A slower twilight: 14th century Byzantine empire and the Balkans

Marc · May 29, 2015

In 1293 Constantine Palaiologos, third and favorite son of Michael VIII - and easily the most competent of the latter's sons - mounts a successful coup against his then ruling older brother Andronikos II. Andronikosis is tonsured (perhaps not that unwillingly), his wife and heirs ah, deposed of.
[Now, dealing with those family members would be an amusing fancy of speculation for those who know the period].

Constantine XI, the "Purple-Born", rules until his death in 1306. The most significant consequence is his keeping Alexios Doukas Philanthropenos as commander-in-chief in Asia Minor. Philanthropenos is good, very good. Certainly capable of holding an Imperial position from say Smyrna and Philadelphia in the south to all of Bithynia; effectively aborting the Karesi beylik and seriously disrupting the progress of the Ottomans. At least until the 1320's.

I give the above date primarily because Constantine's one historically known son John Palaiologos - who in this timeline would be John V, died himself in 1326. After that, everything becomes more misty conjecture.

So, an abbreviated reign of the clearly incompetent Andronikos II. No Catalan Company disaster. No Byzantine civil war that allows the Turks into the Balkans - for a while at least.

The above is a very basic sketch of an idea. A reasonable possibility that modifies and moderates the history of southeast Europe, and more broadly the Eastern Mediterranean.

Thoughts, opinions, worth continuing to riff on?

Deleted member 67076 · May 29, 2015

Its an excellent start, but as always we must remember the empire needs to fix its financial institutions to improve its position. Andronicus II was making about 1/3 of the money the empire had pre Fourth Crusade due to all the tax exemptions and lack of commercial taxes. Therefore its imperative that Constantine fix these issues (which means bringing the nobility to heel).

As well it would do well to cement control in Greece for the addition manpower and tax base.

Halagaz · May 29, 2015

Interesting idea.

John Palaiologos died relatively young out of some disease - in a scenario which changes the outline of his life so much, he would not necessarily have to die around at the same time. Assuming he isn't taken out of the picture by violent means, John could easily stay alive into the 1340s or 1350s. The same applies to Constantine himself, he doesn't have to die in 1306.

A Byzantine Empire which avoids the civil war between the two Andronikoi would definitely be a far less unhealthy state. Avoiding the Catalan Company business is a bonus, though I don't know if Constantine would be able - or lucky - enough to avoid getting dragged into the Genoese-Venetian war as well.

Constantine XI would also have the chance to end his predecessor's unwise policy and begin peace negotiations with Serbia earlier, allowing him to get some breathing room earlier and keep a bit more of Macedonia than Andronikos II would have.

On the less good side, relations with the Golden Horde might deteriorate since I don't think Constantine would be able to make the same kind of marriage alliance with the new Khan Toqta.

Marc · May 30, 2015

Soverihn said:
Its an excellent start, but as always we must remember the empire needs to fix its financial institutions to improve its position. Andronicus II was making about 1/3 of the money the empire had pre Fourth Crusade due to all the tax exemptions and lack of commercial taxes. Therefore its imperative that Constantine fix these issues (which means bringing the nobility to heel).

As well it would do well to cement control in Greece for the addition manpower and tax base.

Well, first off you have take into consideration that the "restored" Byzantine empire, circa 1300 CE is about half the size of what it was back in 1204, even with its being able to hold onto northwest Anatolia as I postulated in my first post; and arguably they were holding the poorer half. Add the effective tax exempt status of the Venetians and Genovese who by this time control most of the mercantile trade - and no Emperor by then can afford the political and military consequences of confronting them. Throw in the steep decline of their of their most lucrative industry, silk production... I think even with tax reform, both urban and rural, it's improbable that there would any notable increase in state revenues during this autumn age.
Finally, aristocrats, almost without exception, are proudly ignorant of economics, and the Palaiologos aren't an exception...

As for the European side of the empire - even under my scenario, they'll be fortunate if they manage to hold onto Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly by the end of the 14th century and beyond.

Let's say my counter-factual is inspired by some of Dylan's lines:

Do not go gentle into that good night,
Old age should burn and rave at close of day;
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.

Though wise men at their end know dark is right,
Because their words had forked no lightning they
Do not go gentle into that good night.

Good men, the last wave by, crying how bright
Their frail deeds might have danced in a green bay,
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.

Marc · May 30, 2015

Halagaz said:
Interesting idea.

John Palaeontologis died relatively young out of some disease - in a scenario which changes the outline of his life so much, he would not necessarily have to die around at the same time. Assuming he isn't taken out of the picture by violent means, John could easily stay alive into the 1340s or 1350s. The same applies to Constantine himself, he doesn't have to die in 1306....

...On the less good side, relations with the Golden Horde might deteriorate since I don't think Constantine would be able to make the same kind of marriage alliance with the new Khan Toqta.

I'm reluctant to speculate on different life spans in alternative settings. Outside of situational deaths: murder, accident, contagious and some infectious diseases, dying is a subtle event, now and always. John Palaiologos death in 1326 could have easily been from a heart attack, a stroke, a pulmonary embolism, cancer. All the untreatable illness back then that kept life expectancy even for adults fairly low.

Don't know you're aware of it, but there's a very useful actuarial table for earlier eras:
"Frier's Life Table for the Roman Empire"
Bruce Frier's work on this table is considered one of the very best demographic tools available to classical scholars. My take is that his estimates would apply pretty much right up into the 18th century.
(Readily found online, well worth bookmarking for those who like that kind of detail in their speculations.)

Using Frier's numbers for John, men of his age (at real death) had a projected average expectancy of 56, with a roughly 17% chance of not surviving 35. So, for literary sake if nothing else, I suppose we could have him live into 1340's. And using the same table, his father Constantine XI making it in to the 1320's. But that they didn't, strongly suggests that they both were of the less healthy of their respective age groups.

About the Golden Horde: Haven't thought much about what impact they could have had on the Byzantines during the 14th century. My broad sense is that they were far more interested in crushing the Russian princes, and violently bickering with their cousins, the Il-khanate.
However that does bring up the question of daughters. Contantine was married to Irene Palaiologina Raoulaina: basically faceless, as most women were, even one from two important families. Only one son is mentioned, John. Daughters are quite possible (again, faceless females), even surviving ones - even among the elite, you tried for large families. So, if needed, conjecture can easily provide a few treaty and embassy daughters.

Deleted member 67076 · May 30, 2015

Marc said:
Well, first off you have take into consideration that the "restored" Byzantine empire, circa 1300 CE is about half the size of what it was back in 1204, even with its being able to hold onto northwest Anatolia as I postulated in my first post; and arguably they were holding the poorer half. Add the effective tax exempt status of the Venetians and Genovese who by this time control most of the mercantile trade - and no Emperor by then can afford the political and military consequences of confronting them. Throw in the steep decline of their of their most lucrative industry, silk production... I think even with tax reform, both urban and rural, it's improbable that there would any notable increase in state revenues during this autumn age.
Finally, aristocrats, almost without exception, are proudly ignorant of economics, and the Palaiologos aren't an exception...

The thing is it would be prudent of the Imperials to reduce tax exemptions of many of their landowners as that's a huge source of income that's just not being tapped and provides multiple benefits to the emperor: Not only is income increased, but it also keeps the Dynatoi from having less and less resources to use (which in and of itself is another pillar to keep the empire stronger), it allows for an easier time centralizing and increases popularity amongst the lower and urban classes of the empire as they don't get their taxes raised, keeping them in perpetual poverty. As well, smaller latifundia means there's more pronoia to go around, which makes the army stronger.

Also, the lack of increasing taxes amongst the urban classes will help in keeping the manufacturing base of the empire recovering as most of the people who paid taxes to use the additional income to invest in their businesses.

As for Genoa and Venice, dealing with them is a matter of building up a navy and laying low until war breaks out between the two merchant republics (which it will). Once that happens, the imperials just need to pick a side and help cripple a Merchant republic. In the ensuing peace, their tax exemptions can be nullified, they can be barred from Black Sea trade, their naval size restricted and so on and so forth.

All these things together are going to start a feedback loop that ends with the state finances increasing.

As for the European side of the empire - even under my scenario, they'll be fortunate if they manage to hold onto Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly by the end of the 14th century and beyond.

Eh, Im a bit more optimistic. The Serbs rise to power wasn't guaranteed (not once the Hungarians get a French King and he drastically reforming the state) and the Bulgarians were undergoing similar decentralization problems as the Romans were. And then this is the time period that the Neapolitians finally got tired of raiding Greece.

Play the cards right, avoid civil wars and the state will be able to keep its European holdings.

Zlorfik · May 30, 2015

Interesting choice of date.
The fertile plains of western anatolia will be absolutely vital

Marc · Jun 2, 2015

Looking at the mosaic.

Rather than a linear narrative and chronology, I'm going to try to explore this idea more topically, in segments.

Assuming that Constantine XI is successful in his coup against his older brother in 1292/3, without an immediate civil war, what changes in Western Anatolia from the ascension of Constantine to the death of John V in 1326 - that ends up changing a great deal of the history of Southeast Europe?
(Note that I am going with the least change, most plausible directions as I can - such as not changing the "natural" death dates of important figures.)

As I stated earlier, I think it's very probable that Constantine XI has his kinsman, Alexios Philanthropenos, stay as commander-in-chief in Asia Minor.

To quote an abstract from a paper on him:

The campaign of Alexios Philanthropenos in Asia Minor, and his subsequent rebellion and punishment were among the most dramatic events in the Byzantine Empire in the 1290S. When first he assumed the responsibilities of a general and doux of the Thrakesion theme, Alexios was the great hope of the Emperor, Andronikos II, and of the population of Asia Minor. With his army, the general soon achieved spectacular victories in the Maeander valley. The Turks of the area were defeated, the Greek population took heart, deserted cities and villages were repopulated; he was able to send back to Constantinople the spoils of war, gold and silver and corn, and many captives. Large numbers of Turks, pressed on the other side by the Mongols, preferred to join Philanthropenos' army, and came to form a substantial part of it. To his own followers he gave a considerable portion of the spoils, and this too spurred them on to greater victories. The local population, having at last found a defender, joined him and gave him their loyalty. At Constantinople, the Emperor and Philanthropenos' friends rejoiced at the success of the young and brilliant general.

Of course it doesn't end well. Nothing did during the reign of Andronikos II. In 1295 Philanthropenos launches a reluctant rebellion, gets betrayed, blinded and vanishes for 30 years (likely spent on one of his relation's estates). Only to be recalled by a desperate Andronikos to try and save the fragments of what was left in Anatolia. He actually attempted his best, and did decently; a Belisarius of his age (called that by a contemporary in fact).

So, Constantine, not being - by any slim account - anything the fool his brother was, keeps Alexios Philanthropenos as his loyal bulwark in Asia Minor.
However, over the next 30 years, Philanthropenos is more likely to play the role of Lee in Northern Virgina in 1864 than anything else. The fundamental problem is limited military and economic resources with continual pressure all along a front from Bithynia to the east of Constanipole, down to Lycia, the southwest corner of Anatolia. And that pressure is coming from a different, more tenacious foe than the Seljuk Turks that the Byzantines had finally established a rough balance of power with. The Turkmens, or turcomens (term used even at that time by both Seljuk and Byzantine), were fresher off the steppes of Central Asia, more ardent, still very nomadic, more "total-war", and coming into western Anatolia in wave after wave, from individual ghazi fighters to small bands, to entire tribes, decade, after decade.

The geography, demographics, local economies, are why I suggested my first premise: Give up the southwest (removing and resettling as much of the Greek population as possible - a practice started with Alexius Comnenus) - hold tight to the central Aegean coast and the province of Bithynia, so close to the City.

What of the Ottomans? That is for another post.

I hope you all don't find this too granular and low key.

Fredrick II Barbarossa · Jun 2, 2015

Prety good but what will help more is a byzantine focus east. Otl they were too focused on Serbia an Bulgaria. Rather what they should have done and I hope in your tl contantine does is focus their resources and troops into the east and set up a defensive position in the west. Byzantium in 1290 was salvageable. Avoiding the civil wars helps but you need to also shift the byzantine mentality.

After all Anatolia was the reason why the Byzantines lasted as long as they did as at worst a regional power. Also Soverihn makes good points about the adminstrative and taxations structure of late byzantium herein vast amounts of capital was accumilated by a few great families with the peasantry living under crushing poverty and paying high taxes. Otl Byzantium post Michael Paleologos had options to only focus their resources in either the direction of the west or east but not both. because they focused on both fronts they got screwed. Thus Byzantium should either a)Stay defensive in the balkans and interfere little in western affairs and focus everything on and seek aid to drive the Turks from Anatolia(Especially central Anatolia).
or b)Abandon Anatolia altogether and focus all resources on reconquering the Balkans and creating a state encompassing Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, and Albania. Oh and playing off the turkish emirs against one another preventing any one group to dominate. Plus Byzantium should not in either scenario pick a side in the inevitable genoese-venetian wars.

Al B. Short · Jun 2, 2015

very interesting so far...keep going. Oh and if the Palaiologos family makes an alliance with a western power could they get rid of Venice like the time when Louis I of Hungary defeated them in 1357? That could help them regain trade, at least in the Aegean to a certain extent. It would help the economy. Oh and the power of the high nobility (those few richest families) need to be reduced and the peasantry's position improved to have a better economy in the Empire.

Marc · Jun 3, 2015

...I don't know if Constantine would be able - or lucky - enough to avoid getting dragged into the Genoese-Venetian war as well.

...Plus Byzantium should not in either scenario pick a side in the inevitable genoese-venetian wars.

...As for Genoa and Venice, dealing with them is a matter of building up a navy and laying low until war breaks out between the two merchant republics (which it will). Once that happens, the imperials just need to pick a side and help cripple a Merchant republic. In the ensuing peace, their tax exemptions can be nullified, they can be barred from Black Sea trade, their naval size restricted and so on and so forth.

As quoted above, several of you commented on the Genoa & Venice problem for the Byzantines. First some real history as to events that did occur during my suggestive reigns of Constantine XI and John V, circa 1293-1326.

War between the two Italian Maritime states breaks out just as Constantine XI takes power (counter-factual). Sometimes called the War of Curzola after its last major battle. (a massive, if ultimately inconsequential, Genoa victory.) It started in 1294 and ran till 1299. In 1296, Venetian naval forces in the course of their campaign against Genoese possessions, attacks and wrecks Galata - the Genoese "factory town" right across from Constantinople. And, since they were already there, they decided to attack the City. Which to be expected failed, but they did raid the suburbs at will - and they were mostly trying to make a point.

In response, Andronikos II arrested a number of Venetian residents, and then the local Genoese attacked and tried to kill as many Venetians as they still can find. Venice holds Andronikos responsible even though they had very flagrantly broken a 12 year truce with the Empire by that assault on the Constantinople, and a small but ugly war breaks out that lasts until 1302. the Empire does not fare well (and Genoa is indifferent)...

But the key thing to consider, is that the Byzantines still hated the Venetians for their role in the desolation of the 4th Crusade. There are some events you don't forgive or forget, ever.

So, replace Andronikos II with his brother Constantine XI, and it probably doesn't matter. Whoever is wearing the red buskins is going to face a unavoidable conflict.

However, the rebuilding the fleet that Andronikos dismantled might become a more urgent priority for Constantine, one that he and his son might carry out. Even a few squadrons would make a difference over the next decades.

Marc · Jun 5, 2015

What happens to the Ottomans?

The above map nicely shows what happened historically.

Legend and some history suggests that Osman might have a been a recent convert to Islam (one of the footnotes of history, the Turkmen tribes that poured into Anatolia in the 13th-14th century did almost literally come straight off the Central Asian steppes, many were either still pagan, or half-pagan). Which explains in part his concentration on attacking the Byzantines instead of his neighboring beyliks - unlike most of the small emirates being established in the breakdown of the Seljuk Sultanate.
The other being practical, the Byzantines were easier to hit, and success against them would draw more and more immigrating warrior clans; we know that he increased his army by at least 5 fold, from 800 to 4000, during the 1290's.

However, in this counter-factual, Osman is facing a top-tier general, who is able to raise a decent, if very heterogeneous, army, and backed by a competent Emperor.
I don't see the Osmanlis being obliterated; they aren't a high priority for the Byzantines compared to the various armies thrown at them by the Karesi and Germiyan
Still, to quote a great Jim Steinman song, Osman goes nowhere fast.

I can reasonably see Osman taking the territory to the east of the land he inherited - to all intents, they were lost to the empire anyway. If the Karesi are crushed as I think they would be (their leader, their Bey got lucky in real history), some of their people and territory. And, in a nice twist to history, how about taking Seljuk Ankara, instead of Byzantine Bursa on his death bed?

The key is that Osman won't be leaving a state that is poised to pour in the Balkans in the 14th century, and that makes all the difference...

Avrorrange · Jun 5, 2015

So the ERE still loses the rest of Anatolia and gets destroyed eventually,but much slower?

B-29_Bomber · Jun 5, 2015

darthfanta said:
So the ERE still loses the rest of Anatolia and gets destroyed eventually,but much slower?

Honestly if the Romans can avoid the 1341 civil war their fall would be far from inevitable.

The Turks were able to get a foothold in the Balkans because of an earthquake in Gallipoli, which led to the Romans to abandon the area due to lack of funds.

Marc · Jun 6, 2015

So the ERE still loses the rest of Anatolia and gets destroyed eventually,but much slower?

The title of this thread is a "A slower twilight..."

If there really is such a thing, the 14th century is one of pivot points in Europe/Mediterranean history; how Byzantine civilization essentially collapsed is an important part of it. A "better" denouement, the outcome of a complex series of events, even if as leads to the end of a civilization as they knew and we knew it, is something that I think can possibly enlighten us, as well as entertain.
By and bye, I would say that that I've been most influenced by Fernand Braudel when it comes to looking at history.

honestly if the Romans can avoid the 1341 civil war their fall would be far from inevitable.

The Turks were able to get a foothold in the Balkans because of an earthquake in Gallipoli, which led to the Romans to abandon the area due to lack of funds.

I think survival is very dicey, but yes, not inevitable. However in what form the Byzantines survive (yes, fully aware of their self-perception, and the artificiality of Byzantine, but I argue for familarity and simplicity), can vary quite a bit regardless - there is the United Kingdom of 2015, and the Great Britain of 1900...

The Turkmen, particularly Osman and his heirs, apparently always wanted to get into the Balkans. It was just a matter of opportunity . The whys are obvious: the Balkans were comparatively wealthy, of course very infidel, and fairly vulnerable - in other words, far more attractive on a number of levels than trying to beat up on your neighbors in Anatolia.
The question I am posing in this counter-factual, is when, where, who and how successful they might be.

A question: Why were the Ottomans so successful in the battles that counted in the Balkans? They did lose a number of clashes, but seemed to always win the ones that determined the fate of nations...

Fredrick II Barbarossa · Jun 6, 2015

Marc said:
So the ERE still loses the rest of Anatolia and gets destroyed eventually,but much slower?

The question I am posing in this counter-factual, is when, where, who and how successful they might be.

A question: Why were the Ottomans so successful in the battles that counted in the Balkans? They did lose a number of clashes, but seemed to always win the ones that determined the fate of nations...

The Otto's were successful because the majority of the peaseantry in the balkans prefffered the turkish turban to the assholish tax collectors of the Paleologian, Latin, and Balkan states. Essentially crushing tax burdens coupled with disunity and incompetency and disintegration of central authority were what allowed the Ottomans to win so many victories. It also helped that most crusaders aside from the Hungarian forces were incompetant.

Wealtha ccumulation among a few great famileis was already mentioned and to fund the families lifestyles lots of taxes were taken from the peaseant not to mention bribery and corruption at all levels lead to tax collectors basically exhorting tons of hard earned coined from the common man. Of course they would be pissed. Not to mention the Byzantines were making overtures tot he hated popes and I am certain many in the Balkans who had a negative experience of the westerners felt a sense of Betrayal.

In terms of crusaders well at Nicopolis, the battle was a close run thing but because the Burgundian knights got overzealous and hasty, they charged stupidly into turkish lines and were slaughtered and once they were destroyed the Allied forces had no choice but to turn back. Or in the case of Serbia, once Dusan died, his administrators declared independence and fought amongst each other and Bulgaria... well Bulgaria was the only Balkan nation at the time in a worse state than Byzantium...

As for Byzantines crushing tax burdens, theological controversies, civil wars, and mismanagement screwed them up.

Halagaz · Jun 6, 2015

Marc said:
A question: Why were the Ottomans so successful in the battles that counted in the Balkans? They did lose a number of clashes, but seemed to always win the ones that determined the fate of nations...

A combination of skill and sheer dumb luck. By sheer dumb luck, all three of the major Balkan states - Byzantium, Bulgaria and Serbia - underwent an extreme decentralization and basically fell apart on their own just as the Ottomans were entering the region. The Ottomans then didn't find it too hard to pick them off one by one - skillfully manipulating the greed and mutual hostility of certain Christian rulers to fragment the opposition even further. By the time the Balkan lords realized what was going on and got their act together, most of the region had been conquered or made vassals. At that point, Hungary itself was threatened, but not so threatened that it did not find time for a civil war, or three...and so on.

Life under the Ottoman Empire was not better for the average peasant (especially as the Ottomans tended to copy all the taxes of the preceding Christian states, not abolish them), but it did employ an effective combination of relative tolerance and brutality which made sure people wouldn't rebel so often.

Marc · Jun 7, 2015

Before visiting the issues about the health of the Byzantine economy, and its possible reform under my alternate Constantine XI and his son John V, I'd like to talk a little about one clear divergence in the early 1300's that occurs with a much more stalwart and successful defense against the Turkmen in Asia Minor.

In 1302, Andronikos II Palaiologos hired the Catalan Company, raised and commanded by one of the most notable leaders of the time, Roger de Flor,* to try to stem the disaster happening in Anatolia, principally at that point by the Osmanlis.
The Catalan Company wasn't just a bunch of Iberian mercenaries. They were 4000-8000 strong, plus some thousands more of support personal; think a decent sized medieval army; probably as large or larger than any forces the Byzantines could put into the field at that time. The warriors were predominately Almogavars, professional shock troops, perhaps the best infantry of their era, devastatingly lethal against the generally mediocre foot troops raised by most in the 14th century, and very effective against either the heavily armored cavalry of the West, or the light horse of the East.
And, they were classic mercenaries: purely fighting for money, utterly ruthless, and very, very hard on civilians.

In real history, they rain havoc on the Turks, and thoroughly ravish the countryside of Western Anatolia. Andronikos commits the cardinal sin of not paying them, and it ends up with Roger de Flor being assassinated (there is some speculation that the Genoese had a hand it, they preferred having the Byzantines stay weak).
The follow up is called the the Catalan Revenge between 1305-1307. Basically they destroy every military unit that opposes them and then they work on civilian extermination.

Finally about half of them go down to the Duchy of Athens, annihilate the French ruler and his nobility. Take the spoils, settle down, and let the King of Aragon know that he now has a new possession.

However, with much more successful defense in Anatolia, Constantine isn't very likely to hire Roger de Flor.

