WI Pearl Harbor put on high alert?

Delvestius

Banned
Say one of the preemptive signs of attack were heeded. What would the consequences be of the Japanese attacking a battle-ready station? How long of a heads up would the Americans have needed to mount a (more) successful defense?
 
How much notice?

5 Minutes warning - the ships are closed up at action stations all doors doubled dogged - a handful of US Aircraft might get airborne in time to do something.

1 hours notice - it would take no more than an hours notice for the Battleships to come up to steam to power all their weapons and be closed up at action stations.

I suspect that this would also be enough time for the Pilots to shake off hangovers and a decent number of fighters Fuelled and armed - their engines warmed up

Four Hours - All capital ships (bar the one in Drydock) - enough steam to move and all aircraft bombed up and dispersed etc.

This is actually dangerous for the US Fleet as ships might be caught manoeuvring slowly leaving port.

A BB sunk in the channel their might even block the harbour

BBs lost at sea might result in them being unrecoverable and suffer high crew casualties.

However with several hundred Aircraft ready to defend / strike back it might also be dangerous for the IJN Strike fleet

12 Hours plus - all of the BBs and ships that can have left port and the entire Island is on Alert.

What happens next depends but it can go really badly for either side - ie the Battleships try to go for the Carriers and either get lucky or get sunk at sea

Probably what would happen is the US ships devoid of carrier support would move south east of the Island (under Air cover) - perhaps even return to the US West Coast out of range of any Japanese adventurism.

Meanwhile in Peal Harbour a phone in a 'Japanese barbers' rings unanswered.....
 
Marshall doesn't say, "Nah, why send another needless warning.":p

"Tora! Tora! Tora!" doesn't get an ironic scene with a Japanese messenger delivering a warning telegram in the middle of the battle...
 
With no ships in the harbor the fuel tank farms, the work shops, and the dry docks would get blown sky high. Remember, the entire fuel reserve for the Pacific fleet were in those tanks.
 
What would be an acceptable loss ratio for the Americans to the Japanese?
Maybe if the ships sunk or heavily damaged received a slightly smaller amount of damage in this scenario [as evading the torpedoes and bombs reduce the hits obtained, but keep them away from shallow water and land to run aground ] what would be the impacts?
American battleship and cruiser losses:
USS Oklahama
USS West Virginia
USS California
USS Nevada
USS Honolulu
USS Raleigh
Plus a few more losses in destroyer and auxillary units. The Japanese probably lose a few more destroyers and maybe a cruiser and carrier due to American planes or a lucky submarine.
In lieu of the watertight doors being closed, maybe the Nevada and California [with watertight doors shut] might survive a torpedo or several bomb hits.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
With no ships in the harbor the fuel tank farms, the work shops, and the dry docks would get blown sky high. Remember, the entire fuel reserve for the Pacific fleet were in those tanks.
Can you blow bunker fuel sky high? IIRC it takes a lot to get it to burn much...
(For that matter, the Americans can just fuel off tankers in an emergency. The US was kinda the world producer of oil at this point, no way in heck they're going to be out of fuel...)
 
Can you blow bunker fuel sky high? IIRC it takes a lot to get it to burn much...
(For that matter, the Americans can just fuel off tankers in an emergency. The US was kinda the world producer of oil at this point, no way in heck they're going to be out of fuel...)

The Sea Mammal of the Pacific strikes again...
 

marathag

Banned
Maybe if the ships sunk or heavily damaged received a slightly smaller amount of damage in this scenario [as evading the torpedoes and bombs reduce the hits obtained, but keep them away from shallow water and land to run aground ] what would be the impacts?.

the Kates with the AP bombs would have less success than B-17s did against moving targets
 
US had plenty of tankers.

Not so many fast ones, though.

Yeah, but remember they were transferring a lot of warships to the Atlantic and they were also sending tankers too. As to blowing things sky high, it was just a figure of speech. But if their weren't any ships in port, the other targets I mentioned would be to good to pass up. By destroying the tank farms it would limit what the U.S. navy could do, because it would take time to get more fuel from the west coast to Hawaii, not to mention it would take time to rebuild those storage tanks.
 
