Marne without Moltke v.2.0

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Deleted member 1487

Alright, I am going to slowly start reworking this TL, and I present the first installment here. Significant changes have been made and will continue to be made to each part. I will keep some of the story the same, but there will be major divergences coming, which will change the trajectory of the story. As always, constructive criticism is welcome, as is praise.

The Story
The sudden death of Helmuth von Moltke on the night of the 18th of August was the most decisive moment in modern history, Winston Churchill would later write in his history of the Great War. Certainly it seemed an ominous omen for Germany. Though the Kaiser was informed within minutes of the fatal fall, the general public remained in the dark until much later. Even when the newspapers were allowed to report it, the details were shrouded in mystery, as it was deemed unbecoming for the most senior officer of the Reichsheer to succumb to a fall down a flight of stairs. His death was a well-kept secret, so much so that the Allies and even the Austro-Hungarians were not even aware of the change in command until October.

In the meantime, the various officers actually running the war were anxious while waiting the Kaiser’s decision for Moltke’s replacement. Tappen, Hentsch, Groener and the rest were shocked and dismayed by the news, which came at startling speed from Berlin. Until now they had actually run much of the war themselves, with Moltke acting as a bystander most of the time. Eric von Falkenhayn was their collective fear. The minister of war represented a threat to their power and most of OHL resented his presence up to this point in Koblenz. In fact he was purposely kept in the dark to what was exactly happening at the front. It was felt that the minister should be in Berlin where his duties were. Additionally, some of the distain for Falkenhayn had to do with the suspicion that he was the Kaiser’s spy meant to keep tabs on them. Moltke and his staff had felt that the Kaiser was a buffoon and as Falkenhayn was his picked man, having been selected over the heads of many more experience and senior officers for his post in the war ministry, he was viewed in the same light.

Falkenhayn was a man apart from the traditional General Staff officers. He was handsome, well traveled, and bitingly sarcastic, all features that would serve to alienate Moltke’s staff and cause bitter arguments. The first power struggle was not long in coming, as the new commander sought to break up the clique dominating the war planning. The heads of the Operations, Intelligence, Political, and Central Sections (Tappen, Hentsch, Dommes, and Fabeck) of the staff had dominated OHL to the point that Moltke had essentially just confirmed their decisions. Falkenhayn proceeded to shake up his new command and express that his orders would be supreme. This came as a relief to many, including the junior officer Max Bauer, who described the chief of operations as “stupid, arrogant, and ignorant” among other adjectives. But he had alienated several important individuals on his staff, who would attempt to obstruct their commander at several crucial junctures in the coming weeks.

Battle of the Frontiers
At the front, the war was just heating up. The fall of Liege had occurred on the 16th and the German army was advancing through Belgium. In Alsace-Lorraine, the French invasion was going badly, with casualties running into the hundreds of thousands. Prince Rupprecht, the commander of the 6th army was demanding permission to launch counter attacks and resume the offensive. Moltke was reluctantly about to give permission, but Falkenhayn was more cautious still. Assent was given by Tappen before Falkenhayn had had a chance to settle in, infuriating the new chief. He had planned to use the troops in Lorraine to reinforce the right wing of the advance, only to have these men committed without his approve or indeed his knowledge. Furious, he took steps to remove elements of the section heads from his staff, which had made the decision. Tappen was severely chastised and kept under strict control, having to have all his orders approved by Falkenhayn, Hentsch was sent out to be the eyes and ears of OHL by monitoring the advance in person and reporting back to the staff, while the remaining members of the coterie were only provided information outside their officer during meetings with Falkenhayn. For now he belatedly approved the Lorraine offensive, but set a definite halt line, where the attack would stop and request further instruction. Falkenhayn already was planning on committing more forces to the right and intended to us elements of the 6th and 7th armies for this plan.
In the meantime, another important decision had to be made: what to do with the second wave of units to be committed to Belgium? This included the 6.5 Ersatz divisions, which were to be used as guards for the lines of communication under Moltke’s plan. These forces were desired by Rupprecht and his chief of staff, who wanted to launch a wider offensive out of Lorraine. Recognizing the threat that the Belgians at Antwerp represented and unable to tolerate the diversion of so many troops from the 1st army, five of these divisions would be sent to besiege Antwerp with the Landwehr from the 1st army, freeing von Beseler’s III reserve corps for use elsewhere. Antwerp would now be properly surrounded, cutting it off from outside communication. The assembling Naval division would also later appear at the siege to add necessary strength. The Belgians would attempt to sally several times to open communications with their allies and to aid the French, but to no avail.

The remaining division would be sent to the Crown Prince’s 5th army, where, with the temporary Landwehr division that was recently recently formed, it would help cover the fortress complex of Verdun. The independent Ersatz brigade would take over the occupation of Brussels, which would allow the 1st army to be restored to its establishment strength, so that it could move on undiminished. Though the exchanges would occur within days, the lagging troops would fall behind the main advance, only to be restored after the coming engagement at Mons.
On the 20th the 6th army threw the French 2nd army out of northern Alsace-Lorraine and caused the withdrawal of the 1st army of Pau to withdraw from the recently captured Mulhouse, as his flank became exposed. By the 22nd the invasion of Germany had returned to its kick off position along the Moselle. The battle of the Ardennes had started on the 21st, as the French 3rd and 4th armies advanced on Neufchateau and bumped into German forces of the 4th and 5th armies, who had methodically advanced through the forest since the 19th. By the 22nd the main forces had come into contact and vicious battles erupting all along the line. Hungry for glory, Rupprecht demanded an additional offensive to smash through the French line. Reaching his stop line, he petitioned to be allowed to continue the advance, receiving lukewarm approval for such a measure, but with several caveats: first, he was to remove the XXI and XV army corps and the 3rd cavalry corps from the Lorraine front to form the nucleus of the new 7th army, which was to be deployed to Belgium starting on September 1st. Otherwise, remaining forces were to focus on limited attacks that to seize important local terrain for tactical advantage. They should also be ready at any time to be withdrawn from the front for transfer to the right wing. Though Rupprecht protested heavily, he obeyed and prepared for a series of local attacks utilizing his massive advantage in heavy artillery to chew up the French.