I can come up with four plausible alternative vectors:

1. They scatter and fade into history. Occam's razor, simplest expostulation. Roger de Flor has a colorful career of no consequence.
2. Frederick III of Sicily, son of Peter, King of Aragon, throws them against the Hafsids of Ifriqiya, i.e. the rulers of modern Tunisia and part of the Libya coast. They either succeed, for a while at least - making this Frederick a much bigger deal, and changing the history of Maghreb Africa - or they fail, and see #1
3. They conquer Rhodes, and perhaps part of the adjoining coast. In real history, Rhodes is technically part of the Byzantine Empire, but barely. In 1305 they hand it off to Andrea Morisco, a Genoese privateer (who ironically has his own story with the Catalans). In 1302 Rhodes would be very tempting for Roger et al. And that of course splinters the history of the Knights Hospitaller.
4. They have fun in Greece. The Duchy of Athens, the Principality of Achaia, the Byzantine holding of Morea. French and Greeks to fight and slaughter, and then rape, loot, and pillage some ripe territories. The Aragonese Empire ends up controlling southern Greece...

Feel free to vote for your favorite. In any of those cases, save for #4. The Byzantine empire ends up even better, than just not hiring these people to begin.

*Pedantic footnote: why his name is most popularly given in French, since he was German/Italian and famously led a Spanish speaking command is beyond me..

Marc · Jun 9, 2015

Fredrick II Barbarossa said:
The Otto's were successful because the majority of the peasantry in the Balkans preferred the Turkish turban to the assholish tax collectors of the Paleologian, Latin, and Balkan states. Essentially crushing tax burdens coupled with disunity and incompetency and disintegration of central authority were what allowed the Ottomans to win so many victories. It also helped that most crusaders aside from the Hungarian forces were incompetent.

This I am skeptical of - what you're suggesting about the willingness of the peasantry to switch loyalties may actually be more reflective of what happened in Anatolia during the 13th and 14th centuries than in the Balkans of the same time. Regardless, what I was specifically thinking of is how battlefield successful the Ottomans were - when it truly mattered.

Some major examples: The battle of Varna. A mixed "crusading" army of Poles, Wallachians, Hungarians, Croatians, Bulgarians, plus some other contingents
is massively defeated by the Ottomans in 1444. The latter have the numbers, true, but the crusaders do have a tremendous amount of medieval firepower.
My take, is that the crusaders were largely out generaled, and outfought. The result is that its the effective end of any Western help against the Turks in the Balkans.

The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 between the Serbians and the Ottomans. If the accounts are right, huge, huge causalities on both side. It might have been a really Pyrrhic victory for the Ottomans, their losses were that bad, save that the Serbs were essentially wiped out, and their wasn't any major other state ready to take over the war. The Turks could have lost, but they won - as they seem so often to, when it really counted.

I'm far from being a determinist about history, but you all would have to give me really strong argument about how to militarily stop the Ottomans once they are firmly established in the Balkans.

Fredrick II Barbarossa · Jun 9, 2015

Marc said:
This I am skeptical of - what you're suggesting about the willingness of the peasantry to switch loyalties may actually be more reflective of what happened in Anatolia during the 13th and 14th centuries than in the Balkans of the same time. Regardless what I was specifically thinking of is how battlefield successful the Ottomans were - when it truly mattered.

Some major examples: The battle of Varna. A mixed "crusading" army of Polish, Wallachians, Hungarian, Croatian, Bulgarians, plus some other contingents
is massively defeated by the Ottomans in 1444. The latter have the numbers, true, but the crusaders do have a tremendous amount of medieval firepower.
My take, is that the crusaders were largely out generaled, and outfought. The result is that its the effective end of any Western help against the Turks in the Balkans.

The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 between the Serbians and the Ottomans. If the accounts are right, huge, huge causalities on both side. It might have been a really Pyrrhic victory for the Ottomans, their losses were that bad, save that the Serbs were essentially wiped out, and their wasn't any major other state ready to take over the war. The Turks could have lost, but they won - as they seem so often to, when it really counted.

I'm far from being a determinist about history, but you all would have to give me really strong argument about how to militarily stop the Ottomans once they are firmly established in the Balkans.

I agree on Varna though in that case had the Polish King not died perhaps the Crusaders could have won.

The easiest way would be I guess at Nicopolis the Burgunndian knights do not charge recklessl and use common sense and the TUrks can be beatean. At least according to my lecturer(Note he didnt say the crusaders could win just that the tide of the battle turned when the Burundians launched a frontal assault and were decimated.)

A slower twilight: 14th century Byzantine empire and the Balkans

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