I don't think the 40 torpedo armed bombers would be as effective against machine shops or the tank farm.

Yeah, but remember they were transferring a lot of warships to the Atlantic and they were also sending tankers too. As to blowing things sky high, it was just a figure of speech. But if their weren't any ships in port, the other targets I mentioned would be to good to pass up. By destroying the tank farms it would limit what the U.S. navy could do, because it would take time to get more fuel from the west coast to Hawaii, not to mention it would take time to rebuild those storage tanks.
 
Yeah, but remember they were transferring a lot of warships to the Atlantic and they were also sending tankers too. As to blowing things sky high, it was just a figure of speech. But if their weren't any ships in port, the other targets I mentioned would be to good to pass up. By destroying the tank farms it would limit what the U.S. navy could do, because it would take time to get more fuel from the west coast to Hawaii, not to mention it would take time to rebuild those storage tanks.

The storage tanks are a lot harder to destroy than is generally realized and bunker fuel does not burn that easily. This issue has been hashed out many times on this forum. The rest of the facilities are large hard targets that can be repaired. Doing serious long term damage to a large area set of targets like a naval base takes constant re-strikes. The Kido Butai did not have anything close to the staying power to do that. Even in this day and age of PGMs that sort of thing is hard to do.

Seriously, this whole issue is the Sea Mammal of the Pacific. Maybe we should call it Operation Hawaiian Monk Seal...
 
I don't think the 40 torpedo armed bombers would be as effective against machine shops or the tank farm.

No, but the Kate's that are armed with bombs, along with the Vals would be effective. Because if I remember correctly some of those bombers carried modified 16 inch armor piercing battleship shells, that were from the battleship Nagato.
 
CalBear, where are you?

With no ships in the harbor the fuel tank farms, the work shops, and the dry docks would get blown sky high. Remember, the entire fuel reserve for the Pacific fleet were in those tanks.

Nope. Neither the Japanese nor anyone else had ship-launched aircraft capable of nailing such heavy targets. Frex, the oil farms and refineries in Balikpapen were too big for even B-25s & B-26s. But once the B-24s arrived, they did Grand Scale Urban Renewal on those oilfields. And unlike at Ploesti, the Japanese had fuck-all for doing any rebuilding.

What would be an acceptable loss ratio for the Americans to the Japanese?
Maybe if the ships sunk or heavily damaged received a slightly smaller amount of damage in this scenario [as evading the torpedoes and bombs reduce the hits obtained, but keep them away from shallow water and land to run aground what would be the impacts?
American battleship and cruiser losses:
USS Oklahama
USS West Virginia
USS California
USS Nevada
USS Honolulu
USS Raleigh
Plus a few more losses in destroyer and auxillary units. The Japanese probably lose a few more destroyers and maybe a cruiser and carrier due to American planes or a lucky submarine.

REMEMBER THE ARIZONA! Oh wait, you didn't.:mad: Only the Arizona was destroyed and the Oklahoma a Total Constructive Loss, but for reasons of propaganda the public was led to believe the OK would be repaired and returned to service.

Any Standard is expendable in exchange of a Japanese fleet CV. That said, it would be a gruesome loss for the US Pacific Fleet in terms of valuable skills in so many future senior officers and non-coms for the Pacific War.

Can you blow bunker fuel sky high? IIRC it takes a lot to get it to burn much...
(For that matter, the Americans can just fuel off tankers in an emergency. The US was kinda the world producer of oil at this point, no way in heck they're going to be out of fuel...)

The US still had a lot to learn about at-sea re-fueling. OTOH, if somehow facilities were so damaged that the destroyers started running low on fuel, they could be re-fueled from the Standards.

The Sea Mammal of the Pacific strikes again...

In terms of the fleet escaping you mean? If so, I'd add on both "The Philippines Hold On", and "Allies defeat Japan in SW Asia (Malaya, DEI, Singapore, Burma*Incoming!*)

By destroying the tank farms it would limit what the U.S. navy could do, because it would take time to get more fuel from the west coast to Hawaii, not to mention it would take time to rebuild those storage tanks.

The oil farms IIRC were too heavily protected.

