Napoleon does different in Spain and Russia

What is the latest Napoleon can call off the invasion of Spain?
How much would it improve his situation if he did so?

What is the latest he could call off the invasion of Russia?

Could that cost him anything like OTL did?

How do both changes effect the war with the UK?

Will Austria, Prussia, and Russia give it one more try?
 
What do you mean by calling off the invasions?

I'm pretty sure that Napoleon wanted both.

In regards to Spain, he need to completely destroy the British, Portuguese, and Spanish while also dealing with a HUGE guerilla force in the whole of Iberia. If he can stabilize Spain and Portugal, then he can focus on Russia
 
What is the latest Napoleon can call off the invasion of Spain?
How much would it improve his situation if he did so?

What is the latest he could call off the invasion of Russia?

Could that cost him anything like OTL did?

How do both changes effect the war with the UK?

Will Austria, Prussia, and Russia give it one more try?

He could call off the Spanish invasion without too much trouble. They were allied until Napoleon tried to depose the king.
 
He could call off the Spanish invasion without too much trouble. They were allied until Napoleon tried to depose the king.
Ja. Replacing an obnoxious and unhelpful ally with what turned out to be a huge bleeding ulcer was one of those things that must have seemed reasonable at the time, but ended up being totally counterproductive.
 
Napoleon could have called off the invasion of Spain at any time even after the deposition of Carlos IV, so long as they allowed (or even 'installed' Ferdinand VII) onto the throne. A withdrawal to the Ebro line after hostilities had started could also have lessened the impact that Spain was to have on the Empire.

Well Spain itself was hardly any sort of helpful addition to the French sphere of influence - it was probably better to just not invade Portugal at all - but it did tie down experienced troops and leaders which could have been used in Russia - perhaps Massena or Soult. With more forces/better leaders Napoleon could have achieved the encirclement of the Russian army at Vitebsk or Smolensk, though of course whether these victories would have led to a peace is debatable.

Napoleon chose to invade Russia - Alexander was trying to put it off for as long as possible - so he could have stopped at any time. Nobody except him (and the Poles, perhaps) was really interested in the invasion.

As for the UK... invading Spain doubtless gave them an opportunity to land a physical force in the European continent. The invasion of Russia severely shook Napoleon's empire and the British were quick to finance the Sixth Coalition, where their money was critical in pushing Austria into the war.

Austria will of course try and fight Napoleon again, though their preparations were dealt a severe blow by the premature War of the Fifth Coalition. German nationalism was on the rise in the late 1800s and probably some German revolt will cause Austria, Prussia and Russia to intervene once more. And they would probably lose to a Napoleon that has not been bled dry in Spain and Russia.
 
It strikes me that the most important question is one of psychology: Not could he have differently? but rather Would he have done differently?. I'll make the claim that the answer is no.

Napoleon I was a man of terrific ambition who, like Hitler, didn't really know how to stop while he was ahead. He could have been content to be a great general and hero of the First Republic, much-beloved by all Frenchmen. He could have been content to rule as First Consul without antagonising so many people who were inclined to support him by declaring himself Emperor of the French. He could have been content to rule Imperial France, having toppled the First Republic and re-established monarchy where it seemed impossible to do so. He could have been content to rule a Continental hegemony (I say Continental to mean the Continent, that is, mainland Europe, not including the British Isles) as its absolute leader, before the quagmires of Spain and Russia. He could have been content even to rule a much tighter hegemony (with the Continental System basically meaning that he could force states to obey his will even if it was grossly against their interests), perhaps describable as a greater French empire, if only he'd accepted that Russia wouldn't be part of it. He could have been content even to rule such a tight hegemony including much of European Russia if, during the invasion of Russia, he'd taken much of European Russia and then left it at that, rather than trying to crush the whole vast Russian Empire.

Napoleon had so many opportunities to stop. At every time he refused; he pushed onward. He only ever gave up when he had absolutely no choice but to give up. This is a trait that shows itself continually in his history; he was never content with what he had, but always pushed for more. He didn't stop while he was ahead; it simply wasn't in his nature.
 
