Thanks for the good, valuable ORBAT info
I am a little frustrated with the obsessive, almost monomaniacal, focus on the Taiwan, Indochina, generally South China Sea avenue of approach for nnaval forces and troop convoys and ground-based air support, as if it is the only option. It's not.
You make these statements about geographical/operational constraints without even quoting paragraphs 3,4,5 and 6 of the first post in the thread, even for rebuttal purposes, even though they were written to preemptively address objections/complaints such as yours. Were they TLDR for you? Are you just headline reader/reactors, not post/content readers? I read stuff before I start making arguments.
Do you think the Mandated islands Japan owned from WWI through the entire interwar era, especially the Palau islands in their southwestern portion, did not exist, or somehow could not stage air or naval forces for operations further afield?
Are you saying the lines illustrated on these maps from the OTL WWII Japanese "centrifugal offensive" in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific are lying, deceptive, misleading?
en.wikipedia.org
With reference to the third map in particular, and Japan's ability to move on the DEI being hamstrung by not having Davao in the Philippines in 1936 (unlike 1942), guess where the Japanese force that took Davao from the American/Filipino forces after Dec. 8, 1941 came from?
The Palau (Pelelieu, Koror, Anguar) an island group the Japanese had owned since 1914. Forces from here also assaulted Legazpi in southeastern Luzon. Both the Davao and Legazpi operations (and early operations from the Carolines in OTL against Australian owned Bismarcks and New Guinea) were conducted at ranges easily reaching several eastern islands of the Dutch East Indies.