The Malvinas Pincer, 1982

MacCaulay · Feb 21, 2010

I'm currently kind of obsessed with books that tell the "other side" of conflicts. I started with Phoenix over the Canal about the Egyptian Air Force, then pulled another book off of my bookshelf: Fight for the Malvinas, a very well researched book about the Falklands War from the Argentine point of view.

One thing they mention is the Navy's plan for a pincer move against the British once they landed at San Carlos Bay and had made their fleet immobile by needing to stay and defend their landing site.

The plan when roughly like this: the carrier Vienticinco de Mayo with some surface ships as ASW would head towards the group from the northeast. Meanwhile, a surface action group centered around the Belgrano would swing south around the islands and come from the west. At a prearranged time, the surface action group would attack, then quickly in succession the carrier's A-4 Skyhawk airwing would come in from the other direction.

Then...the plan fell apart. But not how you folks who know the war would think: a British search plane found the carrier group, which meant that either the VdeM could launch from that position while they still had some measure of surprise, or they could give up. The decision was made to attempt to launch.
The commanders on board the carrier basically had to keep unloading weapons on the A-4s in order to get them light enough to launch and get back at the extreme range they were at. After a few hours, the entire air wing was ready...then the wind died down, making them unable to launch from the carrier at all.

While they were waiting for the wind to come back up, HMS Conqueror torpedoed the Belgrano. With the flagship of the southern Task Force dead in the water and the carrier's cloak of secrecy gone, the Argentine Navy abandoned the plan.

So...what if it had all gone off, and the Argentines had pulled off their pincer movement and attacked the Royal Navy at San Carlos Bay? We always talk about how the Falklands were the most likely opportunity for carrier combat after WWII. Well, here's the plan right in front of our eyes: the Argentines planned to do it, but it was all stopped by a well placed search plane and the HMS Conqueror.

RogueBeaver · Feb 21, 2010

IIRC, the Argentines were using barely serviceable Neptunes as maritime patrol/ELINT aircraft, so unsure if they could detect the Brits earlier than OTL. If winds are favourable, the Skyhawks would have to go through a wall of Harriers, SAMs and flak, and I don't envy the Argies. Another problem was the long ingress time for the AF's Mirage squadrons, and their lack of training. I remember reading that a Mirage V and a Harrier in 1982 were roughly equal aircraft, but the Brits had much better pilots than the Argies. But the aircraft that would be better would be the Etendards with their Exocet ASMs: iron bombs can only do so much damage.

MacCaulay · Feb 21, 2010

RogueBeaver said:
IIRC, the Argentines were using barely serviceable Neptunes as maritime patrol/ELINT aircraft, so unsure if they could detect the Brits earlier than OTL.

Well, that was the point behind waiting until they landed. The Argentine Navy wouldn't have to look for them, then. They'd be right off the coast. And in San Carlos Bay, of all places. There's no need to look: the Royal Navy can't hide, it's landing the Ghurkas!

FlyingDutchman · Feb 21, 2010

I've always wondered about that;
how wise is it to divide your forces when your opponent is stronger?

Although with the lack of decent ASW the Argentinians had and the British SSN's around, maybe it was afterall wise they split up their forces.

How likely was this plan to succeed with one obsolete light carrier versus Hermes and Invincible which are both bigger and more modern then her?

Also, wasn't HMS Spartan, the other SSN in the South-Atlantic, searching for her? If the Argentinians had continued with their pincer-move, the chance increases HMS Spartan finds her. If she finds her, the chance is huge she'll sink the ex-Doorman.

RogueBeaver · Feb 21, 2010

Galtieri would've been wise to upgrade the VDM to allow the Super Etendard operational capability before 1982. Skyhawks are subsonic and nearly obsolete in 1982, whereas the Etendard is an excellent supersonic strike aircraft that can more easily defend itself. The Supers can do real damage to the UK TF, because there'll be much less warning time.

Just Leo · Feb 21, 2010

They had 5 Super Etendards and 5 Exocet. And 45 hours flying time on Super Etendard. Max speed at low level is transsonic, clean. It is only supersonic after weapon delivery at high altitude. Its defense was the stand-off distance of the missile and the RN's lack of good AEW. Sea Harrier/ Sidewinder was effective against Mirage, which was much faster.

DD951 · Feb 21, 2010

There's a story floating around I've heard in several places, which if accurate, suggests that there's a second way the Argentine plan could have been derailed by one of Her Majesty's Submarines. The story goes that another British SSN (presumably Spartan) had been tracking VdM, and had a firing solution locked in, but under the ROEs in effect, had to wait until the Argentine TF got within a certain distance of the Falklands or the British TF before engaging, but shortly before the Argentine TF crossed that line, it turned around as the plan had been called off due to the discovery by the search plane and the loss of the Belgrano. I have no idea if this stoory is true or not, but unless the Argentines managed to elude any British subs out there and surprise the TF at San Carlos Bay, they can probably do some damage at the expense of getting their airwing chopped up, but probably can't do enough with the carrier airgroup alone to stop the landings. (Anyone know what sort of anti-shipping capabilities the RN taskforce had with its Harriers & escorts?)

