Could Britain have won the Southern Theater of American Revolutionary War?

Could Britain have won the Southern Theater of American Revolutionary War?

For me the Southern Theater has always looked like the best place for Britain to achieve decisive victory in the war. In the aftermath of Charleston and Camden the British have the initiative.

If Clinton sent Cornwallis some reinforcements and the defeats at Cowpens/Kings Mountian had been avoided, British victory looks likely.

Interested in everyones thoughts on whether the British could have won in the south and how victory could have been achieved.
 
The biggest factor against Cornwallis is time. While he is busy conquering the South, the American/French army will defeat Henry Clinton's army in the north. Once Henry Clinton is out of the way, the American/French army can just march south and take care of Cornwallis. The British army not suffering any major defeats in the south will certainly help them, but it will only delay the inevitable.
 

Lateknight

Banned
If the British hadn't started arming slaves against the rebels they could have won they defiantly would have won in the south if the Americans had armed slaves to fight the British.
 
The biggest factor against Cornwallis is time. While he is busy conquering the South, the American/French army will defeat Henry Clinton's army in the north. Once Henry Clinton is out of the way, the American/French army can just march south and take care of Cornwallis. The British army not suffering any major defeats in the south will certainly help them, but it will only delay the inevitable.

But the American/French will never be able to take New York, so Clinton has a safe base to operate from. Can't Clinton in theory then send troops to help Cornwallis if Washington decides to head south?

In OTL there were over 20k British troops in New York, while Cornwallis was under siege at Yorktown. Couldn't some be spared?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Except that, as always, the British could never hold anything beyond a port or two

Could Britain have won the Southern Theater of American Revolutionary War?

For me the Southern Theater has always looked like the best place for Britain to achieve decisive victory in the war. In the aftermath of Charleston and Camden the British have the initiative.

If Clinton sent Cornwallis some reinforcements and the defeats at Cowpens/Kings Mountian had been avoided, British victory looks likely.

Interested in everyones thoughts on whether the British could have won in the south and how victory could have been achieved.

Except that, as always, the British could never hold anything beyond a port or two; even with as many Loyalists as they could possibly raise, they never had the troop strength to take and hold any of the interior of Georgia or the Carolinas.

The British missed their chance in 1774; if they had offered some sort of compromise that would have led to real political control being vested in the American colonies, and with the consent of the American colonials, with the level of suffrage they were accustomed to, they might have held on and something approximating the "dominion" type of relationship could have resulted - but that's a real stretch for the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century.

As it was, British North America did not get responsible local government until the 1840s, and dominion status (in other words, a quasi-national government) did not come until Confederation in 1867.

But once war had broken out, the end was going to be independence for the US; the British could never afford an occupation, certainly not from 3,000 miles across the North Atlantic.

Best,
 
Except that, as always, the British could never hold anything beyond a port or two; even with as many Loyalists as they could possibly raise, they never had the troop strength to take and hold any of the interior of Georgia or the Carolinas.

Wonder what would of happened had the Amherst got his way and the British took the war seriously:

"In 1778 when the British commander in North America, William Howe, requested to be relieved, Amherst was considered as a replacement by the government: however, his insistence that it would require 75,000 troops to fully defeat the rebellion was not acceptable to the government, and Henry Clinton was instead chosen to take over from Howe in America."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffery_Amherst,_1st_Baron_Amherst
 
Also in the aftermath of Guilford Courthouse perhaps Cornwallis could have pursued Greene and cleaned up the Carolinas, before moving into Virginia:

From Wiki: "To avoid another Camden, Greene retreated with his forces intact. With his small army, less than 2,000 strong, Cornwallis declined to follow Greene into the back country. Retiring to Hillsborough, he raised the royal standard, offered protection to the inhabitants, and for the moment appeared to be master of Georgia and the two Carolinas. In a few weeks, however, he abandoned the heart of the state and marched to the coast at Wilmington, North Carolina, to recruit and refit his command.

