Different Lorraine Offensive

In WW1, the German 6th army launched attacks on the French 2nd army between Toul and Epinal on August 23rd, after being reinforced by 6.5 Ersatz divisions, that were originially slated for occupation duties in Belgium. These attacks had the stated goal of breaking through and pocketing large number of French troops with the German Center, which was made up of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th armies.
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_11_marne1914_5_(1600).jpg

What if Moltke instead decided that such an attack into the teeth of French fortifications on the Moselle was simply silly and instead decided to have Rupprecht reposition 2-3 corps, most of his heavy artillery, his 3 cavalry divisions and the 6.5 ersatz corps to the north near Metz and launch an attack? This manuever would have several advantages: It would not run into any fortifications. The French 2nd army, if it gave battle, would have to leave its forts and fight on open ground, an area where they proved less that adequate at this point in the war. It would allow the Germans to encircle Verdun and probably catch the French 3rd army in the pocket. If successful the offensive would force the 2nd army out of its forts or risk being pinned against the Moselle and trapped. It could also prevent forces from being transferred West to the French 6th army at the Marne.

This would be similar to the historical St. Mihiel offensive, but with more forces against a weaker opponent and driving into a gap. There are roads and rail to support the move, and, in conjunction with the 3 corps that the 5th army left to screen Verdun, the 6th army then could very well take part of the Meuse heights overlooking the Woevre plains that the advance would occur on. The French 3rd army is being pressed hard by the 5th army and won't have more forces to counter this move. Only the French 2nd army would be available and to do so would mean to leave the safety of their forts. Additionally, these are the forces that the 6th army just defeated in open battle in Alsace, so the moral factor is there too, as it can be psychologically tough to beat the force that just smashed you despite being outnumbered.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/lorraine/photos/maps/MapII.jpg
http://history.sandiego.edu/GEN/WW1Pics2/1919-156stmihiel.jpg

Even if the French 2nd army reorients to face the threat in time and the French 3rd army escapes, Verdun is going to be encircled, which is going to be a massive blow to the French, which will force them into counter attacks to relieve it regardless of the situation at the front. It will also leave about 2 corps of French infantry surrounded that the French 3rd army will have to write off. This would have massive implications to the Marne, as forces dedicated to that fight will have to be switched to deal with the situation on the the Meuse.

What is the community's thoughts? Could it succeed and what would the consequences be? Should I start another TL ?

The Moltke Plan

Hmm,
Do you mean this as a prewar variation to the Schlieffen/Moltke plan, or an ad hoc variation initiated in early August 1914?
.
I'm pretty sure that if it's the latter, such a major addition / variation to the Rail Transport / Logistics plan would have been extremely difficult to organise and risk causing major difficulties in supply and reinforcement of other armies in the West.

Also, how does this fit in with the availability of the rail and road routes that these troops would need to use?.

Incidentally, does anyone know of a source giving details of the Rail Movement plan for the German WW1 mobilisation (or indeed that of any other countries?). As a Railwayman, I have been hunting for info about these for some while without success.

My understanding of the St Mihiel offensive in Sep 1914 was that the roads in the Woevre Strantz used were pretty bad but not quite as bad as the local French commander assumed. What you would be doing is going to result in an earlier German attack on Troyons and they did suffer huge casualties there OTL though the fort was reduced to rubble in the process. Note in OTL when Revigny and Troyons were going on Joffre ordered Third Army to evacuate Verdun but its commander Sarrail talked him out of it.

However in August the French had pulled out of most of the area that I am suggesting for an attack. It won't be an exact copy of St. Mihiel, as there will be a greater attacking force. I failed to mention that the repositioning would involve a demonstration by the remainder of 6th and 7th army to hide the troop transfers. I did not notice that there are about 4 forts near the St. Mihiel rail line, which is gong to make things tougher. Also, you're right that the roads are not that extensive in the area, but they will be advancing over plains rather than wooded hills like in the Ardennes or Argonne. And the bulk of the French armies won't be ensconed on the heights above the river, waiting for the Germans like on the Moselle.

http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Battles_In_The_Woevre

Also, the army of Lorraine was transferred to the 6th army and had departed on the 24th, which was the day before the actual offensive between Toul and Epinal (I was incorrect on the date). So any attack will be advancing into a gap between the 3rd army and 2nd army. In September the French had reoccupied the area.

It's certainly an interesting idea but please don't stop your current timeline!

It's great and I can't wait to see what happens next

I decided to run with it after finding some more information in Sewell Tyng's book about the Marne (incidentally an excellent source on everything that gets ignored in East France by most other books about the Marne). Alright, I have to make some changes to my initial ideas because of information that I encountered in Tyng's book.

Finding the extra rolling stock should not be too much of a problem because rail capacity further north is diminished and can only use limited numbers of trains. That means that there are some underutilized trains floating around. Also the German logistics branch proved excellent at improvising on short notice, especially with rail time tables. Groener had his staff plan a complete redeployment of the entire army to the East in 2-3 days as an intellectual exercise! (and to prove Moltke wrong when he said that it would be too difficult to develop a rail plan that would shift the army East instead of the Schlieffen plan in August 1914).

The idea is formulated on the 21st and redeployment will be complete by the 26th.
The basis for the offensive will come as OHL's assistance to the 5th army in their drive on the French 3rd army and 6th army's drive on the French 2nd army. Basically, it will be used to drive a wedge into the rear of both forces. Initially there is some concern that the Army of Lorraine will be able to hold the region, but as the 3rd army is pushed back, it appears that Joffre is continuously drawing off their forces to reinforce other sectors. Rupprecht and Dellmensingen are arguing that extra troops and guns be sent to them for their breakthrough between Toul and Epinal, but OHL is less than trusting of their claims (handwavery). Instead, the 6.5 Ersatz divisions that are being fought over are to be sent to Metz from which 2.5 will be sent to relieve Strantz's 5th corps to free them up for operations on the Woevre. 6th army will give up the 21st corps under Below and two of its cavalry divisions, the 7th and 8th. The Metz garrison, the 33rd reserve division, will fall under (unnamed commander's) control (Falkenhayn for kicks-OHL wants to get rid of him so they give him a field command, let's say).