MacCaulay · Feb 21, 2010

DD951 said:
I have no idea if this stoory is true or not, but unless the Argentines managed to elude any British subs out there and surprise the TF at San Carlos Bay, they can probably do some damage at the expense of getting their airwing chopped up, but probably can't do enough with the carrier airgroup alone to stop the landings. (Anyone know what sort of anti-shipping capabilities the RN taskforce had with its Harriers & escorts?)

I actually just had some information sent to me that kind of points in that direction, too. I just pulled Sandy Woodward's biography off my shelf, and it seems to validate that point.

There was probably a British SSN tailing the carrier group on the way out. One thing to remember is that the weather at any launching would've been much better, so any attack the submarine would've made would have put it in much more danger of a counter attack than in the case of HMS Conqueror, which sank the Belgrano without it's escorts even noticing.
On a clear day, they'd notice, and probably start trying to sink the SSN. This would probably be alot more dangerous than the blind lobbing of depth charges that was reported by HMS Conqueror during it's attack on the Belgrano.

There would've been no chance at stopping the landings. The Argentine plan was to wait until the British were already beginning their landing attempts. This would mean the Argentine Navy would have a fairly precise fix on the fleet's location without having to send out search ships.

As to anti-ship missiles, I believe the Harriers had Sea Eagles. Though I could be mistaken.

Fellatio Nelson · Feb 21, 2010

There were about 5 SSNs in the area (excluding the SSK which arrived, but was mainly on other duties, but which could do equal task if in a favourable position).

Sea Harriers didn't have Sea Eagle in 1982, but the Argentinians did not know that - supposedly one of the missile trial aircraft was deployed to the area operationally and downed and the Argentinians found Sea Eagle related-stuff in the wreckage, so they thought so.

I don't think the Argentinian Navy would've had much chance getting at an SSN even in better weather; no experience of dealing with them and poor ASW equipment. Main threat would've come from ASW aircraft, but they suffered from the same problem.

San Carlos was chosen in part for its environment hampering air attacks - no Exocets able to be used there and destroyers guarded the approaches - so the 25 May could add its A4s, but no real purpose since they could've been launched from shore without risking carrier.

And the Super Etendards were pretty much defenceless - no AAMs installed back then (and even then, the awful original French Magic Is).

RogueBeaver · Feb 21, 2010

They'd have to use the Neptunes or Trackers against SSNs, which would be almost pathetically vulnerable to any RN CAP in the area without top cover from Air Force Mirages.

MacCaulay · Feb 21, 2010

Fellatio Nelson said:
I don't think the Argentinian Navy would've had much chance getting at an SSN even in better weather; no experience of dealing with them and poor ASW equipment. Main threat would've come from ASW aircraft, but they suffered from the same problem.

The general thought from the folks on Conqueror was that the few depth charges lobbed their way after the attack was that they weren't launched because of the sinking, since the rest of the surface action group didn't realize the Belgrano had been sunk.

San Carlos was chosen in part for its environment hampering air attacks - no Exocets able to be used there and destroyers guarded the approaches - so the 25 May could add its A4s, but no real purpose since they could've been launched from shore without risking carrier.

None of the airstrips were long enough, even for the A-4s. Just the Pucaras could land.

There was apparently an Argentine plan to lengthen the runway at Port Stanley, but the attack date was moved up and the construction equipment wasn't ready to ship.

juanml82 · Feb 21, 2010

MacCaulay said:
I'm currently kind of obsessed with books that tell the "other side" of conflicts. I started with Phoenix over the Canal about the Egyptian Air Force, then pulled another book off of my bookshelf: Fight for the Malvinas, a very well researched book about the Falklands War from the Argentine point of view.

One thing they mention is the Navy's plan for a pincer move against the British once they landed at San Carlos Bay and had made their fleet immobile by needing to stay and defend their landing site.

The plan when roughly like this: the carrier Vienticinco de Mayo with some surface ships as ASW would head towards the group from the northeast. Meanwhile, a surface action group centered around the Belgrano would swing south around the islands and come from the west. At a prearranged time, the surface action group would attack, then quickly in succession the carrier's A-4 Skyhawk airwing would come in from the other direction.

Then...the plan fell apart. But not how you folks who know the war would think: a British search plane found the carrier group, which meant that either the VdeM could launch from that position while they still had some measure of surprise, or they could give up. The decision was made to attempt to launch.
The commanders on board the carrier basically had to keep unloading weapons on the A-4s in order to get them light enough to launch and get back at the extreme range they were at. After a few hours, the entire air wing was ready...then the wind died down, making them unable to launch from the carrier at all.

