Wi Edward Black Prince and his son Edward survive?

VVD0D95

Banned
Exactly as it says on the tin, what if Edward the Black Prince does not die from his illness, or does not contract it, and survives to become king in 1377, and what if his son Edward also does not die and survives? How different would things be?

Is it plausible to think England might well have won the hundred years war and managed to hold onto for a short time at least their victories?
 
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Exactly as it says on the tin, what if Edward the Black Prince does not die from his illness, or does not contract it, and survives to become king in 1377, and what if his son Edward also does not die and survives? How different would things be?

Is it plausible to think England might well have won the hundred years war and managed to hold onto for a short time at least their victories?

Sorry to answer your question with another question, but why exactly did the French, and historians for that matter, call Edward the "Black Prince" ?

Certainly he wasn't Moorish :confused:
 
Exactly as it says on the tin, what if Edward the Black Prince does not die from his illness, or does not contract it, and survives to become king in 1377, and what if his son Edward also does not die and survives? How different would things be?
At this point, Valois already took back the tactical advantage, with for exemple the chevauchée of 1373 being a disaster for England.

Basically, there was little room during the Caroline phase for Plantagenet to do more than hold the line, and be grateful they managed to hold out several harbours in spite of fairly limited financial ressources.

Don't get me wrong, you'd have changes and maybe more english territories holding out in 1380, but overall, he wouldn't have much chances than his father and his son to conquer more territories, let alone make his claims recognized.

Among these changes, we could see a more important grasp on Poitou, but the slaughter at Limoges clearly pointed out that in spite of a true local support in Aquitaine (see below) Anglo-Gascons forces were forced to resort to exceptional coercition to advance.

Simply said, by 1380's, Plantagenets would still be largely put out of the continent.

Another change could be the IOTL truce de facto between the Caroline and Lancastrian phase being reduced or remodeled, with a power continuity in England; and with a bigger English presence in France, a more important motivation for Valois court to pursue Charles V efforts in spite of their rivalities.

Basically, the Lancastrian phase would be butterflied, with maybe something more along the early Caroline phase (with truce de facto regularly broken). A possible greater focus given to Aquitaine (which Lancastrians didn't cared much about, except for Thomas Lancaster) could change a lot for English policies in France : if the infighting between Orléans and Bourgogne still happens ITTL, you may not see a takeover of Northern France but something more akin to post-Brétigny situation.

As for his son Edward, it's hard to see what he could do, giving his youth at his death, but it would certainly help for the aformentioned more stable succession and immediate reign of his father (although Lollard troubles or an equivalent are still to be expected, even more so if Edward tries to get more ressources to fight back).

Sorry to answer your question with another question, but why exactly did the French, and historians for that matter, call Edward the "Black Prince" ?
There's two hypothesis.

1) Due to his reputation, with devastating raids or the slaughter at Limoges. The "black" is a reference to a negative image.
2) Due to his black armour or black-fur covered armour

Neither was used contemporarily, tough.

It is possible the French accept him voluntarily if he offers strong leadership. Many viewed his claim as legitimate.
There's definitely no way it could ever happen. Valois claims were more or less disputed (and by that I mean they were still largely acknowledged) but it was more in favour of Charles II of Navarre than Plantagenêt. There's simply nothing but wishful thinking about a local support for their claims.

That said you did have a local support for Edward, as Duke of Aquitaine, which is significantly different.
Basically the same old story of resistance towards a strong but far power, and probably with an identitarian basis but as well economical interest : most of his support came from western Aquitaine that had large commercial ties with England.
 
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VVD0D95

Banned
At this point, Valois already took back the tactical advantage, with for exemple the chevauchée of 1373 being a disaster for England.

Basically, there was little room during the Caroline phase for Plantagenet to do more than hold the line, and be grateful they managed to hold out several harbours in spite of fairly limited financial ressources.

Don't get me wrong, you'd have changes and maybe more english territories holding out in 1380, but overall, he wouldn't have much chances than his father and his son to conquer more territories, let alone make his claims recognized.

Among these changes, we could see a more important grasp on Poitou, but the slaughter at Limoges clearly pointed out that in spite of a true local support in Aquitaine (see below) Anglo-Gascons forces were forced to resort to exceptional coercition to advance.

