The Falklands war
- Thread starter flamelord
- Start date
It might have been possible for the Argentinean Armed Forces to defeat the Task Force, which in itself doesn't have to mean Argentina wins the war, with proper planning, preparation, training and luck.
However, for the Argentinean military junta to take such measures, they would first had to admit they would be going to war with the UK if they decided to invade the Falklands, and then they wouldn't have dared to do so.
However, for the Argentinean military junta to take such measures, they would first had to admit they would be going to war with the UK if they decided to invade the Falklands, and then they wouldn't have dared to do so.
Last edited:
Dure
Banned
It was a close run thing. Shorter fuses for the Argentinian free fall bombs alone might have done it. Greater willingness to risk aircraft and accept they might lose most of them would have made a big difference. Fewer better resourced troops and a bit more courage from the officer corps would also help
I am having a little private fantasy of M. Thatcher doing a Mussolini
Bearcat
Banned
Easy... wait three years. Invincible is in Australia, the Royal Navy has been cut back. That should be enough to tip the balance.
Riain
Banned
If they had put their invasion back 7 weeks to coincide with the 25th May, Argentine national day, I think they could have won it. IOTL the British worked backwards, they had to have won the land war by mid/late June due to the southern winter. They had to land between 20-24 May as that was the earliest Intrepid would be available and the latest that gives decent campaigning time. The Task force needed a few weeks prior to the landings to fight and win air and sea battles around the islands to allow the landing to proceed. Thus the task force had to leave 3 days after the invasion so that the war could be over before the southern winter made fighting impossible. This ties in well with striking while the iron is hot.
If the invasion doesn't occur until 25/5/82 then the same timeline of events puts the landings in mid July and the land fighting in the worst of the southern winter. The British could not launch a land campaign until probably October/November which puts task force departure in September, some 3-4 months after the invasion. Can Britian sustain the political will to re-take the Falklands after 3-4 months of forced inactivity? Certainly if they can they'd be far better equipped to do so, but then they'd look like bullies in the eyes of the world.
If the invasion doesn't occur until 25/5/82 then the same timeline of events puts the landings in mid July and the land fighting in the worst of the southern winter. The British could not launch a land campaign until probably October/November which puts task force departure in September, some 3-4 months after the invasion. Can Britian sustain the political will to re-take the Falklands after 3-4 months of forced inactivity? Certainly if they can they'd be far better equipped to do so, but then they'd look like bullies in the eyes of the world.
Yes, but simple as those things sound, think about the pods:
Shorter bomb fuses: That means the Argentinean Air Force had to train for naval warfare instead of leaving it to the Naval Aviation - which they knew it was the proper course of action, but didnt' want to take it due interservice rivalry. And then, seriously think how to sink a type-42 destroyer without exocets when they didn't think they would need to fight without them and the natural enemy (Chile) didn't have such destroyers or sams.
Greater willingness to risk aircraft: more? I think it should be about greater willingness to risk ships, which goes to the next point
Fewer better resourced troops, that means diplomatic overtures to Chile and Brazil, trying to smooth things - or even more, avoiding the near war of 1978 altogether.
Better officer corps: that's not only linked to the above point, but it also needs a decade or two of better military instruction and a better selection of promoted officers.
Yes, that's a good chance. IOTL they chose the worst possible timing.
What forced inactivity? Put some SAS or SBS chappies in nuclear subs and drop them off in Argentina or on the Falklands to conduct a few raids. You could also send in frogmen into to put limpet mines on their carrier and cruiser.
Yes, the political will might be difficult to maintain, but Maggie Thatcher on television invoking the memory of the Phony War would put some backbone into the wets.
A few diversions.
According to passage on Wikipedia, the British received supply aid from the US. I would imagine that they received intelligence too, though this has never been officially confirmed.
Chile also supported Britain by providing intelligence and a refuelling point(?). How important this was to Britain... couldn't say.
Memory is hazy on the next one. France "helped" too by simply not supplying the Argentines MORE Exocet missiles. They had already sold them 5. I also remember watching a program where the Argentines were missing some software or launch codes so they weren't able to utilise some sort of missiles they'd only recently bought.
