Forward To Richmond

Forward To Richmond
A TIMELINE

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From “Revisiting Lincoln: A Flawed Giant” by Sherman Hart (2010)

Why do we erase President Lincoln from our national consciousness? While not the most polished of presidents, he was still able to successfully prosecute the '61 Rebellion and lead a fractious coalition of Radical Republicans, Moderates, and War Democrats. Despite this, he is mocked as an uneducated yokel, a man who divided the nation before he reconciled it, and as a politician who was unable to achieve his most fundamental goals. In part, this mediocre portrayal is due to opinions of him in his own time, when he was mocked for his appearance and denigrated by Democrats and his more elitist rivals in the Republican party. But Lincoln is not simply dismissed as bad, but forgotten altogether in the popular mind, part of the string of nonentities between Van Buren and Mann, despite facing far greater challenges than any of the other one term presidents.
We excise Lincoln from our history because the ‘61 Rebellion is, itself, a blot on our national consciousness. Who wants to remember a brief war that accomplished nothing; a war that the Republicans won but at the cost of losing their principles; a war that would lay the foundations for a later civil war? For all of Lincoln’s skill at the time, in failing to end slavery he planted the seeds for a later national disaster. If we forget him, we still cannot forget the consequences of his actions.

Chapter 1: The Butler Did It

"I am now convinced that the crimes of this guilty land shall never be purged but with blood"
-John Brown

From “Autobiography and Personal Reminiscences of Brigadier General Benj. F. Butler” by Ben Butler (1892)

On the 16th of May, my commission as major-general was signed, and I was permitted to come to Washington to receive it and qualify under it. But before I got it I felt my duty to call under General Scott.
He received me curtly enough, and as I stood at “attention” after I made my salute, without asking me to be seated, he broke upon me with words of angry vituperation and accusation of all sorts of wrong-doing about going into Baltimore, and of the great risk I had run. He said that I had thwarted his intention of taking it without shedding a drop of blood, and that I could be entrusted with nothing in the army again.
I waited, standing before him, - I hope not like a whipped cur, - until my patience, of which I have not too large a stock, was exhausted. I felt perfectly independent, because I had at that time come to the conclusion myself, and what was more, with the advice of my wife, to quit the army and quietly go home and attend to my profession and my family. I turned upon the old general and “gave him as good as he sent,” in language not violent but distinct[1], and swore my absolute refusal to command at Fortress Monroe.

From “Revisiting Lincoln: A Flawed Giant” by Sherman Hart (2010)

In the aftermath of Gen. Butler’s resignation, Lincoln needed to find other ways to pacify Democrats, and quickly. The administration intensified it’s courting of Rep. John A. Logan, an Illinois Democrat who had tremendous influence in the “Egypt” region of his home state. Logan had so far been silent about the issue of military action, and Lincoln and the administration wanted to co opt him rather than have him take an unfriendly stance. With some political pressure, and more importantly, the dangling of the Major-General position before him, Logan made his pro-Union views public[2], after a short correspondence with President Lincoln. As a consequence, Logan became the third most senior Major-General of Volunteers, after Nathaniel Banks and John A. Dix. The new Major-General was put in command of the Department of the West, replacing General Harney, who had begun to anger War Democrats and Republicans in Missouri with his attempts to negotiate with Confederate forces.

May 24th, 1861. Fortress Monroe, Virginia

General Wool[3] sat at his desk, pondering. Three slaves had just come to Ft. Monroe, hoping for refuge of some kind. He had sent them packing of course - one had to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act, if you still considered Virginia part of the U.S. - but the slaves had given him military information. Gen. Magruder had started fortifications around Big Bethel and Little Bethel, seeking to strengthen his impotent force. Wool wasn’t about to give him the time to do that. The peninsula was a dagger; one that pointed straight at Richmond. Wool didn’t intend to let the opportunity before him slip away.

May 30th 1861. Washington D.C.

Colonel Elmer Ellsworth sat slouched in the White House chair, toying idly with a bullet hole in his uniform. Lincoln smiled. “You’ve got yourself a scar of war there, young man.”

“Not much of war right now. I reckon there wasn’t more than a handful of Terrett’s [4] men still in Alexandria when we got to it. We hastened them out pretty quickly. All the halloing in the papers, you’d think we’d captured Jeff Davis himself.”

“Well, ‘Sumter Avenged’ and all that. Bloodless battles like this tend to make men think wars are easy. I’m not well versed in military matters, but at least I know it’s better to be winning than losing. For now.”

“Oh come off it, sir. You can’t honestly think it’ll take more than one good battle to whip ‘em, do you?”

“I’ll wait until we have Richmond before I declare victory, rather than be over proud. But I do hope that we now have Gen. Bonham[5] in a vise. ”

From “ The Steedman Administration: A History” by Richard Seill (1895)

As part of the overall plan, Col. Steedman’s regiment was directed to go east along the railroad, to meet up with Col. Kelley at Grafton, as a precursor to a larger Union movement. The seizure of Grafton was now compounded by the possession of more of the Baltimore & Ohio, and by McClellan’s actions he now had a well-organized force of around 3000 in Grafton, which was placed under the command of Gen. Thomas Morris. Organized against them was only 800 poorly trained and supplied recruits, all that Porterfield had to defend western Virginia. Gen. Lee’s inability to allocate forces, apparent throughout the '61 Rebellion, hamstrung Porterfield’s command.
In the face of such obvious weakness, Morris and Kelley decided on a plan of attack. Porterfield’s forces were located 17 miles to the south in Philippi, a small pro-secessionist town. Despite the inexperienced nature of their men, the plan was impressively complex- Morris would split up his forces and try a double envelopment of the Confederates in the town. Both Union columns arrived before sunrise on June 3rd, after a night of marching. All that remained to be seen was whether the soldiers could carry out the maneuver.

June 3rd 1861, Philippi, Virginia

This seemed too easy. Private Ambrose Bierce shrugged. Oh well. If the Confederates had made a boneheaded mistake, more power to them. All he knew was, his unit had marched to the edge of the town and seen tents just standing there. The rebels somehow hadn’t even put up pickets, or a guard, or, well, anything. And then there was a pistol shot[6] and the Union soldiers charged. Startled Confederates bounded out of the tents, running every which way in the rain. It was pandemonium, both sides devoid of training, or really any military instinct. And then the Confederates got away, some part of the double envelopment having miscarried. Faster than Bierce would have thought possible, the small Confederate command scurried through the underbrush, losing their pursuers in the tangled landscape. After chasing them briefly, Bierce stopped, panting from the exertion. He turned to a soldier standing next to him. “We’ve just won the war, haven’t we?”

From “Common Misconceptions of the '61 Rebellion[7]” by Thomas Gorman (1943)

Question. Was the '61 Rebellion actually a war, as some revisionist histories today now claim?

Answer. No, and for a variety of reasons. Most importantly; it is important to remember than a majority of southerners, (and a large minority of “Confederates”) opposed secession. Most southerners were actually hijacked by a small minority of Fire Eaters who seized the state conventions. There was at no point a Confederate nation which truly derived popular support. The quick collapse of the national government and armies helps illustrate this. Slavery, and slave owners themselves, do not deserve the blame inaccurately ascribed to them for the '61 Rebellion.

From “The ‘61 Rebellion in Virginia” by J.J. Buckner (1975)

After the Union commanders had so admirably acquitted themselves at Philippi, Confederates realized something had to change in northwestern Virginia. General Beauregard, commanding the defenses at Norfolk[8] seemed just the man. It was going to be one Napoleonic general versus another, a contest of wills between two of the most flamboyant, argumentative, generals of the war. It was also to be one of the only theaters of the war to have a Confederate victory. Perhaps if Beauregard had remained at the Peninsula, or been sent to command at Manassas, he might have demonstrated his skill there. As it was, he was to be wasted in skirmishes in the foothills of western Virginia, while General Bonham and his undisciplined army were charged with the defense of Richmond, a task which they were unprepared for.

[1] Up to now is all from Ben Butler’s OTL biography, astonishingly. The only change is that he goes slightly farther in his diatribe against Winfield Scott, promising to never take the Ft. Monroe position. In OTL it took Cameron, Chase, and Lincoln all working in concert to change his mind, in the ATL, with refusing the position being a matter of “honor” they are unable to persuade him.

[2]Logan waited a little longer in OTL, but he had already been changing his position. He’s an excellent candidate for getting the commission because he fills precisely the role that Lincoln wanted to fill in OTL with Butler- a reluctant War Democrat won over to the administration. As to why he takes the Department of the West, it’s where Lincoln was having trouble at this point, and there aren’t any other major commands that an Illinois general would logically go to, with the Department of Ohio being under McClellan’s command.

[3] Butler isn’t commanding here, obviously, so John E. Wool is moved down from the Department of the East to replace Butler like he did in August in OTL.

[4]George H. Terrett commanded the small amount of Confederate forces in Alexandria, Virginia. In OTL, Reigart Bolivar Lowry (a sailor) came on land to demand Terrett’s surrender, and Terrett withdrew without a fight, despite the Gen. Sandford on land having nothing to do with this. In the ATL, Lowry is butterflied out of doing this, and the soldiers on both sides take a few potshots at each other, becoming the “first battle of the war”. In OTL, the landing is only notable for Elmer Ellsworth being the first famous soldier to be killed in the war; he was a close friend of the Lincoln family, and was viewed as a martyr in the north.

[5] Beaureagard wasn’t in command of Virginia forces at this point, in OTL he was appointed a few days later. It’s actually Milledge Luke Bonham (who only commanded for a short time period OTL).

[6]The whole lack of pickets is OTL. Like in OTL, the intended signal to attack was a pistol shot.

[7]Not my real viewpoint, but this is given to present an essentially “mainstream” interpretation of the '61 Rebellion in TTL.

[8]IN OTL, Beauregard was originally intended to command at Norfolk (with his knowledge of coastal defense) and by chance Davis decided to reassign him to the more active Manassas front, believing that he was more of a fighting general. ITTL, Beauregard doesn’t get the first lucky appointment but Davis thinks of him later for W. Virginia, rather than sending Garnett.


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Essentially, this is an attempt to invert the common cliche of a southern victory in the civil war by examining a TL where the south does much worse. I know there's been a spate of civil war TLs recently, but does anyone have any specific questions about the different direction the war's going?
 
i have much love for Civil War TLs with different twists - TKIs Glorious Union where the war goes better and faster for the Union but is much nastier; and TSmiths Burnished Rows of Steel with Britain in the mix.

I am a big Logan fan so I am doubly looking forward to this. He is the best of the political generals.
 
Well, it may linger a bit into 1862. '61 simply refers to the year that it began, and is a more convenient shorthand.

Hmm it'll have to go somewhat into '62, I don't think the Confederacy is going to easily beaten in 8 months. Interesting to see how you'll shorten it.
 
Interesting.

'The law of unintended consequences' seems to operate here, preserving the institution of Slavery and the probable survival of the interregional tensions to the point feared a new civil conflict in North America.:confused:

I think the worst and a sample of how shall be the future nation in this TL, is that there is just a general bad opinion of Lincoln ..if not the worst part is that except for historians, all other people ignore to him and his presidency.:(

It's suggestive that may be attempted in a formal work a defense of the class of owners of plantations , (still existing?), against the popular perception of being the instigators or at least his complicity in the beginning of the rebellion.:eek:
 
'The law of unintended consequences' seems to operate here, preserving the institution of Slavery and the probable survival of the interregional tensions to the point feared a new civil conflict in North America.:confused:

Actually that's an interesting point. The shorter the war the less outraged the public becomes over the whole issue of slavery, and the less likely it is for an Emancipation Proclamation to be issued. Though I suppose on the bright side slavery is now 'contained' in the South, while some of the more vocal secessionists probably have their property 'confiscated' its not going to be a war for the breaking of chains, which might lead to slavery dying a 'natural death' due to economics.