I don't think the 40 torpedo armed bombers would be as effective against machine shops or the tank farm.

Against an empty harbor, they say "Oh shit!", dump their fish, and hope there's a place for them to land when they return.:D They'd have to assume "It's A Trap!!"
 
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If the US is on high alert at Pearl Harbor, then do you actually believe that the Vals and Kates coming at loaded and flying at less 200mph (when loaded) are going to be that effective as anything but targets?

No, but the Kate's that are armed with bombs, along with the Vals would be effective. Because if I remember correctly some of those bombers carried modified 16 inch armor piercing battleship shells, that were from the battleship Nagato.
 
5 Minutes warning - the ships are closed up at action stations all doors doubled dogged - a handful of US Aircraft might get airborne in time to do something.

1 hours notice - it would take no more than an hours notice for the Battleships to come up to steam to power all their weapons and be closed up at action stations.

I suspect that this would also be enough time for the Pilots to shake off hangovers and a decent number of fighters Fuelled and armed - their engines warmed up

Four Hours - All capital ships (bar the one in Drydock) - enough steam to move and all aircraft bombed up and dispersed etc.

This is actually dangerous for the US Fleet as ships might be caught manoeuvring slowly leaving port.

A BB sunk in the channel their might even block the harbour

BBs lost at sea might result in them being unrecoverable and suffer high crew casualties.

However with several hundred Aircraft ready to defend / strike back it might also be dangerous for the IJN Strike fleet

12 Hours plus - all of the BBs and ships that can have left port and the entire Island is on Alert.

Given how well the second raid did against the damaged-but-now-fully-active American air defenses ("not very"), it seems that one hours notice is the best bet for the Americans limiting their own damage and maximizing the Japanese.

What happens next depends but it can go really badly for either side - ie the Battleships try to go for the Carriers and either get lucky or get sunk at sea

They have to get within gunnery range of the faster Japanese carrier group without being detected. Unless the Americans find out the precise locations the Japanese carrier group will be days beforehand and make their approach during the night of December 6/7, that is pretty much as likely as (for example) the battleship Yamato making it all the way to Okinawa without being detected by the carrier groups there during Ten-Go.
 
5 Minutes warning - the ships are closed up at action stations all doors doubled dogged - a handful of US Aircraft might get airborne in time to do something.

Couldn't disseminate the news that fast. Frex, most likely some members of the Arizona's crew didn't even know a war was on when they died, especially those in the Black Gang.

1 hours notice - it would take no more than an hours notice for the Battleships to come up to steam to power all their weapons and be closed up at action stations.

Allow for the fact that most BBs only had one boiler lit that morning. The only reason the Nevada could make her famous run for the open sea was because the acting chief engineer had kept an extra boiler lit (against protocols) so he could do the switchover later that morning. Also, ALL the ships in harbor suffered from having too many crew members ashore.

I suspect that this would also be enough time for the Pilots to shake off hangovers and a decent number of fighters Fueled and armed - their engines warmed up

For those quartered near their planes...:( But it won't make much difference, other than perhaps more pilots killed on the tarmac.:(:(

Four Hours - All capital ships (bar the one in Drydock) - enough steam to move and all aircraft bombed up and dispersed etc.

Actually, if Kimmel absolutely hits the panic button, and the rest of the BBs' captains, divisional commanders, and the Battle Force Commander himself (Pye) are willing to work as hard and fast as the Nevada's crew did, you could have the dilemma of a "crowding effect" of major warships trying to leave at nearly the same time. "Everyone storms the exits in the burning theater and no one gets out"?

The Nevada makes it out no question though. And the NV proved something under fire that had long been argued about in Pearl Harbor...A battleship CAN get underway, leave dockside, maneuver through the Inner Harbor, and presumably the Outer Harbor and Outer Channel WITHOUT the aid of tugboats.

Getting the bombers and PBYs dispersed that quickly might be a problem in terms of getting them airborne. But if it can be done, they can go to the other islands for cover. Getting the bombers "bombed up" will take too long at Four Hours (penetrating disbelief and rounding up essential personnel in a "peacetime environment" is very hard).