Simply said, by 1380's, Plantagenets would still be largely put out of the continent.

Another change could be the IOTL truce de facto between the Caroline and Lancastrian phase being reduced or remodeled, with a power continuity in England; and with a bigger English presence in France, a more important motivation for Valois court to pursue Charles V efforts in spite of their rivalities.

Basically, the Lancastrian phase would be butterflied, with maybe something more along the early Caroline phase (with truce de facto regularly broken). A possible greater focus given to Aquitaine (which Lancastrians didn't cared much about, except for Thomas Lancaster) could change a lot for English policies in France : if the infighting between Orléans and Bourgogne still happens ITTL, you may not see a takeover of Northern France but something more akin to post-Brétigny situation.

As for his son Edward, it's hard to see what he could do, giving his youth at his death, but it would certainly help for the aformentioned more stable succession and immediate reign of his father (although Lollard troubles or an equivalent are still to be expected, even more so if Edward tries to get more ressources to fight back).


There's two hypothesis.

1) Due to his reputation, with devastating raids or the slaughter at Limoges. The "black" is a reference to a negative image.
2) Due to his black armour or black-fur covered armour

Neither was used contemporarily, tough.


There's definitely no way it could ever happen. Valois claims were more or less disputed (and by that I mean they were still largely acknowledged) but it was more in favour of Charles II of Navarre than Plantagenêt. There's simply nothing but wishful thinking about a local support for their claims.

That said you did have a local support for Edward, as Duke of Aquitaine, which is significantly different.
Basically the same old story of resistance towards a strong but far power, and probably with an identitarian basis but as well economical interest : most of his support came from western Aquitaine that had large commercial ties with England.


Interesting, so is it possible England might control northern france, perhaps reestablishing the Angevin Empire?
 
Interesting, so is it possible England might control northern france, perhaps reestablishing the Angevin Empire?
Possible? Yes. Probable? Not very.

As LSCatilina says, the biggest ties are with Aquitaine, especially those areas nearest the coast. There's quite a few variables at play here. How does the Black Prince survive? Does he avoid the Spanish expedition in 1366? Does he manage a full recovery from whatever it was that he contracted in Castille?

The latter is probably easier to work with, even if it's introducing more butterflies, even if it is after Bretigny. Incidentally, I think this treaty is the absolute maximum that England could really have gotten out of the situation. If it had held, then I suspect Aquitaine's borders would have been somewhat shrunken when properly demarcated. Normandy and Anjou have been gone for over 150 years at this point, I can't see them taking them back. Aquitaine is where the trade links are, and at least some of the locals are keener on distant rule by a King-Duke of English stock than they are enamoured of rule from Paris. Poitou might be doable, but Henry II's domain is several bridges too far. For what it's worth, I'm also firmly on the side of the historians who consider the Angevin 'Empire' more a fluke agglomeration of states in personal union under a particularly string king, rather than as a state built to be a lasting imperial polity.

However, there's also Breton shenanigans to consider. England kept control of Brest from the landing in the Civil War all the way through to about 1397. The Duke (Jean IV) is only in place thanks to English support, but he is trying to tow the line between the English, the French, his own subjects on both sides, and those who want to get rid of both of the bigger neighbours. In OTL, he was to be run off his throne for a while in the 1370s. In TTL, some cock up in the duchy may well be the catalyst for rekindling the war, whether England's king is Edward III, or his son, the newly crowned Edward IV.
 
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Interesting, so is it possible England might control northern france, perhaps reestablishing the Angevin Empire?

Angevine Empire, in spite of its name, certainly wasn't an unified demesne. It was rather a common feudal hegemony on really diverse demesnes, themselves often divided in small entities (especially Aquitaine, that was a true political mosaic). Hence why the revolts of Henry II's sons fit remarkably the demesnes they recieved : Aquitaine, Anjou, Normandy, etc. each with their own identity, their own structures, their own interests.
All of that under the still present suzerainty of the French kings that could play on the feudal piano quite easily.

