AHC: Russia wins Crimean War

With a POD from 1850, make Russia win the war against the alliance and be allowed to deploy warships to the Black Sea.
 
I think the Battle of Inkerman is probably the best opportunity. The Russians had superior numbers and almost made the allies retreat.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Pretty simple - No French 2nd Empire

With a POD from 1850, make Russia win the war against the alliance and be allowed to deploy warships to the Black Sea.

Pretty simple - No French 2nd Empire, or at least a less Anglophile and interventionist one.

NIII's empire (proclaimed as such in 1852) and the French army was vital to the Allied war effort in 1854-56, both in the Black Sea and the Baltic theaters; without NIII, there would not have been an Anglo-French military alliance, and there (quite probably) would not have been a war, period, certainly not one where three European powers (France, Britain, and Sardinia) intervened on the behalf of the Turks.

Who, it must be said, had essentially already won their war in the Balkans before any British or French troops saw action in the theater, due to their own efforts and the possibility of Austrian intervention than any real threat from the French and British.

Likewise, the Russians had won in the Black Sea (at Sinope) and in eastern Anatolia (or the Turks had lost) absent any threat/assistance - real or imagined - from the British and French, although Williams' involvement at Kars certainly helped the Russians there... Absent Williams, either the Turks pull out their troops in time so they don't have to surrender their forces (the city would undoubtedly fall, as did Batumi), or they surrender anyway, at which point (given the Turkish and Austrian forces in the Balkans) an equilibrium is restored.

A British-only intervention in the Crimea would have not ended well for the British and any Turks, Sardinians, or German, Swiss, or Italian mercenaries they managed to scare up... they could have intervened to assist the Turks in the Balkans and (presumably) defend the Straits and Instanbul against any Russian naval threat, but that's about it.

A British-only intervention in the Baltic, absent the French expeditionary force, would not have even been able to occupy the Aland Islands, unless the British divert a significant portion of their Black Sea army; even though Bomarsund is about spitting distance from Sweden.

A British-only intervention is an interesting concept; presumably they split the field army in half, so that's 15,000 intially for the Straits/Balkans and 15,000 initially for the Baltic; the British can presumably take the Alands, but anywhere on the Russian/Finnish/etc coast is beyond their capabilities (as it was historically) and Somerset (Raglan), Brudenell (Cardigan), Bingham (Lucan) et al don't demonstrate their abilities; the Turks maintain their control of the Balkans, but the Russians make gains in eastern Anatolia and continue to dominate the Black Sea.

One of the interesting things that arises from this is without a Crimean campaign to inspire reform, the British Army remains essentially as it was in 1854 until - when?

Presumably, well into the second half of the Nineteenth Century, when the problems show up in the field in Africa or India or somewhere...purchase and flogging to 1900, even?

Another interesting development is that Hamilton-Gordon (Aberdeen) manages to remain in office, and Temple (Palmerston) never makes it to prime minister, in either of his (historical) terms.

Best,
 
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Pretty simple - No French 2nd Empire, or at least a less Anglophile and interventionist one.

NIII's empire (proclaimed as such in 1852) and the French army was vital to the Allied war effort in 1854-56, both in the Black Sea and the Baltic theaters; without NIII, there would not have been an Anglo-French military alliance, and there (quite probably) would not have been a war, period, certainly not one where three European powers (France, Britain, and Sardinia) intervened on the behalf of the Turks.

Who, it must be said, had essentially already won their war in the Balkans before any British or French troops saw action in the theater, due to their own efforts and the possibility of Austrian intervention than any real threat from the French and British.

Likewise, the Russians had won in the Black Sea (at Sinope) and in eastern Anatolia (or the Turks had lost) absent any threat/assistance - real or imagined - from the British and French, although Williams' involvement at Kars certainly helped the Russians there... Absent Williams, either the Turks pull out their troops in time so they don't have to surrender their forces (the city would undoubtedly fall, as did Batumi), or they surrender anyway, at which point (given the Turkish and Austrian forces in the Balkans) an equilibrium is restored.

A British-only intervention in the Crimea would have not ended well for the British and any Turks, Sardinians, or German, Swiss, or Italian mercenaries they managed to scare up... they could have intervened to assist the Turks in the Balkans and (presumably) defend the Straits and Instanbul against any Russian naval threat, but that's about it.

A British-only intervention in the Baltic, absent the French expeditionary force, would not have even been able to occupy the Aland Islands, unless the British divert a significant portion of their Black Sea army; even though Bomarsund is about spitting distance from Sweden.

