Anzio more successful ?

Given that these next few mths mark the 60th anniversary of the Anzio campaign, what are ppl's views concerning the US 5th Army's landing on the Anzio-Nettuno beach-head in Jan 1944 ? Should Gen Lucas, in charge of VI Corps, have been more speedy in deploying his forces inland after the initial unopposed landing, instead of waiting a wk to dig in, consolidate the positions, unload supplies, and be hit in force by the HERMAN GOERING and other Panzer Divs ? With a more aggressive Allied approach after the initial landings, could Rome have been taken earlier than 5th June and the Italian campaign shortened ? What about the 1st, 3rd and 4th Ranger bns who OTL were wiped out by German ambushes with fullscale armour and arty at Cisterna and Civitavecchia (only 6 men out of 767 escaped back to Allied lines)- could they not have been destroyed with speedier Allied tactical deployment from the beach-head ?
 
Truscott said that aproach taken was correct. While Allies could advance inland they would be cut off as Germans were quick to react to landings. He also points out that he had small forces to cover beachhead and Germans were already there. Had Lucas moved inland as some say he should landings would end in disaster with forces inland cut off and beachead severly weakened as result.

Seeing how he replaced Lucas as beachhead commander later (but was in subordinate enough position during landings) he would be quick to point out how Lucas "screwed up". Since he defends him I'd say he has no axe to grind. IMO Anzio was badlly planned with too much outside interference (need to move landing crafts to UK), too tied with Cassino....
 
The basic mistake was that of having Rome as target for the advance.
Thae landing could instead, more cautiously, be conceived like this: the troops land near Anzio, then the bulk of this force immediately heads south-east to cut German communications between Rome and the Cassino front.
Target of the move: crushing the Cassino lock FROM BEHIND and resuming the advance with the main force at south.
 
I remember reading that Anzio was the last Allied tactical amphibious assault. All following attacks were meant to put troops on a land mass or open a major front (D-Day, Iwo, Southern France etc) rather than as a way to get around stiff resistance, outflank an attack, etc. Pehaps a successful Anzio would have broadened Allied use of attack by sea. How about an amphibious Market Garden or another assault in Normandy in support of the Operation Cobra breakout. Dont know if these in particular are really practical. Just giving examples.
 

Nonny

Banned
Anzio incursion nipped off

If the Anzio beachead had been totally obliterated, as it came close to being, would this have delayed D Day? Could it have had a devastating effect on morale? Or increased the desire for revenge against the Huns?
 
Nonny said:
If the Anzio beachead had been totally obliterated, as it came close to being, would this have delayed D Day? Could it have had a devastating effect on morale? Or increased the desire for revenge against the Huns?

d-day would go as planned. It would be bad for morale, but nothing drastic. OTOH this would eman total dicreditation of Churchill's Med strategy. Not his removal but US would take Brit sugestions far less seriouslly. Front in Italy would likelly stall. Cassino deadlock likelly broken and Rome taken but probablly that's about it. More Yugoslav influence in N Italy with Trst probablly Yugoslav as well.
 
Would quicker and greater success in Italy have allowed the invasion of SOUTHERN France to start earlier than in OTL. Would that in turn mean that D-Day worked quicker?
 
Anzio was a bit better planned and an aggressive and LUCKY comander takes Rome. Nazi forces to the South are cut off.

Could this have happend?

If so Is there not an allied threat to Austria from the South?

Would this situation have changed the balance between the Western Powers and the Sovient Union at Yalta?
 
I don't know what commander is going to turn Anzio around. No less than Patton was distraught when he heard that his old friend would be commanding at Anzio. He actually discussed whether there was any way for Lucas to avoid death, disgrace, or a POW camp.

The only thing he could think of would be if Lucas had suffered a debilitating injury in the opening hours of the operation.
 
The strategic point of SHINGLE is to relieve the pressure on the Cassino front. In order for it to be an effective ploy, it needs to get quickly inland before the Germans stabilise their positions. Fifth Army tried covering mutually exclusive aims (getting a strong beachhead vs punching inland) which had the result of the more conservative, militarily sensible option of building the beachhead became the focus.

Fifth Army believed its own press about the shakiness of the ANVIL landings and with a moderate approach being pushed from the top, SHINGLE can't avoid stalemating where the initiative gained through amphibious movement is stifled by the German defensive system. For SHINGLE to be more successful, Fifth Army must be bolder and more forceful in its orders and planning; they had the troops willing and able to do it, its just they lost their nerve somewhat. Call it innate military conservatism, but this principle, applied throughout the command structure doomed OTL SHINGLE.

Croesus
 
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