Could Lee save Vicksburg from Grant?

After the Chancellorsville Campaign (April 30th- May 10th, 1863), President Jefferson Davis reluctantly gave into Lee invading Maryland which in turn lead to Gettysburg and a turning point for the American Civil War. However, what if Lee didn't invade Maryland? President Davis did try and convince Lee to help with reliving Vicksburg from General Grant. So, the Alternative History is that Lee sent his army from Virginia to Vicksburg, Mississippi in the hopes of beating Grant's army. However, there are a few concerns I have with this plan that a few historians (I forget their names) have supported. First off, Lee's army was listed around 75,000 men at the time of the Gettysburg Campaign (June 3rd - July 24th, 1863), and Hooker's army was listed at 90,000. I find it really hard to believe that Lee would shift his whole army from Virginia to Mississippi while the Union still has a large force in Maryland. Besides Lee's army, I have no idea what other Confederate forces were on the Eastern front to could help in the defense of Virginia if Hooker were to invade. I doubt that Abe Lincoln would pass would an opportunity to attack while Lee's army wasn't around. So I'm forced to conclude that Lee would have to split his army. One half would defend against a possible attack into Virginia, and another half would be sent to attack Grant's army. Grant's army during the siege of Vicksburg (May 18 – July 4, 1863) is listed at around 77,000 and Pemberton is listed around 30,000 men. Maybe combined attack of Pemberton and Lee might force Grant to retreat, and once Johnson's force joins with Pemberton, Lee can head on back to Virginia to help against any attack Hooker might launch or did launch. So far, so good, but then there is another problem. Richmond and Vicksburg are about 955 miles away from each other. Unless the army was traveling about 25 to 30 miles a day, it would be impossible to each Vicksburg before it surrendered. We can forget about transporting troops by ship because of the Union blockade, which means that the only means of reaching Vicksburg in time is the South's railroads. This link shows the railroads during the American Civil War. http://teacher.scholastic.com/activities/bhistory/underground_railroad/map.htm As you can see, only two railroads are possible: One that goes into Tennessee, northern Alabama, and then Mississippi its self. However, Corinth, Mississippi, a major railroad junction, was captured by the Union in 1862 and they are currently holding it. Which means that if they will have to stop in Northern Alabama or Southern Alabama and march the rest of the way. It would take roughly 15 to 16 days to reach Vicksburg from either location (The Train would take about 2-3 days to go from Richmond Virginia to Mississippi). In other words, by about June 5th, 1863, Robert E. Lee's army will be in Vicksburg, and he would have to stay around until early July as that is when Johnson's army was prepared to help Pemberton. If everything goes well, Lee might be back in Virginia around July 20th. In short, Lee's army goes from Virginia to Vicksburg after May 10th, and it returns around July 20th. During this time Virginia needs to hold out against any possible attack that Hooker might launch against the state while Lee is away. It is risky to leave Virginia is a weaken state, but Vicksburg was vital to the Confederacy. Although, I'm not sure who Lee would leave in command. Maybe Longstreet? I don't know. What are your thoughts on it?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Against Grant?

Why not just send Longstreet Corps, like Chickamauga, instead of having Lee head west? Or would it not be enough?

Against Grant?

Nope.

The great strategic problem for the rebels in the Civil War was they were outnumbered more than 3-1 (22 million in the loyal states, six million "whites" in the rebel states) and every step a US soldier took south opened up more territory for recruiting, both of loyal southern whites and, after 1862, men escaping from slavery.

Not to get deterministic about it, but sometimes, God really is on the side of the big battalions.

Lee was a gifted defensive commander at the army level, especially in Virginia; Longstreet was a solid corps commander, but neither were capable of mastering Grant et al, as was proven pretty clearly during the war.

Best,
 
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Against Grant?

Nope.

The great strategic problem for the rebels in the Civil War was they were outnumbered more than 3-1 (22 million in the loyal states, six million "whites" in the rebel states) and every step a US soldier took south opened up more territory for recruiting, both of loyal souther whites and, after 1862, men escaping from slavery.

Not to get deterministic about it, but sometimes, God really is on the side of the big battalions.

Lee was a gifted defensive commander at the army level, especially in Virginia; Longstreet was a solid corps commander, but neither were capable of mastering Grant et al, as was proven pretty clearly during the war.

Best,

Agree, Lee was never Grant's equal not talking superior. I also agree moving more than Longstreet's corp would doom Virginia.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yep; the US had the the people, the government, and the military,

Agree, Lee was never Grant's equal not talking superior. I also agree moving more than Longstreet's corp would doom Virginia.

Yep; the US had the the people, the government, and the military, to put it in Clausewitzian "holy trinity" terms; the rebels had the military, at times, but that was about it.

