A Cat of a Different Color: China After Mao

[Rediv]

Originally Posted by stevep

I suspect both will be doing something, not necessarily in co-ordination. However given how far the Chinese have gone and the warnings they have ignored [or at least decided not to respond to] from the SU I suspect the Russians are moving fairly rapidly by this point from subtle suggestions to cool it in the direction of menacing troop concentrations on the northern border and just about every sign they can make that something nasty is going to happen. With the Chinese slogging their way into Hanoi I suspect their not bluffing either. [Given that Vietnam is an important ally to them, both politically before of its involvement in the defeat of the US and strategically in terms of both bases in SE Asia and flanking China.

With the US I would expect Carter will be seeking to calm things down but he may be somewhat disturbed by Chinese behaviour and less content than Nixon say might have been with them as possible allies. [Presuming Reagan gets in in 1980 and if China hasn't gone off the deep end but still looks more controlled by the military I wonder if he will seek good relations with China against the Russians or do a 'plague on both your houses' and switch support back to Taiwan. [Think I remember some Republicans calling for that sort of thing at the time?]

Steve,

Very true. A negotiated settlement is not exactly what the Soviets have in mind right now. You also make some good points about the US. Already in the mid to late 70’s IOTL, American public opinion towards China had begun to sour after the euphoric China craze of the ping-pong diplomacy years. And TTL’s war-mongering, Khmer Rouge-supporting China isn’t nearly as appealing of an ally as OTL’s economy-reforming, ideologically-liberalizing China.

One minor note: At this point, the US still officially recognizes Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. IOTL, the switch was made on Jan. 1, 1979 – ITTL, the Chinese have been a bit too preoccupied with other issues, and normalization with the Americans has largely fallen by the wayside for the time being.

And you’re right about the Republicans and Taiwan – in 1979-80 Reagan himself dropped several hints that he might make the switch back, or at least upgrade the US representative in Taiwan to a more official status.

Oh, and a new update is coming…

[Rediv]

…right now! Here’s a look at what’s happening back in China:

--------------------------

When the war started, we were busier than we had been in a long time. Nearly every day, the newspaper would get new dispatches from Beijing reporting that our troops had captured another town or another province; they came one right after the other – Dong Dang, Cao Bang, Lao Cai, Lang Son. And there would be other, longer articles too, about the exploits of our soldiers, about the new heroes who were making a name for themselves every day. We could barely keep up with it all!

After the first few weeks, things started to slow down – I for one was a little relieved that our work had become a bit more manageable. In the beginning, we might have to completely re-format the front page several times each day, since right when we had finished, a new headline would arrive announcing an even more glorious victory. But before long the reports from the front slowed down to maybe one or two every day. Then one every few days. Then one every week. Then nothing.

By mid-March, it had been over a month since we had received any news on the war. We would still be given articles from Liberation Army News to print, but these were vague, ideological pieces, mostly filled with exhortations to defend the motherland, defend Cambodia, defeat the aggressors, and things like that. Around the end of March, these articles began to take on a different tone. The word “sacrifice” started to appear more and more. None of us said a word about any of this, but we all noticed it, and we all understood what it meant.

-- Weng Qiaolun, quoted in Behind the Bamboo Curtain, Random House, 1988



In the absence of any official news on the course of the war, people were quick to turn to the nearly endless stream of rumors which had begun circulating with surprising speed. Nearly all were starkly pessimistic, sometimes outlandishly so: in Yunnan, it was rumored that a hundred thousand soldiers had been killed in a single day, gunned down in a desperate “human wave” attack on Hanoi. Posters and handbills presented the gory details of this and countless other alleged defeats, while graffiti announced an ever-mounting death toll.

Local authorities condemned such “defeatist, counter-revolutionary rumors,” but little was done to stop their spread. The urban militias which had previously been counted upon to suppress popular expressions of discontent were unwilling to discipline others for voicing sentiments that many of them shared. It was widely believed that because of their military training, the workers’ militia would be the first to be conscripted into the PLA were such an order to be issued. And so it was hardly surprising when a big-character poster appeared in the main square of Kunming signed by a member of the city militia named Feng Xiying, bearing the title “Down with China’s New Warlords!”

