So Why DID the Western Roman Empire Collapse?

I know this is sort of an unanswerable question, but I'd like to hear people's opinions as part of the preparation of a reading list. (Any suggestions for titles would be much appreciated, too.)

I'm particularly interested in whether the collapse should primarily be attributed to a social or psychological change in the Romans (loss of unity, Christianity), or to changes in empirical/external circumstances (plague, climate shift). Having recently gotten into the work of Fred S. Polak, I'd like to interpret the collapse of the Roman Empire via his theory of culture, but I don't know enough about the time period to really have an opinion yet.
 
Short version?

*Internacine fighting over decades that weakened the army irreversibly

*Degradation of the tax system such that the government could no longer operate effectively nor could it always pay the troops (see above)

*Permitting large bands of potentially hostile barbarians to settle within its domains then treating them poorly in many cases

*Atilla the Hun

*Lack of unified command and control across the Empire

The long version is a topic of more books than I can easily name...
 
Just 2 reasons:

- multiple issues with external threats
- multiple issues with internal structures

If you overestimate the external threats, you are a follower of the shock-theory
If you overestimate the internal structures, you are a follower of the structure-theory
If you are convinced, that Rome never has fallen, you are a follower of the transformation-theory

If you don't like the 3 main theories, there are 97 more. Alexander Demandt listed 100 reasons for the Fall of Rome, which have been discussed seriously since then.

If you use the search function on this forum, you would surely find some more!
 
Last edited:
Recommendations:
Heather - The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians
Halsall - Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 368-576

Heather favors the external interpretation - that the ultimate trigger of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire were the barbarians. Heather's interpretation is founded on his works exploring the history of the Goths. If I remember correctly, to Heather the key moment where the end became irreversible is the failure of the ERE and Anthemius at Cape Bon in 468.

Halsall argues that it was death by suicide. His key arguments are that the 4th century recovery was dependent on strong, adult emperors who could distribute patronage and remain present on the frontier, and once imperial luck took a downturn the deterioration began. Nevertheless, the barbarians, with the exception of Attila, all tried to work within the imperial system instead of destroying it. To Halsall, the key moment signifying an irreversible end is also Anthemius's reign - not really Cape Bon in particular, but his death in 472. As after his death, the WRE was never able to sustain an offensive outside Italy.

As a non-specialist, I'm confident in saying Halsall's work is a great academic starting point, while Heather's is closer to popular history though his earlier works on the Goths are not pop history.
 
Last edited:
Simple----overspending and lavishly generous welfare created crazy debts that, when unpaid, resulted in a massive crash that saw Rome's population go from 2million to under 20 thousand almost overnight.

Even shorter version: tax-and-spend always fails in the end. ;^)
 
I know this is sort of an unanswerable question, but I'd like to hear people's opinions as part of the preparation of a reading list. (Any suggestions for titles would be much appreciated, too.)

The decline of Romania is what could be described as a "perfect storm". An addition of factors and crisis that each could have been manageable, but once added...

I'm particularly interested in whether the collapse should primarily be attributed to a social or psychological change in the Romans (loss of unity, Christianity)
That's the old Gibbon's theory, and let's be straight, it doesn't have the beggining of a proof to be based on, but wishful thinking. Christianisation of ruling and urban elites simply doesn't seem to have provoked any "mental decadance" or treachery in face of Christianised Barbarians.

Heck, if something Christianisation appeared to be an unifying factor, basically a new Romanisation marker.

or to changes in empirical/external circumstances
As Agricola said : Both.

Roughly,

First, "natural" occurences. Climatic changes since the IIth century making not only agricultural production less profitable, but as well putting all the populations between Rhine and Siberia moving.
Epidemics, measles, plague, cholera, didn't helped : probably 1/3 to half of the population simply meet their creators during the period between 300 and 600.