What is the latest Napoleon can call off the invasion of Spain?
How much would it improve his situation if he did so?

What is the latest he could call off the invasion of Russia?

Could that cost him anything like OTL did?

How do both changes effect the war with the UK?

Will Austria, Prussia, and Russia give it one more try?

Well, for starters, if Napoleon, will still invade Russia whatever happens unless you change his character. Which means he aint Napoleon anymore.

To answer your question if Napoleon WI did not invade Russia, it meant that his empire can last until his death. Any coalition was no match to Napoleon and an intact Grand Armee near Napoleon's logistics base.
 
Napoleon not invading Spain is like Hitler not invading Russia. Each was completely convinced that the invasion was both necessary and a piece of cake. To change that, you have to change their perception of those places, and/or the events and cultural trends in their countries that made them think of them the way they did.

In particular Napoleon...

- Misjudged the deposition of Charles IV as a repeat of the Bastille and though that Spain was on the verge of its own path to Revolution, Terror, Directorate and Empire. He though he was actually doing Spain a favor by sparing it of that and replacing their own Bourbon with their very own Bonaparte, as if that chain of events was set in stone to happen.

- Believed that Spain had "the worst army in Europe", probably derived from the Spanish defeat in the War of the Pyrenees, where he actually took no part.

- Disregarded completely the possibility that he could find any popular opposition to his intromision in Spain, or that it would become a problem at all to his forces (peasants vs the Grande Armée, seriously?). Up to that point, wherever the French went (Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Illyria), the populace had sided with France and against their "natural" governments. French propaganda made no attempt to court the Spaniards, except for some vague religious references that were, again, based more on French stereotypes about Spain than actual Spanish sensibilities, and failed to take into account the ideological power of the Spanish priests (see point 1: he believed Spain was on its own 1789, so he assumed the Spaniards were going to revolt against the priests like the French did).

- Had this stupid idea about restoring Charlemagne's empire under his own person, which meant Catalonia (and maybe others) had to join France. It's ironic how the person credited as the introductor of nationalism to the rest of Europe disregarded completely the very existence of nationalism outside France, or the fact that it was strong enough to not be silenced by French cannons.

- Finally, Spain had been firmly puppetized through Charles IV and Godoy. He though this would continue, despite the fact that the very same event that triggered his intervention on Spain was... a revolt that deposed Charles IV and Godoy... because of their pro-French stance.
 
there's certainly a lot of merit to quitting while you're ahead, but, it's not always quite so simple. Both Portugal and Russia were thumbing their noses at Nap's complete hegemony. Portugal was small potatoes, but they refused to join the continental system. What kind of boss who needs to be feared let's a little nobody get away with that kind of insubordination? The intervention in P led directly to trouble in Spain. Spain was getting restless with the French traipsing across their country and were going to explode sooner or later. Isn't it better to take charge of the explosion rather than react to it? Russia was technically an ally, but was even worse of an ally than Spain. They did as little as possible holding up their end militarily, and even worse, dropped out of the continental system while obviously gearing up to actively oppose Nap. Is it a wiser course to take a wait and see approach to a very large country drifting back into the enemy category while it gets stronger?

So, an argument can be made that while France was indeed at the zenith, there were signs that things could start to swing the other way. So, like Hitler, Nap felt the best defense was a good offense. Unlike Hitler, Nap didn't intend to invade Russia, but merely meet on the border and knock it down a few pegs. Russia decided not to play that game and history took a different fork in the road.

Nap was obviously an ego driven, aggressive personality, and he obviously made some big miscalculations, but it doesn't automatically follow that simply quitting while ahead leads to staying ahead.

In hind sight, with plenty of signs at the time, Portugal/Spain (because I consider them both the same action) could have been dealt with differently. You still have to threaten Portugal, but you don't have to make it obvious from the start that your demands are so onerous that it's impossible to comply. From there, Spain was an obvious blunder. The King is overthrown because he's too cozy with the French, so the solution is to replace him with a French king? Yeah, that's one major bit of stupidity. Better to put Ferd on the throne, and let the anti-French king make a mess of things and then come to the rescue with Joseph. (Of course, if Lucien had been more compliant, and married the Spanish Princess/future Queen of Etruria, he'd have been in a golden spot to take the throne and possibly had a better chance of acceptance). Russia was going to have to be dealt with sooner or later. It's only with hindsight that you can see the 'retreat until you win' strategy of Russia happening.
 