If something, turning back to the Angevine Empire is not that would have been a good idea. (It was more or less the spirit of Brétigny, after all, Aquitaine being gave in all property to Plantagenet*)

*Well very technically : the agreed exchanges of territories were never really made, and several places beyond Aquitaine were still on Anglo-Gascon hands, while others in Aquitaine were still under Valois control. If you add to that that Charles V never considered the peace as something else than a truce and readily tried to play on a suzerainty over Aquitaine that technically didn't existed anymore...

As for Northern France...It depends, I'd tend to think that *Edward IV would have gaven more focus to Aquitaine rather than Northern France were support was really low, if not virtually inexistant. IOTL, the Orléans-Armagnac/Bourgogne civil war allowed the English chevauchées in Northern France (that I could still see existing ITTL) to evolve into real campaigns.

It's hard to really tell if the political infighthing is still going to transform itself into a fully fledged civil war, so XVth would be definitely blurry until you sort out what happen in the late XIVth century.

If *Edward IV manages to break inner troubles in England (lollards, Parliment, John of Gand) and Ireland, maybe thanks to a smoother succession, and if he managed to keep more of Plantagenet holdings in France (more of Aquitaine, IMO) giving his personality, I think he would still attempt a truce but not searching for a peaceful treatment of the conflicts.

(And of course, forget about any peace treaty that would not give him the full property of Aquitaine. It was attempted IOTL with Richard II, but refused because French suzerainty would have been maintained)

Basically...

In a first time, roughly in the 70's/80's, I could see Edward of Aquitaine still fighting locally, but with less and less ressources (taxes in Gascons lords can be only difficultly raised, even IOTL he had troubles paying his troops not even mentioning awarding local nobles to prevent a shift of alliegance) refused by Edward III and the Parliament.

Basically it means that the only safe way, as IOTL, to fund the war is to use chevauchées, which is definitely not going to make him popular. (Something close to what happened IOTL in Lancaster Normandy : as they were repetitively raided since decades, a real anti-English feeling appeared, and it was one of the provinces in Northern France were a true resistance against England develloped).

Eventually, Edward of Aquitaine have no way to propose the same deal to Aquitain cities than Charles V did : tax exemption for 20 years if they switched sides. And bloody expeditions as in Limoges didn't exactly terrified the land into obedience, quite the contrary.

Even if Edward can hold more, he's still going to loose big.

In a second time, when succeeding his father. He would have to deal with fiscal, social, dynastical issues. De facto, you'd have a truce for at least some years even with a likely failure of a formal truce such as Bruges*.
I doubt he would be able to use the fiscal revolts in France at his benefit, not before Valois would crush them, mainly because he'd have to deal with his own.

I could see more Plantagenet diplomatic success, critically with the Great Schism, with alliances more or less achieved with other "Roman" supporters, or with German princes.

As such I could see *Edward IV intervening in France in the late 1380's, in support of Gand and Gueldre, for exemple.
This is going to change the "Uncles' government" a bit : they were more focused on social peace and normalisation of rapports with cities and populations after the civil unrest.

They are going to deal with a still agressive England, and still had the means to do it. It could mean that Philippe le Hardi would have a more important policy in Northern France than Germany, for exemple.

Eventually, the threat of a French invasion of England, as it was planned then abandoned in mid-1380 could revive.

Maybe the aborted expedition in Castille could appear ITTL. John of Gand was ready to go, but the Parliment wasn't thrilled about the strong man of England going into a diversion war.
ITTL, with *Edward IV still there, and with a clear succession, such expedition would be more probable.

Even if I could see Castille abandoned in favour of a Flemish intervention in spite of John's claims due to Parliament : it would be too ruinous of an expedition only for limited gain for England and without any real guarantee of success.

And that's what going to be the big problem for *Edward IV : the Parliament.
New Taxes? Nope. Fund your war yourself.
Reinforced royal authority? Nope. You don't deserve it.
Allowing a more coherent strategy than just hit and run? Why this is tyranny!

And he couldn't just crush them, not if he wants to rule another day; while still not undergoing to Valois conditions of peace.

So, in a third time, after interventions in the 1380's, 1390's, I could see a similar truce than IOTL, as in an uneasy one that could really evolve only trough France and England inner policies (as it did IOTL in France with the madness of Charles VI).

Basically : maybe a more important Plantagenet presence in France, probably a less troubled post-Edward III England, probably interventions in France (with the consequences having a France less incline to undergo far expeditions, as in Italy, than attacking again).

