Henry V and France

He never invades France. Perhaps he is stalled due to a major Scottish war or a rebellion in Wales. Or Charles VI is a much stronger ruler and Henry decides to stay out.
 
It would be problematic if he just stays out, even if a strong french king is in place.
Lancasters needed legitimacy, support and wealth and that could be obtained by raiding French coast (the OTL campaign of 1415 being originally that).

Practically, it means that the Caroline situation is maintained for a time, while how it evolves depends entierly on what happen in France.

If it's roughly as IOTL,
with a civil war between Bourguignons and Angevins, but that Henry decides to have a more "classical" policy on it, the focus would be maintained on Aquitaine and possibly reconquering some lost places on the Channel.

I would at least expect the reconquest of Aquitaine (without Rouergue or Limousin), and maybe Ponthieu and Western Basse Normandy in this situation, maybe less by conquest than negociation with Armagnacs.

It would be quite un-Henry V, to say the truth, but it would be the closer thing to "Henry V doesn't intervene in France".​

If the situation is better for Valois
You'd have far less incitative for doing so, that's sure. I still expect raiding in Normandy and tentatives to reconquer Aquitaine coast up to Bordeaux, but not that more.

Military skills of Henry V hide a bit his diplomatics that were quite good : what he wanted was mostly order in England and for England. The civil war in France was threatening that, and without it, he may be much more disposed to deal with these issues diplomatically (and hence, recovering partially Aquitaine*, while Channel holdings are looking more hard. Maybe some sort of domination on Brittany. Normandy being out of question.)

*During Charles' madness, the regents were actually ready to deal a peace agreement for that.

Eventually, the matter wouldn't be resolved, but more likely you'd have a lasting "war by proxy" between England and France (Scotland, Wales, Castille, Aragon, etc.) turning back after a while to the good old war between the two powers. Maybe during Henry's reign.

It's gonna be hard to avoid it outright : it's more a question about "How long without another phase in the HYW".
 
He never invades France. Perhaps he is stalled due to a major Scottish war or a rebellion in Wales. Or Charles VI is a much stronger ruler and Henry decides to stay out.

One obvious consequence is no marriage to Catherine of Valois. Since one of the theories on Henry VI's mental breakdown is that it was inherited from Charles VI of France, via Catherine, that should be avoided, derailing the Wars of the Roses.
 
Would it be that obvious? In order to cement treaties, something Henry V would have to do if he's not to intervene in France, she's perfect marriage material.
 
It would be problematic if he just stays out, even if a strong french king is in place.
Lancasters needed legitimacy, support and wealth and that could be obtained by raiding French coast (the OTL campaign of 1415 being originally that).

Practically, it means that the Caroline situation is maintained for a time, while how it evolves depends entierly on what happen in France.

If it's roughly as IOTL,
with a civil war between Bourguignons and Angevins, but that Henry decides to have a more "classical" policy on it, the focus would be maintained on Aquitaine and possibly reconquering some lost places on the Channel.

I would at least expect the reconquest of Aquitaine (without Rouergue or Limousin), and maybe Ponthieu and Western Basse Normandy in this situation, maybe less by conquest than negociation with Armagnacs.

It would be quite un-Henry V, to say the truth, but it would be the closer thing to "Henry V doesn't intervene in France".​

If the situation is better for Valois
You'd have far less incitative for doing so, that's sure. I still expect raiding in Normandy and tentatives to reconquer Aquitaine coast up to Bordeaux, but not that more.

Military skills of Henry V hide a bit his diplomatics that were quite good : what he wanted was mostly order in England and for England. The civil war in France was threatening that, and without it, he may be much more disposed to deal with these issues diplomatically (and hence, recovering partially Aquitaine*, while Channel holdings are looking more hard. Maybe some sort of domination on Brittany. Normandy being out of question.)

*During Charles' madness, the regents were actually ready to deal a peace agreement for that.

Eventually, the matter wouldn't be resolved, but more likely you'd have a lasting "war by proxy" between England and France (Scotland, Wales, Castille, Aragon, etc.) turning back after a while to the good old war between the two powers. Maybe during Henry's reign.