Still, that's an unsettling possibility I hadn't thought about!
 
I don't think I called it West Virginia ITL, only in locating Philippi, but i suppose for verisimilitude I'll change that. Thanks.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Say "western Virginia" which was what was used at the time

I don't think I called it West Virginia ITL, only in locating Philippi, but i suppose for verisimilitude I'll change that. Thanks.


Say "western Virginia" which was what was used at the time; as in the Department of Western Virginia.

Interesting departure point. I will come back to this one, but off to work.

Best,
 
CHAPTER 2: Bunker Hill to Yorktown

I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event, the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with, property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country.”
-President Abraham Lincoln

From “The ‘61 Rebellion in Virginia” by J.J. Buckner (1975)

General Beauregard arrived in Beverly only to find a tiny force, disorganized, demoralized, and almost incapable of defending the region. The general went into a frenzy, getting supplies, whipping discipline into his men, and pleading with President Davis for more forces. Beauregard realized that his top priority was to retain control of the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike, which was vital in terms of possession of the overall region. He decided on an offensive, hopefully to recapture Grafton, potentially to take Wheeling[1]. Beauregard ultimately got Davis to move some forces from the Shenandoah over to his command, over the wishes of Gen. Joseph Johnston, commanding in the Shenandoah. The allocation of forces was perhaps not ideal. Certainly the soldiers could have been used to more effect in the upcoming Bull Run campaign.

From “Battle of Bull Run: The Pivotal Moment” by Owen McClellan (1950)

With his force weakened in size, and poorly supplied, General Johnston decided he had no choice but to retreat from Harper’s Ferry rather than be bottled up, which he did on June 10. He hadn’t gotten any orders allowing him to depart[2], as a result, his leaving resulted in a serious fracas with President Davis and General Lee back in Richmond. Johnston’s heated exchange of letters with Davis only exacerbated his troubles with higher command.
He also had troubles back on the front; General Patterson crossed the Potomac on June 15th, pursuing Johnston. Although Patterson’s army was largely composed of three month volunteers, he also had some regulars and cavalry[3], and posed a serious threat to Confederate control of the Shenandoah. Johnston, decided to interpose his army before Patterson at Bunker Hill, Virginia. Patterson and Johnston’s forces met there on June 17th, ironically exactly 85 years after the original Battle of Bunker Hill. Casualties were only in the double digits on both sides[4], as Johnston had an orderly retreat while Patterson chose not to pursue vigorously. Little more than a skirmish, as with the Battle of Alexandria there were extreme opinions on both sides, with northerners calling it another in a series of triumphs while some optimistic southerners thought the resemblance to the original Battle of Bunker Hill was fortuitous. The battle meant little aside from the publicity; Johnston’s army only retreated a short distance while Scott, pleased with the victory, allowed Patterson to move his forces to Leesburg, Virginia, to cover McDowell in case of a possible advance[5].
This unnerved both Johnston and Bonham, who were worried that Patterson and McDowell could unite against either of them. They would have been considerably less afraid had they known of the state of affairs in Washington. The administration was still crowing over the victories at Alexandria and Bunker Hill, and with Winfield Scott’s reluctance to use military force, no plans for an offensive would be created until the end of the month. Rather than Manassas, Confederates should have looked, at least at the moment, to the Peninsula. That was where Gen. John E. Wool, one of the oldest but most active northern generals, had launched an offensive.

June 20th 1861, Richmond, Virginia
Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee looked a good deal more frazzled than they had a few weeks ago. But then, a few weeks ago they hadn’t had the Battle of Warwick Court House to think about. Lee cleared his throat.