A good twist would be to have Valois taking back Calais, that was really a pain to negociate any truce (both sides wanting to keep it). More or less so : a relativly stronger Plantagenet continental holding at first, Valois small reconquest, *Edward IV trying to keep what can be saved (and is still relativly more than IOTL) and eventually agreeing to a formal truce.

But all of that wouldn't end the war, IMO. It was kind of a mexican stand-off at this point.


*Basically, Valois were incline to trade peace for Aquitaine and money, but keeping french suzerainty. Which was unacceptable for Plantagenets, and wouldn't have been that wise giving the intensive use of said suzerainty by Capetians and Valois to confiscate lands.

Valois really wanted peace to alleviate the fiscal charges, but Plantagenets would have basically no interest for the moment to do so.


In TTL, some cock up in the duchy may well be the catalyst for rekindling the war, whether England's king is Edward III, or his son, the newly crowned Edward IV.
Actually, IOTL, this conflict was quite in the line of diversion attempt against the major success of Valois, similar to the failed 1373 chevauchée.
With a superior army (both numerically and tactically), and the support of local nobility (that simply didn't wanted to revive the old civil war and were pissed at the lack of respect of Plantagenets for their neutrality), Plantagnenets and John IV are definitely going to have an hard time. (The war didn't even lasted 2 months IOTL).

Eventually, Charles V had the means to stay there (and to swallow up the duchy as planned at some point), while John heavily depended from English support (that transformed their help quickly into garrison and occupation, which didn't pleased much Breton nobility).

I could see, with a more agressive Plantagenet policy (but then again, with which money?) Brittany turning into another front as you proposed. Not that it would be wise for England : it was supposed to be a general diversion, not another drain of forces and ressources. And if John IV doesn't try to neutralise his duchy at the death of Charles V, it's what is going to happen.
 
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I agree with everything else LSCatilina says, I'm just picking out the following for a little side-track discussion.
Actually, IOTL, this conflict was quite in the line of diversion attempt against the major success of Valois, similar to the failed 1373 chevauchée.
With a superior army (both numerically and tactically), and the support of local nobility (that simply didn't wanted to revive the old civil war and were pissed at the lack of respect of Plantagenets for their neutrality), Plantagnenets and John IV are definitely going to have an hard time. (The war didn't even lasted 2 months IOTL).

Eventually, Charles V had the means to stay there (and to swallow up the duchy as planned at some point), while John heavily depended from English support (that transformed their help quickly into garrison and occupation, which didn't pleased much Breton nobility).
Which bit of the Breton shenanigans are you referring to here? The Montfort-Penthievre struggle which finishes when Charles dies at Auray, or the later episode where John is driven out by his own vassals with French help?

I did quite a bit of reading on the Breton situation in the fourteenth century last year at university, but sadly, my sources were rather limited because I don't speak French. :( It was basically a case of Michael Jones or nobody. You're right though, the Dukes need to keep up a very tricky balancing act to stay neutral in the face of French armies over the border, and English ones holding their key port, and dozens of other castles. Not an easy task. John was lucky again in having one of Charles VI's episodes occur when he was at the head of an army marching on the Duchy.

The fact remains, even if a lasting somebody does the almost impossible and acheives lasting peace over Aquitaine and Calais, all it needs is a Breton spark for the whole thing to potentially go up again, especially if at least one of the Kings saw the last treaty as a time to regroup, rather than a real peace. And that lasting treaty will be extraordinarily difficult. The English want to hold Gascony by right of their own, rather than holding the duchy 'of the French king'. The French king will not accept such a clause unless he's been beaten to a pulp. Probably need a half dozen or so battles along the lines of Crécy and Poitiers. The chance of the English pulling enough of those type of victories off without suffering any reverses in between them is staggeringly low.

Bretigny is a high point for English arms, and I fail to see how a surviving Black Prince can do enough to reverse the decline that happened up to the death of his father. Let's face it, he was alive for most of that period, and healthy for the first five or six years, yet still the decline happened. Money tends to be the root of it all, and France was an awful lot richer. Often, the French crown was less efficient at gathering and using that money, yes, but they could afford a lot of waste when the dice were going their way.
 