Economical/Fiscal : while Eastern Roman Empire beneficied from relativly untouched (mostly by virtue of being on the other side of the sea) AND richer lands, Wester Roman Empire was right on the way of many migrations, at the end of Eurasia. Safe Africa, everything was quite damaged, and when Africa was taken over by Vandals, that was the end of WRE revival's hopes.

If you add to that a monetary decline that Diocletian reforms didn't really stopped (basically an inflation, and debasement of the coinage) and a fiscal system that was collapsing in the Vth century, meaning harder time to find ressources to pay armies or foedi...

Political : Romania wasn't a modern state or democracy. Many people simply didn't felt any real kind of affection for Roman state, knowing mostly harsh fiscality from it (take a look at Bagaudae) for exemple. At this point many felt germanic takeover wouldn't change anything, or even that could change it for the better.

Ideology : Rome percieved itself as the social/cultural/ideological center of gravity, and what was outside as inferior or not really worth being considered as truly equal. There were many occasion where Romans could have had a better deal with Barbarians, but they refused or tricked it.
It didn't end well, as in Adrianople or the Sack of Rome.

I'd really advise you this thread, where these questions were debated.
 
One thing we can be sure of is Christianity had nothing to do with it.

These causes are interrelated and often fed on each other.

1. Changes to economic life. Long distance trade broke down and manorialism took root.
2. The tax system became less efficient over time.
3. Power devolved to the regional and local level.
4. The military lost its professionalism.
5. Germanic tribes were larger, wealthier, better armed, and more well versed in Roman doctrine than their Pax Romana predecessors.
6. The western empire suffered a mass invasion of Germanic peoples driven by the arrival of the Huns to the east.
7. The Huns themselves dealt critical blows to both halves of the empire, but the east recovered.
8. Germanic peoples claimed Roman controlled land for themselves and gradually expanded their holdings, replacing the Roman elite as they went.
 
That's the old Gibbon's theory, and let's be straight, it doesn't have the beggining of a proof to be based on, but wishful thinking. Christianisation of ruling and urban elites simply doesn't seem to have provoked any "mental decadance" or treachery in face of Christianised Barbarians.

You know, I just finished volume one of a two-volume set of Gibbon, covering up to the collapse of the WRE, and he hasn't said anything like "Christianity made the Roman Empire fall" so far...

ETA: I mean, he did talk about monasteries removing manpower from the pool of potential draftees, and the internal squabbles over Arianism and other heresies. But he didn't sound like he thought that Christianity was The Cause.

I'd really advise you this thread, where these questions were debated.

Thanks for the link! I did do a Google search for previous threads, but I missed that one.
 
Last edited:
If I can chirp in--as loyalty to Imperial institutions frayed, ongoing crises tended to produce ever-worsening political opportunism amongst the elite, which tended to exacerbate crises, which tended to produce more political opportunism amongst the elite, which tended to...

Well, you get the picture.
 
NolanFoster;11121671 1. Changes to economic life. Long distance trade broke down and manorialism took root. [/QUOTE said:
That's more of a consequence of Western Roman collapse. Before the Vth century, you still had a long-distance range. Among many exemples, the trade domination in northern Gaul by Syrian traders, or the continued exportation of sigilled African pottery.

Manioralism itself isn't a consequence, at the contrary : it can be argued that the ruralisation appears before : tried to represent the situation in a short graph.

3. Power devolved to the regional and local level.
Which was, IMO, more of an adaptation to current needs than a decline. It's the proof that Romans tried to change things that didn't worked anymore, and to take the initiative.

Note that Augustean Empire wasn't exactly centralized either : governors, municipalities, etc. had a really important power already.

4. The military lost its professionalism.
No. It knew important structural changes, and certainly didn't looked up like Augustean army, but Roman army competence was never really put in question : it still had a large score of victories and went eventually quickly integrated into Romano-Barbarian kingdom armies.

5. Germanic tribes were larger, wealthier, better armed, and more well versed in Roman doctrine than their Pax Romana predecessors.
It doesn't seem to be really obvious, when you look at it. The important use of laeti since the Ist century, doesn't point of a really "primitive" state of Germanic peoples at this point.