It is worth remembering that forces under Grant's command (largely the Army of the Tennessee, in various iterations) utterly defeated not one but three rebel armies, at Henry-Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga - that is a record that is essentially unequalled by any field army in the conflict, including the Army of Northern Virginia under Lee.

Grant was the great captain of the conflict, and, arguably, of the era (certainly the 1850s-60s), in terms of his record in the field against a first class peer opponent that did not collapse in a single campaign; the fact the US also came up with Sherman, Thomas, Meade, and Sheridan would suggest something of the resources inherent within the US military class...(setting aside Lee et al).

Best,
 
Yeah, I ask this question because I've heard from one or two historians that Lee should've helped with saving Vicksburg instead of invading Maryland. Of course, Historians like to act like they are military generals when they are not. :D
 
When Vicksburg is clearly in serious danger, that's because it's besieged. That's too late for the Confederates to do anything to save it. The soonest Davis could decide to send Lee (and Lee won't go unless Davis orders him) is May 25 or so (a week into the siege).

It will take several weeks for the Confederacy to move Lee and a significant number of troops from Virginia to Mississippi. The move cannot be concealed, and the Union will respond by attacking in Virginia and reinforcing Grant. Lee will not have an advantage in numbers.

And Lee was no magician. Grant has only to hold his ground at Vicksburg and on the Yazoo just north. He can dig in and dare Lee to come at him.
 

jahenders

Banned
I think they're just saying that superficially because the invasion didn't work out for Lee. If he had sent any sizeable forces to assist as forces approached Vicksburg, it would quite likely have led to a Southern loss in Virginia, perhaps pushed into Petersburg defenses sooner.

In any case, those forces would need to be sent BEFORE Grant had Vicksburg surrounded to be much use -- anything but a large force could be repulsed.

Yeah, I ask this question because I've heard from one or two historians that Lee should've helped with saving Vicksburg instead of invading Maryland. Of course, Historians like to act like they are military generals when they are not. :D
 
Why not just send Longstreet Corps, like Chickamauga, instead of having Lee head west? Or would it not be enough?

Longstreet being sent in support of an existing army with operational surprise against a first rate second class general (Rosecrans) is one thing. But going double the distance into a maelstrom of enemy forces led by the best commanders the North has is another.

Against Grant?

Nope.

The great strategic problem for the rebels in the Civil War was they were outnumbered more than 3-1 (22 million in the loyal states, six million "whites" in the rebel states) and every step a US soldier took south opened up more territory for recruiting, both of loyal southern whites and, after 1862, men escaping from slavery.

I would like a source for your numbers here. I am not questioning your accuracy, but rather mine.:eek: I had always been taught that the ratio was, in political military terms, for the Confederacy four million Whites, for the Union one million Southern Unionists, four million slaves, one million wartime immigrants, and twenty-one million Yankees.

That's 4 million versus 27 million:eek: Though of course many of those in the South that were pro-Union were in no position to aid the North save as spies and couriers.

Not to get deterministic about it, but sometimes, God really is on the side of the big battalions.

Ironically, the CSA tended to organize their forces in much larger formations. That is, they actually HAD the bigger battalions.:rolleyes: While the Union's method of employing smaller formations gave them greater defensive flexibility, Southern methods tended to give them much greater offensive fighting power. The downside for this meant the Union could survive defeats more easily (getting more formations out), while it meant that CSA formations could suffer much heavier casualties when things turned to poo:p

Lee was a gifted defensive commander at the army level, especially in Virginia;

Virginia, from the north, was supremely defensible. Even the British in 1812 and the ARW never considered coming at the state from that direction.

Longstreet was a solid corps commander, but neither were capable of mastering Grant et al, as was proven pretty clearly during the war.

Best,

Especially considering that ITTL Grant would be operating on the defensive.

Agree, Lee was never Grant's equal not talking superior. I also agree moving more than Longstreet's corp would doom Virginia.

Lee would never permit it, and Davis would never order it. Davis had all of two friends among Confederate flag officers. Braxton Bragg and Robert E. Lee. Most of all, Lee. Lee would accept orders from Davis, of course. But beyond a certain point, [1] Lee would demur Davis' "requests" for him to leave Virginia, with Lee's response being to propose instead new offensives in Maryland (Antietam) and Pennsylvania (Gettysburg).

1] Namely his leaving Virginia, sending out of Virginia the AoNV, or both

Essentially, just as Lee's first loyalty was to Virginia rather than the USA, so too his first concerns were always for Virginia's protection rather than the South's as a whole. He was no more a Nationalist for the Confederacy than he was for the United States.

Yep; the US had the the people, the government, and the military, to put it in Clausewitzian "holy trinity" terms; the rebels had the military, at times, but that was about it.