On March 19, one day after the poster had appeared, Feng was arrested at his work unit and taken to the local station of the Public Security Bureau. Several of Feng’s fellow workers followed the police to the station and demanded his release. A fight soon broke out, and soldiers from the city’s PLA garrison were summoned to restore order, taking Feng and several of the quarreling workers back to their base. News quickly spread claiming, incorrectly, that the workers had been executed, and a crowd quickly gathered in the center of Kunming, denouncing the army and calling for retribution.

The city’s mayor was reluctant to call in troops to suppress the protests, and the local garrison commander agreed; having lived through the violence of the Cultural Revolution, he knew the calamitous result of turning the army against the people. While soldiers had seized the arms of the worker’s militia to prevent a more serious uprising, angry citizens marched through the streets shouting slogans and papering the walls of the CCP headquarters with big-character posters. Word of the protest spread across the province and into neighboring Guangxi and Sichuan, often through messages scrawled on the sides of trains and buses. Within a week, news began to reach Beijing of disturbances in at least five different cities throughout southern China.

While Feng Xiying’s original poster had targeted local PLA commanders as the main culprits responsible for the disaster in Vietnam, many other protesters laid blame elsewhere. As the local authorities in Kunming began to take notes on the content of the rapidly-growing number of posters and graffiti spread throughout the city, they noticed the name of Wang Hongwen begin to appear with increasing frequency. Posters depicted Wang as inexperienced and hot-headed, eagerly jumping into war with Vietnam in the hope of proving himself as a leader. Wang’s relatively young age (he was 44) was an object of particular derision. A poetic couplet became popular in Chengdu: “Little Wang plays with his toy soldiers / Mother cries over the body of her son.”

-- Roderick MacFarquhar, China After Mao, Belknap Press, 1997.

[stevep]

Rediv

"Posters depicted Wang as inexperienced and hot-headed, eagerly jumping into war with Vietnam in the hope of proving himself as a leader. Wang’s relatively young age (he was 44) was an object of particular derision. A poetic couplet became popular in Chengdu: “Little Wang plays with his toy soldiers / Mother cries over the body of her son.”

That's going to hurt, especially in a country like China with its respect for age and mistrust of youth. Possibly even more so in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

It sounds like the Chinese offensive has stalled, probably @Hanoi I presume and that they are suffering serious casualties in trying to press on.

Steve

[Space Oddity]

Ehh--China's "respect for age and mistrust of youth" have always been--rather tricky. There's a reason many Chinese government officials probably spend a fair portion of their salary on black hair dye. China respects age--but it must be an age that maintains the strength and vigor of youth. China's intense machismo culture is one of its most undervalued aspects.

That said--to state the obvious, this is exactly what Wang doesn't need.

[Rediv]

Originally Posted by stevep

That's going to hurt, especially in a country like China with its respect for age and mistrust of youth. Possibly even more so in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

Very true. The generation gap in the leadership is a particularly tender issue in post-Cultural Revolution China. If Wang is discredited, that casts a very negative light on all the other younger officials who were given posts in the Party and state in the early 70’s, and towards whom a lot of older cadres bear a great deal of resentment (as many of them were attacked by their younger colleagues during the CR).

Originally Posted by Space Oddity

Ehh--China's "respect for age and mistrust of youth" have always been--rather tricky. There's a reason many Chinese government officials probably spend a fair portion of their salary on black hair dye. China respects age--but it must be an age that maintains the strength and vigor of youth. China's intense machismo culture is one of its most undervalued aspects.

That’s a really good point to keep in mind. I remember reading somewhere that one of the (many) sources of popular dissatisfaction leading up to the 1989 Tiananmen protests was the somewhat pathetic spectacle of the “Immortals” clinging to power long after they had passed their prime.

[Rediv]

Comrade Wang Hongwen, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, has personally issued the following order:

All troops of the People’s Liberation Army are to be immediately withdrawn to Chinese territory.

-- Central Committee Document Zhongfa No. 31, Mar. 27, 1979



Immediately after issuing Zhongfa 31, Wang Hongwen signed an order calling a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission. Unlike the meeting which had marked the start of the war, this was to be an “enlarged” session, attended not only by the eleven members of the MAC, but by the entire Politburo, which was temporarily accorded voting rights. Also summoned to the meeting were the heads of China’s eleven military districts, as well as nearly fifty other local PLA commanders, with a majority from the southern provinces which had been embroiled in the border war with Vietnam. But it was clear that this meeting was to be dominated by the Party’s civilian leaders, many of whom had long held misgivings about the rising prominence of the army and its increasing independence from Party control.