A British-only intervention is an interesting concept; presumably they split the field army in half, so that's 15,000 intially for the Straits/Balkans and 15,000 initially for the Baltic; the British can presumably take the Alands, but anywhere on the Russian/Finnish/etc coast is beyond their capabilities (as it was historically) and Somerset (Raglan), Brudenell (Cardigan), Bingham (Lucan) et al don't demonstrate their abilities; the Turks maintain their control of the Balkans, but the Russians make gains in eastern Anatolia and continue to dominate the Black Sea.

One of the interesting things that arises from this is without a Crimean campaign to inspire reform, the British Army remains essentially as it was in 1854 until - when?

Presumably, well into the second half of the Nineteenth Century, when the problems show up in the field in Africa or India or somewhere...purchase and flogging to 1900, even?

Another interesting development is that Hamilton-Gordon (Aberdeen) manages to remain in office, and Temple (Palmerston) never makes it to prime minister, in either of his (historical) terms.

Best,

Without France being in, however, I don't see any casus belli. Russia was relatively happy with status quo after all. Nicholas I's policy was all about not rocking the boat of European balance of power (in which, according to the general perception before Crimea, and partly even after that, Russia was the strongest continental power) while pursuing gains whenever it was possible to get them cheaply (in diplomatic terms).
Nicholas the first was not the sort of Tsar that would have dismembered the Ottoman Empire, although he certainly sough paramount influence over it that France and Britain were not going to let pass.
The crisis IOTL broke out because of a fairly ridicolous squabble about religious rights in some very holy churches in the Holy Land, in which France sided with the Catholics and Russia with the Orthodox Church. The matter would have been immaterial in itself, of course, until it devolved into a problem of relative power within the Porte. Britain was utterly uninstered in the whole mess before Sinope, when it became a naval guns affair. I can't see Britain picking a direct fight with Russia of its own accord at this time, although they were certainly enganged in "containment" of Russia.
A conflict is possible at some slightly later point, I'd guess, but that would be a different war, possibly in some other theater (Afghanistan? That would be a nightmare for both sides; or you'd see a totally differen alignment, with Austria fighting on Britain's side - which could prompt Prussia and maybe even Sardinia into Russia's side).
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Certainly possible, but the OP asked for a "Russia wins the Crimean War"

Without France being in, however, I don't see any casus belli. Russia was relatively happy with status quo after all. Nicholas I's policy was all about not rocking the boat of European balance of power (in which, according to the general perception before Crimea, and partly even after that, Russia was the strongest continental power) while pursuing gains whenever it was possible to get them cheaply (in diplomatic terms).
Nicholas the first was not the sort of Tsar that would have dismembered the Ottoman Empire, although he certainly sough paramount influence over it that France and Britain were not going to let pass.
The crisis IOTL broke out because of a fairly ridicolous squabble about religious rights in some very holy churches in the Holy Land, in which France sided with the Catholics and Russia with the Orthodox Church. The matter would have been immaterial in itself, of course, until it devolved into a problem of relative power within the Porte. Britain was utterly uninstered in the whole mess before Sinope, when it became a naval guns affair. I can't see Britain picking a direct fight with Russia of its own accord at this time, although they were certainly enganged in "containment" of Russia.
A conflict is possible at some slightly later point, I'd guess, but that would be a different war, possibly in some other theater (Afghanistan? That would be a nightmare for both sides; or you'd see a totally differen alignment, with Austria fighting on Britain's side - which could prompt Prussia and maybe even Sardinia into Russia's side).

Certainly possible, but the OP asked for a "Russia wins the Crimean War" so presumably there's some sort of conflict in 1854-56 between Russia and the Turks that (at least) the British intervene in; otherwise, there's not much of a chance of said war.

...which is what prompted the "simplest way" response, which is the French don't get involved, and the British try and turn the Turks into the Indian Army.

Presumably, not a recipe for success.

I can see the Russians taking a run at the Balkans and Anatolia, the Turks fighting back (as historically), and the British weighing in; have a hard time seeing even London trying for Sebastopol on its own, however.

But anything's possible when a senior minister is commanding via a world map; consider Gallipoli.

