Deleted member 1487
Alright, I am going to slowly start reworking this TL, and I present the first installment here. Significant changes have been made and will continue to be made to each part. I will keep some of the story the same, but there will be major divergences coming, which will change the trajectory of the story. As always, constructive criticism is welcome, as is praise.
The Story
The sudden death of Helmuth von Moltke on the night of the 18th of August was the most decisive moment in modern history, Winston Churchill would later write in his history of the Great War. Certainly it seemed an ominous omen for Germany. Though the Kaiser was informed within minutes of the fatal fall, the general public remained in the dark until much later. Even when the newspapers were allowed to report it, the details were shrouded in mystery, as it was deemed unbecoming for the most senior officer of the Reichsheer to succumb to a fall down a flight of stairs. His death was a well-kept secret, so much so that the Allies and even the Austro-Hungarians were not even aware of the change in command until October.
In the meantime, the various officers actually running the war were anxious while waiting the Kaiser’s decision for Moltke’s replacement. Tappen, Hentsch, Groener and the rest were shocked and dismayed by the news, which came at startling speed from Berlin. Until now they had actually run much of the war themselves, with Moltke acting as a bystander most of the time. Eric von Falkenhayn was their collective fear. The minister of war represented a threat to their power and most of OHL resented his presence up to this point in Koblenz. In fact he was purposely kept in the dark to what was exactly happening at the front. It was felt that the minister should be in Berlin where his duties were. Additionally, some of the distain for Falkenhayn had to do with the suspicion that he was the Kaiser’s spy meant to keep tabs on them. Moltke and his staff had felt that the Kaiser was a buffoon and as Falkenhayn was his picked man, having been selected over the heads of many more experience and senior officers for his post in the war ministry, he was viewed in the same light.
Falkenhayn was a man apart from the traditional General Staff officers. He was handsome, well traveled, and bitingly sarcastic, all features that would serve to alienate Moltke’s staff and cause bitter arguments. The first power struggle was not long in coming, as the new commander sought to break up the clique dominating the war planning. The heads of the Operations, Intelligence, Political, and Central Sections (Tappen, Hentsch, Dommes, and Fabeck) of the staff had dominated OHL to the point that Moltke had essentially just confirmed their decisions. Falkenhayn proceeded to shake up his new command and express that his orders would be supreme. This came as a relief to many, including the junior officer Max Bauer, who described the chief of operations as “stupid, arrogant, and ignorant” among other adjectives. But he had alienated several important individuals on his staff, who would attempt to obstruct their commander at several crucial junctures in the coming weeks.
Battle of the Frontiers
At the front, the war was just heating up. The fall of Liege had occurred on the 16th and the German army was advancing through Belgium. In Alsace-Lorraine, the French invasion was going badly, with casualties running into the hundreds of thousands. Prince Rupprecht, the commander of the 6th army was demanding permission to launch counter attacks and resume the offensive. Moltke was reluctantly about to give permission, but Falkenhayn was more cautious still. Assent was given by Tappen before Falkenhayn had had a chance to settle in, infuriating the new chief. He had planned to use the troops in Lorraine to reinforce the right wing of the advance, only to have these men committed without his approve or indeed his knowledge. Furious, he took steps to remove elements of the section heads from his staff, which had made the decision. Tappen was severely chastised and kept under strict control, having to have all his orders approved by Falkenhayn, Hentsch was sent out to be the eyes and ears of OHL by monitoring the advance in person and reporting back to the staff, while the remaining members of the coterie were only provided information outside their officer during meetings with Falkenhayn. For now he belatedly approved the Lorraine offensive, but set a definite halt line, where the attack would stop and request further instruction. Falkenhayn already was planning on committing more forces to the right and intended to us elements of the 6th and 7th armies for this plan.
In the meantime, another important decision had to be made: what to do with the second wave of units to be committed to Belgium? This included the 6.5 Ersatz divisions, which were to be used as guards for the lines of communication under Moltke’s plan. These forces were desired by Rupprecht and his chief of staff, who wanted to launch a wider offensive out of Lorraine. Recognizing the threat that the Belgians at Antwerp represented and unable to tolerate the diversion of so many troops from the 1st army, five of these divisions would be sent to besiege Antwerp with the Landwehr from the 1st army, freeing von Beseler’s III reserve corps for use elsewhere. Antwerp would now be properly surrounded, cutting it off from outside communication. The assembling Naval division would also later appear at the siege to add necessary strength. The Belgians would attempt to sally several times to open communications with their allies and to aid the French, but to no avail.
The remaining division would be sent to the Crown Prince’s 5th army, where, with the temporary Landwehr division that was recently recently formed, it would help cover the fortress complex of Verdun. The independent Ersatz brigade would take over the occupation of Brussels, which would allow the 1st army to be restored to its establishment strength, so that it could move on undiminished. Though the exchanges would occur within days, the lagging troops would fall behind the main advance, only to be restored after the coming engagement at Mons.
