense pressure to get the X-20 up before it was completely upstaged by the competition. MacNamara's solution was crafty and politically astute. For the first several years of the space program, civilian programs had used military boosters to launch their spacecraft. Now they would return the favor. DoD purchased several Saturn 1 boosters (which had no spacecraft associated with them) to ensure that X-20 flights could begin with no delays.  The single-man spaceplane had limited operational utility, but it would serve as the basis of a series of evolved designs. The X-20 Mark A (Satyr) space transport began development in early 1964. It was to be a direct competitor to NASA's Delphi. The X-20 Mark II (Cerberus), the operational version of X-20 designed for reconnaissance and limited bombardment, also began development in 1964. Management conflicts between the two similar craft caused progress to be slow for both projects until the summer. <DoD's satellites> The Icarus communications system was completed by the beginning of 1963, funded by furtive diversions from other DoD projects as Congress favored the adaptation of civilian designs rather than the development of a whole new program. Unfortunately, in 1963, there was no booster to launch the heavy, high orbit Icarus as the Atlas Centaur was not yet online. DoD was thrust into a quandry: Should they wait two years (or more) for the Atlas Centaur or Titan 3C to come on line? Should they go to Congress with hat in hand and request appropriations to build a new, smaller series of satellites? Secretary MacNamara ultimately chose neither of these options. Instead, using the same fiscal ingenuity employed to create the Icarus in the first place, he funneled funds into the development of a stronger Atlas Agena, one just powerful-enough to get the commsats into usable orbits. The gamble paid off. There were four launches between July and December 1964. The first failed in orbit, its stabilizers malfunctioning. The other three worked surprisingly well and provided virtually complete coverage of the Earth. DoD could now count on a survivable international communications system, which was quickly put to work maintaining contact with forces deployed in Vietnam.  Other DoD satellite projects included the abortive "Argus," a Thor-Agena launched kamikaze anti-satellite (a few months of study done in early 1963) and the Aeolius weather satellite, whose progress had stalled since 1962. The latter program was stuck on the backburner; instead, the military relied on the wildly successful TIROS series for their weather maps. The cost savings were used to fund the Atlas Agena B used on the Icarus project. The Hermes navigational constellation was launched into operational service in May 1963. It and its descendents have provided reliable service for nearly 50 years. <NRO's Eyes in the Sky> In some ways, though they began with a warm partnership, the NRO stood to become DoD's greatest competitor. While millions in lobbying went into touting the spaceplane as the reconnaissance platform of the future, spy satellites were already filling that need. In 1963-64, 21 Discoverer satellites flew, 11 of which provided useful information. 1963 was an exciting year in particular for the now-venerable program. Discoverer 26 provided the first photographs of the new Soviet UR-200 emplacements, and Discoverer 28 refined Western estimates of Soviet aircraft strength. In October 1963, in an event only recently declassified, Discoverer 32's film capsule fell somewhere in the Soviet Union. No protests were lodged, which at the time was taken as evidence of a similar Communist program. Just two months later, Discoverer 34's film capsule landed in the Arctic ice near Sweden. The tense race between American and Soviet forces to recover the prize has been recounted several times in popular media, particularly in the novel and film, "Ice Station Yankee."  <Successes for the unmanned program> After the failure of the Block 2 Odins, it was decided to return to the drawing board for a further twelve months of development. The Block III Odin which emerged was a streamlined, more reliable machine with most of the experiments removed, emphasis being placed on the photographic mission. Odin 6 was launched in February of 1964 and returned thousands of images of Mare Tranquilitas, a prime landing candidate for the first Artemis mission, with a final resolution of less than a meter. Odin 7, launched six months later, was also an unqualified success, returning high resolution photographs from an area between Mare Nubium and Oceanus Procellarum (subsequently named Mare Cognitum.)  OSS's big success story was the Heimdall lunar orbiting mapper. Using scanning technology borrowed from the Department of Defense, the Heimdall was designed to fully map the moon for use in future lunar exploration missions. The first flight, on May 10, 1964, was a complete success, returning some 183 photos of potential landing sites as well as the far side of the moon. The satellite was crashed into the moon on October 3, 1964 to avoid interference with the upcoming mission. On October 28, 1964, Heimdall 2 went into lunar orbit where it returned a battery of photographs, and returned valuable lunadetic information used to construct a gravity map. Heimdall 2 also photographed the area near the landing site of Cilnii Lunastrela 1 (though its resolution was too poor to actually make out the Soviet lander). More Heimdall missions were planned, and they would soon be complemented by the Jottenheim lunar lander designed to scout out Artemis landing sites. What should have been a highlight of 1964 ended up being a downer. Rushed into production for the 1964 conjunction, a pair of probes, Skadis 1 and 2, were launched on March 27 and April 2, 1964. Three and a half months later, both probes flew by Earth’s “twin” and returned the first pictures taken of another planet from close vantage. The photos electrified the public, and the data returned nicely complemented the science gained by Odin-Venus in 1962. The spacecraft instruments measured both interplanetary and Venusian magnetic fields, charged particles, and plasmas, as well as the radio refractivity and UV emissions of the Venusian atmosphere. Unfortunately, this flight dashed all hopes that Venus might harbor any sort of life. It was a barren furnace and while interesting to the scientific community, missions to the Evening Star just weren't sexy any more.  A pair of Skadis was sent to Mars late in the year, Skadi 3 failing with its booster on November 5. Skadi 4 launched successfully on November 27, 1964 bound for an encounter with the Red Planet in Spring 1965. The Orbital Solar Observatory was launched in March of 1962 and returned tremendous results, continuing to operate until the beginning of 1964—an unprecedented lifespan. Njord, the Orbital Astronomical Observatory (OAO), was launched in April of 1964 on an Atlas Agena. It continued to return excellent results through 1965 despite having been reduced in capability to fit on its launcher. The first Orbiting Geological Observatory (OGO) was slated for launch in '65, but nothing budgeted after that. After seven successful TIROS launches, an upgrading and enhancement program was initiated in mid-1963. The result was Earth Environmental Sciences Administration (ESSA) 1, which flew in December. This was the first in a series of operational weather satellites providing continuous coverage on a global basis. ESSA was further upgraded in mid-1964.  <And the bad news> It was around this time incoming Deputy Director Mueller (replaced the former unmanned chief, Hugh Dryden, after his death) began entertaining the possibility of launching truly massive missions to the outer planets atop the powerful Saturn rockets. Constrained budgets kept such plans strictly on the drawing board, however. In 1963, the unmanned budget gutted by Congress, Mueller's programs being eclipsed by the sexier manned programs. In fact, the Musplheim program, though marked by continued successes (Muspleheim 13 provided a comprehensive map of neutral particle density in the exosphere; Muspelheim 16 returned valuable data on the status of the ionosphere), was suspended in the summer of 1964 for budgetary reasons. Another victim of the budget crunch was Nimbus, a second-generation weather satellite, suspended after twelve months of development. The Loki constellation of solar orbiters was similarly stalled. It was clear that, if the Office of Space Science was to be more than a handmaiden to the manned lunar program, Mueller would have to take bold steps.
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