“President Davis, I think we may need to move soldiers to reinforce Magruder. Not just from the forces in Norfolk, but from Bonham’s army.”

Davis shook his head. “Why can’t Magruder hold the line on the peninsula with what he has? General Wool isn’t all powerful you know. The larger threat is from Alexandria after all.”

“Wool may not be all powerful… But he did get around Magruder’s outpost at Big Bethel, and then cut the road with Yorktown and-”

“And then he beat Magruder’s men at Warwick Court House and seized Yorktown, I know. I have the Richmond Examiner practically shouting as much already. As if, just because they captured Yorktown, we’re suddenly as doomed as Cornwallis.”

“I don’t think it’s quite that bad. But our plan for defending the capitol did hinge on a defensive line at Yorktown, and past that the Peninsula starts to widen. I think we’ll need more men if we want to prevent Wool from breaking through around Williamsburg. And if we take soldiers out of Norfolk, the Federal navy could carry Wool’s forces across the James to take that. We don’t want those people with any more of our ports than they have already.”

“Very well. What you say is true. We don’t want McDowell defeating us in the north though.”

“We don’t have enough men to do everything we want, Mr. President.” Lee said, pained by the admission.

“I know. I shall reinforce Magruder. We just have to hope that in case of battle Gen. Johnston and Gen. Bonham can come to each other’s aid when the north attacks. As the north inevitably will.”

June 20th 1861, Jefferson City, Missouri

Major-General John A. Logan, commanding an area larger than continental Europe, smiled at the man sitting across from him. A strange man indeed; red haired, thin, dressed somewhat poorly, and busy slathering mustard on a sandwich. Gen. Lyon looked up from his meal.

“Am I to suppose by your expression that you are pleased with the progress we have made against the secessionists, General Logan?”

“You are indeed, General Lyon. Quite a month.”

Lyon chuckled. “Been little more than a month since Claib Jackson’s train derailed[6], sir. I’d say that’s what started our little string of luck.”

“With him out of the way… We certainly haven’t had as much opposition as we would otherwise. And here we are. And Curtis in St. Joseph as well.”

“It’s a good thing that those Democrats love you, isn’t it, General Logan.”

“And it’s a good thing that they hate you, isn’t it General Lyon. We can work better that way.” Both men grinned in a way that boded ill for any secessionists in Missouri. Logan spread out a map.

“And as for your proposed move on Springfield, let it just be said that I trust in your abilities, General Lyon.”

“And I in yours, sir. ” Lyon put his sandwich down and picked up the map. “Now let’s see how long it is before we’re in Arkansas.”

June 29th 1861, Washington D.C.

General Irvin McDowell paced the room a little uneasily; he and his plan, after all, were the reason that this meeting had been called. He was trying to explain it all to President Lincoln, who had an amateur understanding of warfare at best.

“Well Mr. President, essentially I want to swing around and fall on General Bonham’s left flank, assuming that he hasn’t, uh, met me in battle by then. As long as General Patterson stays to hold Johnston in the Shenandoah, we should be able to beat Bonham.”

“So if I understand you general, we should be able to defeat the main Confederate army in this battle, and then - on to Richmond?”

“I don’t know if it will be as simple as that. The Army of Northeastern Virginia outnumbers Bonham’s forces by a considerable amount now, but I still don’t think our troops can crush their army. Everybody’s awfully new to this, after all.” McDowell chuckled wryly.

“Of course. Do you think a further demonstration by Gen. Wool on the peninsula would be of assistance?”

McDowell paused. “I guess so. Although it isn’t really my area, Mr. President-”

“Nonsense! You generals quarrel more over your territory than mother hens. We all need to work together if we are to beat the rebels, after all. What good is an army if you don’t use it?”

“Very true, Mr. President. I shall be sure to, uh, cooperate.”

“You, and General Wool, and even Patterson and McClellan out in the mountains, ought all to pull the load together I think. Let’s go over that plan again shall we?”

“Of course, Mr. President.”