This is actually dangerous for the US Fleet as ships might be caught maneuvring slowly leaving port.

This will depend a lot on US Army/Navy cooperation:rolleyes:, as with Four Hours Warning the Opana Point radar station will not only remain manned and operating, but even under possible heavy guard. So no "Instant tactical surprise" ITTL. Which leads me to...

A BB sunk in the channel their might even block the harbor

That's what Harbor Masters are for. To throw up the Red Flag the moment the Opana Point radar installation tells the navy of the approaching Japanese attack waves and roughly when they could be expected to show up. So they would have "X amount" of time before throwing down the bar. This happened when the Nevada was turning towards the Outer Channel. The Harbor Master Station had the flags up closing the harbor. The NV's skipper agreed with the Master's decision and beached his ship, but there were more than a few angry junior officers who thought that the order was wrong.

But as you say, it wasn't.

BBs lost at sea might result in them being unrecoverable and suffer high crew casualties.

True, on an individual basis. But its not like they were the crews of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, sailing off to their doom. Or even the Bismarck's, who at least had the prospect of rescue by the British, and could have had a lot more survivors if an offensively disarmed U-Boat hadn't foolishly closed in, forcing the heavy cruiser Dorestshire to abandon the German sailors to their fate. A handful were rescued by the U-Boat, but that was all.

At Hawaii the Standards would be operating in friendly controlled waters and skies, in calm seas, warm water, and few (if any?) sharks. I say friendly skies because the Nagumo Force will have little time to tarry and strafe helpless sailors bobbling in the water. Not that they wouldn't if they got the chance.:mad:

However with several hundred Aircraft ready to defend / strike back it might also be dangerous for the IJN Strike fleet

Meh. Short's "7th Air Force" on 12/7/41 was as deadly as a kitten to targets at sea. I'd barely give them credit to handle supporting tactical operations defeating a Japanese invasion force (ASB), but the mass obsolescence of so many of their aircraft (B-18s, P-35s, P-36s, Buffaloes), or unsuitability for naval air strikes of others [B-17s, A-20s[size=-4](bomb load)[/size]], renders the entire body of aircraft on Oahu useless for any missions except diversion, recon, or CAP. And the CAP mission mainly due to her complement of P-40s.

I know some may point to the aircraft shot down by some of these iron coffins (NOT the P-40s) at Pearl OTL. BUT: The Japanese had never done anything like this. In some ways, even their vaunted veterans were "newbies". And they too made newbie mistakes. Since mostly only squadron and flight leaders had radios, once the fighters broke formation to hunt targets (seeing no aircraft in the skies), their commanders lost the ability to recall their planes quickly enough to deal with immediate threats, like a few fighters being able to take off and engage the enemy. An enemy who had grown complacent, thinking that there were no enemy planes aloft at all.

So when the Nevada made her run, there was no way for the Japanese to "call in the clans" from the moment she pulled away from the dock. So too when the handful of American fighters that got off the ground engaged the enemy, some could enjoy an initial level of surprise, especially the famous two pilots from the auxiliary field at Haleiwa. But then, they were flying P-40s.

...and at this time the Americans know NOTHING about the Zero, much less how to combat it. When they try to engage a bunch of "near-sighted pilots flying tinker-toys":eek:

12 Hours plus - all of the BBs and ships that can have left port and the entire Island is on Alert.

Yeah, even the beach defenses are manned at this point.

What happens next depends but it can go really badly for either side - ie the Battleships try to go for the Carriers and either get lucky or get sunk at sea

The Standards lack the speed to catch up to Nagumo and Nagumo lacks the fuel to hunt for them. If Nagumo tries for a Third Wave, some of his DDs aren't getting home. If he stays through 12/8, NONE of them are. And since he doesn't know that the vaunted Mark XIV is fractionally less dangerous than a barrage of spitballs...:rolleyes:, he could in his own mind be facing a "Night of the Long Knives" before he ever gets home. IF he gets home. If there was one thing the world's navies had learned to appreciate, it was the power of the Submarine.:mad:

Probably what would happen is the US ships devoid of carrier support would move south east of the Island (under Air cover) - perhaps even return to the US West Coast out of range of any Japanese adventurism.