Napoleon not invading Spain is like Hitler not invading Russia. Each was completely convinced that the invasion was both necessary and a piece of cake. To change that, you have to change their perception of those places, and/or the events and cultural trends in their countries that made them think of them the way they did.

In fairness to Napoleon, invading just about all of Europe had been a piece of cake up to that point. It's almost understandable that he thought invading Spain would be easy, especially when you consider the simultaneous beatdown that France had just delivered to Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
 
Thanks for the discussion, everyone, which is getting very interesting.

there's certainly a lot of merit to quitting while you're ahead, but, it's not always quite so simple.

Not always, but in Napoleon's case I think it was. Perhaps things would have gone badly for him if he'd been more cautious, but things definitely went badly for him as a direct result of his action, and it's the consistency of his responses—attack X, attack Y, attack Z, all the while trying to increase his power—that lead me to believe that his personality was such that he didn't really understand the idea of reacting to problems in any other way, in particular the idea of withdrawing. Whether or not withdrawing or simply aiming for more limited gains would at some points have been sensible (and it's a fair point that sometimes it wouldn't have been), my point is that he wasn't, as a person, capable of doing it; he always aimed for bigger and bigger gains.

Both Portugal and Russia were thumbing their noses at Nap's complete hegemony. Portugal was small potatoes, but they refused to join the continental system. What kind of boss who needs to be feared let's a little nobody get away with that kind of insubordination?

Disobedience was a direct result of Napoleon essentially trying to centralise power over the hegemony that he had created in Europe (since the Continental System applied Napoleon's policy in the states he had subjugated, in spite of their own interests that were strongly to the contrary) for his own ends (defeating the British). He wasn't content to rule that hegemony in the looser manner of before, or to be master of most of mainland Europe while the United Kingdom remained in charge of the far smaller British Isles, even though there's no way the UK could have defeated him without him antagonising the rest of Europe too. It wasn't the British threat that caused him to want to defeat the UK; it can't have been, unless he ludicrously overestimated the threat posed by the UK (and overestimating his enemies was not exactly a trait of Napoleon's); it was his ambition.

The intervention in P led directly to trouble in Spain. Spain was getting restless with the French traipsing across their country and were going to explode sooner or later. Isn't it better to take charge of the explosion rather than react to it?

I don't think that's so. The invasion of Spain turned the Spanish against him. He ought to have predicted that by what happened when foreign armies invaded newly-Revolutionary France, but, as Tocomocho so aptly pointed out, he didn't apply what he knew of French nationalism to the fact that other nations had nationalism too.

Russia was technically an ally, but was even worse of an ally than Spain. They did as little as possible holding up their end militarily, and even worse, dropped out of the continental system while obviously gearing up to actively oppose Nap. Is it a wiser course to take a wait and see approach to a very large country drifting back into the enemy category while it gets stronger?

Wiser than his OTL course of action? Yes. If Russia attacks him, he fights on his own ground, with short and defensible supply lines, and he hasn't lost all his army on a futile quest into Russia. We see his love for the strategic offensive and his inability to comprehend the huge advantage of the strategic defensive.

Also in regard to a later point of yours: I'm not saying he should necessarily have been able to foresee what would happen on the Russian campaign. But once he was marching into Russia and he saw what was happening (i.e. his army was losing more and more men for very little gain, and he was evidently not going to succeed in forcing the Imperial Russian Army to fight a battle) he had no practical excuse for not stopping. That, in my opinion, was a refusal to recognise what was happening in front of him and to consequently give up on an unattainable objective (the defeat of the Russian army and subjugation of Russia) because of his pride, and it led directly to his downfall.

So, an argument can be made that while France was indeed at the zenith, there were signs that things could start to swing the other way.

A fair point, but it was Napoleon who guaranteed his own defeat. In reacting to perceived possible threats (e.g. a war against Russia, a war against Spain) he turned those threats from possible to certain, he convinced the rest of Europe that he was an unstable warlord who couldn't be trusted to live in peace with them under any circumstances, and he also provided his enemies with the ammunition (surely useful for nationalism) that it was he who had invaded them. Maybe he would have fallen anyway if he hadn't done all this, but by doing all this he guaranteed his fall.

Nap was obviously an ego driven, aggressive personality, and he obviously made some big miscalculations, but it doesn't automatically follow that simply quitting while ahead leads to staying ahead.

You're right, that doesn't follow. But I'm not contending that it did follow. What I am contending is "he was never content with what he had, but always pushed for more. He didn't stop while he was ahead; it simply wasn't in his nature."

So I'm saying that this trait of his necessarily made him fall, not that he would necessarily have not fallen if he hadn't had this trait.
 
fair rebuttal all around.

I'm neither of one mind or another (I do tend to side with those who think it's his hubris that led him astray, but I don't think it's quite that simple). I think, though, that his general plan of actions can be defended. That his exact actions led to failure isn't in doubt (unless you disregard OTL history books). The general line of thinking, though, is defensible. absolutely nothing had gone wrong for him up to that point, except for one thing: Britain. Britain was NEVER going to back down. except for one brief moment, they never showed any sign that they were not going to back every opportunity against Nap. You simply cannot say Britain had no army, therefore no threat. They were a constant threat (they would finance anyone, anywhere, anytime, along with their naval supremecy), and would be a constant threat at any given point so long as Nap had an enemy with a breath left.
 
fair rebuttal all around.

I'm neither of one mind or another (I do tend to side with those who think it's his hubris that led him astray, but I don't think it's quite that simple).

Fair enough. I suppose that I'm somewhat cheating in that regard by unquestioningly ascribing his single most obviously flawed campaign, the poor military decision in Russia (which could alternatively be classified as a typical soldier's-conservatism, the unwillingness to believe that what had worked before wasn't going to work again), to his own inability to accept that sometimes he couldn't just win by outfighting everyone. But I think that is a fair analysis, albeit not a perfectly robust one.

I think, though, that his general plan of actions can be defended. That his exact actions led to failure isn't in doubt (unless you disregard OTL history books). The general line of thinking, though, is defensible.

Alright.

absolutely nothing had gone wrong for him up to that point, except for one thing: Britain. Britain was NEVER going to back down. except for one brief moment, they never showed any sign that they were not going to back every opportunity against Nap.

Yes. But if China or the United States had been constantly and relentlessly hostile to Napoleon at all times, what would it have meant? To demonstrate that Napoleon's thinking was correct, one must demonstrate (a) that the United Kingdom in its own right (and that's a part I'd like to stress) posed a major threat to Napoleon, and (b) that his chosen course of action was a good course of action to end the threat to him. I dispute both of these.

You simply cannot say Britain had no army, therefore no threat. They were a constant threat (they would finance anyone, anywhere, anytime, along with their naval supremecy), and would be a constant threat at any given point so long as Nap had an enemy with a breath left.

(a)

Yes, fair, but that ability was only meaningful if there were major European powers that opposed Napoleon, or else the UK could have all the money in the world but it would be useless. And if Napoleon didn't throw away his army in the blaze of glory and stupidity that he did IOTL, it couldn't be just one major European power (with the possible exception of Russia); it would take several at the same time to defeat France, if that were even possible at the time without the massive losses incurred in Russia (which is questionable). So my argument is that the UK wasn't a threat in its own right, it was a threat in that it could greatly strengthen existing anti-Napoleonic armies on the Continent… but not create them. The Cavalry of St George weren't going to charge Paris themselves.

(b)

I think that the most vulnerable part of British power wasn't the United Kingdom itself, but the connection between the UK and its intermittent Continental allies. Instead of weakening that connection, Napoleon strengthened it with the Continental System, since he proved to those states (Prussia, Austria et cetera) that even when they weren't attacking him he would still damage their interests and that he couldn't be trusted to remain a distant, non-interfering hegemon; he drove them into the UK's waiting (and money-laden) arms. So I don't think that he acted sensibly to minimise the threat of his enemies.