On the 20th the 6th army threw the French 2nd army out of northern Alsace-Lorraine and caused the withdrawal of the 1st army of Pau to withdraw from the recently captured Mulhouse, as his flank became exposed. By the 22nd the invasion of Germany had returned to its kick off position along the Moselle. The battle of the Ardennes had started on the 21st, as the French 3rd and 4th armies advanced on Neufchateau and bumped into German forces of the 4th and 5th armies, who had methodically advanced through the forest since the 19th. By the 22nd the main forces had come into contact and vicious battles erupting all along the line. Hungry for glory, Rupprecht demanded an additional offensive to smash through the French line. Reaching his stop line, he petitioned to be allowed to continue the advance, receiving lukewarm approval for such a measure, but with several caveats: first, he was to remove the XXI and XV army corps and the 3rd cavalry corps from the Lorraine front to form the nucleus of the new 7th army, which was to be deployed to Belgium starting on September 1st. Otherwise, remaining forces were to focus on limited attacks that to seize important local terrain for tactical advantage. They should also be ready at any time to be withdrawn from the front for transfer to the right wing. Though Rupprecht protested heavily, he obeyed and prepared for a series of local attacks utilizing his massive advantage in heavy artillery to chew up the French.
Further north, the German 2nd and 3rd armies made contact with the French 5th army, which had concentrated on the town of Charleroi. Weakened by transfers of troops and artillery to the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, the French were sandwiched between two opposing, stronger armies that proceeded to push back and attempted to cut off the French forces. Ultimately unsuccessful, thanks to bold action by Franchet d’Esperey’s corps, the French fell back in disorder on the 23rd. The German 1st army had contacted advanced elements of the BEF on the 22nd and engaged the smaller army on the 23rd. Despite giving the Germans a bloody nose, the BEF withdrew on the 24th as the French 5th army had unexpected fallen back without prior notification leaving the British dangerously exposed.
Aware of battles being fought all along the frontier, Falkenhayn was incensed that OHL had only a vague impression of the situation. As a commander, he was uncomfortable with the concept of Aufträgstaktik and sought a firmer grip on the course of the fighting. The solution to this issue was to move OHL further west, closer to the front. Luxembourg would be the ultimate destination, despite the fears of many on the staff that the HQ would be too near the front. Furthermore, junior officers were dispatched to the various HQ’s of the armies operating on the Western Front with the conceptual overview of Falkenhayn’s war plan and orders to enforce his will. Ostensibly only observers, each man was provided with an aerial “courier” to dispatch important information to OHL and orders. Colonel Hentsch was tasked with the coordination of the incoming information from these sources so that OHL could then understand what was happening at the front. He would eventually be find himself used to coordinate the right wing of the advance and enforce Falkenhayn’s strategy.
Plan of Action
Each junior officer was presented with Falkenhayn’s grand strategy to help them regulate the actions of army commands that each man was to be assigned to. Worried about a mess of independent actions impeding the overall strategy during this vast war of movement, each officer was to enforce Falkenhayn’s vision in their various assignments. Committed to a large flanking maneuver, Falkenhayn saw the right wing, comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies, as a means to encircle Paris, push back individual French forces, and take the French whole army in the rear. This was the knock out blow that was to finish the war in the West and allow Germany to engage Russia on better terms. The center would have to do it’s part and wheel around the fortified area of Verdun, separating and destroying the French 3rd and 4th armies, while taking the 1st and 2nd armies in the rear while the 6th army would serve as its fixing force for the moment. The 6th could also be tapped to provide reinforcements for the decisive sector near Paris if needed. The 7th army was being reformed for use to the north to serve as reinforcement to assist in the looping attack of the right wing as it descended on Paris and the furthest flank of the French forces.
Transient tactical opportunism would not be tolerated under Falkenhayn; the overall battle plan must be maintained. Spacing and direction would be crucial and it would be up to these junior officers to help their commanders to remain in line with the overall plan. So far von Bülow had used his power as lead commander in the right wing to force his neighbors to conform to his needs instead of the needs of the overall strategy. The result was the engagement at Mons, which threw away the opportunity to encircle the BEF, as von Kluck’s original plan would have allowed. Falkenhayn was aware of the folly and sought to correct future occurrences with his new policy.
The junior officers would all be in place by the 27th, the last arriving at the 1st army in the afternoon. This new arrangement would not be well received in the various HQ’s and the importance of the measure would not be felt for some time.
For the moment, a major strategic victory seemed in the offing, but logistics were breaking down as the right wing pushed further into France. Adding the 7th army into the equation threatened to collapse the system, but it was deemed necessary to complete the encirclement of Paris. Already the staff at OHL was being forced to create contingencies and the increasingly worried Falkenhayn began to envision increasing danger as Paris loomed in the horizon.
