I have mostly re-written everything to the end of the sortie now. Heavy basis on what was already written and changing only times, places etc.
Yes, I changed gun ranges too!
I would appreciate it if I could post it all before any comments pop up (Probably be this evening UK time) as I am giving it a final check over as I post adding a few more minor tweaks. I will say when I have posted all of the re-written stuff for those that wait.
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Background - Background changes to the German Navy
Non-Historical changes to the High Seas Fleet after The Battle of Jutland
January 1918
In January 1918, Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, the head of the Kaiserliche Admiralstab (German Imperial Admiralty) was informed in a meeting with General Paul von Hindenburg, the head of the German Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL (Supreme Army Command), that the Army was planning to conduct an assault in March against the Allies in the hope of capturing the three channel ports at the Eastern end of the English Channel. (The Lys Offensive) The three channel ports were Dunkirk, Calais & Boulogne and General Hindenburg asked Admiral Holtzendorff for any assistance that the navy could give in support of the offensive.
Admiral Holtzendorff ordered Admirals Reinhard Scheer and Franz von Hipper to report to him at the Admiralstab and together they discussed the options before them. They were all in agreement that the Unrestricted Submarine Warfare campaign should continue, as it seemed the most practical way of pushing England out of the war, and stopping American supplies and reinforcements from reaching the Allied front line. Admirals Scheer and Hipper returned to the fleet to consider options for the fleet in relations for a sortie and to draw up several outline proposals before returning to the Admiralstab on February 1st 1918 for discussions on the proposals with Admiral Holtzendorff.
February 1st 1918
Admirals Scheer and Hipper reported to the Admiralstab as ordered on 1st February with their proposals. They were as follows:
A) The HSF does nothing in support of the Lys Offensive. This would keep the fleet intact, but may decrease moral among the navy and army.
B) The HSF conducts limited sorties with small, fast craft. Destroyers (DD) and Light Cruisers (CA) that can sail at 25+ Knots. They will conduct operations into the English Channel to harass Allied shipping. This is a moderate risk operation due the presence of the HMS Dreadnought and the HMS Dominion and multiple smaller units. If the Channel Fleet could catch the Light German forces deployed, then the German forces could be destroyed by superior firepower. Also, the light craft sent may not locate any targets, making it a wasted operation.[
C) The same as above but including the Battlecruiser Squadron. The two surviving Derfflinger class (SMS Derfflinger & SMS Hindenburg), the SMS Seydlitz, SMS Moltke and SMS Von der Tann. All of these ships were capable of 26.5+ knots and so constituted a fast attack force. They would position themselves on the Eastern side of the Dover-Calais mine barrier and screen the light forces as they breached it to allow submarines into the English Channel to attack shipping. The light craft would also engage any allied ships sighted. The ships themselves would not enter the English Channel unless forced to do so to attack Allied intercepting forces. This option was risky as while they could defeat the Channel Fleet and any light forces thrown at them, if they were slowed down due to battle damage then they would be annihilated should a portion of the Grand Fleet intercept them. As this squadron was made up of Battlecruisers, it would be under the command of Admiral Hipper.
D) The same as above, but with the HSF covering the Eastern End of the English Channel should the Battlecruiser Squadron of the GF appear. This would give the HSF the opportunity to destroy a squadron of the GF, before the main portion of the GF arrived. The main fleet would be under the command of Admiral Scheer if this option was selected.
Option 'D' was the most attractive to Admiral Holtzendorff as it gave the opportunity to potentially destroy either the 1st or 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron of the GF, and sink four modern British Battlecruisers for minimum risk. There were problems with this plan however. Should the HSF sortie, then the GF would be aware of it through Radio Direction Finding, and the GF would sortie in an attempt to destroy the HSF. Precautions would therefore have to be taken to ensure that the HSF attacked the Channel Squadron by surprise, thus allowing the HSF to make port again before the GF could intercept. Also, due to the ongoing transfer of personnel to the submarine and small craft arms of the fleet, several ships had reduced crews. Finally, due to general supply shortages, there was not enough fuel available for the entire HSF to sortie.