It is worth remembering that forces under Grant's command (largely the Army of the Tennessee, in various iterations) utterly defeated not one but three rebel armies, at Henry-Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga - that is a record that is essentially unequalled by any field army in the conflict, including the Army of Northern Virginia under Lee.

Speaking of, wouldn't the Army of Northern Virginia count as the fourth rebel army that Grant utterly defeated?

Grant was the great captain of the conflict, and, arguably, of the era (certainly the 1850s-60s), in terms of his record in the field against a first class peer opponent that did not collapse in a single campaign; the fact the US also came up with Sherman, Thomas, Meade, and Sheridan would suggest something of the resources inherent within the US military class...(setting aside Lee et al).

Best,

You forgot Grierson, McPherson, Hancock, Reynolds, Custer...

OK, forget Custer:p

Yeah, I ask this question because I've heard from one or two historians that Lee should've helped with saving Vicksburg instead of invading Maryland. Of course, Historians like to act like they are military generals when they are not. :D

Like your namesake, you understand that amateurs discuss tactics, dilettantes discuss strategy, experts discuss logistics.:cool:

When Vicksburg is clearly in serious danger, that's because it's besieged. That's too late for the Confederates to do anything to save it. The soonest Davis could decide to send Lee (and Lee won't go unless Davis orders him) is May 25 or so (a week into the siege).

It will take several weeks for the Confederacy to move Lee and a significant number of troops from Virginia to Mississippi. The move cannot be concealed, and the Union will respond by attacking in Virginia and reinforcing Grant. Lee will not have an advantage in numbers.

And Lee was no magician. Grant has only to hold his ground at Vicksburg and on the Yazoo just north. He can dig in and dare Lee to come at him.

Then there is the Battle of Chancellorsville not ending until May 7th, with the withdrawal of the last Union troops, and how the death of Stonewall Jackson had forced a reorganization of the AoNV, splitting up the divisions again to create Hill's and Ewell's Corps. Leaving 2/3rds of the army under unproven (and as the future will tell, weak commanders. Not a good situation for sending the varsity Longstreet's Corps gallivanting to the other side of the CSA in the height of the summer campaign season.

I think they're just saying that superficially because the invasion didn't work out for Lee. If he had sent any sizeable forces to assist as forces approached Vicksburg, it would quite likely have led to a Southern loss in Virginia, perhaps pushed into Petersburg defenses sooner.

In any case, those forces would need to be sent BEFORE Grant had Vicksburg surrounded to be much use -- anything but a large force could be repulsed.

Agreed. And even in the best case scenario, say political interference causing Grant to pull back from Vicksburg [2], Virginia would indeed be lost [3] ITTL [4] to a vengeful Army of the Potomac, once Hooker finally managed to get himself fired.

2] Ridiculous considering how much Lincoln trusted Grant

3] So the South manages to save her rook Mississippi only to lose their queen Virginia

4] Taken by George Meade, TTL's 18th President of the United States:cool:
 

TFSmith121

Banned
My source is basically facts rattling around in the gray matter, but:

...Speaking of, wouldn't the Army of Northern Virginia count as the fourth rebel army that Grant utterly defeated?

You forgot Grierson, McPherson, Hancock, Reynolds, Custer...

My source is basically facts rattling around in the gray matter, but the NPS totals up the loyal and border state populations as 21.5 million (including the enslaved in the border states), 5.5 million whites in the rebel states, and 3.5 million enslaved in the rebel states; I (very SWAG and ROM) usually round up for the US population and rebel "white" populations and down for the enslaved in the south, just to get to round numbers.

http://www.nps.gov/civilwar/facts.htm

npscw_facts-01.jpg


I give Meade the "ANV victor" laurels; the Army of the Potomac was his army, after all, both at Gettysburg and in the '64-65 Virginia campaign.

As far as the laundry list goes, I was limiting it to army and army group commanders who operated independently and defeated an enemy army or more in the field - Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Meade, and Sheridan get the nod, I think. McPherson and the rest were operating mostly at the corps level, or directly under an army group (Grant in Virginia, Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas) commander.

Best,
 
Nice information you posted!

I do think the numbers for the Confederacy's strength size is a bit misleading because I'm willing to bet that as the war went on, they recruited both young boys and old men to help them. I do have my doubts that the Confederacy equipping African-Americans into their army along with more Native Americans would've helped them. They still have the issue of feeding, clothing, and equipping them. All of which they struggled to do throughout the war.

http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/warfare-and-logistics/warfare/who-fought.html
 
I always wondered even without further manpower, if Pemberton adopted a more mobile defence, trying to hit Grant's attempts to land on the east bank whether he would have had more success. Alternatively had he abandoned Vicksburg and joined with Johnston, perhaps he could have caused Grant more problems. Johnston certainly had a talent for defensive maneuvers.
 