Further north, the German 2nd and 3rd armies made contact with the French 5th army, which had concentrated on the town of Charleroi. Weakened by transfers of troops and artillery to the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, the French were sandwiched between two opposing, stronger armies that proceeded to push back and attempted to cut off the French forces. Ultimately unsuccessful, thanks to bold action by Franchet d’Esperey’s corps, the French fell back in disorder on the 23rd. The German 1st army had contacted advanced elements of the BEF on the 22nd and engaged the smaller army on the 23rd. Despite giving the Germans a bloody nose, the BEF withdrew on the 24th as the French 5th army had unexpected fallen back without prior notification leaving the British dangerously exposed.

Aware of battles being fought all along the frontier, Falkenhayn was incensed that OHL had only a vague impression of the situation. As a commander, he was uncomfortable with the concept of Aufträgstaktik and sought a firmer grip on the course of the fighting. The solution to this issue was to move OHL further west, closer to the front. Luxembourg would be the ultimate destination, despite the fears of many on the staff that the HQ would be too near the front. Furthermore, junior officers were dispatched to the various HQ’s of the armies operating on the Western Front with the conceptual overview of Falkenhayn’s war plan and orders to enforce his will. Ostensibly only observers, each man was provided with an aerial “courier” to dispatch important information to OHL and orders. Colonel Hentsch was tasked with the coordination of the incoming information from these sources so that OHL could then understand what was happening at the front. He would eventually be find himself used to coordinate the right wing of the advance and enforce Falkenhayn’s strategy.


Plan of Action

Each junior officer was presented with Falkenhayn’s grand strategy to help them regulate the actions of army commands that each man was to be assigned to. Worried about a mess of independent actions impeding the overall strategy during this vast war of movement, each officer was to enforce Falkenhayn’s vision in their various assignments. Committed to a large flanking maneuver, Falkenhayn saw the right wing, comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies, as a means to encircle Paris, push back individual French forces, and take the French whole army in the rear. This was the knock out blow that was to finish the war in the West and allow Germany to engage Russia on better terms. The center would have to do it’s part and wheel around the fortified area of Verdun, separating and destroying the French 3rd and 4th armies, while taking the 1st and 2nd armies in the rear while the 6th army would serve as its fixing force for the moment. The 6th could also be tapped to provide reinforcements for the decisive sector near Paris if needed. The 7th army was being reformed for use to the north to serve as reinforcement to assist in the looping attack of the right wing as it descended on Paris and the furthest flank of the French forces.

Transient tactical opportunism would not be tolerated under Falkenhayn; the overall battle plan must be maintained. Spacing and direction would be crucial and it would be up to these junior officers to help their commanders to remain in line with the overall plan. So far von Bülow had used his power as lead commander in the right wing to force his neighbors to conform to his needs instead of the needs of the overall strategy. The result was the engagement at Mons, which threw away the opportunity to encircle the BEF, as von Kluck’s original plan would have allowed. Falkenhayn was aware of the folly and sought to correct future occurrences with his new policy.

The junior officers would all be in place by the 27th, the last arriving at the 1st army in the afternoon. This new arrangement would not be well received in the various HQ’s and the importance of the measure would not be felt for some time.
For the moment, a major strategic victory seemed in the offing, but logistics were breaking down as the right wing pushed further into France. Adding the 7th army into the equation threatened to collapse the system, but it was deemed necessary to complete the encirclement of Paris. Already the staff at OHL was being forced to create contingencies and the increasingly worried Falkenhayn began to envision increasing danger as Paris loomed in the horizon.
 
Alright, I am going to slowly start reworking this TL, and I present the first installment here. Significant changes have been made and will continue to be made to each part. I will keep some of the story the same, but there will be major divergences coming, which will change the trajectory of the story. As always, constructive criticism is welcome, as is praise.

The Story
The sudden death of Helmuth von Moltke on the night of the 18th of August was the most decisive moment in modern history, Winston Churchill would later write in his history of the Great War. Certainly it seemed an ominous omen for Germany. Though the Kaiser was informed within minutes of the fatal fall, the general public remained in the dark until much later. Even when the newspapers were allowed to report it, the details were shrouded in mystery, as it was deemed unbecoming for the most senior officer of the Reichsheer to succumb to a fall down a flight of stairs. His death was a well-kept secret, so much so that the Allies and even the Austro-Hungarians were not even aware of the change in command until October.

In the meantime, the various officers actually running the war were anxious while waiting the Kaiser’s decision for Moltke’s replacement. Tappen, Hentsch, Groener and the rest were shocked and dismayed by the news, which came at startling speed from Berlin. Until now they had actually run much of the war themselves, with Moltke acting as a bystander most of the time. Eric von Falkenhayn was their collective fear. The minister of war represented a threat to their power and most of OHL resented his presence up to this point in Koblenz. In fact he was purposely kept in the dark to what was exactly happening at the front. It was felt that the minister should be in Berlin where his duties were. Additionally, some of the distain for Falkenhayn had to do with the suspicion that he was the Kaiser’s spy meant to keep tabs on them. Moltke and his staff had felt that the Kaiser was a buffoon and as Falkenhayn was his picked man, having been selected over the heads of many more experience and senior officers for his post in the war ministry, he was viewed in the same light.

