What does the USSR need to beat the Nazis without L-L?

We all know that the Soviet Union only beat the Germans back because of the immense amounts of supplies that was sent from its allies, mainly from the United States. Let's say the Soviet Union was to beat the Nazis without any foreign help. What would they need for this?
A larger population base in Siberia and Central Asia to support the war?
A Soviet "green revolution" due to focus on genetics research?
Industrialisation along the Caspian Sea area?
Infrastructural development in coal and mineral basins in Siberia?
Now let's say Stalin rose to power as IOTL and, as IOTL, was free to develop any policy as he wished. And let's also say that the Germans invaded the Soviet Union with Barbarossa, as per OTL. Given the requirements we have outlined for the Soviet Union to beat back the Nazis, how much can Stalin accomplish in the timeframe given?
 

nbcman

Donor
Your initial premise is incorrect. The Nazis were not guaranteed to defeat the Soviets without L-L. It would only raise the probability that the Nazis could win from 0% to a low percentage.
 
Stalin not being a moron in the months before Barbarossa. If he listens more to his Generals from the Beginning. A lot of the lossses of OTL occured because a)Stalin didn't believe that Hitler of all people would break his word and didn't react in time
b) when he finally accepted the German invasion he didn't listen to his Generals who wanted to retread and move to better positions because the Wehrmacht was about to surround them.

He reacted to late and when he reacted he made poor decisions.

He does have a good chance of winning with out LL, but only because Hitler and a big part of the NSDAP leadership where even bigger idiots.
 

Deleted member 1487

Your initial premise is incorrect. The Nazis were not guaranteed to defeat the Soviets without L-L. It would only raise the probability that the Nazis could win from 0% to a low percentage.
No, in fact the Soviets would collapse without LL:
http://www.amazon.com/Accounting-War-Production-Employment-Post-Soviet/dp/0521894247
http://www.amazon.com/Russias-Life-Saver-Lend-Lease-U-S-S-R-World/dp/0739145630
These studies into the Soviet economy clearly demonstrates how LL filled in the gap without which the Soviets would have been collapsing in 1942 and in famine by 1943. Without LL and OTL strategic situation as of winter 1941-42 they'd be in serious trouble.

To answer the OP their only shot would be to realize the Nazis are coming after France falls and cut trade immediately, don't dismantle the Stalin Line, don't expand the military, don't order a reorganization, and mobilize for war. Plan for an invasion, plan for a defense, and just get ready for total war from mid-1940 on.
 
No Purge of the Officer Corps

Had those officers been in place in the summer of 41 then the Red Army is going to be far better able to react faster and be more resistant to shock and losses than the OTL formations were.

Far less likely to be encircled, and out manoeuvred as well as being far more capable of launching attacks of their own.
 

nbcman

Donor
No, in fact the Soviets would collapse without LL:
http://www.amazon.com/Accounting-War-Production-Employment-Post-Soviet/dp/0521894247
http://www.amazon.com/Russias-Life-Saver-Lend-Lease-U-S-S-R-World/dp/0739145630
These studies into the Soviet economy clearly demonstrates how LL filled in the gap without which the Soviets would have been collapsing in 1942 and in famine by 1943. Without LL and OTL strategic situation as of winter 1941-42 they'd be in serious trouble.

To answer the OP their only shot would be to realize the Nazis are coming after France falls and cut trade immediately, don't dismantle the Stalin Line, don't expand the military, don't order a reorganization, and mobilize for war. Plan for an invasion, plan for a defense, and just get ready for total war from mid-1940 on.

I agree the Soviets would be in serious trouble, but does that guarantee that the Soviets would surrender. No, it does not. The Nazi's may well be beating up on a rump Soviet state barring a regime change on the Soviet side. What benefit is there for the Soviets to surrender and to entrust their fate to the Nazi's who are busily genociding them?
 