This new group called (whatever the commander's name is, so let's say: Army detachment Falkenhayn) is to assemble around Metz while the 5th corps at Etain near Verdun is to cover the flank of the advance. Roads are not particularly great, but not terrible either. There is a rail line running to St. Mihiel, which will be the center of the advance, as all supply is going to have to flow from there.

These troops will march out on the 26th, two days after the 6th army's offensive is launched along the Mortagne. This is also two days after the Army of Lorraine begins to be redeployed to the 6th army near Paris. So the only thing blocking their way is 4 small, older forts: Genicourt, Troyon, Paroches, and fort of the Roman camp near St. Mihiel.

Army Detachment Falkenhayn includes the following forces: 7th and 8th cavalry divisions; Guard, 4th, 8th and 10th ersatz divisions, 5th corps and 21st corps, with the 33rd reserve division acting as the detachment's reserve. Mobile artillery has been removed from the Metz forts to supliament the firepower of the group, 2 minenwerfer batteries have been taken from 6th army, and the armored train number 9 has been requisitioned for use on the rail line leading to St. Mihiel.

5th corps will be acting as the flank formation that is to attack the fort of Troyon and guard against a sally by the Verdun garrision; they are also maintaining contact with the 2.5 Erstaz formations at Etain, from which the independent brigade is to help intervene against the Verdun garrison if it sallies. 21st corp is to lead the attack on St. Mihiel and will have the support of the armored train and 2 minenwerfer batteries. Their attack will be supported by the Guard and 4th Ersatz divisions, while the cavalry and the 8th and 10th Ersatz divisions are to take Commercy and guard the flank against any intervention by units from Toul.

From the German border to St. Mihiel the distance is roughly 14-16 miles, while from Etain to Troyon is only about 12. The 5th corps arrives first, clashing with the remaining formations of the army of the Lorraine. The attack proceeds well, as the units were preparing to redeploy. The opening salvo is the first that the French are truly aware of the attack, causing the Troyon fort commander (possessing only a company of infantry, two batteries, and 2 machine guns) to send distress signals to Verdun, which then make their way to 3rd army. Engaged in heavy battles along the Meuse, the 3rd army can only send the 7th cavalry division, which will need to disengage and move to the area. It won't arrive until that evening. The commander of the 2nd army is made aware of enemy troops crossing the Woevre, but thinks it is only a feint meant to draw troops from the critical battles in Alsace. He allows the his forces in the area to deal with the move without reinforcement. The Germans hit the French corps in the Woevre as they are pulling back towards Toul. Outnumbered, they fight well, but German numbers and firepower, as well as being caught in the middle of redeployment cause the evacuation of the plains.

By night fall, the Germans have cleared the plains of the Woevre and have a foothold on the heights. Using the armored train as a battering ram, the 21st corps and the guards ersatz plow forward to the heights. The 4th, 8th and 10th ersatz divisions working in conjunction with the cavalry divisions cover the flank of the advance against the intervention of troops at Toul. The first day is a success despite combat raging along the heights of the Meuse and all the French forts still in action. So far the only intervention has been the arrival of the French 7th cavalry division. De Castelnau, the 2nd army commander, is hard pressed in Alsace and only begrudgingly approves the release of the Toul garrison and a reserve division for support of the battered corps holding the line near Toul.

wiking said:

I decided to run with it after finding some more information in Sewell Tyng's book about the Marne (incidentally an excellent source on everything that gets ignored in East France by most other books about the Marne). Alright, I have to make some changes to my initial ideas because of information that I encountered in Tyng's book.

Finding the extra rolling stock should not be too much of a problem because rail capacity further north is diminished and can only use limited numbers of trains. That means that there are some underutilized trains floating around. Also the German logistics branch proved excellent at improvising on short notice, especially with rail time tables. Groener had his staff plan a complete redeployment of the entire army to the East in 2-3 days as an intellectual exercise! (and to prove Moltke wrong when he said that it would be too difficult to develop a rail plan that would shift the army East instead of the Schlieffen plan in August 1914).

The idea is formulated on the 21st and redeployment will be complete by the 26th.
The basis for the offensive will come as OHL's assistance to the 5th army in their drive on the French 3rd army and 6th army's drive on the French 2nd army. Basically, it will be used to drive a wedge into the rear of both forces. Initially there is some concern that the Army of Lorraine will be able to hold the region, but as the 3rd army is pushed back, it appears that Joffre is continuously drawing off their forces to reinforce other sectors. Rupprecht and Dellmensingen are arguing that extra troops and guns be sent to them for their breakthrough between Toul and Epinal, but OHL is less than trusting of their claims (handwavery). Instead, the 6.5 Ersatz divisions that are being fought over are to be sent to Metz from which 2.5 will be sent to relieve Strantz's 5th corps to free them up for operations on the Woevre. 6th army will give up the 21st corps under Below and two of its cavalry divisions, the 7th and 8th. The Metz garrison, the 33rd reserve division, will fall under (unnamed commander's) control (Falkenhayn for kicks-OHL wants to get rid of him so they give him a field command, let's say).

This new group called (whatever the commander's name is, so let's say: Army detachment Falkenhayn) is to assemble around Metz while the 5th corps at Etain near Verdun is to cover the flank of the advance. Roads are not particularly great, but not terrible either. There is a rail line running to St. Mihiel, which will be the center of the advance, as all supply is going to have to flow from there.

These troops will march out on the 26th, two days after the 6th army's offensive is launched along the Mortagne. This is also two days after the Army of Lorraine begins to be redeployed to the 6th army near Paris. So the only thing blocking their way is 4 small, older forts: Genicourt, Troyon, Paroches, and fort of the Roman camp near St. Mihiel.

Army Detachment Falkenhayn includes the following forces: 7th and 8th cavalry divisions; Guard, 4th, 8th and 10th ersatz divisions, 5th corps and 21st corps, with the 33rd reserve division acting as the detachment's reserve. Mobile artillery has been removed from the Metz forts to supliament the firepower of the group, 2 minenwerfer batteries have been taken from 6th army, and the armored train number 9 has been requisitioned for use on the rail line leading to St. Mihiel.