Falkenhayn was a man apart from the traditional General Staff officers. He was handsome, well traveled, and bitingly sarcastic, all features that would serve to alienate Moltke’s staff and cause bitter arguments. The first power struggle was not long in coming, as the new commander sought to break up the clique dominating the war planning. The heads of the Operations, Intelligence, Political, and Central Sections (Tappen, Hentsch, Dommes, and Fabeck) of the staff had dominated OHL to the point that Moltke had essentially just confirmed their decisions. Falkenhayn proceeded to shake up his new command and express that his orders would be supreme. This came as a relief to many, including the junior officer Max Bauer, who described the chief of operations as “stupid, arrogant, and ignorant” among other adjectives. But he had alienated several important individuals on his staff, who would attempt to obstruct their commander at several crucial junctures in the coming weeks.

Battle of the Frontiers
At the front, the war was just heating up. The fall of Liege had occurred on the 16th and the German army was advancing through Belgium. In Alsace-Lorraine, the French invasion was going badly, with casualties running into the hundreds of thousands. Prince Rupprecht, the commander of the 6th army was demanding permission to launch counter attacks and resume the offensive. Moltke was reluctantly about to give permission, but Falkenhayn was more cautious still. Assent was given by Tappen before Falkenhayn had had a chance to settle in, infuriating the new chief. He had planned to use the troops in Lorraine to reinforce the right wing of the advance, only to have these men committed without his approve or indeed his knowledge. Furious, he took steps to remove elements of the section heads from his staff, which had made the decision. Tappen was severely chastised and kept under strict control, having to have all his orders approved by Falkenhayn, Hentsch was sent out to be the eyes and ears of OHL by monitoring the advance in person and reporting back to the staff, while the remaining members of the coterie were only provided information outside their officer during meetings with Falkenhayn. For now he belatedly approved the Lorraine offensive, but set a definite halt line, where the attack would stop and request further instruction. Falkenhayn already was planning on committing more forces to the right and intended to us elements of the 6th and 7th armies for this plan.
In the meantime, another important decision had to be made: what to do with the second wave of units to be committed to Belgium? This included the 6.5 Ersatz divisions, which were to be used as guards for the lines of communication under Moltke’s plan. These forces were desired by Rupprecht and his chief of staff, who wanted to launch a wider offensive out of Lorraine. Recognizing the threat that the Belgians at Antwerp represented and unable to tolerate the diversion of so many troops from the 1st army, five of these divisions would be sent to besiege Antwerp with the Landwehr from the 1st army, freeing von Beseler’s III reserve corps for use elsewhere. Antwerp would now be properly surrounded, cutting it off from outside communication. The assembling Naval division would also later appear at the siege to add necessary strength. The Belgians would attempt to sally several times to open communications with their allies and to aid the French, but to no avail.

The remaining division would be sent to the Crown Prince’s 5th army, where, with the temporary Landwehr division that was recently recently formed, it would help cover the fortress complex of Verdun. The independent Ersatz brigade would take over the occupation of Brussels, which would allow the 1st army to be restored to its establishment strength, so that it could move on undiminished. Though the exchanges would occur within days, the lagging troops would fall behind the main advance, only to be restored after the coming engagement at Mons.
On the 20th the 6th army threw the French 2nd army out of northern Alsace-Lorraine and caused the withdrawal of the 1st army of Pau to withdraw from the recently captured Mulhouse, as his flank became exposed. By the 22nd the invasion of Germany had returned to its kick off position along the Moselle. The battle of the Ardennes had started on the 21st, as the French 3rd and 4th armies advanced on Neufchateau and bumped into German forces of the 4th and 5th armies, who had methodically advanced through the forest since the 19th. By the 22nd the main forces had come into contact and vicious battles erupting all along the line. Hungry for glory, Rupprecht demanded an additional offensive to smash through the French line. Reaching his stop line, he petitioned to be allowed to continue the advance, receiving lukewarm approval for such a measure, but with several caveats: first, he was to remove the XXI and XV army corps and the 3rd cavalry corps from the Lorraine front to form the nucleus of the new 7th army, which was to be deployed to Belgium starting on September 1st. Otherwise, remaining forces were to focus on limited attacks that to seize important local terrain for tactical advantage. They should also be ready at any time to be withdrawn from the front for transfer to the right wing. Though Rupprecht protested heavily, he obeyed and prepared for a series of local attacks utilizing his massive advantage in heavy artillery to chew up the French.

Further north, the German 2nd and 3rd armies made contact with the French 5th army, which had concentrated on the town of Charleroi. Weakened by transfers of troops and artillery to the invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, the French were sandwiched between two opposing, stronger armies that proceeded to push back and attempted to cut off the French forces. Ultimately unsuccessful, thanks to bold action by Franchet d’Esperey’s corps, the French fell back in disorder on the 23rd. The German 1st army had contacted advanced elements of the BEF on the 22nd and engaged the smaller army on the 23rd. Despite giving the Germans a bloody nose, the BEF withdrew on the 24th as the French 5th army had unexpected fallen back without prior notification leaving the British dangerously exposed.

Aware of battles being fought all along the frontier, Falkenhayn was incensed that OHL had only a vague impression of the situation. As a commander, he was uncomfortable with the concept of Aufträgstaktik and sought a firmer grip on the course of the fighting. The solution to this issue was to move OHL further west, closer to the front. Luxembourg would be the ultimate destination, despite the fears of many on the staff that the HQ would be too near the front. Furthermore, junior officers were dispatched to the various HQ’s of the armies operating on the Western Front with the conceptual overview of Falkenhayn’s war plan and orders to enforce his will. Ostensibly only observers, each man was provided with an aerial “courier” to dispatch important information to OHL and orders. Colonel Hentsch was tasked with the coordination of the incoming information from these sources so that OHL could then understand what was happening at the front. He would eventually be find himself used to coordinate the right wing of the advance and enforce Falkenhayn’s strategy.