In the six days between the calling of the meeting and its convocation, the consequences of an unchecked military were again made abundantly clear, as retreating Chinese troops were savagely attacked by pursuing Vietnamese forces, and relentless antiaircraft fire on the border with Laos continually thwarted attempts to withdraw the nearly 6,000 “people’s volunteers” from Cambodia. Several of the southern generals making their way to the meeting expected to be dismissed from their posts, or worse. Upon receiving the summons, the commander of the 56th armored division reportedly wrote out his last will, handing it in a sealed envelope to his chief of staff before boarding the plane that was to take him to Beijing.

-- A.J. Gordon, Dragons Entangled: China’s Vietnam War, Plume Press, 1988



Since the responsible comrades elected me to the leadership of the Party, I have made numerous mistakes and have frequently displayed a tendency to ignore the views of others while stubbornly insisting on my own. However in the past three months I have committed grave errors which have brought great and irreparable suffering to the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. I have betrayed the trust and the confidence of the Central Committee, and brought shame upon the great, glorious, and correct Chinese Communist Party.

Therefore, I hereby resign as chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

-- Wang Hongwen, private letter to the members of the Politburo and the MAC, Mar. 28, 1979



Hanoi Says Over 2,000 Chinese Troops Captured In Cambodia; Reports From Phnom Penh Say Pol Pot Has Fled, Analysts Predict Little Resistance In Final Drive

-- Washington Post, Mar. 30, 1979



For this disaster, the air force must take particular responsibility. We have failed to protect the valiant fighters of the people’s army, and have allowed the courageous proletarian internationalist volunteers in Cambodia to fall into the hands of the enemy. This is not the fault of the many brave and hard-working pilots or officers in our air force – it is my fault alone. I therefore submit to the Central Committee of the Party and to the Ministry of Defense my resignation from all my posts.

-- Ma Ning, Commander of the PLA Air Force, private letter to the Politburo and the MAC, Mar. 31, 1979



Vietnam-backed Cambodian rebels have seized control of Phnom Penh, according to a report by Hanoi Radio yesterday. The news came after several weeks of renewed fighting between the rebels and the Khmer Rouge government, in which Western observers have reported that the rebels have made significant gains, winning control of at least two-thirds of the country. The Hanoi broadcast did not mention the presence of Vietnamese troops in the fighting, but analysts believe that over 70,000 Vietnamese soldiers are currently in Cambodia, with more arriving as China completes its withdrawal from northern Vietnam.

-- Los Angeles Times, Apr. 2, 1979



I have neglected my duties to the Party and the Army, and I have failed to uphold Chairman Mao’s teachings on the People’s War. You comrades should hold no one but me responsible for the ideological laxity which allowed this new wind of militarism to sweep through the highest ranks of the armed forces. I therefore resign from my post as director of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army.

-- Zhang Chunqiao, private letter to the members of the Politburo and the MAC, Apr. 3, 1979

[historybuff]

Wonder how these resignations are gonna effect China's leadership.

[LeoXiao]

Protests? Seems like the beginning of the end.

[King Henry]

Wow, can't believe I missed this timeline for so long. Very interesting and dramatic.

So the Chinese pulled out before there were Soviets driving through Inner Mongolia and Manchuria? That's one good thing at least, I suppose.

So will the debacle lead to a radical upsurge, or does Zhang's resignation signify it's mostly an anti-military backlash?

[stevep]

Originally Posted by King Henry

So the Chinese pulled out before there were Soviets driving through Inner Mongolia and Manchuria? That's one good thing at least, I suppose.

I think that is probably the reason for the withdrawal as the Chinese wouldn't have been running short of men but were probably losing heavily while the Russians were getting pretty heated.

So will the debacle lead to a radical upsurge, or does Zhang's resignation signify it's mostly an anti-military backlash?

I would suspect the radicals will have some boost both because the army were a major opponent of the radicals and because they will be seen as part of the more 'conservative' establishment they will oppose and been seen as the alternative to.