From “Revisiting Lincoln: A Flawed Giant” by Sherman Hart (2010)

Lincoln in the middle of 1861 was a man in motion, constantly trying to learn more about all things military, his passion for learning extended to the pursuit of war. To view the war from his, concerned, perspective, it is most necessary to forget all of the assumptions modern historians propagate about the “inevitability” of the victory. Rather than focus on the immense lead in population, industry, and generalship that the north clearly had, one must try to remember that at the time, much seemed in doubt. While many northerners, such as Horace Greeley, confidently predicted the fast victory of northern arms in a few months, some southerners were equally optimistic. It seemed almost impossible that the United States could successfully reconquer an area the size of European Russia with untrained fledgling armies. Rather than dismiss Lincoln as “doing what any goddamn abolitionist could have done” in Reynolds[7]’ lasting judgement, he is someone who faced challenges not only of waging the war, but of maintaining public confidence. How did he do that? Quite simply, by abandoning the issue of slavery.

From “Tour Guide to Washington D.C. 3rd Edition” by Sheila Benjamin (2005)

Abraham Lincoln Memorial:

The Abraham Lincoln Memorial is only to be recommended for those history buffs seeking to visit all the monuments in D.C. Otherwise it’s a fairly unprepossessing sight; one statue sitting on a block of stone, Lincoln’s ugly face rather off-putting. Only commissioned in the 1920s, there was originally quite a controversy over what inscription to put on the statue. Although the more nasty wanted to quote particularly distasteful sections of his Farewell Address, majority opinion overruled that as being disrespectful to a man who, despite his flaws, had still been president. In the end, “No oppressed people will fight, and endure, as our fathers did, without the promise of something better than a mere change of masters.[8]” was chosen from his speech at Richmond. The quote, obviously, is more relevant in the foreign policy of the 1920s than in relation to Lincoln personally.

[1] Does an offensive in the region, especially to take Wheeling, make geographical or logistical sense? No. But is it the kind of thing Beauregard would want to do? Yes.

[2]Johnston left before getting orders OTL; they caught up with him as he retreated, which was his justification.

[3]IOTL, Scott was spooked for unknown reasons right after Patterson advanced, and ordered his strongest forces over to McDowell, because of an illusory threat from Beauregard. As a result, Patterson retreated and didn’t recross the Potomac until weeks later. ITTL, Patterson leaves earlier, with a more substantial force.

[4]This is analogous to the OTL Battle of Falling Waters, where again both forces were completely unused to fighting.

[5]This is an OTL plan by Patterson, and a more pleased Scott allows it.

[6]IOTL, once Lyon’s talks with Price broke up on the 21st (not butterflied ITTL), Gov. Jackson and Sterling Price rushed to the state capitol by rail as fast as they could in order to issue a call to arms. With the frequent derailments of 1800s trains, in TTL the train derails and both Jackson and Price are injured (Jackson seriously) and delayed in returning to the state capitol. All of this disorganizes the pro-C.S.A. faction in the state to a considerable extent. This can be thought of as a major butterfly, or an additional POD if people want.

[7]Reynolds is a famous 1950s historian ITTL, known for his slant towards the slave-owners in much of his analysis of American history. he is widely quoted, to some extent for the extremism of his views.

[8]This was from an original draft for Lincoln’s first inaugural; he frequently reused phrases he thought of in later speeches.
 
So it's sort of a cascade of butterflies? Hmm so just the Confederacy getting purely abysmal luck?

Interesting considering all the good luck they had with commanders OTL in the early stages compared to the Union.
 
Essentially, this is an attempt to invert the common cliche of a southern victory in the civil war by examining a TL where the south does much worse. I know there's been a spate of civil war TLs recently, but does anyone have any specific questions about the different direction the war's going?

So the South does worse (so much so that Lincoln is a one-term President and a borderline historical footnote), but that early defeat only sows the seeds of a more cataclysmic (second?) Civil War later on?
 
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