At Wilmington, the British general faced a serious problem. Instead of remaining in North Carolina, he determined to march into Virginia, justifying the move on the ground that until Virginia was reduced, he could not firmly hold the more southerly states he had just overrun. General Clinton sharply criticized the decision as unmilitary, and as having been made contrary to his instructions. To Cornwallis, he wrote in May: "Had you intimated the probability of your intention, I should certainly have endeavoured to stop you, as I did then as well as now consider such a move likely to be dangerous to our interests in the Southern Colonies."
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Did the British have the ability to raise and deploy a 75,000-strong

Wonder what would of happened had the Amherst got his way and the British took the war seriously:

"In 1778 when the British commander in North America, William Howe, requested to be relieved, Amherst was considered as a replacement by the government: however, his insistence that it would require 75,000 troops to fully defeat the rebellion was not acceptable to the government, and Henry Clinton was instead chosen to take over from Howe in America."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffery_Amherst,_1st_Baron_Amherst


Did the British have the ability to raise and deploy a 75,000-strong expeditionary force in the Western Hemisphere in the Eighteenth Century?

Much less sustain it with replacements, etc?

Given the size of the British expeditionary forces in Europe during the Anglo-French/ANapoleonic wars (Wellington's army at Waterloo had all of 25,000 "British" troops, IIRC), I doubt it.

Even during the Russian war in 1854-56, the "British" troops deployed to the Crimea numbered less than 100,000 over the full two years of the war, and the largest effective strength they ever managed was under 30,000 - and this is with steamships, etc.

The French, Turks, and Sardianians made up the majority of the Allied army (as the Portuguese and Spanish had in the Peninsula, or the Belgians and Dutch did in the Low Countries); even the mercenaries the British tried to recruit for the Russian war (the German, Swiss, and Italian "legions") didn't really pan out, for a lot of reasons.

A 75,000-strong "British" expeditionary force actually in the field doesn't show up until the 2nd South African war, I think; it's just a LOT of troops to sustain in the Western Hemisphere absent significant support from within the Western Hemisphere, which the British, obviously, did not get in 1775-83.

Best,
 
Did the British have the ability to raise and deploy a 75,000-strong expeditionary force in the Western Hemisphere in the Eighteenth Century?

Much less sustain it with replacements, etc?

A 75,000-strong "British" expeditionary force actually in the field doesn't show up until the 2nd South African war, I think; it's just a LOT of troops to sustain in the Western Hemisphere absent significant support from within the Western Hemisphere, which the British, obviously, did not get in 1775-83.

Best,

Your probably right.

I did a quick look on wiki for comparative numbers. During the French and Indian War the British fielded 42,000 Soldiers/Militia so perhaps that's around the max.
 

Riain

Banned
From what I've read it was the Militia that secured victory for the Patriots. Not in battle, but by controlling the countryside and not allowing the British free reign to run the country, collect taxes, administer laws etc. The British could only operate in bodies of men large enough to handle the harassment of the Patriot Militia, which wasn't often and certainly not enough to run the country. Instead it was the Patriots that ran most of the country by default, Patriot leaders collecting taxes and enforcing the law, and thus at the end of 7 years of war ended up victorious.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
And realize that a fair percentage of the "British militia" in the

Your probably right.

I did a quick look on wiki for comparative numbers. During the French and Indian War the British fielded 42,000 Soldiers/Militia so perhaps that's around the max.

And realize that a fair percentage of the "British militia" in the 1760s were the Continentals in the 1770s - Washington, for example.

Best,
 
Back to the topic at hand:

Cornwallis nearly managed to take over four states with under 10K troops. How much could more reinforcements have meant?

My guess is the British will be able maintain a presence in the Georgia and Carolinas countryside, post Eutaw Springs, and not be forced back to the coast.
 
1) yes
2) see Dominion of Southern America, by Glenn
3) have Banastre Tarleton (or analogue, probably) be less vicious.

4) but does require some effort, and is lowish probability.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
If I may suppose and woolgather a bit:


The Americans in the ARW, broadly, had three problems.
1) The guerilla warfare.
2) The Continental Army - by which is meant all regular forces of the Continental Congress.
3) The other European powers.


Now, I think the lynch-pin here is actually 2, if we are looking for a path to victory for the British in an alt-ARW.