While they were waiting for the wind to come back up, HMS Conqueror torpedoed the Belgrano. With the flagship of the southern Task Force dead in the water and the carrier's cloak of secrecy gone, the Argentine Navy abandoned the plan.

So...what if it had all gone off, and the Argentines had pulled off their pincer movement and attacked the Royal Navy at San Carlos Bay? We always talk about how the Falklands were the most likely opportunity for carrier combat after WWII. Well, here's the plan right in front of our eyes: the Argentines planned to do it, but it was all stopped by a well placed search plane and the HMS Conqueror.

Actually, those are two different operations. When the RN began operations against Argentinean positions in the Falklands on May 1st, the Argentinean Navy had three task forces in the sea. One was the VdM task force, the other one was the Belgrano one and a third one as a light corvettes force. Those forces were attempting to perform the pincer attack on the RN ships. At that time, the British haven't yet decided to land on San Carlos. They were just bombing the place and attempting an airborne assault with helicopters. On May 20th, the British begun disembarking in San Carlos and the Argentinean Navy was, save for a few subs, in port.

The failed carrier attack you describe was on May 1st. A flight of Argentinean Canberras found themselves, out of pure chance, flying right into the Invincible task force and were shot down. One of the pilots was rescued by VdM helicopters and thus, the VdM got the approximate location of the Invincible. Had the VdM been closer or the weather was stronger, then the Skyhawks would have taken off. They would have been 12 at the very most, IIRC. The results of the battle are open to speculation. HMS Glamorgan had been damaged that same day on open waters by Mirages so the Skyhawks, at first, had a fighting chance of bombing Invincible (if they find it, of course). However, the HMS Invincible was escorted, the A4 are slower than the Mirages, probably would have carried less bombs and there were probably Harrier CAPs in the area. If an RN SSN was indeed trailing the VdM or around the general area, it's very likely that the VdM would have been sunk.

EDIT: On San Carlos Bay, if you want an army POD. There was an Argentinean 105 mm battery covering the area. However, their flares didn't work and, unable to illuminate the target nor aim properly by other means, they just shot a couple rounds and withdrew that night. Had the flares worked, the landing would have been done under artillery fire (which would have been contested by RN ships and Harriers)

Riain · Feb 21, 2010

I agree, the pincer attack, where there was first too much wind and then not enough wind to launch occured in May 1, the landing didn't occur for another 3 weeks.

A few other points. The RN scraped the bottom of the barrel for Sea Harriers and sent the Sea Eagle trials plane which was shot down. The Argies apparently found the Sea Eagle fire control equipment in the wreckage, but were well and truly confined to port by SSNs by then.

The Argies extended Port Stanley airfield by about 500ft to 4600ft, but no further and shipped but didn't install the arrestor gear. The only jets stationed there were Macchi 339s, whose swept wings gave the Brits a start until it was confirmed that they weren't Etenards. There were a few attempts for planes to use Port Stanley, like a damaged Mirage which dropped its tanks before approach and was shot down by the AA gunners.

There were dozens of things the Argies could have done to defend the Islands, but then again there were dozens of things the Brits could have done, and many that they started so I think the end result would turn out much the same but with greater casualties.

Fellatio Nelson · Feb 21, 2010

Had the Argentinians attempted to meet the RN in Blue Water during the initial approach, they'd have been outside land-based air coverage. (And the Task Force didn't arrive all in one big group; the carriers were behind an advance party.)

So to attack the carriers, the Skyhawks of 25 May would've faced Sea Harriers. They'd also have had to approach at low level due to Sea Dart (and to a lesser extent Sea Slug), which rendered them vulnerable to other missile and gun systems, hindering range and ability to spot the enemy.

The Belgrano et al had Exocets and bigger guns than the RN, so did provide a threat, but would've had to have been guided into position to within 15-20 miles to stand a good chance of hitting ships (and the RN was well-versed in use of shipborne Exocet). Again, they'd run the gauntlet of shipborne sensors, Harriers and helicopters before they even got within range.

Given both Argentinian task groups were weaker than the Task Force for reasons given, relying on a very well-co-ordinated simultaneous strike to stand any chance of disabling the carriers amidst their escorts, doubtless directed by vulnerable airborne units, they'd stand a very grave chance of having their entire inventory of major warships wiped out.

They'd also be extremely vulnerable to submarines in Blue Water, which could've outrun them in certain conditions. So even if the attack was pressed home and a couple of ships (chances are escorts and auxiliaries instead of carriers) were sunk and damaged, they'd risk being attacked as they sailed back to harbour.

Naturally they could've succeeded, which was why the Belgrano was attacked.

As for attacking with the RN at San Carlos - well, one can't predict what the plan would've been had the Belgrano not stuck the bulk of the Argentinian Navy in harbour thereafter. Not precisely the same as OTL by any means.