Which bit of the Breton shenanigans are you referring to here? The Montfort-Penthievre struggle which finishes when Charles dies at Auray, or the later episode where John is driven out by his own vassals with French help?
The latter. Montfort-Penthievre war was over since little less than one decade when Edward fell ill.

It was basically a case of Michael Jones or nobody.
Philippe Contamine, the french specialist on HYW, is translated in English. I'd stronly suggest you to find it if you're interested on the period.

John was lucky again in having one of Charles VI's episodes occur when he was at the head of an army marching on the Duchy.
And eventually, Brittany kept playing both sides up to the end of the war, which probably helped a great deal having the duchy remaining in one piece in the XVth century, and largely autonomous until its union with France (because, let's be serious, there was no way in hell that Valois would have left it willingly escape its sphere of influence, even then)

The fact remains, even if a lasting somebody does the almost impossible and acheives lasting peace over Aquitaine and Calais, all it needs is a Breton spark for the whole thing to potentially go up again, especially if at least one of the Kings saw the last treaty as a time to regroup, rather than a real peace.
Thing is, in order to have such peace treaty, you'd need a really catastrophic situation in England, that would push Plantagenet to accept Valois conditions.
And this would cause several issues : loss of prestige, acknowledging Valois suzerainty (knowing very well they will, sooner or later, use it to takeover continental holdings), etc.

An England forced to abide by these conditions is an England that would be in no shape to meddle in Britanny before quite some time.

The French king will not accept such a clause unless he's been beaten to a pulp. Probably need a half dozen or so battles along the lines of Crécy and Poitiers.
They didn't even accepted that IOTL before being in a situation when England could pretend to dual monarchy. If the only way for England to have Aquitaine on its own right (Lancasters did this for Normandy, not for Aquitaine IIRC) is to take over France, that makes the whole discussion taking a really different direction, don't you think? :)

Often, the French crown was less efficient at gathering and using that money, yes, but they could afford a lot of waste when the dice were going their way.
The whole "they were richer" as sole explanation let me a bit dubious. The whole Caroline strategy prooved efficient enough to force Edward III lowering his ambitions from the Treaty of London (gaining all western France and not giving up the claims, this treaty being for me the real high point of Plantagenets) to Brétigny (half of it, and renounciation to claims).

Heck, Brétigny is basically a ragequit after Edward III didn't managed to be crowned in Reims.

You really had a tactical qualitative jump (that was amorced with John II already) under Charles V's reign (that I tried to resume in the link I provided above), a new financial policy and the famed Valois diplomacy (basically isolating Plantagenets geopolitically).

Of course, the war of attrition beneficied France, but to say it was less efficient than England is a bit weird : the HYW is after all the period where the late medieval french taxation and fiscal system get perfected, but maybe you're talking of the beggining of the war or the political troubles during Charles VI's reign?
 
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VVD0D95

Banned
Hmm all interesting answers, a lot to consider.

Wht do people think Edward's son would have been like?
 
Wht do people think Edward's son would have been like?

There's nothing to say about it that wouldn't be wild speculation : he died really young, and using his brother as an exemple would be irrelevant giving he grew up while his father died and surrounded by troubles and succession problems.

An Edward that would have lived more than 5 years, with a still living father could have been basically everything even if maybe relatively close to his father's personality (but keep in mind that context of his era, with a general lassitude about war, would have impacted).
 

VVD0D95

Banned
Okay fairs enough.

It could be an interesting time, though one does have t wonder what might have been had John not been so bad, and lost most of the angevin territories.
 