Guerilla warfare is very difficult to defeat wholesale.
People are not monolithic, though, and it is a lot easier of a sell to try to get people to rebel against "injustice" and "high taxation" when they think they have a good chance of winning. (It's one thing to decide to fight for independence - it's another to decide to spend the rest of your life in a forest on the run because the taxes on imported tea are a little bit high - especially when you've heard a Loyalist friend of yours mention that the British tea is actually better quality than the smuggled stuff, and cheaper to boot.)
Thus, it seems like the best way to cause guerilla warfare to wither away is to make it seem that the British are going to win - that is, that they have the momentum. That will reduce the guerillas to the die-hards, who are smaller in number and as such less of a problem. (This would be more effective if the British recognize the need for concessions - this doesn't mean representation straight-away. It could easily mean no taxation for a few years, followed by local autonomy as occurred OTL in the remnants of British North America. But guerilla warfare has faded away in places in the past, so long as it's a major and lifetime commitment to something which is losing...)

French support (and the other European powers) is caused by two things. One is pre-PoD, the desire for revenge on Great Britain. But the other is that, again, the Continentals looked like they were winning. (Hence why Washington insisted on fighting conventional warfare - it demonstrated that the Congress was intending to act like a nation, not like a band of dangerous rebels - but merely fighting isn't necessarily enough. Winning is enough.)

This means that both these problems for the British are exacerbated considerably by the Continental Army. Specifically, their victories and survival.
So, we have a plausible route. Basically, the Continental Army gets itself kicked up one side of British North America and down the other, and eventually forced to surrender in whole or in part. Since this route involves mainly the British fighting and winning a series of conventional engagements, it can be brought about relatively sensibly - more methodical commander, perhaps, with a better focus on logistics, who brings the Continentals to battle when he will win. (Since several battles were close run things, OTL, then they or equivalent battles could go the other way - I've seen one source suggesting that the Continental Army had basically no gunpowder at some points.)
This is difficult. But it's perfectly serviceable for Alt Hist, and it relies on people being people rather than being interchangeable die-hard Patriots.


Of course, COIN methods and Hearts and Minds would work better, too. But that's a little advanced for the 1770s.
 

Riain

Banned
I've read that even years into the War several southern States had State regulars which fought alongside Continentals and state Militias, the Battle of Cowpens supposedly had about 150 State regular infantry from Virginia and the two Carolinas and 55 State regular dragoons from the same 3 states as well as the Continentals and Militias.

The maintenance of regular state troops by these southern states suggests to me that after years of war they were fighting as organised entities both as part of the Union and as independent states, not about to crumble under the British.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I've read that even years into the War several southern States had State regulars which fought alongside Continentals and state Militias, the Battle of Cowpens supposedly had about 150 State regular infantry from Virginia and the two Carolinas and 55 State regular dragoons from the same 3 states as well as the Continentals and Militias.

The maintenance of regular state troops by these southern states suggests to me that after years of war they were fighting as organised entities both as part of the Union and as independent states, not about to crumble under the British.
I'm sure - years in. That's not actually all that surprising.
It's (in my opinion, anyway) a matter of momentum. As British victory becomes less and less likely, the organization of the Continental Congress extends and becomes more and more "regularized". (The same thing actually happened in WW2 with the USSR's partisans in Ukraine - by 1944, quite a lot of the partisan bands had tanks and some even had aircraft.)
I don't think it too implausible that, in a world where there's no Continental Army (meaning the large formed body of troops) due to repeated losses to the British, then the southern states wouldn't be nearly as likely to form Regular forces of their own. (Would you want to be part of a body of about four hundred Regular troops intending to face battle with a British army about three to four times your own numbers?)
 
If I may suppose and woolgather a bit:


The Americans in the ARW, broadly, had three problems.
1) The guerilla warfare.
2) The Continental Army - by which is meant all regular forces of the Continental Congress.
3) The other European powers.


Now, I think the lynch-pin here is actually 2, if we are looking for a path to victory for the British in an alt-ARW.