Best,
 
I don't think we should so cavalierly assume that Prussia would go to war with Austria while Austria was engaged with Russia. The problem is that Prussia is always engaged in a soft power competition with Austria for influence in Germany. When Austria is engaged in a war with a non-German power, the sympathy of the smaller German states is going to be all with Austria against the foreigners. If Prussia sides with the foreigners, it's basically stabbing the leading German power in the back for its own selfish reasons, and loses support. During the OTL Crimean War, Bismarck (in Frankfurt) was able to mostly prevent the German Confederation from doing anything to help the allies, but this would have been much harder had Austria actually joined the war, and even so, Prussia's policy was, at best, very mildly helpful to Russia. During the 1859 War, Prussia came much closer to fighting it on Austria's side than on the French side. Bismarck urged the latter, but he was widely ignored because his idea was insane and terrible.
 
Also - it's certainly not true that the British weren't interested before Sinope. The course of events was that the Holy Land dispute, which France won, made Nicholas feel insecure about his power over the Sublime Porte, so he sent the Menshikov Mission to Constantinople to bully the Ottomans into basically acknowledging various insulting types of Russian supremacy. The Ottomans resisted, and got backing from the British - Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador there, was particularly important, but you also had Palmerston warmongering back in England and pushing the Aberdeen government towards war. Britain refused both to use its influence to try to force the Porte to accept a compromise settlement, and to abandon the Ottomans if they refused. If anything, by the time of Sinope they were dragging the French along with them, and not vice versa.
 
I assume a better diplomatic preparation would have helped the Russian side. After all Austrian and Russian interests are not necessarily conflicting. So if Austria is not working against russian interests (Danubian principalities) but is actively supporting it (for an "equal share" of the spoils of war) it could - probably with less than the 300.000 mobilized troops - repay russia for the 1848/49 intervention and make progress on the Balkans.
 
I don't think we should so cavalierly assume that Prussia would go to war with Austria while Austria was engaged with Russia.
We should also remember that this is the army of the Olmutz punctuation, not of the Roon reforms. At this time its first-line divisions are half regulars, half Landwehr- the same Landwehr which performed so poorly against the Hanoverian army in 1866. In 1859, Moltke pointed out, it would take six weeks to concentrate 250,000 Prussian troops on the Rhine and Main: in 1870, it takes 19 days to get the full field force there. Important not to project performance from 1864-70 back onto 1854-60.

During the OTL Crimean War, Bismarck (in Frankfurt) was able to mostly prevent the German Confederation from doing anything to help the allies, but this would have been much harder had Austria actually joined the war

It wasn't particularly easy as things stood:

On 14 January 1855, the Austrian foreign minister proposed that the German Confederation's Federal Army should be mobilised and a single commander-in-chief elected- for which role there were suggestions they would propose Emperor Franz Joseph. The Prussians announced their intention to block this, on the grounds that "we should be obliged to do violence to our own conviction before we could arrive at the conclusion that Russia will assume the offensive if she is not attacked". The Saxon states were said to be on the side of Prussia and the Hanse towns with Austria; Hanover, siding with Austria, recalled its reserves, brought their cavalry to war establishment and purchased 3,000 draught horses for the artillery and supply wagons; Wurtemberg also ordered its troops to be brought to a war footing and requested a credit of 3,000,000 florins from the chambers. At the end of January the Austrians sent General Crenneville to Paris to discuss co-operation, and at the start of February the Prussians announced their intention to bring forward a vote banning the French from moving a corps within Confederation territory.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
True enough, which makes a French non-intervention policy

Also - it's certainly not true that the British weren't interested before Sinope. The course of events was that the Holy Land dispute, which France won, made Nicholas feel insecure about his power over the Sublime Porte, so he sent the Menshikov Mission to Constantinople to bully the Ottomans into basically acknowledging various insulting types of Russian supremacy. The Ottomans resisted, and got backing from the British - Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador there, was particularly important, but you also had Palmerston warmongering back in England and pushing the Aberdeen government towards war. Britain refused both to use its influence to try to force the Porte to accept a compromise settlement, and to abandon the Ottomans if they refused. If anything, by the time of Sinope they were dragging the French along with them, and not vice versa.

True enough (although IIRC, the French declared war before the British), but it certainly makes an Anglo-Turkish alliance more challenging in the wake of a French non-intervention policy; the British have seapower, and the Turks can presumably hold their own in the Balkans while trading space for time in eastern Anatolia (more or less as they did historically) but the end result is presumably a very weak Allied expeditionary force for the Crimea (if there is one at all) which certainly sets up the possibility of the end result the OP asked for ... as opposed to variants involving hostilities by the Austrians, Prussians, Hanoverians, Wurttembergers, or whoever else...