In my opinion, what Napoleon should have done was to not use the Continental System but instead maintain a large standing army powerful enough to threaten devastating invasion against anyone who militarily helped the UK. Even if it took another few coalitions, if Napoleon weren't being the aggressor and weren't doing anything objectionable then, I would claim, eventually the various countries like Spain and Prussia would have given up, rather than heeding the UK's endless calls for action against France that never achieved anything and always cost plenty of their lives. And in time, with such a strategy, the British people might eventually tire of funding efforts against the European Pax Napoleonica.

Of course, I don't think that Napoleon would ever have actually used such a strategy (limiting his ambition? Forgoing attacks in favour of the strategic defensive?) but oh well.
 
What if Napoleon became convinced, from the very start, that there was no way for the Continental System to work (or at most that the chance of it succeeding is too small), and that it would do more harm than good ? What would he have done differently ?

Also, given another decade or so, wouldn't have eventually managed to build a fleet outnumbering and outgunning the British one by a large margin, given that he had most of Europe at his disposal ?

Lastly, would it have made sense to break up Austria and grant independence to the Hungarians ? IMHO they would have been VERY grateful and loyal. Same with the Southern Slavic peoples and the Romanians, should they have been freed from Ottoman yoke.
 
overall, don't disagree. I think we're actually agreeing.

His overall strategy had major flaws, as proven OTL. I think each (most) step within his plan can be accepted as a plausible step, and that was my point. Ultimately, it's an iffy proposition that his strategy line of thinking would ever win, because, as I think we both agree, it was a strategy that encouraged additional opposition, so it's a never ending battle.

Nap's biggest blunders weren't Spain and Russia, they were naval and economic. He was hopelessly outmatched on the seas, but still tried to go toe to toe with the top master. Economically, he maybe had a chance, because he wasn't completely without means, but it did put too much pressure on his military hegemony. Ultimately, I think his forays outside his area of expertise doomed his military genius.
 
What if Napoleon became convinced, from the very start, that there was no way for the Continental System to work (or at most that the chance of it succeeding is too small), and that it would do more harm than good ? What would he have done differently ?

I don't know how he would be convinced to avoid such ambitious and reckless plans (given his tendencies IOTL) but if so, his empire might well survive longer. But with the tendencies of the Tsar then conflict with Russia will probably come anyway, so I'd think that Napoleon (presuming that he acts as stupidly in Russia as he did IOTL, which I think is probably fair) would fall, albeit later.

Also, given another decade or so, wouldn't have eventually managed to build a fleet outnumbering and outgunning the British one by a large margin, given that he had most of Europe at his disposal ?

I don't think he would have a decade.

Lastly, would it have made sense to break up Austria and grant independence to the Hungarians ? IMHO they would have been VERY grateful and loyal. Same with the Southern Slavic peoples and the Romanians, should they have been freed from Ottoman yoke.

Actually destroying a long-established great power would, I think, be unwise in regard to other European countries' view of him.

overall, don't disagree. I think we're actually agreeing.

Alright.

His overall strategy had major flaws, as proven OTL. I think each (most) step within his plan can be accepted as a plausible step, and that was my point. Ultimately, it's an iffy proposition that his strategy line of thinking would ever win, because, as I think we both agree, it was a strategy that encouraged additional opposition, so it's a never ending battle.

Astutely noted. Agreed.

Nap's biggest blunders weren't Spain and Russia, they were naval and economic. He was hopelessly outmatched on the seas, but still tried to go toe to toe with the top master. Economically, he maybe had a chance, because he wasn't completely without means, but it did put too much pressure on his military hegemony. Ultimately, I think his forays outside his area of expertise doomed his military genius.

A good and defensible analysis. I'd put more weight on the Russian campaign than that (though the Spanish one fits perfectly with that analysis given that Napoleon tried to estimate another people's reaction to his own actions, which was something outside his area of expertise, and got it catastrophically wrong), since he antagonised Russia but a Franco-Russian war would probably have happened anyway, but I agree with the general thrust of that argument.
 
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