How big an upsurge they might get is another matter. The fact that the army went into Vietnam conflict to boost their prestige in part because of their fear about the radicals suggests they thought the latter still a threat. Hopefully however they won't greatly enhance their position.

Steve

Steve

[King Henry]

Originally Posted by stevep

I think that is probably the reason for the withdrawal as the Chinese wouldn't have been running short of men but were probably losing heavily while the Russians were getting pretty heated.



I would suspect the radicals will have some boost both because the army were a major opponent of the radicals and because they will be seen as part of the more 'conservative' establishment they will oppose and been seen as the alternative to.

How big an upsurge they might get is another matter. The fact that the army went into Vietnam conflict to boost their prestige in part because of their fear about the radicals suggests they thought the latter still a threat. Hopefully however they won't greatly enhance their position.

Steve

Steve

Okay, that all makes sense, although losing a war in such a humiliating way (strategic rout and lots of POWs captured by the enemy) can't be good for the officer class.

By the way, now that the wars over and the high command of the PLA's being scrapped, will the unrest die down? or will the lost war just give it a boost?

Oh, and what effect does the war have on Brezhnev's standing?

Also, I kind of hope the radicals gain power, but thats just because I enjoy reading dystopian fiction

[Space Oddity]

My thoughts on the situation: Wang has taken a hit. Can he survive it? Possibly yes.

If this leads to a radical resurgence, AND the radicals overestimate their own influence and try to start up Cultural Revolution Mk II, then Wang will shortly swing back into power as the moderates' black-haired boy. Indeed, his willingness to acknowledge mistakes may ultimately assist him depending on how great a boondongle the radicals get involved in--and realize a boondongle of some sort is pretty much inevitable. Suddenly, instead of 'the idiot who got us into a stupid war' he's 'the great and compassionate leader who realizes when he errs, and corrects his course, as opposed to those Red Guard fanatics'. If the radicals are careful and take their time, on the other hand--and that's a big 'if'--expect to see Wang eased even further out of his leadership position, probably facing the same fate Deng.

[Rediv]

Originally Posted by King Henry

By the way, now that the wars over and the high command of the PLA's being scrapped, will the unrest die down? or will the lost war just give it a boost?

We shall see...

Originally Posted by King Henry

Oh, and what effect does the war have on Brezhnev's standing?

Off the top of my head, I would imagine that this can only be seen as a win for the Soviets, though some in Vietnam might grumble that Moscow waited awfully long before bringing out the big guns. Furthermore, the Soviets might be more emboldened to aggressively pursue their agenda on the world stage (Afghanistan, Africa, etc.). But I think I'd be out of my depth if I speculated any further for the time being -- does anybody else want to chime in here?

[stevep]

Rediv

It could go either way possibly. Their feeling more confident and aggressive after this 'success'. Or the actions of the Chinese attract their attention and because their worried about potential further clashes along the border they don't occupy Afghanistan. Given the number of butterflies possibly the forces committed to that OTL are on the Manchurian border, although this doesn't rule out them moving in later of course. Or some other factor means that one of the various Marxist factional coups in Afghanistan end up differently.

Steve

Originally Posted by Rediv

We shall see...



Off the top of my head, I would imagine that this can only be seen as a win for the Soviets, though some in Vietnam might grumble that Moscow waited awfully long before bringing out the big guns. Furthermore, the Soviets might be more emboldened to aggressively pursue their agenda on the world stage (Afghanistan, Africa, etc.). But I think I'd be out of my depth if I speculated any further for the time being -- does anybody else want to chime in here?

[Constantinople]

Originally Posted by LeoXiao

Maybe we would see a fractured China but intact USSR?

We can only hope so. There aren't enough modern POD anti-sinowanks. Really need more of those.

[arrowiv]

What would Henry Kissinger do as Secretary of State in a scenario such as this?

[Urban fox]

Originally Posted by stevep

Rediv

It could go either way possibly. Their feeling more confident and aggressive after this 'success'. Or the actions of the Chinese attract their attention and because their worried about potential further clashes along the border they don't occupy Afghanistan. Given the number of butterflies possibly the forces committed to that OTL are on the Manchurian border, although this doesn't rule out them moving in later of course. Or some other factor means that one of the various Marxist factional coups in Afghanistan end up differently.