Deleted member 1487

I agree the Soviets would be in serious trouble, but does that guarantee that the Soviets would surrender. No, it does not. The Nazi's may well be beating up on a rump Soviet state barring a regime change on the Soviet side. What benefit is there for the Soviets to surrender and to entrust their fate to the Nazi's who are busily genociding them?
No they wouldn't surrender, they would implode with famine and economic collapse. There wouldn't be a Soviet government, it would just be whatever the Nazis hold and warlordism on the former Soviet side
 
No they wouldn't surrender, they would implode with famine and economic collapse. There wouldn't be a Soviet government, it would just be whatever the Nazis hold and warlordism on the former Soviet side

I think you got Nazi and Soviet mixed up in the above post :D

What the Soviets need to win without LL is time. They will likely be on the back foot defending for a long time but that will mean the Nazis are trying to supply their armies deep in the USSR at the end of a tenuous logistics chain. The Soviets did not starve, they cut rations to well below Western, even German levels but they did not starve, they managed to distribute food around the remaining territories to where it was needed. The economy is unlikely to implode, it will stagger, it will groan but it will keep on going much like a Russian engine.

While one cannot say that Soviet victory is guaranteed the longer they can hold the more likely victory is to go their way and besides the Nazis were great at motivating people to resist, especially those untermenschen Slavs they intended to largely exterminate and enslave forever the rest.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think you got Nazi and Soviet mixed up in the above post :D

What the Soviets need to win without LL is time. They will likely be on the back foot defending for a long time but that will mean the Nazis are trying to supply their armies deep in the USSR at the end of a tenuous logistics chain. The Soviets did not starve, they cut rations to well below Western, even German levels but they did not starve, they managed to distribute food around the remaining territories to where it was needed. The economy is unlikely to implode, it will stagger, it will groan but it will keep on going much like a Russian engine.

While one cannot say that Soviet victory is guaranteed the longer they can hold the more likely victory is to go their way and besides the Nazis were great at motivating people to resist, especially those untermenschen Slavs they intended to largely exterminate and enslave forever the rest.

Without LL weapons, raw materials, food, etc. they cannot economically recover and go on the offensive; even the winter 1941 counteroffensive would be significantly weaker without LL. 30-40% of the AFVs and aircraft used around Moscow was from the Brits. Critical machine tools came from the Brits. Nearly 50% of the AFVs in the Caucasus in 1942 were LL. Over half of Avgas was LL, most of the high octane stuff was LL. Without LL food already unacceptably low civilian rations would have been cut another 38%. We've had this discussion before I can't remember the thread, but it lasted pages and I posted all sorts of articles about the contributions of LL; by 1943 without it the USSR would be imploding. Most resistance to the Nazis didn't come from people occupied, but agents parachuted in behind the lines from 1941 on or soldiers caught behind the lines from 1941 on. They ended up spending more time looking for food than fighting, though once the Nazis were already losing in the field resistance picked up; in fact when the Axis was winning the most there was the least resistance and even with that they didn't really inflict that many losses on the Axis forces. They disrupted logistics and diverted resources, but they weren't all that effective at killing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_partisans#Assessment
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_partisans#Belarus

With less resistance in the field against Axis armies the partisans wouldn't achieve much and organized resistance depends on being able to get food to the army and supply it with weapons, which was becoming impossible without LL in 1942-43.
 
Without LL weapons, raw materials, food, etc. they cannot economically recover and go on the offensive; even the winter 1941 counteroffensive would be significantly weaker without LL. 30-40% of the AFVs and aircraft used around Moscow was from the Brits. Critical machine tools came from the Brits. Nearly 50% of the AFVs in the Caucasus in 1942 were LL. Over half of Avgas was LL, most of the high octane stuff was LL. Without LL food already unacceptably low civilian rations would have been cut another 38%. We've had this discussion before I can't remember the thread, but it lasted pages and I posted all sorts of articles about the contributions of LL; by 1943 without it the USSR would be imploding. Most resistance to the Nazis didn't come from people occupied, but agents parachuted in behind the lines from 1941 on or soldiers caught behind the lines from 1941 on. They ended up spending more time looking for food than fighting, though once the Nazis were already losing in the field resistance picked up; in fact when the Axis was winning the most there was the least resistance and even with that they didn't really inflict that many losses on the Axis forces. They disrupted logistics and diverted resources, but they weren't all that effective at killing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_partisans#Assessment
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_partisans#Belarus

With less resistance in the field against Axis armies the partisans wouldn't achieve much and organized resistance depends on being able to get food to the army and supply it with weapons, which was becoming impossible without LL in 1942-43.