That said, the main difference is the ethnogenesis of these peoples, that integrated Romanized peoples (trough sheer exchanges, contacts) if not Romans to form Romano-Barbarian peoples as Goths or Franks; and eventually more well integrated into political/military structures. (Which doesn't implyes a systematical threat for Rome : see Stilicho)

6. The western empire suffered a mass invasion of Germanic peoples driven by the arrival of the Huns to the east.
At best, representing 5% of the Roman population, which is less than current immigrations rates in most 1st World countries nowadays.

7. The Huns themselves dealt critical blows to both halves of the empire, but the east recovered.
Huns never really managed to do that : eastern regions of the Empire were untouched, and even knew an economic growth during the IVth/Vth centuries. Western Romania didn't have the possibility to "sanctuarize" its equivalents regions, as Africa.

8. Germanic peoples claimed Roman controlled land for themselves and gradually expanded their holdings, replacing the Roman elite as they went.
The replacement theory is long abandoned, to be honest. Everything leads to a gathering of elites since the Vth century, under royal lead (antrustons in Francia, for exemple). I could name, among many many other exemples, Vincentius in Spain, Syagrii or Desiderii-Salvii families in southern Gaul, Abrograst, etc. as exemples that Roman elites remained largely in place and eventually merged up with romanized Barbarians.
 
ETA: I mean, he did talk about monasteries removing manpower from the pool of potential draftees, and the internal squabbles over Arianism and other heresies. But he didn't sound like he thought that Christianity was The Cause.
Not that he said it was the only cause, but you got to admit that he takes a good time to explain Christianism provoked inner division, diversion from both ressources and "human energy", loss of real concern for Roman State even if he does states, IIRC, that you had still an attachement for Romania.

And, again IIRC, that the Christianisation of Barbarians prevented a full counter-attack from Christianised Romans, based on religious solidarities.
 
Just some things I heard

They ran out of $$$

The barbarians arrived with a heavy cavalry that the Roman legion couldn't answer

The loyalty of those living inside the Western Roman Empire shifted away from Rome

Italians weren't allowed in the army anymore (was this true?)

The national income from taxation equalled the cost of servicing the national debt as of 383, causing the Imperial Army to no longer be paid (really?)
 
Not that he said it was the only cause, but you got to admit that he takes a good time to explain Christianism provoked inner division, diversion from both ressources and "human energy", loss of real concern for Roman State even if he does states, IIRC, that you had still an attachement for Romania.

And, again IIRC, that the Christianisation of Barbarians prevented a full counter-attack from Christianised Romans, based on religious solidarities.

He seemed to me to really be attributing it more to a general loss of Manly Virtue among the Roman populace, caused not by Christianity, but by living as the slaves of tyrants, subject to the capricious whims of the despot, etc. etc. That's what I took out of it, anyway. <shrug>
 

Alcsentre Calanice

Gone Fishin'
The reasons are to be found in domestic policies: if outer threads would be the dermining factors of collapse, Rome would have crippled much before - the Cimbri and Teutones of 100 BC were quite strong, but the republic, armed with inner strength and stability managed to crush the two Germanic tribes.

The fact is: Rome's big victories were achieved under the republic, with an army of citizens under a more or less oligarchic government. The victories of the Principate were either minor conquests (Britannia, Dacia) or wars defending the status quo (against Parthia, against Germania). The little Roman Republic managed to beat the strongest empires of its time: Carthage, Macedonia, the Seleucids, to conquer Gaul and to conquer Asia Minor. The strong Byzantine Empire collapsed in front of some Arabian tribes.

From a quite deterministic point of view, you could say that the fall of the Western Roman and Byzantine Empires was a consequence of the downfall of the republic.
 
Last edited:
Simple----overspending and lavishly generous welfare created crazy debts that, when unpaid, resulted in a massive crash that saw Rome's population go from 2million to under 20 thousand almost overnight.