Plan of Action

Each junior officer was presented with Falkenhayn’s grand strategy to help them regulate the actions of army commands that each man was to be assigned to. Worried about a mess of independent actions impeding the overall strategy during this vast war of movement, each officer was to enforce Falkenhayn’s vision in their various assignments. Committed to a large flanking maneuver, Falkenhayn saw the right wing, comprising the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies, as a means to encircle Paris, push back individual French forces, and take the French whole army in the rear. This was the knock out blow that was to finish the war in the West and allow Germany to engage Russia on better terms. The center would have to do it’s part and wheel around the fortified area of Verdun, separating and destroying the French 3rd and 4th armies, while taking the 1st and 2nd armies in the rear while the 6th army would serve as its fixing force for the moment. The 6th could also be tapped to provide reinforcements for the decisive sector near Paris if needed. The 7th army was being reformed for use to the north to serve as reinforcement to assist in the looping attack of the right wing as it descended on Paris and the furthest flank of the French forces.

Transient tactical opportunism would not be tolerated under Falkenhayn; the overall battle plan must be maintained. Spacing and direction would be crucial and it would be up to these junior officers to help their commanders to remain in line with the overall plan. So far von Bülow had used his power as lead commander in the right wing to force his neighbors to conform to his needs instead of the needs of the overall strategy. The result was the engagement at Mons, which threw away the opportunity to encircle the BEF, as von Kluck’s original plan would have allowed. Falkenhayn was aware of the folly and sought to correct future occurrences with his new policy.

The junior officers would all be in place by the 27th, the last arriving at the 1st army in the afternoon. This new arrangement would not be well received in the various HQ’s and the importance of the measure would not be felt for some time.
For the moment, a major strategic victory seemed in the offing, but logistics were breaking down as the right wing pushed further into France. Adding the 7th army into the equation threatened to collapse the system, but it was deemed necessary to complete the encirclement of Paris. Already the staff at OHL was being forced to create contingencies and the increasingly worried Falkenhayn began to envision increasing danger as Paris loomed in the horizon.

Glad to see you rebooted this.
 

Riain

Banned
Sweet. Don't get carried away with marching distances, the logistics were no good and the marching troops were knackered by the Marne. More troops etc isn't going to change that, but they will provide numbers at the same culmination points.
 

Riain

Banned
I'm thinking from the questions about coastal defences the other day the Germans are going to win the Race To The Sea. Sweet!
 
I can't warm to the concept of sending out junior officers. In the Geman tradition you have to address the leader. Even the parallel general staff structure in WW1 was frowned upon by many - and that was army group or army chief of staff to Falkenhayn and later Ludendorff, not just a junior officer. - The system you describe won't work. The junior officers either go over to their resüective army staff - or they will be isolated.
 
Sweet. Don't get carried away with marching distances, the logistics were no good and the marching troops were knackered by the Marne.

But not too knackered to march from the Marne to the Aisne. What was that, about 50 miles? So they could probably march a similar distance in the other dirction.
 

Deleted member 1487

I can't warm to the concept of sending out junior officers. In the Geman tradition you have to address the leader. Even the parallel general staff structure in WW1 was frowned upon by many - and that was army group or army chief of staff to Falkenhayn and later Ludendorff, not just a junior officer. - The system you describe won't work. The junior officers either go over to their resüective army staff - or they will be isolated.


Oh, I know it won't work. The defects will become quite apparent as the campaign continues, which will I will detail in the next installment. For the time being, it just struck me as a compromise strategy to exert more influence and have impartial observers who would send information back to OHL that Falkenhayn would have gone for. Perhaps I do need to retcon the concept...
 
Wiking, this is by far one of my favourity WI WWI western front timelines and I'm really glad it's back. [So rare now is it for me to actually post in places other than political chat, I really must do better :eek:] Anyway I really look forward to it. Capture those ports and the industry! Shorten the front line! And bombard me with obscure French villages I have to get my maps out to find :)
 