The grand offensives of 1943 onwards won't be possible, most likely but that does not mean the Soviet Union loses. It is extremely unlikely to simply collapse, not impossible for that to happen but extremely unlikely and the Nazis lack the power to force a decision in the field as such would actually require them to march far beyond their logistic limits to be decisive. Given the nature of the Nazi regime the Soviets are likely to win so long as they continue to exist.

Would we see the Soviets in Berlin in 1945? No but we might well still see a Soviet Union in 1989 even without Lend Lease and the Nazis would most likely still be a distant memory, especially if this scenario still includes war in the west.
 
Assuming no LL but otherwise still 2 front war, the end of the war may see the USSR back to 1939 borders, but not much beyond. I expect the war will end later, with instant sunshine used on Germany. One effect of LL, which continued through August/September 1945 as the last shipments enroute arrived, was the jump starting of Soviet reconstruction after WWII. Another was a technological boost that western equipment gave the Soviets in terms of actual plans etc given as well as reverse engineering in electronics, aircraft, etc. To the extent that looting Eastern Europe and Germany of factories and tools helped rebuild the USSR, that won't happen either.

While the absence of LL will for sure hurt Soviet offensives, it will also hurt standing on the defensive. No AVGAS means the Luftwaffe does much better which is going to hurt. Less food means that you will see actual starvation in some areas, and reducing calories across the board will further impact production. No machine tools, fewer weapons of war. No trucks, no mobility. No radios, poor communications, less effective military actions. No rails, engines, railcars means transporting anything is now much more difficult. Does this means the USSR loses? Maybe, or at least a Brest-Litovsk settlement.

While no officer purges and being alert will help, the bottom line is throwing masses of men forward only works up to a point, you need food, fuel, appropriate weapons. No LL means the latter in much shorter supply.
 
One of the add on effects is that the Soviets manpower pool was badly depleted from 1943 on. They had to retake territory so they could impress all of the liberated manpower into the Soviet Army.

Without LL the Soviets might not loose but I tend to think they don't win either. The most likely outcome is bloody statemate in the east. Now if no LL is combined with no North Africa Front, No Bomber Campaign, no UK and USA at war with Germany too? Yah thats ugly for Soviets. Germany then has good chance of victory it might be hallow victory with millions dead and a bleeding ulcer on the east for decades.

Michael
 
Wouldn't such a situation look like the Japanese occupation of China. Holding the most important parts while warlords carve up the rest.
 
We all know that the Soviet Union only beat the Germans back because of the immense amounts of supplies that was sent from its allies, mainly from the United States. Let's say the Soviet Union was to beat the Nazis without any foreign help. What would they need for this?

Stopping the German advance approximately at or further west then the Ps'kov-D'niepr river line. This leaves the Soviets with all their major centers of natural resources, agriculture, industry, and manpower perfectly intact, uninterrupted, and in their hands. With that, they have more then enough industrial power to sustain an advance all the way into Central Europe regardless of whether they get lend-lease or not.


At no point in that book does he ever indicate the Soviets would collapse or fail to stave off the German invasion without lend-lease. Indeed, the worst he envisions the Soviets doing without lend-lease is "maybe only to a stalemate" (page 152).

And he says outright on page 130:

Thus, the Red Army's destruction of German offensive power in 1941-42 was accomplished largely on the basis of Soviet domestic supply; but it's technical ability to pursue the retreating Wehrmacht, to project Soviet military power into the heart of Europe, to meet up with the Allied ground forces advancing from the west, was based significantly upon western resources.
On the whole, that source mainly supports what I have always asserted: lend-lease was vital in facilitating victory but not staving off defeat. It made the difference between victory and stalemate, not victory and defeat.
 