In reality though, the Falklands War couldn't have gone much worse for Britain. When the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, pretty much all Britain's Chinooks went down with it. My PE teacher was part of the 60 mile yomp to Port Stanley.
According to passage on Wikipedia, the British received supply aid from the US. I would imagine that they received intelligence too, though this has never been officially confirmed.
Chile also supported Britain by providing intelligence and a refuelling point(?). How important this was to Britain... couldn't say.
Memory is hazy on the next one. France "helped" too by simply not supplying the Argentines MORE Exocet missiles. They had already sold them 5. I also remember watching a program where the Argentines were missing some software or launch codes so they weren't able to utilise some sort of missiles they'd only recently bought.
In reality though, the Falklands War couldn't have gone much worse for Britain. When the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, pretty much all Britain's Chinooks went down with it. My PE teacher was part of the 60 mile yomp to Port Stanley.
The Argentine submarine ARA San Luis, although it failed to sink any British ships (defective torpedoes as I recall) was the most dangerous of their warships, and pulled more than its own weight in the conflict. The Royal Navy deployed an aircraft carrier, eleven destroyers, six submarines and twenty-five helicopters in an effort to hunt down and sink this one sub, wasting an enormous amount of ordinance on false contacts. The San Luis patrolled freely, keeping the British on their guard the entire time, and they never did manage to hit her. Pretty impressive for one diesel sub, tying up so many ships. What if the Argentines had had more of these subs?
Maybe the US Navy (and possibly the US Coast Guard) should look into purchasing some of these German-made diesel subs. They are much cheaper than our nuclear boats, can be manned by smaller crews, and can do many of the same tasks. For coastal patrols, they are ideal. They can also rest on the ocean floor silently, watching and waiting. Why do all of our subs have to be enormous, expensive nuclear vessels? Surely there is a role for these diesel boats as well.
ANA San Luis
PS There was a rumor at the time, that there was some infighting in the Reagan Administration regarding our position in this war, with Alexander Haig wanting to help the British, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick favoring Argentina, or at least a policy of strict neutrality. I never learned any more about this. Anyone ever hear anything?
Maybe the US Navy (and possibly the US Coast Guard) should look into purchasing some of these German-made diesel subs. They are much cheaper than our nuclear boats, can be manned by smaller crews, and can do many of the same tasks. For coastal patrols, they are ideal. They can also rest on the ocean floor silently, watching and waiting. Why do all of our subs have to be enormous, expensive nuclear vessels? Surely there is a role for these diesel boats as well.
ANA San Luis
PS There was a rumor at the time, that there was some infighting in the Reagan Administration regarding our position in this war, with Alexander Haig wanting to help the British, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick favoring Argentina, or at least a policy of strict neutrality. I never learned any more about this. Anyone ever hear anything?
Last edited:
Bill Cameron
Banned
Jacobus,
Neither Britain or Argentina have ever substantiated those claims you've innocently repeated regarding San Luis.
So, who has been talking about the sub's "accomplishments"? Why the company that builds and sells them, that's who.
I'll point out that it was a nuclear sub which essentially won the war for Britain when it sent the Belgrano to the bottom. Argentina had three task forces at sea, one of which included their carrier, attempting to catch the RN task force in a pincer. After Belgrano went under, the Argentine navy fled and never put to sea again.
Because they work better, have a greater endurance, carry more powerful weapons, and other inconsequential stuff like that.
Bill
Nikephoros
Banned
I can't really argue about that claim, so I'll let Bill do it.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:ARASanLuisS32.jpg
The answer to your question is actually inside of it.
"For coastal patrols, they are ideal."
That is the answer. The US doesn't use submarines to patrol the coasts, they use subs to patrol hundreds to thousands of miles from shore.
Well, IIRC, the US didn't want this war to happen. We just had little choice but to quietly support the British.