As nothing could be done about the fuel shortage situation within the HSF, all three Admirals decided that although Option 'D' was the most desirable, Option 'C' would have to be chosen ~ Provided that the risks to the Battlecruisers could be minimized, and the British kept unaware until the fleet attacked the English Channel. Admirals Scheer and Hipper were therefore told to develop a rough plan for Option 'C' and return in a week with his proposal for submission to Admiral Holtzendorff. If he approved then the plan would be submitted to the Kaiser for final approval.
February 7th 1918
The meeting on February 7th went ahead with several Admiralstab planners in attendance with Admiral Holtzendorff, and Admirals Hipper and Scheer, along with several senior HSF Squadron Commanders. During discussions with his Squadron commanders, Admirals Scheer and Hipper had produced the following plan:
The Battlecruiser Squadron of the HSF would sortie on March 20th 1918, scheduled to arrive in the English Channel at midnight to begin sweeping the Dover-Calais mine barrier. This cannot be delayed until after the land offensive is due to begin as the night would shield the HSF ships from the Royal Navy and hamper them should they attack with ships or coastal artillery. The fleet would sail under complete radio silence until the naval attack began, and was to be controlled by flag and light signals prior to this.
It was also suggested that since the GF successfully intercepted the HSF at Jutland in 1916, then German naval codes may be broken. Although codes had been changed in 1917 all orders in relation to the sortie were be given by written orders, flag and light signals. The radio was not to be used to communicate any orders in relation to the sortie so as not to warn the Allies through increased radio traffic. Codes would be changed again, but the new codes would not be used until the sortie began, as it may warn the Allies that something was planned.
Zeppelin and seaplane patrols over the North Sea were to continue and report Allied shipping as usual, but the number of patrols were to gradually increase so as not to alarm the Allies.
It was also suggested that the HSF be re-organized. Older ships to be retired from the main fleet, and the remaining ships fully crewed. By doing this, it was hoped that all ships that sortied would have a full compliment, and high moral would be maintained in the remaining ships as the core ability of the fleet was to be maintained.
The overall plan was to sortie the fleet under a complete radio blackout. Light forces first to sweep for Allied submarines, followed by the heavier ships. These would form up and head West for their destination at 15 knots. It would take approximately 15 hours to reach the barrier at this speed so it would have to sail at 9am on the 20th at the latest. The fleet would also sail over the horizon and out of sight of land.
At midnight on the 20th/21st March, the Battlecruisers under Admiral Hipper would cover the destroyers and torpedo boats as they started to sweep the mines for the submarines that were to follow. The submarines would lay mines outside the main supply shipping ports on both the French and English coasts, and if the captains judged it safe, they would shell the harbors, sinking ships in the and destroying dockyard facilities. Some submarines would then continue into the Atlantic to attack Allied shipping, others would remain in the Channel to attack shipping there.
No later than 09:00 hours the fleet was to retire towards their own minefields at maximum speed regardless of whether the sweeping had been accomplished successfully or not. If they delayed any longer then there was the risk that the Grand Fleet would catch and destroy them before they were safe.
Admiral Scheer also recommended that new minefields be laid by submarine along the most probable lines of approach that the GF would take to intercept the HSF, and that submarines are placed outside GF harbours and along these lines of approach to attack the GF and report its position to him.
Admiral Holtzendorff approved the Admiral's general plan and asked them to draw up a list of ships that were to be retired for his approval, and the reasons for retiring them. They were also to draw up lists of ships to be used as part in the sortie. They were then to return to the Admiralstab as soon as possible to discuss this with Admiral Holtzendorff.
As he had given his approval to further develop the plan, Admiral Holtzendorff contacted the Kaiser's staff and requested a meeting for the following morning. The next day, at 10:00am sharp he entered the presence of Kaiser Wilhelm II and explained that General Hindenburg had requested the HSF's assistance in the March Offensive against the Allied Channel Ports.
Admiral Holtzendorff explained the proposed plan to the Kaiser, and told him that he had given Admirals Scheer and Hipper his approval to proceed with detailed plans for the operation, and that they had been ordered to report back as soon as detailed plans and ship lists had been made.
Kaiser Wilhelm II said that while he would wish for his navy to do everything possible to assist the Army in its offensive, he would not approve an outline plan. When Admirals Scheer and Hipper had drawn up their detailed plans and ship lists, then all three of them were to report to him and explain the plan to him. After hearing the plan, he would decide whether to risk his navy or not on the sortie against the English Channel.
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