The Story
The sudden death of Helmuth von Moltke on the night of the 18th of August was the most decisive moment in modern history, Winston Churchill would later write in his history of the Great War. Certainly it seemed an ominous omen for Germany. Though the Kaiser was informed within minutes of the fatal fall, the general public remained in the dark until much later. Even when the newspapers were allowed to report it, the details were shrouded in mystery, as it was deemed unbecoming for the most senior officer of the Reichsheer to succumb to a fall down a flight of stairs. His death was a well-kept secret, so much so that the Allies and even the Austro-Hungarians were not even aware of the change in command until October.
In the meantime, the various officers actually running the war were anxious while waiting the Kaiser’s decision for Moltke’s replacement. Tappen, Hentsch, Groener and the rest were shocked and dismayed by the news, which came at startling speed from Berlin. Until now they had actually run much of the war themselves, with Moltke acting as a bystander most of the time. Eric von Falkenhayn was their collective fear. The minister of war represented a threat to their power and most of OHL resented his presence up to this point in Koblenz. In fact he was purposely kept in the dark to what was exactly happening at the front. It was felt that the minister should be in Berlin where his duties were. Additionally, some of the distain for Falkenhayn had to do with the suspicion that he was the Kaiser’s spy meant to keep tabs on them. Moltke and his staff had felt that the Kaiser was a buffoon and as Falkenhayn was his picked man, having been selected over the heads of many more experience and senior officers for his post in the war ministry, he was viewed in the same light.
Falkenhayn was a man apart from the traditional General Staff officers. He was handsome, well traveled, and bitingly sarcastic, all features that would serve to alienate Moltke’s staff and cause bitter arguments. The first power struggle was not long in coming, as the new commander sought to break up the clique dominating the war planning. The heads of the Operations, Intelligence, Political, and Central Sections (Tappen, Hentsch, Dommes, and Fabeck) of the staff had dominated OHL to the point that Moltke had essentially just confirmed their decisions. Falkenhayn proceeded to shake up his new command and express that his orders would be supreme. This came as a relief to many, including the junior officer Max Bauer, who described the chief of operations as “stupid, arrogant, and ignorant” among other adjectives. But he had alienated several important individuals on his staff, who would attempt to obstruct their commander at several crucial junctures in the coming weeks.
Battle of the Frontiers
At the front, the war was just heating up. The fall of Liege had occurred on the 16th and the German army was advancing through Belgium. In Alsace-Lorraine, the French invasion was going badly, with casualties running into the hundreds of thousands. Prince Rupprecht, the commander of the 6th army was demanding permission to launch counter attacks and resume the offensive. Moltke was reluctantly about to give permission, but Falkenhayn was more cautious still. Assent was given by Tappen before Falkenhayn had had a chance to settle in, infuriating the new chief. He had planned to use the troops in Lorraine to reinforce the right wing of the advance, only to have these men committed without his approve or indeed his knowledge. Furious, he took steps to remove elements of the section heads from his staff, which had made the decision. Tappen was severely chastised and kept under strict control, having to have all his orders approved by Falkenhayn, Hentsch was sent out to be the eyes and ears of OHL by monitoring the advance in person and reporting back to the staff, while the remaining members of the coterie were only provided information outside their officer during meetings with Falkenhayn. For now he belatedly approved the Lorraine offensive, but set a definite halt line, where the attack would stop and request further instruction. Falkenhayn already was planning on committing more forces to the right and intended to us elements of the 6th and 7th armies for this plan.
In the meantime, another important decision had to be made: what to do with the second wave of units to be committed to Belgium? This included the 6.5 Ersatz divisions, which were to be used as guards for the lines of communication under Moltke’s plan. These forces were desired by Rupprecht and his chief of staff, who wanted to launch a wider offensive out of Lorraine. Recognizing the threat that the Belgians at Antwerp represented and unable to tolerate the diversion of so many troops from the 1st army, five of these divisions would be sent to besiege Antwerp with the Landwehr from the 1st army, freeing von Beseler’s III reserve corps for use elsewhere. Antwerp would now be properly surrounded, cutting it off from outside communication. The assembling Naval division would also later appear at the siege to add necessary strength. The Belgians would attempt to sally several times to open communications with their allies and to aid the French, but to no avail.
The remaining division would be sent to the Crown Prince’s 5th army, where, with the temporary Landwehr division that was recently recently formed, it would help cover the fortress complex of Verdun. The independent Ersatz brigade would take over the occupation of Brussels, which would allow the 1st army to be restored to its establishment strength, so that it could move on undiminished. Though the exchanges would occur within days, the lagging troops would fall behind the main advance, only to be restored after the coming engagement at Mons.