5th corps will be acting as the flank formation that is to attack the fort of Troyon and guard against a sally by the Verdun garrision; they are also maintaining contact with the 2.5 Erstaz formations at Etain, from which the independent brigade is to help intervene against the Verdun garrison if it sallies. 21st corp is to lead the attack on St. Mihiel and will have the support of the armored train and 2 minenwerfer batteries. Their attack will be supported by the Guard and 4th Ersatz divisions, while the cavalry and the 8th and 10th Ersatz divisions are to take Commercy and guard the flank against any intervention by units from Toul.

From the German border to St. Mihiel the distance is roughly 14-16 miles, while from Etain to Troyon is only about 12. The 5th corps arrives first, clashing with the remaining formations of the army of the Lorraine. The attack proceeds well, as the units were preparing to redeploy. The opening salvo is the first that the French are truly aware of the attack, causing the Troyon fort commander (possessing only a company of infantry, two batteries, and 2 machine guns) to send distress signals to Verdun, which then make their way to 3rd army. Engaged in heavy battles along the Meuse, the 3rd army can only send the 7th cavalry division, which will need to disengage and move to the area. It won't arrive until that evening. The commander of the 2nd army is made aware of enemy troops crossing the Woevre, but thinks it is only a feint meant to draw troops from the critical battles in Alsace. He allows the his forces in the area to deal with the move without reinforcement. The Germans hit the French corps in the Woevre as they are pulling back towards Toul. Outnumbered, they fight well, but German numbers and firepower, as well as being caught in the middle of redeployment cause the evacuation of the plains.

By night fall, the Germans have cleared the plains of the Woevre and have a foothold on the heights. Using the armored train as a battering ram, the 21st corps and the guards ersatz plow forward to the heights. The 4th, 8th and 10th ersatz divisions working in conjunction with the cavalry divisions cover the flank of the advance against the intervention of troops at Toul. The first day is a success despite combat raging along the heights of the Meuse and all the French forts still in action. So far the only intervention has been the arrival of the French 7th cavalry division. De Castelnau, the 2nd army commander, is hard pressed in Alsace and only begrudgingly approves the release of the Toul garrison and a reserve division for support of the battered corps holding the line near Toul.

Click to expand...

I don't have any huge objections with this though would caution against getting too carried away with an armored train can do. V AK should take both Combres and Les Eparges on its way to Ft de Troyon. South of St. Mihiel there is another small fort-- de Liouville that may come into play in your scenario.

Tom_B said:

I don't have any huge objections with this though would caution against getting too carried away with an armored train can do. V AK should take both Combres and Les Eparges on its way to Ft de Troyon. South of St. Mihiel there is another small fort-- de Liouville that may come into play in your scenario.

Click to expand...

All it takes is one direct hit from a 75. Besides, it is limited to the rails. I probably will do some retcons as I go along, which will include Combres and Les Eparges. Do you have any information about de Liouville?

Day 2

double post

Day 2

A couple Retcons: When the army of Lorraine is disbanded (having been created for just this eventuality), its commander and two reserve divisions were sent to the 6th army. The remainder (4 reserve divisions plus the Verdun garrison) were folded back into the 3rd army. However, as the Lorraine army was just disbanded 2 days prior, the reserve formations are still being transferred to fight the German 5th army further north. As a result, there are still some reserve infantry regiments in the area on the 26th, who are opposing the Germans. Two are in the area of Troyon and one is still near St. Mihiel. They are without artillery support and are preparing to march north, so the attack by the Germans comes as a surprise. However, the Verdun garrison was still prepared to intervene, as this was their task until a day or so ago. As a result, the reserve infantry division from Verdun marches out and arrives in the late afternoon near Troyon. Also the 7th cavalry division arrives in Troyon in the evening. Nevertheless, the Germans have taken Les Eparges and Combres. The two infantry regiments have been badly smashed up by the regulars in the 5th corps. Corps artillery has been deployed by early evening and has been holding of the attacks of the French reinforcements. Fighting is in the heights about Mouilly and Rupt-en-Woevre (thanks google earth!!!)

South, the formations release by 2nd army are the Toul garrison (one reserve infantry division), plus the 2nd cavalry division instead of another reserve infantry division.

DAY 2
St. Mihiel:
The most successful advance is in the center, where the 21st corps has effectively destroyed the infantry regiment that was left in the area. The armored train has proven less than useful with the forts, so it has been held back. The two batteries of minenwerfers have been brought up over night and combined with the 21st corps' artillery, the forts are battered into submission by the afternoon. The rail station at St. Mihiel is captured undamaged in the fighting and is operational by 1400 hrs. Supplies pour in to help the 21st corps hold the area. The Guards ersatz division is sent south to capture Commercy and is accompanied by the armored train. Moving along the river Meuse in support of the train, the division bypasses the fort at de Liouville and takes the town of Commercy without resistance. The 8th cavalry division is detached from the flank guard and is sent to secure supply lines to Commercy. The French 7th Cavalry arrives in the late afternoon in the St. Mihiel area, after ensuring Troyon is safe. They arrive too late and find themselves outnumbered. After initial clashes, the division sets up positions to prevent the 21st corps from marching north to support the attack on Troyon. They come under attack by 31st division plus a brigade from the 33rd reserve division Metz garrison that was committed to enlarge the salient. Pushed back to the fort at Troyon, the division rallies and stops for the night, as German forces push within artillery range of the fort.

Troyon:
Further north the situation is desperate for both sides throughout the early morning. The Germans, once confronted with the 72nd reserve division counter attacking from Verdun, then the 7th cavalry from Troyon on the 1st day, are halted and locked in an artillery duel while the infantry struggle forward through forested hills and ambushes. Von Strantz, commander of the 5th corps, had reserved the right to call on the ersatz divisions at Etain. Once the Verdun garrison (most of it) was committed to the fight, he had one of the divisions and the independent brigade brought up over night to reinforce his push towards Troyon. 7th Cavalry left before the German ersatz divisions were committed, which left the 72nd reserve division in a precarious positions, as they found themselves under attack from the flank in the late morning. The two reserve regiments that were left in the area on the first day were nearly wiped out at this point, so were unable to stop the 10th division when it bypassed the beleagured 72nd reserve division. Troyon was now within sight. By 1500 hrs, the 5th corps had concluded its battle with the 72nd division, that had pulled back after being overwhelmed on multiple fronts. It pulled back to Sommedieue and the Fort de Genicourt. Its commander informed 3rd army what had happened.
Von Strantz was now free to attack the fort at Troyon, which he promptly shelled for 30 minutes before requesting it surrender. The commander refused, which saw the fort blasted for the remainder of the day. 7th Cavalry returned to the area that evening, and had the dubious honor of watching the magazine of the fort explode and with it their hopes for sanctuary. By dusk the division pulled back across the Meuse.

Toul and the Southern Flank:
The forces of 2nd army were still locked in battle with the 6th army, but had assembled a force to deal with what de Castelnau thought was an enemy feint. Due to spotty communications, he had no idea that the forts along the Meuse were under attack and that St. Mihiel was about to fall. His three infantry divisions and one cavalry division were now set to go toe to toe with the Germans. The three erstaz divisions and their two cavalry divisions had dug in over night, aware that the French had the high ground and observation over the plains. Aware that the entire plain could not be covered by the forces available, the infantry divisions had set up strong points in a line from the Moselle at Aingery across to Sanzey. The 8th cavalry patrolled the line from Sanzey to Bourq while the 7th was held in reserve at Tremblecourt. The aviation detachment from the 21st corps was used to patrol the plains to watch for a French Manuever at the flank instead of a thrust into the Woevre.

Expecting little more than a skirmish, the French moved out in the morning at 0900. Having miles to travel and with observation from air and heights, the French knew where to find the Germans. Being reserve formations that had little combat experience to this point, they followed doctrine and prepped the German positions at Andilly, Avrainville, and Jaillon with their 75mm guns before moving to contact. Wearing their bright colored pants and coats, they made easy targets for the Germans and, in conjunction with their artillery, drove them back again and again. The 75mm proved incapable of penetrating the German trenches except for a direct hit. The shrapnel shells that they were equipped with proved equally ineffective, and the Germans held their ground. The heavier artillery, few in number, that were in range from the fort proved somewhat more effective, which allowed the 2nd cavalry division to punch a hole and move through to the German rear. However, their attack was met with the German cavalry, which soon prevailed. Back by artillery firing over open sights with shot, the survivors of the French division fled back to their lines, bloodied. The line held throughout the day, and the French ultimately gave up after 1800 hrs. Their return to Toul caused de Castelnau to realize that this feint might be more substatial than he thought.
Confident that the forces he deployed could still handle the situation and unaware that Commercy had fallen he left it up to his commander on the spot to solve.

That evening, the Germans had finally excepted the surrender of the fort at Troyon and expanded their salient. The French 3rd army was now aware of the danger to his rear and transferred back two reserve infantry divisions to the Meuse line. They would arrive early the next day and would take up positions near the 72nd reserve division. Falkenhayn now committed the rest of the 33rd reserve division to St. Mihiel, which was to garrison the city (united with its previously committed brigade). The 21st corps was moved across the Meuse to threaten the rear of third army. The 5th corps was expected to follow in the morning. The two batteries of minenwerfer were sent north to Troyon to held with the reduction of the forts at Genicourt, which the ersatz divisions would be expected to deal with alone. The Guard ersatz division, after securing Commercy, began moving down river toward Foug to take up the defensive positions. In the course of the next few days, they would maneuver to attack the 2nd army in the rear, hopefully drawing off forces to allow for a breakthrough in Alsace by the 6th army. Over night the ersatz divisions were moved out of the plains to support the Guard division in their manuever. The 7th cavalry division was left as a screen in case the French tried to rush across the plain. The ersatz would not arrive until after dawn, given the broken terrain, but they needed not worry just yet.

Sarrail, who was to take over the 3rd army on the 28th, contacted de Castelnau and let me know what the Germans had been up to. Worried, but still fixated on the German 6th army, he released another corps to move to Toul, but refused to commit more forces. As it was Joffre was demanding more divisions, which he would soon not be able to spare. Both sides deployed for combat, neither aware of the other's plans.

Looks very good so far. A small request - as someone not an expert in this area, could you possibly refer to the units by their native language designations, to make it easier to keep them seperate?

Your maps

Going by Arthur Banks' picture book I see one rail line running parallel to the Meuse and another further east running through Hattonville and Apremont and then further south it passes within < a mile of Ft. de Liouville. Are you showing an east/west spur into St. Mihiel? I don't see it. Things that show up on one map and not another are usually single track and built later in the war and sometimes narrow guage to boot.

I don't think de Liouville can ignored until it is at least renderd impotent by heavy howitzers.

From Hew Stratchan's "To Arms", it shows a branch of rail lines heading from Metz that reach out to St. Mihiel, Toul, and Nancy. From St. Mihiel one line extends north to Verdun, running through or near Troyon. The other line runs south, branching at an unnamed town, at Commercy, and at the southward branch of the river Meuse. It also extends straight to Toul.

As to the fort you mentioned, I found it on google earth, and based on its location, a force travelling along the river/rail line should be shielded from its line of sight by the hills.

Edit: checking again, I found the city, not the forts, so yes, you are right and the retcon will have to be the minenwerfers heading south a little ways to deal with the forts. This will mean no great southern maneuver, so the ersatz divisions stay put, as they will be locked up for too long dealing with the forts. Eventually they will head north to deal with the fort to the north of Troyon, but that probably won't be until the next day.

Edit2: I have Banks' book too and I see what you mean. There also maybe some other forts in the area to watch out for, especially across the Meuse. I don't know what to make of it really. Banks' map is supposed to represent 1915, but how were the Germans supplying the Salient if they captured it in 1914? Apparently Strachan's maps are from "the Times War Atlas", so perhaps they had a better set of prewar maps? I'm guessing it was only a single line running from Metz to St. Mihiel, so I am going to run with it unless someone can produce definitive evidence one way or another.

wiking said:

From Hew Stratchan's "To Arms", it shows a branch of rail lines heading from Metz that reach out to St. Mihiel, Toul, and Nancy. From St. Mihiel one line extends north to Verdun, running through or near Troyon. The other line runs south, branching at an unnamed town, at Commercy, and at the southward branch of the river Meuse. It also extends straight to Toul.

As to the fort you mentioned, I found it on google earth, and based on its location, a force travelling along the river/rail line should be shielded from its line of sight by the hills.

Edit: checking again, I found the city, not the forts, so yes, you are right and the retcon will have to be the minenwerfers heading south a little ways to deal with the forts. This will mean no great southern maneuver, so the ersatz divisions stay put, as they will be locked up for too long dealing with the forts. Eventually they will head north to deal with the fort to the north of Troyon, but that probably won't be until the next day.

Click to expand...

I have good news and bad news. I found 2 more sources for you

The first is a good map of the area as of 1918 http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW1Pics2/1919-156stmihiel1600.jpg

The bad news is I still don't see the east/west rail connection to St. Mihiel (in fact the rail lines look like Banks' map). Now sometimes rail lines that show up in late war maps don't exist early in the war (I had this problem with Shavli) but I don't think the reverse is likely.

OK there is another problem and that is there is yet another fort to worry about at Gironville Here is another source: http://translate.google.com/transla...ult&prev=/search?q=gironville+fort&hl=en&sa=G

(thisis part of a French site that has useful info about all the forts)

You seem particulary linterested in Commercy. Might I suggest making that the schwerpunkt taking Liouville and neutralizing Gironville before going after St. Mihiel and Camp of the Romans. Once you take Commercy the heights of the Meuse are outflanked and picking off those two from the south would be much easier IMHO.

Thanks for the information! I had found a lower quality map of the one you posted, but yours offers much more detail. It look like there is a rail line to Vigneulles, which is right near St. Mihiel. But Commercy seems to be the area where the line from Metz meets up with the north-south line near the Meuse.

It looks like you're right about the Schwerpunkt of the attack, so I am going to have to make some changes. This does make things easier for the Germans on several accounts, so I might need to do more rewrites. Google earth is helpful to a degree, but this drawing represents things a bit easier, though somewhat less faithful to the actual layout of the ground and the heights near Toul (which are depicted as the highest point in the area in google). It looks like Commercy is going to be the focal point for the rail hub, Troyon to isolate the flank from Verdun, and the plains are going to have to be occupied only up to Pont-a-Mousson or thereabouts.

But I am curious as to how the Germans kept St. Mihiel supplied through serveral offensives OTL without having a direct rail line.

I guess I am going to have 5th corps and the guards ersatz go after Troyon/establish a frontage near St. Mihiel. 2 divisions and a cav. division hang back to watch the plains, while 21st corps, the armored train, the minenwerfers and 4th ersatz and 7th cav. go after Commercy and smash through the smaller forts. 4th ersatz stays in Commercy with 7th cav. and the train, 21st corps marches north through st. mihiel with the minenwerfer and strikes at Troyon from the side. Troyon, 5th corps and the 1.5 ersatz reinforcements stays the same. 33rd division still is brought in, except this time as the whole division, to garrision st. mihiel. The southward move toward Toul never happens, and the mission is to take the French 3rd army in the rear while 5th army goes for the front. Pinch off Verdun and create a dangerous salient for exploitation. From the heights, 3rd army can be observed and hammered by artillery from the flank/rear. Though only 2 corps and a couple of ersatz divisions are going to have to hold against whatever the French 2nd and 3rd armies are going to throw at them, they might very well destablize the French position and prevent forces from being transfered West to the 6th army.

http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW1Pics2/1919-156stmihiel1600.jpg

Alright, lets try this again.
Abbreviations:
German (G)
French (F)
Ersatz (e)
Cavalry (cav)

Disposition
On August 26th, Forces detailed above depart from Metz, Etain and the frontier to launch an offensive into the gap between the French 2nd and 3rd armies. The army of Lorraine, the French right wing of the 3rd army that occupied the heights of the Meuse south of Verdun has been disbanded on the 24th, which means that one reserve corps has been sent west to the French 6th army forming near Paris with the army's commander. The French 3rd army reabsorbed the dissolving army and moved their reserve divisions across the Meuse, northwest of Verdun to oppose the German 5th army that is grinding its way forward. They have pulled out of the plains for the most part and are focused in Alsace with the Garrison at Toul, a reserve division, acting as the sole (F) force in the area. (F) 2nd cav. is in close by.

Southeast near Toul and Nancy, the 2nd army is being attacked by the German 6th army along the Meurthe between Toul and Epinal. Since the 24th Rupprecht has made little progress, as the French forces occupy the high ground.

Offensive
The offensive starts at 0500 on August 26th.
Group Falkenhayn is operating out of Metz and drops two (e) divisions, the 8th and 10th, near Pont-a-Mousson at 0645. The remainder, 21st corps, 7th and 8th cav., Guard and 4th (e) divisions, march across the plains through Thiaucourt (0900), along the Mad river, and towards Apremont (1200) and Gironville. The Guards and 4th (e) along with the 7th cav. establish themselves from Vigneulles to Varneville (1100) and move cautiously into the heights. Moving in mainly from the north of the city, they reach Lamorville and Varvinay before coming into contact with the fort of the roman camp, which over looks the city. Throughout the day they artillery duel with the small fort, but the infantry are stopped by its firepower, causing them to wait for the 21st corps (1800).

Commercy
21st corps and 8th cav. move straight towards the rail junction at Commercy with the minenwerfers, and by 1600 hrs. have begun ranging in on the forts about Liouville and Gironville. Aided by corps artillery, the minenwerfers scare the commanders into surrendering by 1830 despite being mostly intact, allowing the 21st corps and 8th cav. to move into Commercy and secure the rail junction near Lerouville. Word is sent back to Metz regarding the capture of the rail station, which is reinforced overnight by the 33rd r. division from Metz, along with supplies to dig in. They occupy the heights surrounding the city by dawn and begin to prepare defenses. The captured forts, mostly intact, aid setting up defenses, despite being focused toward the plains.

The capture of Commercy allows the minenwerfer and elements of the 21st corps to move north by 2000 hrs., with dusk approaching. Positions are occupied across the Meuse and the batteries are set up waiting for the morning so that they can observe and reduce the fort of the Roman camp.

Troyon
The 5th corps (G) was relieved on the 25th by two (e) divisions, while another (e) independent bridge was attacked to the corps. The commander, von Strantz, moved out early too, at 0600. Marching through Fresnes (0800), Les Esparges was occupied soon after. From there his forces moved into the forest of the Mortagne and on to the heights of the Meuse. Meeting little resistance, he moved on to the fort by 1100hrs, and was repulsed by the plucky fort commander. Instead of attempting another infantry assault, von Strantz had his corps artillery brought up by 1300 hr. The small fort would experience a prolonged bombardment for 2 hours until 5th corps' guns finally penetrated the magazine, reducing the fort to almost no ammunition for its artillery. Much of it had been reduced to rubble, but the commander still held out. Finally, after another hour of battering, the survivors surrendered. Though this fort fell, there still remained another overlooking Troyon at Genicourt, which in turn was subjected to the artillery. But soon after 1600hrs. the Verdun garrison, (F) 72nd reserve division, made an appearance. It had been alerted several hours before by distress calls from Troyon and villagers that had seen the Germans crawling over the heights. Though too late to save fort Troyon, the French soldiers managed to save fort Genicourt, at least for August 26th. The 5th corps managed to occupy the heights above Rupt and was locked in another artillery duel with the new French division.
Overnight another (e) division from Etain would be brought up to aid the 5th corps.

Day 2 August 30th

Retcon: The offensive is launched on the 29th, as I have learned more about the situation at the front that makes the 26th impossible as the start date. Also the armored train stays with the 6th army. The two ersatz divisions deployed to Pont-a-Mousson engage the French division in the area, which draws in the other forces in the plains to the Moselle river and the skirmishes there. De Castelnau, the French 2nd army commander, is convinced that this is only a feint and a supporting assault for the attacks by the German 6th army on the Mortagne river.

The French Disposition on the evening of the 29th:
Ruffey, the 3rd army commander, is informed by Verdun that the 72 r. division is moving out to Troyon to stop the Germans from taking the fort, and dispatches the 7th cav., as they are the only unit that could be spared as the German 5th army pushes across the Meuse. The 7th cav. moves into the area on that evening, but doesn't take part in the fighting. On the evening of the 29th Verdun dispatches another regiment to help near Troyon, leaving it with 2 regiments and a r. brigade.

The 2nd army is still engaged along the Mortagne and in the north near the Moselle by the two ersatz divisions from Metz. As of the morning of the 30th there is no knowledge of the German attacks on Troyon or the seizure of Commercy.

St. Mihiel
The artillery of the 21st corps and their supporting minenwerfers opened up on the dawn of the 30th, pounding the fort of the roman camp to dust. Within the hour, the fort had fallen and the soldiers of the 21st corps began to assemble to move North to Troyon. The town was occupied and secured by 0800, which allowed the 7th cav. and Guard (e) division to move south to Commercy, arriving around 1000. The 4th (e) set up as the garrison of the town.

Commercy
The 33rd r. division had been hard at work with the 8th cav. setting up defenses and chosing terrain to defend. As the rail junction had been captured, trains were moving in from Metz with supplies and defensive materials to enable the defenders to hold the area. The heights were soon occupied and had rudimentary trenches, with the captured forts, mostly intact, used as part of the defenses. The arrival of the two divisions from St. Mihiel allowed the process to quicken, and the positions held to increase. The men worked all day and had not yet experienced a French attack. By nightfall the town had been suplimented by additional firepower, as machine guns and some artillery had been removed from the Metz forts to aid the defenders in their task.

Troyon
The fighting continued to rage throughout the morning, with the Germans having a distinct advantage with their howitzers. The French had far fewer guns and of these most were the 75mm gun, which had a hard time competing in the heights. Though both sides had dug in, the Germans were able to inflict the most damage. The arrival of the French 7th cav. and the extra regiment of infantry from Verdun the previous night had helped defend the area, but they brought little extra artillery, the most necessary weapon. The German 5th corps had silenced the fort at Genicourt by noon, leaving the French with even less artillery. Overnight the Germans had also brought up an extra Ersatz division from Etain, which had proceded to launch a flank attack on the heights from Mesnil/Haudiomont. The attack up the steep ground of the heights was unexpected and caught the French off guard, but even with their artillery, they were not able to penetrate far. However, their positions allowed them to hit the French from another angle, allowing them to inflict signficant casualites on the outnumbered defenders.

Their fate was sealed with the 21st corps arrived around 1300 with their artillery compliment on the west bank of the Meuse. Really the entire units moved between the Aire river and the Meuse, which shielded them from the limited fire that could be brought by the French. They occupied the hills above Villers by 1400 and brought further fire to bear on the beleaugered Frenchmen. Pounded on 3 sides by the Germans, the French broke contact and withdrew to the protection of the Verdun forts. The Ersatz division and independent brigade moved forward to occupy the high ground between the abandoned positions and the French forts at Verdun. The 5th corps, that had borne the brunt of the fighting, paused to reorganize and resupply. Also out of ammuntion, a train from Metz was able to arrive by the late afternoon. The Germans paused for the evening after two days of hard marching and fighting. For now the rear of the French 3rd army lay open and tomorrow it could be assailed.

The French
De Castelnau was finally informed by Toul in the afternoon that the Germans had occupied Commercy. A villager had come forth with the information, which prompted him to withdraw an infantry corps and his cavalry division to deal with the German forces in the town. Believing that he was facing only 1 reserve division and some cavalry, he thought the force was adequate to liberate town. Though he recieved communication from the 3rd army and their new commander, Sarrail, about the fighting near Verdun, he was still convinced that this force should be enough. Joffre was already demanding he give up a corps to the 6th army around Paris, and considering that Rupprecht was still hammering away along the Mortange, he was loath to send more.

15th corps was transferred from 2nd army to support Sarrail. Until it arrived, Sarrail decided to detach an infantry corps to guard against the threat to his rear, which forced him to pull back and let the Germans advance. He coordinated this move with de Langle, the commander of the 4th army, who would lengthen his front line to accomedate his neighbor. This prompted him to demand another corps from Joffre, who obliged by removing one from 2nd army. Distrubed by this trend of robbing his army to support everyone else, de Castelnau protested that any more withdrawals were going to compromise his front. Joffre told him to expect to lose at least one more corps, and his southern neighbor was told to prepare two more corps for transfer.

Day 3 August 31st

Ok, so I am INTENSELY bored at work and have too much internet access.

The French
2nd army: to send out a combat group to attack the Germans at Commercy, de Castelnau had to shorten his line along the Moselle and scede to the Germans Pont-a-Mousson. Two reserve infantry divisions have been pulled out of the line and the garrison of Toul has been withdrawn to the city. 2nd cav linked up with the two r. divisions at Toul around 0700 and they set out at 0800 with the cav division screening the advance after aerial recon had shown German positions around Commercy being developed. 2nd army was significantly weaker, as 15th corps left the line that morning to entrain for 3rd army. 1st army had lost 21st corps on the same day to 4th army, which gave Rupprecht and Dellmensingen hope that renewed drives on the Mortagne might be able to pierce it, which so far only proves to allow local successes.