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Thanks, what was that cgsc link though, it's broken

correct link:
International aid statistics, World War II : a summary of War Department lend lease activities reported through 31 December 1945:
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/950/rec/1

seems the link got broken with copying (fixed the original post)

it links to this pdf with a lot of statistics (67 pages)
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/util...0/filename/939.pdf/mapsto/pdf/type/singleitem
 
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Deleted member 1487

At no point in that book does he ever indicate the Soviets would collapse or fail to stave off the German invasion without lend-lease. Indeed, the worst he envisions the Soviets doing without lend-lease is "maybe only to a stalemate" (page 152).
He asserts that LL aid was irreplaceable in all categories; other professionals that I have cited in the past specifically state that without US food the Soviets would lose 38% of their civilian daily caloric rations to make up for shortfalls with the army. Death rates were already well above natural causes due to malnutrition and IOTL the situation stabilized as greater aid was brought in after 1942 even though replanting of liberated areas didn't really restart until 1944. Without LL equipment enabling the liberation of Ukraine in 1943-44 then the food situation would have been even worse than just lack of LL food, it would have also resulted in the absence of historically liberated harvests in 1943-44. So the famine issue alone, putting aside equipment, would have effectively collapsed Soviet domestic production due to worse mass die off of civilians from 1942 on.

And he says outright on page 130:

On the whole, that source mainly supports what I have always asserted: lend-lease was vital in facilitating victory but not staving off defeat. It made the difference between victory and stalemate, not victory and defeat.
I disagree with him on the Soviets destroying German offensive power in those years, they were able to survive those years without LL aid, though without LL in 1941-42 they would have suffered worse and performed more poorly as that was when important machine tools and such were coming in. So without LL they are in a worse historical position by the start of the winter offensive in 1941 when LL gear first appeared to November 1942 when they were historically able to go on the offensive; because of the stacking issues of no LL from late 1941 to late 1942 they might not have been able to pull off Stalingrad and already be in a worse food and equipment position without US and British LL machinery. By 1943 famine is a very real and serious issue, as is the massive loss of equipment that would have otherwise been accumulating. Rather than being able to get OTL course of events from late 1941-summer 1943 the USSR is probably in a worse position and their economy is beyond overheated. Without liberating farmland, harvests, and labor in 1943 they are in famine/economic collapse territory by the end of the year.
 
He asserts that LL aid was irreplaceable in all categories; other professionals that I have cited in the past specifically state that without US food the Soviets would lose 38% of their civilian daily caloric rations to make up for shortfalls with the army. Death rates were already well above natural causes due to malnutrition and IOTL the situation stabilized as greater aid was brought in after 1942 even though replanting of liberated areas didn't really restart until 1944. Without LL equipment enabling the liberation of Ukraine in 1943-44 then the food situation would have been even worse than just lack of LL food, it would have also resulted in the absence of historically liberated harvests in 1943-44. So the famine issue alone, putting aside equipment, would have effectively collapsed Soviet domestic production due to worse mass die off of civilians from 1942 on.


I disagree with him on the Soviets destroying German offensive power in those years, they were able to survive those years without LL aid, though without LL in 1941-42 they would have suffered worse and performed more poorly as that was when important machine tools and such were coming in. So without LL they are in a worse historical position by the start of the winter offensive in 1941 when LL gear first appeared to November 1942 when they were historically able to go on the offensive; because of the stacking issues of no LL from late 1941 to late 1942 they might not have been able to pull off Stalingrad and already be in a worse food and equipment position without US and British LL machinery. By 1943 famine is a very real and serious issue, as is the massive loss of equipment that would have otherwise been accumulating. Rather than being able to get OTL course of events from late 1941-summer 1943 the USSR is probably in a worse position and their economy is beyond overheated. Without liberating farmland, harvests, and labor in 1943 they are in famine/economic collapse territory by the end of the year.
I believe there was not much to harvest from liberated territories as whatever was there was already looted by Germans.

On other side without L-L Soviets will be still able to buy at least most important material. (even if we take into consideration they don't have 2800 tons of gold as you asume but Russian historians are saying otherwise). So food, radios etc could still be delivered. Even just Soviet year production of gold, silver, platinum but also some other raw materials which were shipped to US OTL can asure Soviets will get enough to stop Germans if they are not able to do wothout l-L(there is discussion on axis history about importance or not importance of L-L material during battle of Moscow).
 
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