Even shorter version: tax-and-spend always fails in the end. ;^)

That's the one thing that didn't cause the collapse. And I hope you understand when you are saying Rome you do mean the city not the Empire; and the collapse in population was hardly overnight. Roughly 800,000 person drop (not 2 million) in about 400 years is 1,000 person drop a year, NYC has gone through bigger single year drops. Drastic but hardly qualifying the use of hyperbole "overnight". http://davidgalbraith.org/blg/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/romepopulation.png
 
The barbarians arrived with a heavy cavalry that the Roman legion couldn't answer
They did : trough formation of an heavy cavalry (Cataphractarii, Clibinarii, Sagitarii) or use of Barbarian forces (Alans, for exemples).
Assuming of course, that Barbarians had a large calavry force, which wasn't the case.

If something, it was the light cavalry of the Late Antiquity that was a really important problems : Sarmatic heavy cavalry was well managed enough for that it was never a political survival threat.

The loyalty of those living inside the Western Roman Empire shifted away from Rome
For the population? It should be proven first that the bulk of countryside had a real affection from Rome and felt themselves as Romans as elites.

As for elites, that's a big no. Any contemporary text can point that.

Italians weren't allowed in the army anymore (was this true?)
Err...No? First, you didn't have a legal distinction between Romans from Italy and Romans from...say Illyria.

The effective disbandement of legionary/auxiliary distinction was mostly made on paper : eventually it remained as a difference between elite and prestigious units, and the others.

What happened was that recruitement was at least partially build on conscription, included Provincial and Barbarians elements (as it always did, but this time in very large numbers and without distinguish them wholly) meaning the purely Italian part of the army went more and more small, but still on the prestigious units.

I'm not even sure from where this come from, to be honest.

The national income from taxation equalled the cost of servicing the national debt as of 383, causing the Imperial Army to no longer be paid (really?)
No, not really. You had problems on the paiement of armies, but the total ceasement of paiement wasn't really something that lasted one century : it happened from time to time, making the fiscal pressure going more importantly, but not went into a total ceasement of paiement.

I suppose that by 383 you mean the troubles in Britain?
That scarce and irregular paiment may have been a problem, there were more important political problems at hand, such as the failure of Tetrarchy.

From a quite deterministic point of view, you could say that the fall of the Western Roman and Byzantine Empires was a consequence of the downfall of the republic.
I'm really skeptic : late Republic never had to deal with nearly the same ammounts of troubles Late Empire had (with, among other factors, your population shriking by 2/3), not that the idealized picture of a "citizen army" is really true : Rome already used, massively, auxiliaries (a large, very large, part of Cesarian army was made of Celtic and Germanic warrior) and even mercenaries.

In a deterministic way we could say it all comes down to the initial conditions of the universe, but I'm not sure it explains the immediate reasons why it fell. (Explaining 1453 by what happened in the Ist Century BC would be like explaining Hitler rose in power because of the Vandalic conquest of Africa, chronologically-wise)
 

Spengler

Banned
Simple----overspending and lavishly generous welfare created crazy debts that, when unpaid, resulted in a massive crash that saw Rome's population go from 2million to under 20 thousand almost overnight.

Even shorter version: tax-and-spend always fails in the end. ;^)
Yeah uhuh considering that that welfare system went back the first century I think our explanation shows a rather poor grasp of history, more like internal rot had to do with it. I will not expand because others have made it clear what actually happened.

Also to anyone saying it was Barabarian heavy cavalry, no it wasn't heavy cavalry will fail when confronted by disciplined heavy infantry, which the legionaries were.
 
For Christanity I see it more as the excuse used by usurpers/rivals for internal conflicts. "He is a heretic! I am of the true path and should be crowned Emperor. Never mind how idelogicly close our sects are. You don't follow my sect? Well that gives me an excuse to jail the Pope and control the Papacy". Christanity was the reasoning for things like religious riots, personal incidents of "Kill the Heretic" on a local level and the sort but in the end it just appropriated the Roman religious hierarchy and was used for propaganda purposes.