Philippe Contamine, the french specialist on HYW, is translated in English. I'd stronly suggest you to find it if you're interested on the period.
Luckily, the University did have Contamine, who was very useful. The library wasn't badly stocked on France, but yours truly chose to do a presentation on Breton diplomacy with the two kings from 1337-1485. I thought 'this will be interesting!' without actually considering the prevalence of useful sources. Apart from raiding all the 'French' books for the Breton specific bits, all I had was Jones, and some of his writings were in French! :eek:
And eventually, Brittany kept playing both sides up to the end of the war, which probably helped a great deal having the duchy remaining in one piece in the XVth century, and largely autonomous until its union with France (because, let's be serious, there was no way in hell that Valois would have left it willingly escape its sphere of influence, even then)
It's the only way to survive, and many of the Dukes did it pretty well, all things considered.
They didn't even accepted that IOTL before being in a situation when England could pretend to dual monarchy. If the only way for England to have Aquitaine on its own right (Lancasters did this for Normandy, not for Aquitaine IIRC) is to take over France, that makes the whole discussion taking a really different direction, don't you think? :)
Very different. Such a Treaty would need a perfect storm. I won't quite say ASB, but the fact that the Dual Monarchy solution came first shows just how implausible said perfect storm is.
The whole "they were richer" as sole explanation let me a bit dubious. The whole Caroline strategy prooved efficient enough to force Edward III lowering his ambitions from the Treaty of London (gaining all western France and not giving up the claims, this treaty being for me the real high point of Plantagenets) to Brétigny (half of it, and renounciation to claims).
Oh, it's not just about money, of course, diplomacy and demographics matter too. The English kings knew they needed allies on the continent, or discord and division in France to make headway. While the English fifteenth century decline started before Arras, it's no coincidence that their fortunes reversed dramatically once the Valois and Burgundians were back together again. I didn't include London because I never thought it feasible. Conversely, I think Bretigny could have bought a peace that lasted longer than OTL, although probably not much longer.
Of course, the war of attrition beneficied France, but to say it was less efficient than England is a bit weird : the HYW is after all the period where the late medieval french taxation and fiscal system get perfected, but maybe you're talking of the beggining of the war or the political troubles during Charles VI's reign?
I was talking about the beginning. From my reading (sadly English and translated works only), the war provided something of a kick up the backside with regards to the efficiency of the revenue gathering process.


OP, I agree with LSC's take on young Edward. Butterflies mean he could end up any which way. He could be in the mould of his Father and Grandfather. Then again, he could end up like his Great Grandfather! by the time he succeeded, there'd be a malaise over the whole war party, and the Commons would likely want to cut back funding.

Although peace with France was never popular (see Richard II and Henry VI), it was often the only sensible option, and occasionally inevitable. Sadly, it was normally only when it became inevitable, and thus on France's terms, that the powers that be bit the bullet. Even then, sometimes the English still decided to go the opposite direction, such as in 1449 at Fougeres, one of the most baffling and mind numbingly stupid moves of the whole HYW.

French wiki appears to have a complete article on said Charlie Foxtrot. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siège_de_Fougères_(1449)
Okay fairs enough.

It could be an interesting time, though one does have t wonder what might have been had John not been so bad, and lost most of the angevin territories.
To stop that rot, I think you need to game both sides of the table. Not only does John need to be much better, but you also need to nerf Philip II Augustus, or have him fall off his horse, or suffer another fatal accident.
 
It could be an interesting time, though one does have t wonder what might have been had John not been so bad, and lost most of the angevin territories.

Eventually, it less dependend on John than Capetians, and it less depended on Capetians than the general geopolitical situation.
As said above, the so called Angevin Empire was a puzzle of really various political ensemble under french influence.
Henry II's sons didn't revoled for the lolz of it, but because having each to rule a coherent entity, they had to comply more to them than to their father in order to set their interests and ambitions.
Heck : continental territories were basically exempt to give men for war, even in the case when war was made on the continent on their behalf.

That's just how ridiculously limited was Plantagenet hegemony on several matters.

As for John...
Henry II tried to unify more the whole thing trough royal intervention : it backfired spectaculary.
John Lackland cared but was as competent as a boiled oyster : it backfired as well.

The point is less Plantagenets having good or bad kings, but the whole thing being a mess. Maybe that without extern pressure, it could have been dealt, but then again : Capetians.

Eventually, they had real important advantages (suzerainty that allowed meddling in these territories, possibility of alliances against Plantagenets, rich territories, division of Angevins territory and dynasts...) that may be less obvious with a more limited Plantagenet presence in France (as in Normandy+Anjou) that would be less a ressource drain.

But really, the whole Angevin political continuity was at some point very, very likely to crumble onto the weight of its own contradictions.

Apart from raiding all the 'French' books for the Breton specific bits, all I had was Jones, and some of his writings were in French! :eek:
Modern French or Medieval French?