Steve

The kicker is the Soviets never needed to invade Afghanistan in order to put a puppet regime in Kabul. They could've supported a loyal faction with money and guns and maybe covert action by a few elite troops.

This would cost far less than an outright invasion and wouldnt cause troubles on the home-front the way the OTL war did. Given how things stand I think forces that would've been sent to Afghanisytan OTL would be shifted to the Soviet-PRC border.

[Rediv]

So it seems the consensus is no Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? You guys bring up a good point about the need for the USSR to keep some spare troops around in case China starts acting up again. Well then, it looks like we'll start seeing some significant global butterflies a lot sooner than I expected!

Originally Posted by Constantinople

We can only hope so. There aren't enough modern POD anti-sinowanks. Really need more of those.

Drew is doing a pretty good job running China into the ground in his monumental “Fear, Loathing, and Gumbo,” even if it’s not the main focus of the TL.

Originally Posted by arrowiv

What would Henry Kissinger do as Secretary of State in a scenario such as this?

He always did seem pretty gung ho about the Sino-American quasi-alliance, and I imagine he’d welcome an aggressive China as useful obstacle to Soviet expansion. Brzezinski probably feels much the same way. But there are plenty in the US foreign policy establishment who see things quite differently (to say nothing of the politicians or the general public), as we’ll be seeing soon enough.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Rediv

So it seems the consensus is no Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? You guys bring up a good point about the need for the USSR to keep some spare troops around in case China starts acting up again. Well then, it looks like we'll start seeing some significant global butterflies a lot sooner than I expected!

Rediv

Possibly, possibly not. I think part of the problem was that a couple of factions, both pro-Moscow, were having a messy squabble with some nasty massacres by the more hard line group and the Soviets went in partly to avoid things spiraling out of control and their interests being discredited. It didn't help that the man on top at the time who officially called for Soviet assistance suffered a fatal overdose of Soviet aid almost immediately. [Lead delivered at high velocity is rather detrimental to a person's health].

Hence, if there's still in-fighting and instability the Soviets could feel they need to step in anyway. According to Wiki the US under Carter were already sending some military aid to conservative groups after the initial round of coups in 1978. Also, if there's heightened tension with China and the Soviets think one of the Afghan factions might look to Peking for support that could really prompt them to step in.

Therefore it could go either way, although if they don't go in as you say that could give some big butterflies. Coupled with China looking unstable and more aggressive, as well as it's support for Pol Pot, when full details come out about the killing fields, the idea of an anti-Soviet alliance with Peking may look less attractive in the west.

Steve

[Lord Roem]

Originally Posted by stevep

Rediv

Possibly, possibly not. I think part of the problem was that a couple of factions, both pro-Moscow, were having a messy squabble with some nasty massacres by the more hard line group and the Soviets went in partly to avoid things spiraling out of control and their interests being discredited. It didn't help that the man on top at the time who officially called for Soviet assistance suffered a fatal overdose of Soviet aid almost immediately. [Lead delivered at high velocity is rather detrimental to a person's health].

Hence, if there's still in-fighting and instability the Soviets could feel they need to step in anyway. According to Wiki the US under Carter were already sending some military aid to conservative groups after the initial round of coups in 1978. Also, if there's heightened tension with China and the Soviets think one of the Afghan factions might look to Peking for support that could really prompt them to step in.

Therefore it could go either way, although if they don't go in as you say that could give some big butterflies. Coupled with China looking unstable and more aggressive, as well as it's support for Pol Pot, when full details come out about the killing fields, the idea of an anti-Soviet alliance with Peking may look less attractive in the west.

Steve

Lots of sensible points here, I think that the Soviet Union would be better placed with regards to internal reforms without the specter of Afghanistan hanging around the place. In addition, with a left-wing CCP leadership, the chances are that the reformist faction in the Kremlin may be in a better position as well as they won't be as associated with Beijing. In some regards, the USSR is going to be better off it this timeline, assuming that is that the border crises don't become full-out war.

Of course, Vietnam is going to be too focused on its northern neighbour to focus too much on the one to the west. I feel that Pol Pot may have more breathing space ITTL, sadly.