Deleted member 1487

OHL
Issues were mounting OHL that disturbed the festive attitude of the staff in the wake of the victories in the West that left the French on the run. In one of his first crises Falkenhayn was disturbed to receive a call from general von Prittwitz, commander of the 8th army, distraught and demanding reinforcements, while claiming that he was abandoning East Prussia to the Russians. Unbeknownst to OHL, Prittwitz recovered his nerve by the end of the night and had set plans in motion that would culminate in the battle of Tannenberg. But Falkenhayn had already resolved to remove Prittwitz and his chief-of-staff. Orders went out the next day to reactive the retired general Hindenburg, a native of East Prussia, to take command. Also, the chief-of-staff of III army corps, von Seeckt, was tapped to join him. This caused considerable debate, as removing the chief-of-staff at this crucial juncture could seriously disrupt the afflicted corps, but von Seeckt was very confident in his assistant, Georg Wetzell, to take over his post. The transfers were made and on the 21st von Seeckt was on his way to the East. In the meantime Falkenhayn contacted the remaining staff of the 8th army on the 22nd, now headed up by colonel Hoffmann, who now claimed the Eastern Front would not require reinforcement. This was a massive relief for OHL, as every man was needed in the West.
Ludendorff needed to be rewarded for his actions at Liege and the opening in the East seemed to be a perfect spot for the hero of the hour. Falkenhayn was not a fan of the man, who had been a protégé of Moltke However, he was popular among many in the army, so a prestigious spot was found for him in the West, one to keep him out of the way, but not so far as to be humiliating. Antwerp was to be his new posting, where he was to take command and eventually capture the city. Given his recent experience taking Liege, it seemed a perfect fit. Frustrated with the necessary passive stance his forces needed to take initially, as there were no siege weapons available for weeks thanks to the more crucial sieges at Namur and Longwy, as well as the coming obstacle of Maubeuge. For the moment Ludendorff would have to wait for the 1st naval division and the siege guns, while beating of the frequent Belgian probes and occasional sallies. There was also the threat that the British would attempt to land men to his rear to aid the Belgians, causing significant worries. Calls for reinforcements were ignored for now, as were Ludendorff’s demands for a more active assignment.
Significant difficulties were developing at the main front in Belgium and Northern France, as logistic troubles were mounting. The Belgians had effectively sabotaged the rail net in their country, holding up supplies and forcing the German armies of the right wing to plunder the countryside for food. Falkenhayn was a cautious man, who still worried about the increasing distances that the armies were traveling and the successful French and British rearguards, which were sapping his armies of strength. Though his generals reported great victories, there were no corresponding hauls of prisoners and captured equipment, just more casualties. Coupled with this dilemma, which seemed only to concern Falkenhayn, the chief was constantly quarreling with his staff.
Tappen and others were consistently arguing for increased offensive action in Alsace, confident as they were that the war was won and that the French needed only a push to collapse. A breakthrough there would result in a ‘super-Cannae’, which would go down in history as a greater victory than even the Franco-Prussian war. Rupprecht was furious that his fleeting chance at glory in the war was denied, as the Commander in Chief had denied him the right to conduct a broader offensive towards Nancy. In fact his front was weakened by the transfer forces to form a new 7th army, which meant that this sort of breakthrough was now impossible. This suited Falkenhayn well, as he now thought that any attack without the 420mm Krupp guns on the French border fortress system would be a bloody failure, as with Liege. All that was authorized was short, sharp, limited attacks to capture important tactical terrain, which would bleed the French, keep them occupied, and pin them to the front. This worked splendidly against the French, as the Germans possessed so much heavy artillery at that army level that the enemy could not compete. Instead, de Castelnau and Dubail were frustrated by their inability to compete and soon launched a new series of attacks to thrown the Germans back and renew the war of maneuver.
The French 1st and 2nd army were still being stripped of forces to help form new forces to oppose the Germans, including Foch’s detachment, soon to become the 9th army, and the 6th army around Paris, initially to help defend the city. As a result, though the French engaged the Germans from late August to early September in massive new assaults, they simply suffered more casualties and did not prevent the frontier from becoming a source of German reinforcements. In fact, all these attacks did was to pin valuable troops to the sector instead of making them available in more decisive areas. These assaults were finally called off by September 4th leaving French forces exhausted and allowing the Bavarians to redeploy.

In the meantime, Falkenhayn was somewhat buoyed by his correct judgment to reinforce the screen around Antwerp, as the Belgians sorteed on the 23rd, hoping to disrupt German supply lines. The ersatz divisions were still arriving, several units even being thrown into the line directly from arriving trains. The Belgian move was blocked and thrown back into the ring of fortresses surrounding the national redoubt. The tiny nation’s army would be marginalized for the duration of the campaign despite attempting another action of the 7th of September to aid the allies in the battles around Paris. This final move would destroy the moral of the defenders, who would never again attempt an offensive action.


The Right-
The fighting in the North had changed into a pursuit, as what was later termed the “Great Retreat” began for the Allies. Several counter attacks were launched during this period by the French to slow the relentless German advance, with varying degrees of success. It was discovered by the long suffering German soldiers that the (in)famous French 75mm field gun was an excellent defensive weapon against exposed, advancing masses of troops, which was characteristic of the German assault columns at the time. The weapon had at its disposal a shrapnel shell with 10,000 ball bearings that exploded 1-3 meters above the ground reliably, making it more effective than a machine gun at stopping attacks cold. Despite the heavy casualties that the Germans were taking, they did experience some successes, such as the capture of Namur on the 25th. This shocked the world, as it was expected to hold out for 6 months. The subsequent loss meant that the Germans would be free to send the troops back to the front.

The most notable and important actions during the retreat include the following:

Le Cateau, where the BEF made a stand on the 26th of August, hoping to halt the Allied retreat. Unfortunately, the battle proved to be a disaster for the British, as the German artillery proved to be the most effective counter to the excellent marksmenship of the “Old Contemptibles”. Of the 40,000 men engaged, nearly a quarter became casualties. Another important factor for the loss, was that the Germans attacked along the flank, overwhelming the defenders, causing nearly 2,600 men to surrender. The French forces in the area, the Group d’Amada, were too far away to be an important factor until much too late. The fortified town of Maubeuge was invested in prior to the battle, which caused the 2nd army of the German right to drop off troops to reduce it. It would fall on the 7th of September.

St. Quentin (Battle of Guise): After the Allies withdrew from Le Cateau on the night of the 26th the retreat continued. The German armies start to draw out of order, chasing the various Allied armies that they clashed with over the previous week. As there remained little coordination between the armies, save for what could be organized by the junior officers deployed to the various army HQ’s. Aware that the plan was coming unhinged by the pursuits, the general staff officers with Belöw and Kluck attempted to keep the armies in line, despite the separation pulling the 2nd army away from Hausen’s 3rd. Aware of this development, and that the 7th army was transferring from Alsace, Falkenhayn, when he was informed of the move, allowed for the gap to develop, with the intention of sending the 7th army to plug it. In the meantime, Joffre was planning to throw a monkey wrench into the German offensive. Convinced that the campaign was essentially won, Belöw was confused when plans were discovered for a counter attack by the French 5th army on a captured officer on the 28th. Prepared for the worst, they met the attack the next day launching a counter counter attack, forcing Lanrezac’s left over the Oise. However, the French still managed to capture Guise by nightfall. Realizing his precarious position, Lanrezac fell back the next day under order of Joffre, destroying the bridges over the Oise. The battle had delayed Bulöw, forcing him to stay in place on the 30th, further disjointing the link between armies.

The Center-

The 4th and 5th armies would continue to grind through the forests and over the Meuse. The French would become of much more proficient foe, as they had learned from their earlier mistakes quickly. The four days along the frontier had cost the French nearly 140,000 men, which would balloon to 260,000 along the whole front, including 75,000 dead by the end of the month. The Germans would overall suffer less than 136,000 for the entire front, but this was not clear at the time. Both sides thought they were winning the casualty game, exaggerating the losses the other was suffering. But it was clear who was in retreat. The slow fighting was separating the Allies from Verdun, their hinge. Sarrial’s 3rd army was stubbornly resisting this move, but the move backward was inexorably occurring. By the 26th, Hausen’s 3rd army had invested Givet and was attacking the border between the French 4th and 5th armies, creating a dangerous situation. This would ultimately be salvaged by troops transferred from the Franco-Italian border, as Italy declared its neutrality after prompting by the Allies, and from troops in Lorraine. This unit, called the Foch detachment, would resist the German 3rd army for the rest of the month before becoming the 9th army and would prevent Hausen from wheeling and taking Larezac’s 5th in the flank/rear in the wake of the battle of Guise.

Results:
By the end of the day on the 30th of August, the situation of the right was critical, at least to Falkenhayn. The engagements fought over the previous 10 days had pulled the overall alignment of the German armies out of joint. After the battle on the 29th, it was obvious that the 2nd army was exhausted and casualties were taking their toll. The 1st army was pulling forward of the 2nd, which left that army behind its other neighbor, the 3rd army. Informed by aerial messenger of the situation after a considerable delay, Falkenhayn ordered the right wing to halt. This was partly to allow supply to catch up, something that was causing significant problems to the advancing armies, but this order caused intense disagreements among the OHL staff. Some supported Falkenhayn, though the majority thought that giving the French time to recover would throw away the opportunity for victory. Tappen and Falkenhayn would have a permanent falling out over the issue, one which plagued their working relationship for the remainder of Tappen’s tenure. By the time the advance continued on the 31st, the French were still in retreat, but now slightly ahead of the Germans. The BEF had fled the scene entirely.
It was obvious by this point that the goal of encircling the Entente forces before they could make contact with Paris had failed. The 1st and 2nd army had become separated and while there was currently no threat that the BEF would exploit the gap, there were still fears that it would prove fatal. Kluck wanted to chase the BEF and prevent it from recovering, while Below was just worried about his flanks. The reduction of his forces to besiege Maubeuge worried him, as had his setback at Guise. The 7th army was just starting to move to Brussels, so for now the 1st army would need to conform to its neighbor. However, there was a new threat developing: intelligence indicated that the French were forming a new army in front of Paris, over the Ourcq. Falkenhayn was worried that the French were going to try to turn his flank the closer he approached to Paris, but to give up the advance now would mean the front could solidify and costly frontal attacks would be the only option. For now the intended plan to swoop around Paris was impossible with the forces on hand, so preparations were needed to bring up even more forces, which meant the 6th army. For now it was defending against another French offensive, which meant that until it was resolved, that force had to stay put.
The solution arrived at, especially given the precarious supply situation, was to continue the advance to a specific halt line to allow the center to be covered by the right wing, upon which the 1st and 2nd armies would hold and absorb French counter attacks while waiting for the 7th army and later the 6th. OHL felt that picking the ground to fight on would give them the chance to hold until supply could be picked up and reinforcements inserted into the line. Once this happened, then the right wing would continue forward. The halt line was set for the Marne. Kluck and Below were informed of the plan, which was accepted without much argument, as the ‘wheel’ inward was desired by both men. Once the necessary orders were given, the advance was set to continue.

The halt of the right wing, which did not include the 3rd army, gave the exhausted and attritted soldiers of the 1st and 2nd armies a badly needed rest. They would have until the 1st of September to prepare, but the short time was still welcomed. The halt had allowed the diversion of trains to prevent an added hardship on the men, who now had time to requisition food from some of the richest farm country in France. Belöw’s men were given time to catch up and prepare for the next step of the advance.

The Allies:
On the other side of the hill, the halt had given the allied armies a badly needed rest as well. The French had intercepted the halt order given on the 30th from the Eiffel tower. Though able to intercept, the tower was not yet able to completely jam German transmissions. The line was reformed, but the BEF was not yet rallied; Intervention by Kitchener would be necessary to finally get general French to stop his retreat, but the restart of the German advance delayed the confrontation. The French 6th army was forming up on the farthest wing of the Allied left, mostly units drawn from the frontier. By now the French outnumbered the German right wing by 1.5:1 with 40 divisions to the German 26. However, the 6th army was not yet completely formed. Lanrezac’s counter attack had bought the Allies time, unexpectedly so with the inexplicable German halt. Joffre was waiting for the right time to counter attack and envelop the Germans, but first they must be drawn in. Additionally, his forces were not yet able to stand fast against the advancing Germans, the 5th army’s respite notwithstanding. Not sure of how long the halt would last and unaware of the reorientation of the 1st army, which now aimed for the center, Joffre allowed the retreat to resume.

The stage was set for the great decisive battle that would decide the course of the war.
 

Riain

Banned
Very Nice! What about a naval evacuation of Antwerp, it could be a nice touch.
 
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By this time, Hoffmann was a Major, Ia of 8th Army Command, COS was Waldersee.

The effect of the French 75s was more on the morale than in terms of casualties. The constant banging - while the own artillery wasn't noticeable - ennerved the German soldiers. But habitually, the French were shooting too high to do much danger.
Only were the 75s were used to defend prepared French positions, like at the Meuse crossing, were they really able to do a lot of damage.
And the Germans didn't advance in dense crowds, only were formations (away from the combat) were caught while road marching, bulk casualties might occur.

Given Ludendorff's restless ability to organise, he should be able to design his siege army from scratch, using old fortress guns from Germany and everything that Liège could provide.
 

