From C.V. Wedgwood's wonderful _The Thirty Years War_, discussing the unsuccessful peace conference at Regensburg in 1630:
"Had Maximilian [of Bavaria] refused to help or be helped by the French agents... had the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg accepted the defeat of Protestantism instead of making an eleventh hour stand, there might have been peace in Germany. The King of Sweden might have withdrawn and the war between Bourbon and Hapsburg might have been fought out in France and Italy. Surrender in 1630 might have saved Germany from eighteen more years of war, and although the settlement would have been very different from that [of] 1648, it would not have been appreciably worse. Surrender in 1630 would have meant the abandonment of the German Liberties [but] these Liberties were the privileges of ruling princes... and had nothing to do with the rights of peoples. Popular liberty was unknown before, during and after the war.
"Ferdinand's victory would have meant the centralization of the Empire under Austrian control, the establishment of one despotism rather than several in the German speaking world. It would have meant a heavy defeat for Protestantism but not its extinction... Ferdinand's organization was already proving unequal to the execution of the Edict of Restitution, and even had he achieved all that was implied by that document, Protestantism would not have been extinguished. There remained Saxony and Brandenburg and the undisputed fragments of Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Baden and Brunswick.
"It would be absurd to pretend that [such a victory] would have been an unmixed blessing... The power of the Hapsburg would overshadow all Europe. Yet in point of fact the continuation of the struggle led only to the no less threatening dominance of the Bourbon."
Okay, I think Wedgwood is being optimistic on some points here, but it's not a crazy POD. Ferdinand came to Regensburg willing to negotiate for victory; most obviously, he was willing to throw Wallenstein overboard. If the princes had been as willing, the war might have ended there. As Wedgwood points out, though, Maximilian was a treacherous weasel, while John of Saxony had a sudden attack of conscience-driven stubbornness at the worst possible time.
So, handwave these away, and say a settlement is reached before Gustavus Adolphus lands in the north.
Now what?
Doug M.
"Had Maximilian [of Bavaria] refused to help or be helped by the French agents... had the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg accepted the defeat of Protestantism instead of making an eleventh hour stand, there might have been peace in Germany. The King of Sweden might have withdrawn and the war between Bourbon and Hapsburg might have been fought out in France and Italy. Surrender in 1630 might have saved Germany from eighteen more years of war, and although the settlement would have been very different from that [of] 1648, it would not have been appreciably worse. Surrender in 1630 would have meant the abandonment of the German Liberties [but] these Liberties were the privileges of ruling princes... and had nothing to do with the rights of peoples. Popular liberty was unknown before, during and after the war.
"Ferdinand's victory would have meant the centralization of the Empire under Austrian control, the establishment of one despotism rather than several in the German speaking world. It would have meant a heavy defeat for Protestantism but not its extinction... Ferdinand's organization was already proving unequal to the execution of the Edict of Restitution, and even had he achieved all that was implied by that document, Protestantism would not have been extinguished. There remained Saxony and Brandenburg and the undisputed fragments of Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Baden and Brunswick.
"It would be absurd to pretend that [such a victory] would have been an unmixed blessing... The power of the Hapsburg would overshadow all Europe. Yet in point of fact the continuation of the struggle led only to the no less threatening dominance of the Bourbon."
Okay, I think Wedgwood is being optimistic on some points here, but it's not a crazy POD. Ferdinand came to Regensburg willing to negotiate for victory; most obviously, he was willing to throw Wallenstein overboard. If the princes had been as willing, the war might have ended there. As Wedgwood points out, though, Maximilian was a treacherous weasel, while John of Saxony had a sudden attack of conscience-driven stubbornness at the worst possible time.
So, handwave these away, and say a settlement is reached before Gustavus Adolphus lands in the north.
Now what?
Doug M.