Sarrail in the 3rd army had sent out his 4th corps to relieve pressue on Verdun and shield his rear. He had pulled back slightly during the evening to compensate for the reduction of combat power.

Day 3:
Occupying the heights above the Meuse gave the German defenders an edge as the 21st corps and 5th corps occupied positions overlooking what would be known as the Voie Sacree OTL. The 5th corps moved to the hills to the north of Viller where the 21st corps was positioned. This gave the Germans a commanding view of the relatively low areas before them. As the French 4th corps marched into position near Regret, Baleycourt, and Blercourt in the afternoon confident that they would be able to push the Germans back. Artillery prepped the German positions in the heights south of Lemper-aux-Bois. Von Strantz held back his guns, conserving ammunition for the infantry assault to follow. By 1700 the two divisions of the French 4th corps marched out to rush the hill. Once the French regiments were descending or marching across the valleys below, they were met with murderous fire from above, as the 21st corps maneuvered across another valley further south near the village of Souilly.

With their forces committed to the assault, the French were unaware of the brisk repositioning that Germans were performing. The minenwerfer had been transferred to the 5th corps and were proving deadly in the steep hills of the region. While few in number, the dreaded scream of their shells drove the terrified French to the ground. By 1900 the attack had died down, as the bloodied infantry retreated. In the meantime, the 21st corps had crossed the Voie Sacree and established themselves in the heights near Osches and proceeded to move along the heights, attempting to flank the French positions on the hill overlooking Blercourt. Both sides maneuvered to counter the other, while the armies further north clashed. Sarrail was becoming increasingly worried as he was pressed back closer to the fighting to his rear. So far it was not effecting him, but unless he was able to resolve it soon, he would be sandwiched between two German forces...

Commercy
The French approached the town of Commercy from the rail line running from Toul and from the plains on the opposite side of the heights. Marching along the road leading to Boucq one infantry division then mounted the heights containing the Forest du Hasoy. The other marched with the 2nd cav division along the Meuse, while another element marched along the road leading to Void, essentially aiming to attack the area from three sides. All came into contact with the Germans in unfortunate manners. The groups aiming to march through Void was ambushed by forces occupying the heights above the city, as they left contact with the force marching along the Meuse. The Meuse detachment was hit after it marched into full view of the heights above Euville. The final group was able to mount the hill above Boucq, but as they tried to cross the vally leading to the next series of heights, they were struck by machine gun and artillery fire.

The raging battle lasted most of the day, as the French tried to penetrate the prepared German positions above them. By night fall the forces in the valley had retreated to Troussy to lick their wounds, while the others fled into the safety of the forest. The defenses had proven solid, much to the relief of Falkenhayn, who was worried that the French would overwhelm them. So far it seemed that they did not take the threat seriously.

But on the other sides of the hill, de Castelnau as troubled to hear that the offensive to that Commercy had failed so badly. He dispatched another reserve infantry division that evening and was prepared to send the Toul garrison if they proved necessary. On the German side, the 4th ersatz division in St. Mihiel was prepared to head south if necessary and had established that a regiment would be left behind if they were needed. The next day would tell.

I am glad to see the events moved back as the original scheme did seem at least one day too early to me. Nothing here strikes me as wrong. It is time to compliment you on your detail and ask what comes next.

Day 4, September 1st

Strategic Picture
Events were transpiring quicker along the Meuse, as both sides realized the importance that the next few days represented. The Germans were advancing on both side of the French 3rd army and they were coming closer pinching off Verdun and possibly entrapping their opponent's field army in the process. Sarrail was increasingly desperate, as the German 5th army advanced fast through the Argonne ever since crossing the Meuse. The departure of the 4th corps from the line was proving difficult to cope with. The 15th corps from the 2nd army would not arrive in the field before the 4th, as the Germans were sitting astride the St. Mihiel line to Verdun, and a more roundabout line was needed. Further trouble was developing, as the Germans were now in partial observation of the supply route running to Verdun, which was also being partly used to supply the 3rd army. Joffre was becoming worried by the seeming beginnings of a military disaster, and implored de Castelnau to resolve the situation at Commercy. The last of his reserve division group moved up to Boucq overnight to held grind the northern shoulder of the Commercy position.

Falkenhayn (I don't really feel that he would be the likely person for this job, so if someone can name a decent commander that would have been available, let me know) was becoming worried himself, as supplying the forward most corps across the Meuse was becoming difficult. The rail lines running from Metz to the St. Mihiel line were only single track, which meant the force could only sustain limited ammunition usage. This of course was not going to work in reality, as the primary advantage that the Germans had was their artillery, which they used in prodigious amounts. Fighting against the French 4th corps was heating up and the 5th corps had used over 60% of their stock. Though small arms munitions were still holding up well, as there had been little direct fighting on the 31st for reasons sited below. But the 5th and 21st corps were operating in hilly terrain with few good roads, and as the rail line ended below, the improvised supply troops taken from training depots were forced to lug everything uphill and over farmers' paths. For the moment the situation was managable, but there remained a lingering fear that a pull back would be necessary.

So far further south at Commercy the Germans had stood up well. They had been able to occupy the best positions and had nearly two days to prepare them ahead of time. They had another reserve at St. Mihiel, only an hour's march away. Additionally, they were near the rail junction supplying the advance, so were amply fitted in every manner. The critical nature of their position demanded it. The fighting the previous day had only given the less experienced men of the ersatz division and reserve garrision division a taste of real war. They were confident afterward and ready for more. The experienced troops of the cavalry divisions, blooded in Alsace, were able to assist their infantry brethern with their knowledge and numbers. Becoming more infantry men everyday, they were indistinguishable from their brothers of line.