Well, of course the Royal and Argentine navies have remained officially silent about their capabilities and accomplishments. That's to be expected. All I'm saying is, some of the things we rely on our nuclear subs to do, could be done more cheaply by diesel subs. If we had a fleet of them, we could spread our forces around a bit more. Certainly I won't suggest that these boats are superior to, or even equal to, our Seawolf class! We can never totally replace our nuclear subs - they can do things that the diesels can't. However, quantity does have a quality all its own, as they say.
IMHO, Britain won the war by three strategic moves that were all successfully delivered, although could have gone the other way:
- HMS Conquerer sinking the General Belgrano probably was a deciding factor in the Argentine carrier Veinticinco de Mayo (ex HMS Vererable) going to port for the conflict and reducing Argentine aircraft range;
- The Black Buck bombing raids on Stanley whilst tactically of limited effect discouraged the stationing of Mirage IIIs on the island. The reduced range of Mirage IIIs flying from the mainland meant that they could not use afterburners so were subsonic and had no maneuverability advantage over Harriers in dog fights;
- Through various methods, MI6 operatives cut off the market for Argentina to procure additional Exocets from third parties
The USA assisted Britain in swift provision of updated AIM 9L; giving formal permission for the UK to use Wideawake field on Ascension island (which was leased to the USA as a Space Shuttle emergency strip); and aviation fuel at Wideawake. As was seen in Gulf War 1, satellite reconnaissance isn't great for tactical purposes because of clouds, so US satellites weren't that useful. Victors flying from Ascension did much of the preliminary recon, with Harriers flying recon missions in the later stages.
Chile assisted Britain in turning a blind eye to SAS operations in Patagonia. SAS teams were on the ground observing aircraft movements at Rio Grande, Rio Gallegos and Comodoro Rivadavia.
Whilst France 'helped' by stipping flow of additional arms, French technical support in Argentina before the war started didn't return home...
The view that taking out a British Carrier would have ended the war for Britain is over simplified. The Royal Navy had MV Atlantic Causeway (sister ship to Conveyor) refitted as a reserve carrier (google SCADS for a diagram), and after the landings, Harrier GR3s operated from HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid.
The 'conscript' nature of the Argentine Army is also overstated. One of the key problems for Argentina army deployment was that the forces were from the far north of Argentina (very hot) as the southern forces (used to the cold weather) were held in place incase of Chilean issues. The forces were also severely short of supplies due to the botch early invasion and British blockade of the islands.
To answer the original point, I think a British defeat would have had a profound effect on the national' spirit' and confidence of Thatcher to implement the reforms she did - she would have not won the election following the war and the rise of the SDP at the time might have change British politics considerably. Finally, the decision and the ability of Britain to fight such a war would has put a stake in the ground for British international relations and psyche ever since.
- HMS Conquerer sinking the General Belgrano probably was a deciding factor in the Argentine carrier Veinticinco de Mayo (ex HMS Vererable) going to port for the conflict and reducing Argentine aircraft range;
- The Black Buck bombing raids on Stanley whilst tactically of limited effect discouraged the stationing of Mirage IIIs on the island. The reduced range of Mirage IIIs flying from the mainland meant that they could not use afterburners so were subsonic and had no maneuverability advantage over Harriers in dog fights;
- Through various methods, MI6 operatives cut off the market for Argentina to procure additional Exocets from third parties
The USA assisted Britain in swift provision of updated AIM 9L; giving formal permission for the UK to use Wideawake field on Ascension island (which was leased to the USA as a Space Shuttle emergency strip); and aviation fuel at Wideawake. As was seen in Gulf War 1, satellite reconnaissance isn't great for tactical purposes because of clouds, so US satellites weren't that useful. Victors flying from Ascension did much of the preliminary recon, with Harriers flying recon missions in the later stages.
Chile assisted Britain in turning a blind eye to SAS operations in Patagonia. SAS teams were on the ground observing aircraft movements at Rio Grande, Rio Gallegos and Comodoro Rivadavia.
Whilst France 'helped' by stipping flow of additional arms, French technical support in Argentina before the war started didn't return home...
The view that taking out a British Carrier would have ended the war for Britain is over simplified. The Royal Navy had MV Atlantic Causeway (sister ship to Conveyor) refitted as a reserve carrier (google SCADS for a diagram), and after the landings, Harrier GR3s operated from HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid.