Deleted member 1487

By this time, Hoffmann was a Major, Ia of 8th Army Command, COS was Waldersee.
Correct, I was off on his rank, however, Waldersee is gone with Prittwitz, leaving Hoffmann as the most knowledgeable man regarding operations with the 8th army on the 22nd.

The effect of the French 75s was more on the morale than in terms of casualties. The constant banging - while the own artillery wasn't noticeable - ennerved the German soldiers. But habitually, the French were shooting too high to do much danger.
Only were the 75s were used to defend prepared French positions, like at the Meuse crossing, were they really able to do a lot of damage.
And the Germans didn't advance in dense crowds, only were formations (away from the combat) were caught while road marching, bulk casualties might occur.
Disagree there. The 75mm caused the bulk of German casualties during 1914, somewhere around 75%. Historically with around 700,000 losses to the German army in the west in 1914, near 500,000 were inflicted by the 75mm guns, given the previous ratio (accounting for losses to the Belgian and British). The shrapnel shells were like giant shot guns, so for attacking troops, it was deadly. Rommel's book details a particularly graphic scene with losses to the 75. Furthermore the German infantry often attacked with fixed bayonets in masses for shock action, just like the French. The guards units in particular were guilty of this, something progressive officers of the day lamented. Training and doctrine varied greatly in German units, as corps commanders were given control over how their troops were trained. Often units of the same division were demonstrate fire and maneuver tactics, others napoleonic fixed bayonet charges, based solely on the whims of their commanders. I've read enough first person accounts of German attacks in 1914 being chewed up by the the 75 to know it wasn't hyperbole. I'd like to know why you think they were shooting to high; I've never come across that blanket statement before in reading about the French artillery.

Given Ludendorff's restless ability to organise, he should be able to design his siege army from scratch, using old fortress guns from Germany and everything that Liège could provide.

Sure, Ludendorff may have that ability, but he doesn't have the authority. It takes time, manpower, and transportation to do what you are suggesting, things he doesn't have. There is a reason that the Germans did not do this in 1914: they don't have any extra of the above. It just makes more sense to wait for the super heavies before moving on. They arrived on September 28th, which is a shorter time than removing and fashioning carriages for older heavy guns that were not of the caliber necessary to penetrate the Belgian forts around Antwerp. So for now Ludendorff has to kick his heels and prevent the Belgians from breaking out.


Very Nice! What about a naval evacuation of Antwerp, it could be a nice touch.
Antwerp could not be evacuated by sea even historically due to Dutch neutrality. They controlled the mouth of the Scheldt and would not let any combatant enter their territory, just like the Germans did not enter Maastricht. So the only way for them to evacuate by sea is to break out and head to the coast, i.e. Nieuport or Oostend. Or for the British to land troops to help them out like historically. Churchill might be making an appearance in a later installment...
 
If you read Rommel's account, it amounts to 'much noise about nill' - the impression of an overwhelming thunderstorm - but without hitting lightnings.
Shrapnel may be deadly if aimed correctly. In most cases, however, the French just 'let fly' - without any idea where the German troops were, except general direction.
The story of the 'fabulous' (!) 75s is a French myth, which Anglo-American writers have adopted without ever questioning it. That doesn't make it any more true.

Ludendorff will acquire the authority by just exerting it. He will only stop if confronted massively by a superior. The man was a maniac.
 

Deleted member 1487

If you read Rommel's account, it amounts to 'much noise about nill' - the impression of an overwhelming thunderstorm - but without hitting lightnings.

Depends on what section you are reading. There were other passages that included stories of how 2 squads (26 men) were shredded by one shell.

Shrapnel may be deadly if aimed correctly. In most cases, however, the French just 'let fly' - without any idea where the German troops were, except general direction.
The story of the 'fabulous' (!) 75s is a French myth, which Anglo-American writers have adopted without ever questioning it. That doesn't make it any more true.
Heavily disagree there. Read up on Verdun and what the measly 75 was able to accomplish there. While it is overrated as the best field piece of the era (it was close no doubt), it was not the best artillery piece of the war by a long shot. However, in 1914 during the retreat, it proved effective in hurting the Germans. During August and September (i.e. before Ypres) the German suffered nearly 400,000 casualties. Like I stated before the French artillery accounted for ~75% of German casualties in 1914, and considering that 95% of French artillery in 1914 was the 75mm field gun, guess which was the most casualty producing weapon in their arsenal?

Now there is no question that the piece was not always used properly or effectively, but combat is an imprecise art and people make mistakes. As I stated last time, there are plenty of memoirs and regiment diaries that included horrific stories of the effectiveness of the 75, even Holger Herwig mentions how effective it was in his book on Germany during WW1. As possibly the best English language scholar on Germany's war effort, he has read quite a few first person accounts by Germans of the 75's effectiveness. So I honestly trust that it was a heavily effective weapon on the retreat when it can 'let fly' on advancing columns and quickly retreat to set up down the road.

Ludendorff will acquire the authority by just exerting it. He will only stop if confronted massively by a superior. The man was a maniac.

Uh, he has no authority to order forts in Germany to dismantle their guns and send them to him in Antwerp. He must request that in 1914, as he still has no authority over anything beyond the troops besieging Antwerp. He'd have to request everything he needs. The chain of command is still in effect after all. Historically he might have been able to do what you are suggesting when in command of the 8th army, as he as also given control of the German war effort in the East, including the fortress system covering the eastern border and several corps districts, which were the means within Germany for administrating the war effort in every fashion. Here he has no such authority.
 
Being a reader of German regimental histories myself, I know that most of these do not contain horrific stories about the effectiveness of the 75s. During the French attacks at the Marne and during the retreat, the constant banging of French artillery was seen as a sign of the enemy's superiority, but actual losses to it were insignificant. - As were overall German losses in that battles. Karl von Einem, then a corps commander, was wondering why von Bülow, his army commander, ordered a hasty retreat although his two divisions had suffered only very lightly in the combat, one of them had been in the centre of Foch's attacks.

At Verdun, the 75s no longer were spraying shrapnel. Attributing 75 percent of the losses to artillery is a figure valid for WW1 overall. In 1914, considerable losses on both sides were due to rifle fire.

When Max Bauer, a junior major of the OHL staff, could order the artillery of Metz at the disposal of Rupprecht's army (without any authority to do so), what do you think Generalmajor Ludendorff would do with the fortress artillery of Cologne and Liège. He would not ask the chain of command to produce something for him, but would go and get it.
 
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Deleted member 1487

The next installment is due soon, real life has gotten in the way though.
 

Deleted member 1487

Prelude to the Marne

September 1st started the advance of the German right wing once again. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd German armies once again lunged forward, but found the French 5th army had retreated. The 1st army had wheeled inward, with OHL and Kluck both considering the French forces to his front a negligible threat for now. Appraised of the intelligence that the French were forming a force in Paris, Kluck was aware of the potential threat, but given the British retreat and his firmly held belief that the BEF was smashed, he did not consider the situation threatening. Rather, he saw the French 5th army’s open flank as an opportunity to assure his place in history. The resumption of the advance would be staggered to allow for the 1st army to get advance and close the gap between the armies, as well as give them a chance to close in on the French 5th instead of just pushing them back.

Reorienting his army to the southeast, Kluck now sought a decision in the French campaign. Below was happy for the support, especially as Hausen’s 3rd army was soon to encounter Foch’s detachment, limiting his ability to intervene. Lanrezac began to pull back when the inward wheel was discovered by air reconnaissance, though the German 2nd army had not advanced yet. When it was discovered that the French had started to pull back, Below ordered his troops to move forward, which they did with caution. The French slipped away again, though Kluck’s forces stood closer than ever to Lanrezac’s open flank. By September 2nd, the German 1st army had crossed the Oise and was barreling forward toward the Ourcq and Marne. The French had started to fight again at the Vesle river, but slowly inched back toward the Marne as the 1st army approached. Falling back over the Marne by midday on September 3rd with the 9th army at their flank, the 5th army was now baiting the trap for the Germans.

To the East the fighting was hard going for the German 4th and 5th armies, as the French retreated slowly and fought well through the rough terrain of the Argonne. Unlike their retreat at the beginning of the campaign, the French 3rd and 4th armies had been retreating only to keep pace with the detachments at their left flank, rather than being defeated in battle. This retreat and the lack of symbols of obvious victories, like prisoners or captured artillery, had convinced Falkenhayn that the French were trying to draw them in to a trap. At a loss to stop the advance, he was starting to dither about where the final halt line should be. First it was the Marne river, but as the 1st army plunged onward, properly covering the flank exposed to Paris, Falkenhayn sanctioned Kluck’s advance over the Marne on the 4th. As more intelligence rolled in as to the strength of the French build up in Paris, he belatedly and desperately called a halt. There was an important delay in the halt order, as the Eiffel tower was jamming wireless communications for over 100km outside of Paris. Aerial courier finally reached Kluck on the 5th, who promptly disregarded the message, as he was convinced that the French 5th army was finally within his grasp.

Having left three corps covering Paris, two reserve and his most depleted active corps, Kluck led with his cavalry corps and two most aggressive corps, the 3rd and 9th. The remaining corps covered the gap between the two separated detachments, setting up on the Grand Morin, though desperately overstretched. Blowing bridges and digging defensive positions in case of French attack, this single corps would be the single most important element in deciding the course of the battle of the Marne. The attack element that had chased after the supposed flank of the French 5th army discovered simply that it was a new cavalry corps formed from forces taken from the Franco-German frontier. The German 2nd army was fighting hard to push the 5th army back over the Petit Morin, while the German 3rd was fighting hard with the French 9th. Kluck’s forces now joined in on the afternoon of the September 5th with their cavalry corps contacting the French cavalry, who were covering flank of the 5th army. Kluck maneuvered his two attacking infantry corps across the Grand Morin to strike the 5th army to the south of the French cavalry corps on the 6th, but his exhausted forces were maneuvering too slowly to take advantage of the fleeting situation. Franchet d’Esperey, Lanrezac’s aggressive replacement, brought up his reserves and met the Germans with his larger, fresh corps.

Unbeknownst to OHL or Kluck was the return of the rallied BEF to the field. Advancing during the day on September 6th, the newly reinforced, though still wary British plunged back into the fight, eager to take advantage of the German focus on Paris and the 5th army. They would not start to attack until the 7th, but skirmishing began with the single corps that Kluck had left on the Grand Morin.

Over the Marne, Paris was a beehive of activity. The advance of the German 1st army, seemingly directly at Paris, had caused panic in the population and a grim determination among the new 6th army to defend the city no matter the cost. The government had fled over several days prior, which left the city a military base. The fortifications ringing the city would keep it safe, as would the righteous anger of the army. However, the Germans had only screened the city with half their number before moving on, leaving the 6th army numerically superior. Gallieni, the military governor of the city appealed for a strike now that the Germans were outnumbered, something that Joffre had been planning for several days. Allowing the eager general to help rather the garrison of Paris to attack with the 6th army, the advance began on the morning of the September 6th, once it was obvious the Germans over the Marne were committed and engaged in battle. It was time to throw l’Boche out of France.

All along the line battle was joined, in some places earlier than others. By September 6th, action was heating up and the exhausted armies of both sides steeled themselves to decide the fate of their nations. With the French and British joining battle the German troops were eager to end it, here and now, while the Entente forces were ready to finally stop the retreat and start their advance that toward Berlin.
 
This is going in a completely different direction than 1.0. Will there be decisive action? Will a repulsed Germany still be able to get the channel ports (as in 1.0?).

Eagerly waiting.
 
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