Driftless

Donor
I always wondered even without further manpower, if Pemberton adopted a more mobile defence, trying to hit Grant's attempts to land on the east bank whether he would have had more success. Alternatively had he abandoned Vicksburg and joined with Johnston, perhaps he could have caused Grant more problems. Johnston certainly had a talent for defensive maneuvers.

That may have worked better from a tactical standpoint - no small deal; but Pemberton was pressed to hold Vicksburg for strategic and political purpose. The bluffs on a big bend in the Mississippi were good defensive grounds, and surrendering control of the river was politically unsupportable.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
YAQW ... the military strength of the rebel forces at any

Nice information you posted!

I do think the numbers for the Confederacy's strength size is a bit misleading because I'm willing to bet that as the war went on, they recruited both young boys and old men to help them. I do have my doubts that the Confederacy equipping African-Americans into their army along with more Native Americans would've helped them. They still have the issue of feeding, clothing, and equipping them. All of which they struggled to do throughout the war.

http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/warfare-and-logistics/warfare/who-fought.html


YAQW ... the military strength of the rebel forces at any given point during the conflict is a term of art, because of the very "boys & old men militia" question you raise.

The rebels certainly shoved a larger percentage of the white male population into ranks than the US did, after all - which, of course, reflects the reality that the southern states were more militarized before the war (for internal security purposes, but still) than the majority of loyal states ever were, and speaks to the "one hand behind its back" concept as well.

But from the point of view of the overall military balance, the population figures - like the financial, agricultural, livestock, and industrial numbers, as well - make it clear why the rebellion was doomed.

The other interesting point that sort of gets overlooked in these sorts of discussions is the pre-war occupational/labor force differential between the US and rebel forces' manpower - having almost a quarter of one Industrial Age army be made up of men who made their living with tools and mechanical equipment vis a vis another where one-twentieth can say that is going to make an appreciable difference in the technical arms (artillery, ordnance, quartermaster, signals, etc.), much less the capabilities of the one over the other on the offensive ...

It also speaks to a larger issue, of the greater level of industrialization generally and industrial mobilization potential, as well, in the loyal states.

Best,
 

Driftless

Donor
The other interesting point that sort of gets overlooked in these sorts of discussions is the pre-war occupational/labor force differential between the US and rebel forces' manpower - having almost a quarter of one Industrial Age army be made up of men who made their living with tools and mechanical equipment vis a vis another where one-twentieth can say that is going to make an appreciable difference in the technical arms (artillery, ordnance, quartermaster, signals, etc.), much less the capabilities of the one over the other on the offensive ...

It also speaks to a larger issue, of the greater level of industrialization generally and industrial mobilization potential, as well, in the loyal states.

Best,

To that point, compare the relative sophistication, number, and administration of the Union riverine navy to the CSA; particularly with it's use during the Vicksburg campaign. Starting from scratch at the beginning of the war, both sides jury-rigged some variably effective protected gunboats, while the Union was also able to build seven purpose built & effective Ironclads in months. Part of the success with the Ironclads, was the ability to convert steamship yards to scale up for what was then "high-tech" work.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Sure; the US familiarity with, and use of, steam for

To that point, compare the relative sophistication, number, and administration of the Union riverine navy to the CSA; particularly with it's use during the Vicksburg campaign. Starting from scratch at the beginning of the war, both sides jury-rigged some variably effective protected gunboats, while the Union was also able to build seven purpose built & effective Ironclads in months. Part of the success with the Ironclads, was the ability to convert steamship yards to scale up for what was then "high-tech" work.

Sure; the US familiarity with, and use of, steam for transport - riverine, coastal, and by rail - vis a vis the rebels' (relative) inability to use steam, speaks to it as well.

There's a good point in your CWT site link about the relative rates or literacy and education between the two armies, as well, which speaks to the ability of the armies to form "technical" units, as well as the relative financial and political wealth of both sections in the antebellum era.

Free public education is a force multiplier...

Best,
 
Longstreet being sent in support of an existing army with operational surprise against a first rate second class general (Rosecrans) is one thing. But going double the distance into a maelstrom of enemy forces led by the best commanders the North has is another.

There is one offsetting point. When Longstreet and his troops were sent to Tennessee, it was just after Burnside took Knoxville and cut the railroad from Virginia to east Tennessee. This forced them to take a very circuitous route.

If they are sent to Mississippi three months earlier, they can take a direct route, and I think that the overall distance isn't much greater.

Lee would never permit it, and Davis would never order it.

In at least one private letter, Lee seems to have been resigned to going west. He wouldn't like it one bit, but he wouldn't mutiny, explicitly or implicitly.
 
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