I doubt seriously that Kimmel would go that far. If he does, its only because he lacks the fuel and escorts to cover the Standards.

And yes, CAP is the One Thing I could trust Short's boys to pull off.

Meanwhile in Peal Harbor a phone in a 'Japanese barbers' rings unanswered.....

IDK about that. AIUI, the barber didn't even know who he was talking to. Its not a matter of making sure there is no one to answer the phone as it is to insure the person on the other end of the line is not able to make the call in the first place.

To shut down the Japanese intelligence operations to affect Japan's knowledge of the fleet sortieing, you'd need to storm or otherwise shut down the Japanese Consular Office from the outside world almost immediately. Then there's the issue of the Japanese submarines in the area, especially the midgets, who were giving vital intel to the IJN right up until 0400 on 12/7.
 
1 hour is enough to hurt the Japanese seriously

1 Hour is more than enough to seriously threaten the entire basis of the Japanese attack. The Fleet will have water tight doors closed, most of its anti aircraft weapons manned, damage control teams assembled, and some of the crews who are ashore (especially a lot of the officers at home with their families) have time to get to their ships.

note this map
http://history-world.org/pearlmap2.jpg

the most serious damage to the fleet was from the torpedo bombers, which sank the California, West Virginia and Oklahoma, and put torpedoes into the Arizona. This damage was done in the initial few minutes as the torpedo bombers were unopposed. With an hours warning which assumes an alert triggered by the Aaron Wards engagement with a submarine and the radar warning taken seriously, which assumes a few minutes delay of the air defense staff going to breakfast... both of which could have been set in motion by Marshall's staff sending a radio message or or more urgently marked message (it was not marked high urgency).

So note the flight paths of the torpedo planes, and note they fly right over the cruisers which would have a really good chance of shooting the hell out of them. In OTL the Conyingham managed to shoot 3 torpedo planes, in spite of surprise, by 8:08 AM (first 13 minutes of the attack). Consider how vulnerable the rest of them would have been if surprise was lost.

A few fighters might be enough to disrupt the level bombing attack, which could possibly save the Arizona..

http://www.amazon.com/Attack-Pearl-Harbor-Strategy-Deceptions/dp/1612001971

this book analyzed thoroughly the attack, and estimates warning doubles or more the Japanese losses, and results in far less serious damage... half or fewer torpedo hits and bomb hits. Fewer hits and damage control means almost certainly the Oklahoma does not roll over, and most likely the West Virginia is far less damaged. The California is still screwed though, it needs more time to secure hatches that were removed for the inspection planned.

The Japanese did not at any point prior to the attack seriously consider attacking the oil and base facilities. An attack of opportunity against the facilities was only considered after success in the first two strikes.

If the fleet has steamed out of the harbor, the Japanese would go looking for it instead of hitting the fleet base. It is why they sent float planes out first that morning, checking not only Pearl but other likely anchorages as well.

Zimm also points out, using data from Midway and the Solomons campaign, that the fleet at sea is not as vulnerable as has been suggested, pointing out that even 1941 US Navy air defense is pretty powerful for the time period, the level bombers would be unlikely to cause serious damage to moving targets, and the dive bombers lacked bombs powerful enough to penetrate battleship deck armor (the Arizona was hit by a level bomber with a converted artillery shell, the Nevada was beached because of its torpedo damage, not because of deck damage caused by the dive bombers). That fleet operating in Hawaiian waters would also have fighter cover, and while American pilots were not prepared for the Zero, there are a lot of them, and breaking up an attack and reducing its effectiveness is more important than gaining kills and worth severe losses.

So it seems likely based on this that an hour is really decisive, and a specific warning to prepare not only for internal sabotage but possible external attack (which TWO US Navy fleet problems in the 1930s showed was possible) would potentially get the Army air defense batteries deployed to their air defense positions in time to make a huge difference as well.
 
galveston bay, where are you?

galveston bay

Outstanding analysis. How do you see the scenarios for:

"Four Hours Warning"

&

"Twelve Hours Warning"

I'm really interested on your take on these.
 
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