WI different Command in the Falklands?

Perhaps a pedantic topic, but there is no shortage of pedantic armchair strategists here.

In 1982 there were 4 sea going commands in the RN, Flag Officer Submarines (self explanitory), Flag Officer Flotillas 1, 2 & 3. FOF3 had recently changed its name, but not it's role, from Flag Officer Carriers & Amphibious Ships which makes it also self explanatory. FOF1 & 2 therefore were in charge of the surface ships.

FOF3 held the national titles of Fleet Aviation and Fleet Amphibious Warfare Authority. FOF3 also had a NATO command, Commander Anti-Submarine Group Two under NATO Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic. FOF3 was a Vice Admiral instead of a Rear Admiral of the other Flotillas and had a large staff for a sea going Admiral to allow him to cope with the size and scope of his command. His staff contained Commodore Amphibious Warfare, the only other RN command to have a specific NATO role, which further illustrates the importance and scope of FOF3s command.

In 1982 FOF1, Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward a former submariner now in charge of destroyers and frigates, was at sea in the Med for exercise Springtrain '82, heading for Gibraltar for a rest period. On April 2 this force was ordered to head south immediately, and after cross decking stores from some ships to others a force went south. It seems to me that by virtue of a large headstart a submariner in charge of destroyers and frigates inherited command of a combined operation complete with 2 carriers and a huge amphibious fleet. I've read that there was considerable problems with this command arrangment, it didn't achieve all that it might have and cost more than it should have.

So WI FOF3, Derrek Reffel in 1982, took overall command of the Task Force as logic would dictate? Would the Falklands War be fought much differently than OTL, perhaps with less emphasis on the surface and sub threat derviving from Woodwards background?

Reffel in charge might mean less friction between the 'Admiral' and the amphibious group commanders. He had, after all worked closely with both Cdre Clapp (COMAW) and Brigadier Thompson (CO of 3 Cdo Bde) in the recent past, while Woodward hadn't.

Woodward was not particularly popular aboard his initial flagship - Antrim, and shifted his flag to Glamorgan, officially because he had worked with her crew in the past. Unofficially he had a sense of humour failure when a drunken party in a PO's mess under his cabin ended with the mess singing 'Woodward is a wanker'.

I suspect Reffel would not have misused the Sea Harriers as Woodward did. He admitted in the second edition of One Hundred Days that he was not as informed as he might have been about the aircraft's capabilities, plus his staff's aviation officers were old Phantom and Buccaneer men who were biased against the Sea Harrier. FOF1's staff had been augmented by men from FOF3 in a rather ad hoc way and it didn't quite work as well as it should have.

It's impossible to say, but with Reffel rather than Woodward we may have lost one, or two fewer ships. However I hesitate to critise Woodward as I was not there under the stresses he was at the time.

Interestingly it was Reffel who relieved Woodward after the cease-fire.

Interesting idea. Seeing which sea-going command he filled, Reffel presumably would have a better appreciation of naval aviation and a better handle on amphibious operations too.

So, would the flotilla be better prepared for the Argentine air attacks? Perhaps saving the Atlantic Conveyor and her helos? And would the botched landing at Port Pleasant be avoided?

Assuming Reffel in command would result in actual differences, we could be looking at a faster end to the war with fewer casualties on both sides.

Sharkey Ward describes an 801 sqn SHars being directed to 'An intermittent fast moving contact' by the Anti-Air Warfare Control ship on May 4 and this being countermanded by Hermes who then ordered a visial (ie non radar) surface search elsewhere. This gap in the CAP was how the Etenard got through to the Sheffield.

Perhaps a carrier admiral would not have compromised the integrity of the CAP to conduct surface searches by eye. Indeed I'd suspect a carrier admiral or one who has the Fleet Aviation Authority on his staff would investigate why 800 sqn had no confidence in their avionics whereas 801 sqn did, and seek to remedy this situation.

I wonder if 801 sqn, who were getting exellent results form the SHars, were on Hermes instead of Invincible would Woodward have done better?