Day 4
Across the Meuse:
The 5th corps was now firmly established on the heights above Landrecourt, but were starting to regret their choice of position. The infantry had hung back initially and artillery observers were the first line of defense in the densely wooded terrain. These men were able to bring the heavy guns of the corps against anyone trying to cross the valleys below, which they demonstrated with deadly skill the previous day. The blast bodies of French soldiers lay along the ground below as grim testimony to this fact. But initially the forts guarding the opposite ridge, Fort Landrecourt and Dugny, had remained sillent, leading the corps commander, von Strantz, to conclude that they had been denued of artillery. As he moved his men forward to take the opposite ridge the following day, he learned the harsh lesson that they were simply waiting for his infantry to appear. Though only possessing a few guns, when coupled with the artillery of the French 4th corps, they proved more than effective. Losses had been light, but the men of the 5th corps were unused to meeting a foe with similar firepower and retreated into the cover of the woods. This meant that the 5th corps was forced to act as a base of fire to pin the enemy while the 21st corps maneuvered to flank their position. Artillery duels were generally declined by the Germans throughout the day, as ammunition was dwindling and resupply was slow. The French attempted to push across the valley once again to their front, while the other division near Blercourt remained silent. Again the German mortars and heavy guns stopped them cold despite the willingness of the French to expend shells on the opposite ridge. They remained locked in this deadly embrace while another drama occured to the West.

The 21st corps had mounted the neighboring hill of the French division at Blercourt the previous day and had spent time moving across it to turn their flank. Of course the French had been using their air assets to monitor this development, which caused them to reposition to the same hill. Advancing hard, they did not recieve the information from their own recon planes about the transfer in time. Additionally, their artillery has lagging behind on the rough ground. By the late morning, the first formations were emerging from the forests onto the farm land containing the only major road in the area. Leaving their artillery on the opposite hill, the French had moved several regiments into the area and dug in, waiting for the Germans. As they moved across the open fields atop the hill, they were brought under withering small arms and artillery fire, forcing them back. Feeling avenged for their losses the previous day, the Frenchmen stayed put, waiting for the next rush. But it never came. Having learned the lesson of adequate fire support the professionals of the 21st corps waited for their artillery to come up. By late afternoon it was in position, and the duels began. French positions were identified through aerial observation and direct sight, enabling the heavy guns of the corps, still with full shell stocks, to pummel the enemy. The French lacked their heavier corps guns, which were supporting the forts against the German 5th corps, meaning they were at a disadvantage. Having double the guns and howitzers instead of just field guns, the Germans were able to dig into the French trenches and gun positions. Though giving a good account of themselves, they were forced back when the infantry moved in. The French would leave the hills later than day, pulling back to the forested hill north of Blercourt, trying to stay in contact with their corps. Through the rest of the evening, the 21st corps occupied positions extending from the southern hill above Blercourt to northwest to positions overlooking Domblase. The Germans had cut the routes leading to Verdun.

Commercy:
The French began again at 0800, this time with two divisions from the east and the 2nd cav. with a reserve division marching south and striking from the West. This flanking force would march through Staubin early in the morning and arrive at the flank around 0900 with the cavalry coming along the Cousances rail line and the infantry marching up the Saulx road.
The action in the East would come once again from the forest du Hasoy, but this time also from forest de Larreine. The eastern side started their attack earlier, as the r. divisions moving out of the hills attacked cautiously with a brisk bombardment. They were to be the fixing force, that would allow the flank attack aimed at Gironville to succeed. However, the attackers still expected only an infantry division and a cavalry division, unaware that the Germans had been reinforced. This would cost them dearly, as the frontal attack quickly bogged down. The flank assault had been observed from the capture forts, which proceeded to fire off the remaining shells of the turret guns. Stunned by the fire coming off their own forts, the French never even made it to the village. Artillery fire stopped the advance and the furthest penetrations were stopped by accurate machinegun fire coming from the undamaged fort cupolas.

In the west, the fighting raged for longer, but with similar ineffectiveness. The French were once again struck from the high ground and it with accurate machinegun fire. Eventually artillery rounds began to find their mark as the enemy deployed their own guns and the advance stopped, as both sides traded shots. The shrapnel rounds that the French were equipped with were even less effect against the trenches that the Germans fought from. Once again they pulled back, but now they had a foothold in the forest of Commercy. The French halted after a brutal day for attacks and reported their failure to de Castelnau. Now they were much more certain of the German strength and this new information caused him much concern.

Aftermath:
He was informed that another corps was needed for 9th army, which he protested given the situation at his front. He was fighting on two sides and was being bled by Joffre AND the Germans! 1st army was going to need to make up the slack. Frustrated, he was still forced to entrain his 18th division, but was given the 66th reserved division and the 14th dragoon bridage by Dubail. They would not arrive for a day, so in the meantime, the Toul garrison, another reserve infantry division would be needed for the front in Alsace. The Germans were pressing hard there, causing him to give up ground. 1st army was helping, as their front was not nearly as hard pressed. Still he had only 6 divisions with which to fight in Alsace.

The situation near Verdun was even worse. Sarrail was sending out distress signals to Joffre, terrified that he was in danger of being overrun from the rear and Verdun being cut off. Right now supply was cut to the fort, and his own situation was percarious now that one of his hubs was removed. He detached another division to fight the Germans. The 18th division would make its way south and link up with the 7th division near Domblase. 7th cav. still in the Verdun fortress region was ordered West that afternoon and appeared with the 72nd r. division near the forts Dugny and Landrecourt. They would arrive too late to make another push that day, but their artillery would be deployed, along with some that was able to be removed from forts in the area on short notice. Tomorrow they would make a push to drive the Germans back.
15 corps from 2nd army was still also on its way.

Falkenhayn was pleased with the results of the day, despite the precarious supply and military position. He was paranoid about an attack in the rear of the 21st corps and ordered increased aerial survaillence of the areas to the south and west. So far, both Rupprecht and Crown Prince Wilhelm with thrilled with the results, as both noticed the resistance along their fronts drop. The attacks in Alsace had still yielded only limited gains, but Rupprecht was still hopeful for a breakthrough. Wilhelm was particularly successful, moving quicker than anticipated, as his troops entered Corney and Dannevoux that evening. Recognizing the French desire to take Commercy had caused them to out of the Woevre, he prepared to dispatch the 8th Erstaz division, currently one of the two holding Pont-a-Mousson to Commercy. They would stay in the ready reserve, but not yet to be deployed. In the mean time, he had the 4th ersatz division leave a regiment in St. Mihiel and move to Commercy to reinforce the defenders.