On the 20th the 6th army threw the French 2nd army out of northern Alsace-Lorraine and caused the withdrawal of the 1st army of Pau to withdraw from the recently captured Mulhouse, as his flank became exposed. By the 22nd the invasion of Germany had returned to its kick off position along the Moselle. The battle of the Ardennes had started on the 21st, as the French 3rd and 4th armies advanced on Neufchateau and bumped into German forces of the 4th and 5th armies, who had methodically advanced through the forest since the 19th. By the 22nd the main forces had come into contact and vicious battles erupting all along the line. Hungry for glory, Rupprecht demanded an additional offensive to smash through the French line. Reaching his stop line, he petitioned to be allowed to continue the advance, receiving lukewarm approval for such a measure, but with several caveats: first, he was to remove the XXI and XV army corps and the 3rd cavalry corps from the Lorraine front to form the nucleus of the new 7th army, which was to be deployed to Belgium starting on September 1st. Otherwise, remaining forces were to focus on limited attacks that to seize important local terrain for tactical advantage. They should also be ready at any time to be withdrawn from the front for transfer to the right wing. Though Rupprecht protested heavily, he obeyed and prepared for a series of local attacks utilizing his massive advantage in heavy artillery to chew up the French.
Further north, the German 2nd and 3rd armies made contact with the French 5th army, which had concentrated on the town of Charleroi. Weakened by transfers of troops and artillery to the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, the French were sandwiched between two opposing, stronger armies that proceeded to push back and attempted to cut off the French forces. Ultimately unsuccessful, thanks to bold action by Franchet d’Esperey’s corps, the French fell back in disorder on the 23rd. The German 1st army had contacted advanced elements of the BEF on the 22nd and engaged the smaller army on the 23rd. Despite giving the Germans a bloody nose, the BEF withdrew on the 24th as the French 5th army had unexpected fallen back without prior notification leaving the British dangerously exposed.
Aware of battles being fought all along the frontier, Falkenhayn was incensed that OHL had only a vague impression of the situation. As a commander, he was uncomfortable with the concept of Aufträgstaktik and sought a firmer grip on the course of the fighting. The solution to this issue was to move OHL further west, closer to the front. Luxembourg would be the ultimate destination, despite the fears of many on the staff that the HQ would be too near the front. Furthermore, junior officers were dispatched to the various HQ’s of the armies operating on the Western Front with the conceptual overview of Falkenhayn’s war plan and orders to enforce his will. Ostensibly only observers, each man was provided with an aerial “courier” to dispatch important information to OHL and orders. Colonel Hentsch was tasked with the coordination of the incoming information from these sources so that OHL could then understand what was happening at the front. He would eventually be find himself used to coordinate the right wing of the advance and enforce Falkenhayn’s strategy.
Plan of Action
Each junior officer was presented with Falkenhayn’s grand strategy to help them regulate the actions of army commands that each man was to be assigned to. Worried about a mess of independent actions impeding the overall strategy during this vast war of movement, each officer was to enforce Falkenhayn’s vision in their various assignments. Committed to a large flanking maneuver, Falkenhayn saw the right wing, comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies, as a means to encircle Paris, push back individual French forces, and take the French whole army in the rear. This was the knock out blow that was to finish the war in the West and allow Germany to engage Russia on better terms. The center would have to do it’s part and wheel around the fortified area of Verdun, separating and destroying the French 3rd and 4th armies, while taking the 1st and 2nd armies in the rear while the 6th army would serve as its fixing force for the moment. The 6th could also be tapped to provide reinforcements for the decisive sector near Paris if needed. The 7th army was being reformed for use to the north to serve as reinforcement to assist in the looping attack of the right wing as it descended on Paris and the furthest flank of the French forces.
Transient tactical opportunism would not be tolerated under Falkenhayn; the overall battle plan must be maintained. Spacing and direction would be crucial and it would be up to these junior officers to help their commanders to remain in line with the overall plan. So far von Bülow had used his power as lead commander in the right wing to force his neighbors to conform to his needs instead of the needs of the overall strategy. The result was the engagement at Mons, which threw away the opportunity to encircle the BEF, as von Kluck’s original plan would have allowed. Falkenhayn was aware of the folly and sought to correct future occurrences with his new policy.
The junior officers would all be in place by the 27th, the last arriving at the 1st army in the afternoon. This new arrangement would not be well received in the various HQ’s and the importance of the measure would not be felt for some time.
For the moment, a major strategic victory seemed in the offing, but logistics were breaking down as the right wing pushed further into France. Adding the 7th army into the equation threatened to collapse the system, but it was deemed necessary to complete the encirclement of Paris. Already the staff at OHL was being forced to create contingencies and the increasingly worried Falkenhayn began to envision increasing danger as Paris loomed in the horizon.