It's gonna be hard to avoid it outright : it's more a question about "How long without another phase in the HYW".

Why would the french kindly give back through diplomacy parts of Aquitaine it had reconquered ?

They thought they were much stronger. Which in fact they were.

The french just had one thing to do in 1415 at Azincourt : wait until dysentry ended turning Henry V' s retreat into a disaster. But since the french army was led by stupid commanders, Azincourt turned into a providentiel victory for Henry V.
 
France conquered much/most of the Austrian Netherlands and Louis XV handed it back, saying he didn't want to make peace as a merchant. France could do the same with Aquitaine.

Either way, bête comme il paix, or its 15c equivalent parlance comes into usage ahead of schedule.
 
France conquered much/most of the Austrian Netherlands and Louis XV handed it back, saying he didn't want to make peace as a merchant. France could do the same with Aquitaine.

Either way, bête comme il paix, or its 15c equivalent parlance comes into usage ahead of schedule.

No it did not. Louis XI took over the 2 Burgundies, Boulogne and Artois, but almost nothing of what was to become the austrian Netherlands. And it planned to keep it by a treaty planning the marriage of Charles VIII and Mary of Austria. The marriage was cancelled when Charles VIII decided to marry Ann of Britanny. Then, it had to give back Artois and the county of Burgundy.
 
No it did not. Louis XI took over the 2 Burgundies, Boulogne and Artois, but almost nothing of what was to become the austrian Netherlands. And it planned to keep it by a treaty planning the marriage of Charles VIII and Mary of Austria. The marriage was cancelled when Charles VIII decided to marry Ann of Britanny. Then, it had to give back Artois and the county of Burgundy.

When I said Louis XV it wasn't a typo. I was referring to the Bourbon ruler of France from 1715-1774.
 
Why would the french kindly give back through diplomacy parts of Aquitaine it had reconquered ?

Except they DID agreed to such a deal, at least twice, before 1415.

- Treaty of Eltham in 1412 between Armagnacs and Thomas of Lancaster. The latter would give men and money to the former in their struggle against Bourguignons, and he would recieve Aquitaine.
- In 1414, the newly Henry V asked for the hand of Catherine de Valois and Normandy and Aquitaine. Normandy was refused and the deal went off.

Hard cold facts are the council of regency were ready to do so in exchange of a more stable diplomatic situation, and give room for inner problem resolutions.

See, there was a civil war ongoing in France IOTL, meaning that each side was willing to give up something if it allowed it to gain the edge.

In a situation without civil war, it would be still possible, while reduced (it's why I precisely written "the band up to Bordeaux", meaning turning back to the status quo ante bellum as put up in the Treaty of Paris.
Aquitaine was notoriously pro-English at this time, and more or less hard to control in the case of a reprisal of hostilities.

Even a stronger France, without civil war, would have enough issues (with Flanders, fiscal revolts, north Germany, and possibly Italy) that giving up it in the name of a formal peace relieving efforts on the region would be certainly accepted.

But since the french army was led by stupid commanders, Azincourt turned into a providentiel victory for Henry V.
I may be old fashioned, but I think this have been a factor in the defeat of Armagnacs and Valois in 1415-1420.
Azincourt was less a problem of command : you simply didn't have a clear command to speak of, in a situation of civil war.
 
Except they DID agreed to such a deal, at least twice, before 1415.

- Treaty of Eltham in 1412 between Armagnacs and Thomas of Lancaster. The latter would give men and money to the former in their struggle against Bourguignons, and he would recieve Aquitaine.
- In 1414, the newly Henry V asked for the hand of Catherine de Valois and Normandy and Aquitaine. Normandy was refused and the deal went off.

Hard cold facts are the council of regency were ready to do so in exchange of a more stable diplomatic situation, and give room for inner problem resolutions.

See, there was a civil war ongoing in France IOTL, meaning that each side was willing to give up something if it allowed it to gain the edge.

In a situation without civil war, it would be still possible, while reduced (it's why I precisely written "the band up to Bordeaux", meaning turning back to the status quo ante bellum as put up in the Treaty of Paris.
Aquitaine was notoriously pro-English at this time, and more or less hard to control in the case of a reprisal of hostilities.