Best,
 
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True enough (although IIRC, the French declared war before the British), but it certainly makes an Anglo-Turkish alliance more challenging in the wake of a French non-intervention policy; the British have seapower, and the Turks can presumably hold their own in the Balkans while trading space for time in eastern Anatolia (more or less as they did historically) but the end result is presumably a very weak Allied expeditionary force for the Crimea (if there is one at all) which certainly sets up the possibility of the end result the OP asked for ... as opposed to variants involving hostilities by the Austrians, Prussians, Hanoverians, Wurttembergers, or whoever else...

Best,

The question is how the war gets started if you don't have the Franco-Russian dispute over the Holy Places, I guess. If Russia'd not been embarrassed there, no Menshikov mission, and if no Menshikov mission, there's no real reason for a war.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Something equivalent to 1877 is certainly a possibility,

The question is how the war gets started if you don't have the Franco-Russian dispute over the Holy Places, I guess. If Russia'd not been embarrassed there, no Menshikov mission, and if no Menshikov mission, there's no real reason for a war.

Something roughly equivalent to 1877 is certainly a possibility, whether actual, portrayed as such, or both ... An appeal by the Wallachians et al, some sort of border incident in eastern Anatolia, or a combination of both ... The Russians were certainly capable of making some gains against the Turks in the 1850s, absent the rather unexpected Alliance between Turkey, France, and Britain.

Best,
 
Something roughly equivalent to 1877 is certainly a possibility, whether actual, portrayed as such, or both ... An appeal by the Wallachians et al, some sort of border incident in eastern Anatolia, or a combination of both ... The Russians were certainly capable of making some gains against the Turks in the 1850s, absent the rather unexpected Alliance between Turkey, France, and Britain.

Best,

But (and this addresses Richter von Manhofen's point as well), Nicholas wasn't especially interested in a war with the Ottoman Empire, and the Menshikov Mission certainly wasn't simply an attempt to gin one up. What Nicholas mostly cared about was Russian influence over the Ottoman Empire as a whole, not grabbing individual pieces of territory. Without the dispute over the Holy Places, Nicholas isn't looking for a quick prestige victory (which is what the Menshikov mission, misguided as it was, was supposed to be), and, to a lesser extent, without western support it is harder for the Ottomans to hold out.

The 1877 war is a totally different context because it came in the midst of a series of rebellions against Ottoman authority in southeastern Europe. That's not happening in 1853. And even in 1877, note how reluctant the Russians were to go to war (they were reluctant in 1828, too). I guess my feeling is that if you get the diplomatic situation more favorable to Russia, which is what's necessary for Russia to win a war, you're also making a war itself much more unlikely. So it's hard to hit the sweet spot.
 
Also - it's certainly not true that the British weren't interested before Sinope. The course of events was that the Holy Land dispute, which France won, made Nicholas feel insecure about his power over the Sublime Porte, so he sent the Menshikov Mission to Constantinople to bully the Ottomans into basically acknowledging various insulting types of Russian supremacy. The Ottomans resisted, and got backing from the British - Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador there, was particularly important, but you also had Palmerston warmongering back in England and pushing the Aberdeen government towards war. Britain refused both to use its influence to try to force the Porte to accept a compromise settlement, and to abandon the Ottomans if they refused. If anything, by the time of Sinope they were dragging the French along with them, and not vice versa.

Sorry, you are right and I oversimplified. Of course Britain was interested in the power politics within the OE since long before and DEEPLY concerned about any shift in the status quo, but I think that my basic point holds: Sinope was the red line for the British, and before that, Britain was very unlikely to get involved in any other way than diplomacy on her own accord.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Sweet spot is hard, I agree

But (and this addresses Richter von Manhofen's point as well), Nicholas wasn't especially interested in a war with the Ottoman Empire, and the Menshikov Mission certainly wasn't simply an attempt to gin one up. What Nicholas mostly cared about was Russian influence over the Ottoman Empire as a whole, not grabbing individual pieces of territory. Without the dispute over the Holy Places, Nicholas isn't looking for a quick prestige victory (which is what the Menshikov mission, misguided as it was, was supposed to be), and, to a lesser extent, without western support it is harder for the Ottomans to hold out.

The 1877 war is a totally different context because it came in the midst of a series of rebellions against Ottoman authority in southeastern Europe. That's not happening in 1853. And even in 1877, note how reluctant the Russians were to go to war (they were reluctant in 1828, too). I guess my feeling is that if you get the diplomatic situation more favorable to Russia, which is what's necessary for Russia to win a war, you're also making a war itself much more unlikely. So it's hard to hit the sweet spot.

Sweet spot is hard, I agree, but having the French stay out is at least more plausible than the Russians prevailing against the Alliance as it was historically.

Best,
 
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