It's the only way to survive, and many of the Dukes did it pretty well, all things considered.
Certainly, they were, after the HYW, among the rare great princes to be able to resist the king with Bourgogne, and maybe Armagnacs and Bourbons on a smaller scale.

Really, I think the military revolution described by Contamine was accompanied by a political revolution that doesn't have much to cede to the Italian Renaissance policies. (Eventually, even if the great nobles were generally skilled and competent, Louis XI was simply more of this, had more ressource and ruthless enough to crush them without second tought) that is often underestimated when it came to Valois (essentially trough the later description of Charles VII as "the well-served", widely used in British historiography for what I could tell, while we know the man itself was really skilled on its own).

Very different. Such a Treaty would need a perfect storm. I won't quite say ASB, but the fact that the Dual Monarchy solution came first shows just how implausible said perfect storm is.
Oh well, I think we'd have to disagree on the exact terms, then. Can live with that. :D

Oh, it's not just about money, of course, diplomacy and demographics matter too. The English kings knew they needed allies on the continent, or discord and division in France to make headway. While the English fifteenth century decline started before Arras, it's no coincidence that their fortunes reversed dramatically once the Valois and Burgundians were back together again.

I didn't include London because I never thought it feasible.
Which one? The First or Second?
The Second was arguably wishful thinking, but the First was more like a doped Brétigny (basically more money, more territories, and no renounciation to any claim).

Conversely, I think Bretigny could have bought a peace that lasted longer than OTL, although probably not much longer.
From the moment dauphin Charles agreed on Brétigny, it was concieved as an uneasy truce that French certainly didn't want to abide to (even John II, which made an honor point to make peace last didn't went as far than trying to actually exchange the concerned places).

The absence of application of Brétigny terms was actually the casus belli used by French (talks about cynism : "we didn't respected the treaty, therefore you didn't, and so you broke the treaty leading us to war" You can almost touch the southern legalist's hand there)

I was talking about the beginning. From my reading (sadly English and translated works only), the war provided something of a kick up the backside with regards to the efficiency of the revenue gathering process.
Oh, then I agree. But it changed more or less quickly, with John II's reforms that while mostly broke after Poitiers, served as an important basis for Charles V's own reforms that, them, lasted.

To stop that rot, I think you need to game both sides of the table. Not only does John need to be much better, but you also need to nerf Philip II Augustus, or have him fall off his horse, or suffer another fatal accident.
Honestly, I'd give more attention to the general geopolitical situation : competents kings as Henry II couldn't help but see the whole thing going in flames, and I'd say it's less a matter to be better or to nerf than having a less insanely complex and fragile initial situation.
 
Modern French or Medieval French?
Modern. Several of his collected books of essays have about fifty percent of them in French, presumably because there's a much greater interest in his field of study in France.
Certainly, they were, after the HYW, among the rare great princes to be able to resist the king with Bourgogne, and maybe Armagnacs and Bourbons on a smaller scale.
I thought they were a very impressive bunch until they had to deal with the Universal Spider. He was a different class of opponent.
The absence of application of Brétigny terms was actually the casus belli used by French (talks about cynism : "we didn't respected the treaty, therefore you didn't, and so you broke the treaty leading us to war" You can almost touch the southern legalist's hand there)
Wow. I hadn't read a lot on the specifics of that. That's Magnificent Bastard territory, that is.

Then again, in 1377, Edward III objected to being told (as Duke of Aquitaine) to return Robert III of Artois to the King of France to face justice, while also complaining that his Earl of Huntingdon (who also happened to be King of Scotland) was being unjust to the Earl of Atholl. Lots of legal chicanery...
 
Several of his collected books of essays have about fifty percent of them in French, presumably because there's a much greater interest in his field of study in France.
Maybe. Although it could easily be because the conflict mainly happened in France, with an important litterary and historical tradition even at this point.

I thought they were a very impressive bunch until they had to deal with the Universal Spider. He was a different class of opponent.
Now, let's be careful on Louis XI. Would had be it exceptionnal on the Valois line, I would have agreed, but almost one king on two demonstrated really good skills.