People often mistake the Fall of Rome as being one thing, or for that matter any historical event. It is never one thing, it is a whole horde of contributing factors (though many of the contributing factors were actual hordes).
 
The reasons are to be found in domestic policies: if outer threads would be the dermining factors of collapse, Rome would have crippled much before - the Cimbri and Teutones of 100 BC were quite strong, but the republic, armed with inner strength and stability managed to crush the two Germanic tribes.

The fact is: Rome's big victories were achieved under the republic, with an army of citizens under a more or less oligarchic government. The victories of the Principate were either minor conquests (Britannia, Dacia) or wars defending the status quo (against Parthia, against Germania). The little Roman Republic managed to beat the strongest empires of its time: Carthage, Macedonia, the Seleucids, to conquer Gaul and to conquer Asia Minor. The strong Byzantine Empire collapsed in front of some Arabian tribes.

From a quite deterministic point of view, you could say that the fall of the Western Roman and Byzantine Empires was a consequence of the downfall of the republic.

The roman empire would have fallen far more quickly if the oligarchic republic had not been overthrown by the monarchical regime of the Principate.

It was self-destroying in political competition between oligarchs. And It was sucking the provinces' blood to death.

Rome and Italy needed to be controlled for the sake of the empire. This was the role of the imperial regime.
That's precisely what Pompey was doing without saying it and that's why so many roman nobles hated him : he was the patron of while provinces and was able to have kings obey his will what ever the Senate and consuls wanted.
That's what Caesar understood too and did copycat on Pompey's strategy. And he later proclaimed what he intended to do by making his program public : "tranquillity for Italy (i.e. no more mess in Italy, and especially no more mess in Rome that was not even mentioned since It was the source of the problem that needed to be solved), peace for the provinces (i.e. guarantee that the sheep will be mowed but no longer flayed) and security for the empire."

The years when the roman empire conquered the largest areas of new provinces or client kingdoms were those of the reign of Augustus. The imperial regime brought more efficiency and rationalization.

Concerning the downfall of the WRE, as others previously mentioned, there were many reason sur that cumulated : structural and accidental. None was decisive but the mix of all was the fatal storm.

Among the most important, I would mention :

- excessive outsourcing of the army to germanic foederati. One should never outsourcing the core of its defence. The ERE, on the contrary, saw the danger and led a "de-germanization" of its army,

- the split between west and east RE, without cooperation and support between these 2 parts, in the early 5th century. The east was structurally rocher because It was in the core of world trade roads, while the west was peripheral/ex-centered,

- the extreme difficulty for the WRE to defend its over-stretched frontiers against many small and mobile threats. Just look at the map. This point combined to the previous one already was very complex to handle : you need either more resources or you need a deep structural change to face these new threats efficiently. And this leads to the fourth and last reason that seems important to me.

- since it no longer had the vast resources of the east, the WRE was more or less forced to opt for a much more decentralized organization. The western emperor had become obsolete and unfit to the new situation. This was a very long-run trend that basically lasted for 6 centuries. The WRE split into smaller kingdoms and then these kingdoms split into smaller principalities. This was the age of feudality.

Consider this point retrospectively : when did western Europe emerge from its dark ages and started to build the fondations that would lead to its Renaissance and then world domination ?
When, after centuries-long restructuration through which It became self-sufficiant and more efficiency, it was able, through better military power projection capacitives, to plug itself back solidly on the East's trade roads, in the late 11th century (Venice and other italian perchant republics led the way.

And when the egyptian mameluks became too greedy and the Ottomans made trade too complicated and too costly, the europeans had the genious to create new trade routes enabling to by-pass those too costly or too unfriendly middlemen. And by doing so, they discovered America and completely changed the geography and balance of world economy for several centuries.
 
Last edited:
Top