Even a stronger France, without civil war, would have enough issues (with Flanders, fiscal revolts, north Germany, and possibly Italy) that giving up it in the name of a formal peace relieving efforts on the region would be certainly accepted.


I may be old fashioned, but I think this have been a factor in the defeat of Armagnacs and Valois in 1415-1420.
Azincourt was less a problem of command : you simply didn't have a clear command to speak of, in a situation of civil war.

Indeed. I was under the impression, although I could be wrong, that as late as 1415, just before Henry left for France and when he had already had his head turned by the idea of the throne itself anyway, the Armagnacs even offered him the entire terms of the Treaty of Bretigny in order to persuade him to back out of his wooing of the Burgundians and join them - though I could be wrong about that.
 
I'm not sure about how far they were willing to go : Henry V did asked them many things that they were ready to give up, but given the common by then acceptation of Guyenne, I would tend to think it was the Treaty of Paris Guyenne, or it being expanded rather than Brétigny would it be only because they couldn't remove all of Louis (Dauphin and Duke of Guyenne) holdings like that.
(My connection is simply too shitty right now for that I can red the contemporary chronicles to check out)

For Henry V wooing Bourguignons...I'm not sure it was a thing before 1419, to be honest. Bourguignons tended to be quite anti-English at the time, and actually accused Armagnacs to supporting them either by incompetence or by complot or both (and, frankly, it wasn't entierly wrong).
I think he would have supported whatever side that would support him in return.
 
Except they DID agreed to such a deal, at least twice, before 1415.

- Treaty of Eltham in 1412 between Armagnacs and Thomas of Lancaster. The latter would give men and money to the former in their struggle against Bourguignons, and he would recieve Aquitaine.
- In 1414, the newly Henry V asked for the hand of Catherine de Valois and Normandy and Aquitaine. Normandy was refused and the deal went off.

Hard cold facts are the council of regency were ready to do so in exchange of a more stable diplomatic situation, and give room for inner problem resolutions.

See, there was a civil war ongoing in France IOTL, meaning that each side was willing to give up something if it allowed it to gain the edge.

In a situation without civil war, it would be still possible, while reduced (it's why I precisely written "the band up to Bordeaux", meaning turning back to the status quo ante bellum as put up in the Treaty of Paris.
Aquitaine was notoriously pro-English at this time, and more or less hard to control in the case of a reprisal of hostilities.

Even a stronger France, without civil war, would have enough issues (with Flanders, fiscal revolts, north Germany, and possibly Italy) that giving up it in the name of a formal peace relieving efforts on the region would be certainly accepted.


I may be old fashioned, but I think this have been a factor in the defeat of Armagnacs and Valois in 1415-1420.
Azincourt was less a problem of command : you simply didn't have a clear command to speak of, in a situation of civil war.

It was not a treaty between the kingdom of France and the kingdom of England. It was a treaty between the head of the armagnac party and the second son of Henry IV of England. It had the same value as the treaty concluded between Chatles and Navarre and Edward III or between Sertorius and Mithridates of Pontus : hardly more than virtual.
 
It was not a treaty between the kingdom of France and the kingdom of England. It was a treaty between the head of the armagnac party and the second son of Henry IV of England.
As Armagnac faction had the upper hand on french policies up to the late 1410's, and that Thomas Lancaster was just than "the second son" but one of the most important political of England AND the lieutnant (more or less governor, vice-roy, responsible) of Aquitaine : I don't see how that's relevant.

The only reason the 1412 treaty wasn't validated was a short peace being signed up between both sides

Giving we know that Bourguignons were ready to give territories in order to deal with Henry V themselves, it's not even making a point about how it was "just" Armagnacs : you're splitting hairs a bit there.

Neither France was strong as you put it, but rather in a full civil war; and both factions were very willing to give up some territories if it allowed them to get the edge on the other.
 
Sorry but you seems to miss a basic point : one must take political promises carefully.

The armagnac just wanted support to fight their civil war. There are promises which are meant never to be held. Such as : "Finally we'll give you money and that's still too much."