The 'conscript' nature of the Argentine Army is also overstated. One of the key problems for Argentina army deployment was that the forces were from the far north of Argentina (very hot) as the southern forces (used to the cold weather) were held in place incase of Chilean issues. The forces were also severely short of supplies due to the botch early invasion and British blockade of the islands.
To answer the original point, I think a British defeat would have had a profound effect on the national' spirit' and confidence of Thatcher to implement the reforms she did - she would have not won the election following the war and the rise of the SDP at the time might have change British politics considerably. Finally, the decision and the ability of Britain to fight such a war would has put a stake in the ground for British international relations and psyche ever since.
67th Tigers
Banned
They didn't really give material aid directly, HMG decided it needed some war material it had dedicated to NATO. When the British withdrew these munitions the US sold the UK replacements immediately out of their own stocks.
Very, the bulk of the mobilised Argentine army were deployed to the border in expectation that Chile would invade.
SIS also ran a very successful dummy operation, where they bought every available air-launched Exocet off the global market and ran a series of dummy suppliers to occupy the Argentine buyers.
The Argentines had a lot of Exocets, but only 5 of the air-launched variant. They also jury-rigged naval Exocets to fire from shore batteries.
Yes it could. Had TF Mercedes been a fully equipped Argentine infantry battalion I have little doubt 2 Para would have been massacred. That said, much of the blame for that must be laid to the exceptionally incompetant Lt Col Jones.
Now, THAT is one admittedly VERY simplistic way to look at things. To say that nuclear boats "work better" is just wrong.
Ask any nuc driver what he fears most. Diesel-electric subs of German origin will likely be at the very top of the list. If there's a German crew manning the sub, most even admit they'd rather be elsewhere than in the same area.
A couple of years back, a German 206A managed to penetrate the protective screen around a USN carrier goup, including tow LA-class boats and "sank" the carrier without the escorts being able to locate the boat. Interestingly, it wasn't the first time this had happened in an exercise. Even in the case the boat had been "sunk". Compare the cost of one 30-year-old sub with the cost of one supercarrier and its assorted planes. I won't even talk about the crew size. 24(?) versus 5.500(?)...you do the math. The German-made boats (especially the 206A) are too small for the US sonar systems to be picked up by active sonar. They are simply filtered out by the program. In a sub-on-sub scenario with a nuc and a d-e boat,, both with halfway competent crews, the non-nuc will almost always emerge victorious. They're more maneuverable and much quieter.
Nuclear subs and diesel-electric subs do have completely disparate tasks. Nucs are pure blue-water boats used for defense of carrier task groups, hunting other nucs, the occasional strike mission with cruise missiles and disrupting enemy shipping. They are fast, have high endurance but they're also patently unable to bottom the boat for longer periods (the reactor cooling pumps tend to chocke on the silt) and they're comparatively loud (and never mind the Clancy-esque propaganda about American subs being the quietest subs around...it's just that: propagandistic claptrap). At speeds greater than about 26 knots they sound like a gravel truck. I heard one myself on passive sonar, 2005 in the Med. The sound signature of the reactor pumps is another Achilles' heel.
"Conventional subs" specialize in littoral warfare. They're small, extremely quiet, pack an awesome punch in relation to their size and close to the coast can do anything a nuclear boat can do, only much much better because their Achilles' heel, speed and endurance, doesn't factor into the equation as much in this case.
As a rule, the further a nuclear boat comes inshore, the more the disadvantages outweigh the nuc's inherent advantages. For conventional boats, of course, it's vice versa.
And the US has been trying to get their greedy fingers on German submarine technology for years. They even tried to buy HDW shipbuilding through a Spanish investment bank . Luckily, they failed. I think this goes to show how much nuclear boats "work better" than coventional ones, right? My ass...
Last edited:
Indeed, it happens quite a lot during NATO exercises that European diesels take out US CVs and such. This is the print of a T-shirt made celebrating the sinking of the Theodore Roosevelt during a exercise:
