British action in the Pacific
- Thread starter Riain
- Start date
Can they be sped up or do you need the war to last longer?
The other possibility is that instead of having the British contribute forces to the main effort aimed at Japan (the British Pacific Fleet), they retain their forces to reclaim lost Imperial territory instead.
I know it is a controversial issue. One argument is that such operations were not relevant to achieving victory over Japan but the other argument is that it would have allowed the British to own their own slice of the war against Japan instead sending forces to be a junior partner to the US.
Just a couple of thoughts. I would be interested in seeing a TL on this.
The other possibility is that instead of having the British contribute forces to the main effort aimed at Japan (the British Pacific Fleet), they retain their forces to reclaim lost Imperial territory instead.
I know it is a controversial issue. One argument is that such operations were not relevant to achieving victory over Japan but the other argument is that it would have allowed the British to own their own slice of the war against Japan instead sending forces to be a junior partner to the US.
Just a couple of thoughts. I would be interested in seeing a TL on this.
Had the British tried this "All I care about is putting out the fire in my own house" approach, I wonder how accepting the U.S. would've been? And if they truly resented it, what leverage might they exert to coerce the British to contribute more broadly? Even this late in the war, I'd suppose that the U.S. had serious financial and economic tools to apply, if it were willing to use them.
Edit: if the British had tried this, wouldn't we see a significant souring of Anglo-American relations postwar? If, as I've heard, the U.S. deliberately worked to demolish the British Empire after the war OTL, how much more diligent might their efforts have been with relations soured by this scenario?
Well Admiral King had to have his arm severely twisted to accept a British role in the assault on Japan in OTL, so coercion seems unlikely.
On the other hand, his arm was twisted.
Now, I'm completely unfamiliar with this incident, so I must ask "Who did the twisting?"
If it was the Brits, then issue resolved -- Britain isn't going to concern itself solely with recovering its own colonies, anyway. They want in on The Big Show.
If it was the American leadership, then the intransigence of this one man really doesn't prove much. It wouldn't be the first, or last, time that a very powerful American military leader allowed his personal feelings to run into conflict with national policy.
sharlin
Banned
The British Pacific Fleet at the time was about the size of one of the USN's CAG's and the USN had something like half a dozen of them. The RN wanted to be there to show it was doing something after being driven out of the Indian Ocean in 41. But we was Johnny come latelys and we turned up with a fleet of Prius's whilst the USN was there with Limo's and Mercs.
Zheng He's timeline about a more successful Eastern fleet would make King's arm all the easier to twist.
Resource shortage...
I get the impression from Churchill's World War 2 memoir that the UK seldom had enough troops and landing craft spare to do much in the Pacific. Once the Italian fleet had switched sides, and the Tirpitz and Scharnhorst no longer posed threats to convoys, the Royal Navy had ships in hand to send though...
Well at a cost of long-term damage, British carriers soaked up a lot of kamikaze strikes that would have seen American carriers pulled out for repairs (not necessarily permanently, but probably for at least a few days), so they did contribute.
Britain had been fighting for just about a year and a half longer than the Americans, and had less industrial capacity, and it was more like they turned up in land-rovers.
That was more like two and a half years, 1939,1940,1941. In a USA context that would be WW2 until mid 1944.
Now now Gentlemen.
Lets not derail this thread with the age old Armoured Deck Carrier vs Open hanger types.
The Essex and Yorktowns were very good carriers
So where the Illustrious class
For those of you who think that the latter were 'Prius' let me smack you with the fact stick
http://www.armouredcarriers.com/
Lets not derail this thread with the age old Armoured Deck Carrier vs Open hanger types.
The Essex and Yorktowns were very good carriers
So where the Illustrious class
For those of you who think that the latter were 'Prius' let me smack you with the fact stick
http://www.armouredcarriers.com/
Technically yes, but I'm counting from 10 May 1940 as the day 'real' combat began.
I think the RN would disagree that the war did not commence for them until May 1940, the sinking of the aircraft carrier Couragous on September 17th 1939 with loss of over 500 of her crew would indicate that a real war was being fought.
Admiral Beez
Banned
Considering his strong British routes it's surprises me how anti-British he was.
Riain
Banned
A couple of things:
TF 57/37 is often said to be the size of a USN TG, this is pretty close TF57 had 4 fleet carriers and 2 BBs and in 1945 USN TGs tended to be 2 fleet and 2 light fleet carriers. The USN tended to deploy 3 of these TGs to operations, so the BPF TF57 added a fourth TG equivalent to the striking force which is nothing to be sneezed at. In addition given the supply situation on the US west coast where ships were stacked waiting to be loaded the introduction of Australia as a source of supply for TF57/37 meant that this significant increase in strength did not come at the expense of an increased load on the USN supply chain which would have slowed down the tempo of operations.
The Lancaster, which would have made up the main fighting strength of Tiger Force if it had seen action by August 45, was quite a hefty bomber in 1945 terms. While the B29 could carry 20,000lb bombload the B24 could only carry 5,000lb, the Lancaster could carry 14,000lb. So if Lancaster squadrons displaced B24 squadrons for bombing of Japan they would deliver almost triple the ordnance per unit, which would be a welcome addition.
As for operations if Tiger Force could be used to support Operations Tiderace and Zipper in late July perhaps the use of Singapore Naval Base from August 1945 would allow more than a single carrier to operate off Japan in the final weeks of the war due to supply problems.
TF 57/37 is often said to be the size of a USN TG, this is pretty close TF57 had 4 fleet carriers and 2 BBs and in 1945 USN TGs tended to be 2 fleet and 2 light fleet carriers. The USN tended to deploy 3 of these TGs to operations, so the BPF TF57 added a fourth TG equivalent to the striking force which is nothing to be sneezed at. In addition given the supply situation on the US west coast where ships were stacked waiting to be loaded the introduction of Australia as a source of supply for TF57/37 meant that this significant increase in strength did not come at the expense of an increased load on the USN supply chain which would have slowed down the tempo of operations.
The Lancaster, which would have made up the main fighting strength of Tiger Force if it had seen action by August 45, was quite a hefty bomber in 1945 terms. While the B29 could carry 20,000lb bombload the B24 could only carry 5,000lb, the Lancaster could carry 14,000lb. So if Lancaster squadrons displaced B24 squadrons for bombing of Japan they would deliver almost triple the ordnance per unit, which would be a welcome addition.
As for operations if Tiger Force could be used to support Operations Tiderace and Zipper in late July perhaps the use of Singapore Naval Base from August 1945 would allow more than a single carrier to operate off Japan in the final weeks of the war due to supply problems.
Also British Bomber Squadrons where very experienced at operating at night so this would have allowed the Allies to have conducted round the clock bombing bringing even more pressure on the Japanese.
Plus they had the Lancaster Specials - not sure if any Japanese targets would have warranted Tallboy / Grand slam attacks?
marathag
Banned
At what range?
The longest B-24 raid was over 2700 miles, and 3000 pound bombload
The B-24 could carry about 17,000 pounds of fuel internally, plus up to four 400 gallon bomb bay auxiliary tanks
The 5000 pound bombload Liberator loadout included 6000 pounds of .50s, ammo(4400 rounds) and armor plate and gas for a 1600 mile round trip
My sources give the Lancaster Mk X a 1000 mile range with 14,000 pounds
You don't get max range and max bombload at the same time.
You could get some impressive load figures for the B-24 if you don't bring so many gunners and ammo, if you are planning night time raids
It's all down to payload
B-24 38,000 lbs empty 71,200 maximum. My figures for 1600 miles was with 61,500 pounds
Lanc 36,457 lbs empty 72,000 maximum, figures for 1000 miles was with 68,000 pounds
The difference was the B-24 could use more of that payload for armament and fuel, the Lanc for more bombs
The B-29 was a whole level difference from those two
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Ironically, Mr. Churchill was against what ended happening OTL, he wanted the British to concentrate on the British sphere of influence in Malaya and Burma.
Corelli Barnett in Engage the Enemy More Closely acknowledges that this would have allowed the British to be the biggest fish in their pond instead of playing a very junior partner to the Americans in the Pacific but he also calls this approach a "strategic cul-de-sac" because it would have meant fighting for objectives that did not have an effect on the ultimate outcome of the war.
Here is my bottom line on this - no disrespect intended to the men of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF), they were brave and skilled professionals of the first order but the fact is by the time they got involved, the US had the war in the hand. The operations of the BPF are certainly interesting from a tactical standpoint and how well the armored carriers stood up to kamikaze attacks (sweepers man your brooms) makes for good discussion but ultimately the war had by and large been decided.
From a US standpoint I have no doubt that Ernie King would have preferred that the British stay in their sand box if you will although despite King's comments that the BPF had to be entirely self sufficient, US commanders in theater did provide support to their counterparts. Also, from what I have read, it sounds like the Australians were less than thrilled with how much logistics support they had to provide the BPF which had its main base in Sydney.
I would be very interested in reading a TL that has a primary POD of Churchill winning the argument and the British deciding to focus their effort in the wider PTO on reclaiming their empire in Burma and Malaya while leaving the main effort in the Pacific to the United States. I think there is fertile ground for this. I don't have the time - I'm quite busy with my Indian Ocean TL and I want to get back to my Midway TL as well but I would love to see someone do this and I would be happy to provide inputs and constructive criticism.
Corelli Barnett in Engage the Enemy More Closely acknowledges that this would have allowed the British to be the biggest fish in their pond instead of playing a very junior partner to the Americans in the Pacific but he also calls this approach a "strategic cul-de-sac" because it would have meant fighting for objectives that did not have an effect on the ultimate outcome of the war.
Here is my bottom line on this - no disrespect intended to the men of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF), they were brave and skilled professionals of the first order but the fact is by the time they got involved, the US had the war in the hand. The operations of the BPF are certainly interesting from a tactical standpoint and how well the armored carriers stood up to kamikaze attacks (sweepers man your brooms) makes for good discussion but ultimately the war had by and large been decided.
From a US standpoint I have no doubt that Ernie King would have preferred that the British stay in their sand box if you will although despite King's comments that the BPF had to be entirely self sufficient, US commanders in theater did provide support to their counterparts. Also, from what I have read, it sounds like the Australians were less than thrilled with how much logistics support they had to provide the BPF which had its main base in Sydney.
I would be very interested in reading a TL that has a primary POD of Churchill winning the argument and the British deciding to focus their effort in the wider PTO on reclaiming their empire in Burma and Malaya while leaving the main effort in the Pacific to the United States. I think there is fertile ground for this. I don't have the time - I'm quite busy with my Indian Ocean TL and I want to get back to my Midway TL as well but I would love to see someone do this and I would be happy to provide inputs and constructive criticism.