(Note that a good part of the negative image of Louis XI comes from romanticist historiography, which itself is largely issued from pro-Bourguignon sources. Not that the man wasn't...say, dedicaced, far from it, but rarely uselessly ruthless.)

At some point it cease to be about individuals, and becomes more about structures. Not that other nobles were deprived of this, of course, but the "Skills+Ressources" equation is a sharp one.

Wow. I hadn't read a lot on the specifics of that. That's Magnificent Bastard territory, that is.
Basically, Charles V, after a time, just resumed to treat Aquitaine like it was still under his suzerainty, helping Gascon lords that complained about Edward's increasing fiscal pressure. With Plantagenet complaining, he basically answered that the treaty was never enforced, and declared war on Plantagenets for being bad vassals.

That's how much he cared for Brétigny : he could have said "lol, gtfo n00b" that it would have been the same.

That said, you understand why any treaty that would be about Valois still being suzerain of Plantagenet holdings in the continent was unnaceptable for English kings : it had all the odds to turn into the usual "My, your poor vassals are complaining about you. You must come before me to be judged. What you don't want to humiliate yourself for no good reason? Confiscation of your holdings, it shall be then".
 
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Maybe. Although it could easily be because the conflict mainly happened in France, with an important litterary and historical tradition even at this point.
That too.
Now, let's be careful on Louis XI. Would had be it exceptionnal on the Valois line, I would have agreed, but almost one king on two demonstrated really good skills.
Actually you raise a good point there. Louis was hardly alone in his skillset. I suppose that he was helped too by Francis II not having any sons, and good old Charles the Rash throwing away first his army, and then his life.
At some point it cease to be about individuals, and becomes more about structures. Not that other nobles were deprived of this, of course, but the "Skills+Ressources" equation is a sharp one.
Indeed. In the hands of a good king post Charles V, France tends to win in all aspects of this calculation.
That said, you understand why any treaty that would be about Valois still being suzerain of Plantagenet holdings in the continent was unnaceptable for English kings : it had all the odds to turn into the usual "My, your poor vassals are complaining about you. You must come before me to be judged. What you don't want to humiliate yourself for no good reason? Confiscation of your holdings, it shall be then".
Indeed. It happened again and again. As long as the King of England holds land of the King of France, it always will. There are only two ends, complete English victory, or the English being driven from the continent, Calais excepted. Any other solution sees the English king inhabiting the same body corporal as a vassal of the French king. It's always going to be an open sore. The same things happened through the reign of Edward III's forebears, resulting in things like the War of St Sardos, and even back to Angevin times. Of the two ultimate ends, the one that occurred (England driven into the sea) is always the most likely. Not guaranteed, and by no means certain to happen 1450-3, but it's more likely than the other scenario.

There might be case for a third one, in which Aquitaine somehow becomes a fief of the Kingdom of England, rather than France, but that one's nigh on ASB, as I said earlier. I don't think it is ASB, but it's so close to ASB that it can see and hear the winged critters.
 

VVD0D95

Banned
Is it at all possible to create a situation where Edward III or the Black Prince refuse to aid Pedro the Cruel?
 
It's possible, but would be relatively hard to butterfly.
Having a strong pro-Valois king right on the South of your main continental holding is going to be a threat, especially giving the role on seafare part of the conflict (or when your intervention is supposed to make you recieve a lot of money, needed for your own war against Valois).

At some point, Plantagenêts had to try to stop Valois endiguement (that was as diplomatical than geopolitical, see the changes in HRE) : if not in Castile, then in Brittany (which may proove less ruinous, arguably, but could trigger more easily the bulk of Caroline phase, than intervening in a foreign land).
 

VVD0D95

Banned
It's possible, but would be relatively hard to butterfly.
Having a strong pro-Valois king right on the South of your main continental holding is going to be a threat, especially giving the role on seafare part of the conflict (or when your intervention is supposed to make you recieve a lot of money, needed for your own war against Valois).

At some point, Plantagenêts had to try to stop Valois endiguement (that was as diplomatical than geopolitical, see the changes in HRE) : if not in Castile, then in Brittany (which may proove less ruinous, arguably, but could trigger more easily the bulk of Caroline phase, than intervening in a foreign land).

Okay, I suppose, in order for Edward not to get dysentry he might well need to remain away from those areas it was effecting most
 
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