Guerilla warfare is very difficult to defeat wholesale.
People are not monolithic, though, and it is a lot easier of a sell to try to get people to rebel against "injustice" and "high taxation" when they think they have a good chance of winning. (It's one thing to decide to fight for independence - it's another to decide to spend the rest of your life in a forest on the run because the taxes on imported tea are a little bit high - especially when you've heard a Loyalist friend of yours mention that the British tea is actually better quality than the smuggled stuff, and cheaper to boot.)
Thus, it seems like the best way to cause guerilla warfare to wither away is to make it seem that the British are going to win - that is, that they have the momentum. That will reduce the guerillas to the die-hards, who are smaller in number and as such less of a problem. (This would be more effective if the British recognize the need for concessions - this doesn't mean representation straight-away. It could easily mean no taxation for a few years, followed by local autonomy as occurred OTL in the remnants of British North America. But guerilla warfare has faded away in places in the past, so long as it's a major and lifetime commitment to something which is losing...)

French support (and the other European powers) is caused by two things. One is pre-PoD, the desire for revenge on Great Britain. But the other is that, again, the Continentals looked like they were winning. (Hence why Washington insisted on fighting conventional warfare - it demonstrated that the Congress was intending to act like a nation, not like a band of dangerous rebels - but merely fighting isn't necessarily enough. Winning is enough.)

This means that both these problems for the British are exacerbated considerably by the Continental Army. Specifically, their victories and survival.
So, we have a plausible route. Basically, the Continental Army gets itself kicked up one side of British North America and down the other, and eventually forced to surrender in whole or in part. Since this route involves mainly the British fighting and winning a series of conventional engagements, it can be brought about relatively sensibly - more methodical commander, perhaps, with a better focus on logistics, who brings the Continentals to battle when he will win. (Since several battles were close run things, OTL, then they or equivalent battles could go the other way - I've seen one source suggesting that the Continental Army had basically no gunpowder at some points.)
This is difficult. But it's perfectly serviceable for Alt Hist, and it relies on people being people rather than being interchangeable die-hard Patriots.


Of course, COIN methods and Hearts and Minds would work better, too. But that's a little advanced for the 1770s.

Actually, number 2 is more plausible than you may think. During the Battle of Long Island (August 27, 1776), the Continental army of 10,000 men were facing an army of 32,000 men under the command of William Howe. The Americans lost the battle, but George Washington was able to escape during night time while a fog had covered his retreat. Washington escaped across the East River into Manhattan. Howe could've easily split his army. One to hold Washington's army in place while another was put into position to prevent Washington from retreating into Manhattan. With the army surrounded, it would be forced to surrender. Losing such a large force might force the Continental Congress to surrender. Remember that in September 11th, 1776, there was a Peace conference with the Continental Congress in the hopes of ending the war peaceful. Maybe those at the Continental Congress might've decided that continual fighting was useless, and they might surrender?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Again, there were (roughly) 3.9 million people in the US in 1790

TFSmith121,

I found this great thread:https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=123175

Interested in everyones opinions on it:D

Again, there were (roughly) 3.9 million people in the US in 1790; even considering the issues of patriot/loyalist/leave me alone (which were not 33/33/33, of course), the reality is the British could not impose a military solution absent a level of expenditure that, frankly, is pretty much impossible in the 1770s, especially given the conflicts (potential and then real) with the other European powers.

The problem for the British (and indeed, the French, Spanish, Portuguese, etc.) that was made clear in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries is that they could not hold their Western Hemisphere empires by military power alone, especially given the willingness of the other European powers to take advantage of any opportunities, and they would not attempt to hold by political compromise.

And, of course, all four powers' "homelands" were basically on top of each other in Europe, and all four had interests in Europe and the Mediterranean that were, frankly, much more important to them then the whole of their respective Western Hemisphere empires.

Add in the realities of time and distance, and the facts the Western Hemisphere "daughter" societies could function as peer competitors with the European powers in the Western Hemisphere, and there was really no way around it, absent political reform - which never seems to have been seriously considered by any of the European powers until it was far too late.

So one can shuffle commanders around, and suggest whichever European power is being discussed should have committed more troops, but the historical reality is none of them could/did, and - obviously - from a macroscale, it doesn't matter.

At least not based on the historical record, which saw the collapse of all four major European empires in the Western Hemisphere in a period of some six decades (1760-1820), essentially.

And it was not because of the abilities or lack thereof of one commander or another, frankly.

Best,
 
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