France was 4 to 5 times as populated as England. Even weakened by civil war, Henry V's campaign could and even should have ended by a disaster, had the french command not been so stupid. That's what I mean by France being much stronger.
 
Sorry but you seems to miss a basic point : one must take political promises carefully.

The armagnac just wanted support to fight their civil war. There are promises which are meant never to be held. Such as : "Finally we'll give you money and that's still too much."
But you don't really take them carefully, you're assuming something, that really honestly I just didn't found in contemporary sources.

(Admittedly, I didn't consult the actual articles of peace, but that would take quite a time to have them)

The main problem I've with "It was never meant to be" :
- That Thomas Clarence came, personally, to help Armagnacs besieged in Bourges.
- That some land was actually gave to Clarance in Guyenne (that is generally described to be let alone to itself, not defended) and Armagnacs/Berry described by Bourguignon as "traitors"
- That Armagnacs before the truce were in need of help, as being under heavy attack (not "just some support").
Giving their regular lack of financial ressources the "just some money" is itself something far from insignificant (as sending hostages later), but weren't much in a position to be that "smart" at this point.

The Duke of Burgundy (again, the "power behind the throne" in 1412) didn't just made peace with Berry out of kindness, but because English help and increased presence was actually a threat to him.

Giving what happened with Bourguignons after 1415, when they became once again the dominant force in Northern France, I think we can say at least one of the factions in presence was willing to make huge concessions (and Armagnacs not being exactly little saints there, I don't see why they wouldn't have).

I'll stress on this last point a bit more : being willing to give up part of the kingdoms didn't mean you were joyous or not willing to get them back later. That's basically what happened IOTL and what would happen ITTL (given that both factions based themselves on reject of English at this moment).

Without the truce of 1412 (that is, considering how Burgundy changed his mind in 1413, quite butterfliable), it's quite probable that other parts would have been gaven, as the process already began.
Basically, Burgundy takes Bourges, and by holding Berry, beheads the Armagnac faction (that never had a clear leader to begin with).
Giving that Bernard of Armagnac is the "by default" leader (depsite what the name of the faction seems to imply), that he lost an important part of the faction holdings, he's not going to be smart about it.
If renouncing to coastal Guyenne (something that is by mid-year, already done) and Perigord (critically when it gives an actual buffer region between his holdings and advancing Valois-Burgundy alliance) would be the price (even if temporary) he'd pay it.

The same way territorial renounciations were made later by France, while in a definitely better shape (by Charles VIII for exemple) in a political purpose.

I understand your caution there (after all the subject was heavily politicized, even and critically contemporary to events), but frankly, I didn't found anything that would support it.

France was 4 to 5 times as populated as England. Even weakened by civil war, Henry V's campaign could and even should have ended by a disaster,
France was so strong nobody managed to stop Thomas' campaign in France in 1412 (Boulonnais to Bordeaux) at all.
Both sides didn't even think about really fighting him (the most that was made was put new garrisons to prevent Thomas reaching further regions, while Boulonnais was in flames) but rivalized with promises, Bourguignons making arrengement firsts, then Armagnacs doubling not only on money but with territories they controlled.

had the french command not been so stupid.
And again which french command? The whole army was so divided that you could have made a patchwork out of it.

Bourguignons troops were present against the duke's wishes; Jean II le Meingre technically commanded the army but technically covers it well; Bernard of Armagnac was Constable but disregarded("All the lords wanted to be in the vanguard, against the opinion of the constable and the experienced knights."); Charles d'Albret being as well with some theorical power, but not enough support to do anything with it; and all the rest likewise.

They failed to lead an army the same way they failed to pursue negociation : because no one really commanded it, because they were divided up to an absurd point.

If something, it's another demonstration of the civil war weakened France :
the campaign of Henry V had few chances to going really bad, mostly because the 1412's prooved that there was no big resistance to meet, and because Henry could count on an actual efficient and unified command in face of a rag-tag army.

Either we consider him having some military skills and counted on that exact kind of situation (it's not like he didn't had experiance of it at this point), or we consider Henry V to be slightly less affected by the stupidity epidemics.
 
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